

**IN THE MATTER OF AN INDEPENDENT REVIEW PROCESS BEFORE THE
INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION**

DONUTS INC.)	ICDR Case No. _____
)	
Claimant,)	
)	
v.)	
)	
INTERNET CORPORATION FOR ASSIGNED NAMES AND NUMBERS,)	
)	
Respondent.)	
_____)	

**APPENDIX OF APPLICABLE AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF
DONUTS' REQUEST FOR INDEPENDENT REVIEW
RE NEW gTLD APPLICATIONS
FOR .SPORTS, .SKI and .RUGBY**

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<http://newgtlddisputes.com>

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APPENDIX OF APPLICABLE AUTHORITIES

<u>Tab</u>	<u>Description</u>
A	ICANN Bylaws (current), as amended February 7, 2014
B	ICANN Articles of Incorporation (current), as revised November 21, 1998
C	New gTLD Applicant Guidebook
D	ICANN-U.S. Department of Commerce Affirmation of Commitments, Sept. 30, 2009
E	<i>ICM Registry, LLC v. ICANN</i> , ICDR Case No. 50-117-T-00224-08 (Feb. 19, 2010)
F	ICANN Bylaws (archive), as amended September 30, 2009
G	<i>DotConnectAfrica Trust v. ICANN</i> , ICDR Case No. 50-2013-001083 (Aug. 14, 2014)
H	ICANN Cooperative Engagement Process description

DATED: October 8, 2014

THE IP and TECHNOLOGY LEGAL GROUP, P.C.

By: /kan/

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APPENDIX A

Translations Français Español العربية

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BYLAWS FOR INTERNET CORPORATION FOR ASSIGNED NAMES AND NUMBERS | A California Nonprofit Public-Benefit Corporation

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As amended 30 July 2014

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2. Respecting the creativity, innovation, and flow of information made possible by the Internet by limiting ICANN's activities to those matters within ICANN's mission requiring or significantly benefiting from global coordination.
3. To the extent feasible and appropriate, delegating coordination functions to or recognizing the policy role of other responsible entities that reflect the interests of affected parties.
4. Seeking and supporting broad, informed participation reflecting the functional, geographic, and cultural diversity of the Internet at all levels of policy development and decision-making.
5. Where feasible and appropriate, depending on market mechanisms to promote and sustain a competitive environment.
6. Introducing and promoting competition in the registration of domain names where practicable and beneficial in the public interest.
7. Employing open and transparent policy development mechanisms that (i) promote well-informed decisions based on expert advice, and (ii) ensure that those entities most affected can assist in the policy development process.
8. Making decisions by applying documented policies neutrally and objectively, with integrity and fairness.
9. Acting with a speed that is responsive to the needs of the Internet while, as part of the decision-making process, obtaining informed input from those entities most affected.
10. Remaining accountable to the Internet community through mechanisms that enhance ICANN's effectiveness.
11. While remaining rooted in the private sector, recognizing that governments and public authorities are responsible for public policy and duly taking into account governments' or public authorities' recommendations.

These core values are deliberately expressed in very general terms, so that they may provide useful and relevant guidance in the broadest possible range of circumstances. Because they are not narrowly prescriptive, the specific way in which they apply, individually and

collectively, to each new situation will necessarily depend on many factors that cannot be fully anticipated or enumerated; and because they are statements of principle rather than practice, situations will inevitably arise in which perfect fidelity to all eleven core values simultaneously is not possible. Any ICANN body making a recommendation or decision shall exercise its judgment to determine which core values are most relevant and how they apply to the specific circumstances of the case at hand, and to determine, if necessary, an appropriate and defensible balance among competing values.

ARTICLE II: POWERS

Section 1. GENERAL POWERS

Except as otherwise provided in the Articles of Incorporation or these Bylaws, the powers of ICANN shall be exercised by, and its property controlled and its business and affairs conducted by or under the direction of, the Board. With respect to any matters that would fall within the provisions of [Article III, Section 6](#), the Board may act only by a majority vote of all members of the Board. In all other matters, except as otherwise provided in these Bylaws or by law, the Board may act by majority vote of those present at any annual, regular, or special meeting of the Board. Any references in these Bylaws to a vote of the Board shall mean the vote of only those members present at the meeting where a quorum is present unless otherwise specifically provided in these Bylaws by reference to "all of the members of the Board."

Section 2. RESTRICTIONS

ICANN shall not act as a Domain Name System Registry or Registrar or Internet Protocol Address Registry in competition with entities affected by the policies of ICANN. Nothing in this Section is intended to prevent ICANN from taking whatever steps are necessary to protect the operational stability of the Internet in the event of financial failure of a Registry or Registrar or other emergency.

Section 3. NON-DISCRIMINATORY TREATMENT

ICANN shall not apply its standards, policies, procedures, or practices inequitably or single out any particular party for disparate treatment unless justified by substantial and reasonable cause, such as the promotion of effective competition.

ARTICLE III: TRANSPARENCY

Section 1. PURPOSE

ICANN and its constituent bodies shall operate to the maximum extent feasible in an open and transparent manner and consistent with procedures designed to ensure fairness.

Section 2. WEBSITE

ICANN shall maintain a publicly-accessible Internet World Wide Web site (the "Website"), which may include, among other things, (i) a calendar of scheduled meetings of the Board, Supporting Organizations, and Advisory Committees; (ii) a docket of all pending policy development matters, including their schedule and current status; (iii) specific meeting notices and agendas as described below; (iv) information on ICANN's budget, annual audit, financial contributors and the amount of their contributions, and related matters; (v) information about the availability of accountability mechanisms, including reconsideration, independent review, and Ombudsman activities, as well as information about the outcome of specific requests and complaints invoking these mechanisms; (vi) announcements about ICANN activities of interest to significant segments of the ICANN community; (vii) comments received from the community on policies being developed and other matters; (viii) information about ICANN's physical meetings and public forums; and (ix) other information of interest to the ICANN community.

Section 3. MANAGER OF PUBLIC PARTICIPATION

There shall be a staff position designated as Manager of Public Participation, or such other title as shall be determined by the President, that shall be responsible, under the direction of the President, for coordinating the various aspects of public participation in ICANN, including the Website and various other means of communicating with and receiving input from the general community of Internet users.

Section 4. MEETING NOTICES AND AGENDAS

At least seven days in advance of each Board meeting (or if not practicable, as far in advance as is practicable), a notice of such meeting and, to the extent known, an agenda for the meeting shall be posted.

Section 5. MINUTES AND PRELIMINARY REPORTS

1. All minutes of meetings of the Board and Supporting Organizations (and any councils thereof) shall be approved promptly by the originating body and provided to the ICANN Secretary for posting on the Website.

2. No later than 11:59 p.m. on the second business days after the conclusion of each meeting (as calculated by local time at the location of ICANN's principal office), any resolutions passed by the Board of Directors at that meeting shall be made publicly available on the Website; provided, however, that any actions relating to personnel or employment matters, legal matters (to the extent the Board determines it is necessary or appropriate to protect the interests of ICANN), matters that ICANN is prohibited by law or contract from disclosing publicly, and other matters that the Board determines, by a three-quarters (3/4) vote of Directors present at the meeting and voting, are not appropriate for public distribution, shall not be included in the preliminary report made publicly available. The Secretary shall send notice to the Board of Directors and the Chairs of the Supporting Organizations (as set forth in Articles VIII - X of these Bylaws) and Advisory Committees (as set forth in Article XI of these Bylaws) informing them that the resolutions have been posted.

3. No later than 11:59 p.m. on the seventh business days after the conclusion of each meeting (as calculated by local time at the location of ICANN's principal office), any actions taken by the Board shall be made publicly available in a preliminary report on the Website, subject to the limitations on disclosure set forth in Section 5.2 above. For any matters that the Board determines not to disclose, the Board shall describe in general terms in the relevant preliminary report the reason for such nondisclosure.

4. No later than the day after the date on which they are formally approved by the Board (or, if such day is not a business day, as calculated by local time at the location of ICANN's principal office, then the next immediately following business day), the minutes shall be made publicly available on the Website; provided, however, that any minutes relating to personnel or employment matters, legal matters (to the extent the Board determines it is necessary or appropriate to protect the interests of ICANN), matters that ICANN is prohibited by law or contract from disclosing publicly, and other matters that the Board determines, by a three-quarters (3/4) vote of Directors present at the meeting and voting, are not appropriate for public distribution, shall not be included in the minutes made publicly available. For any matters that the Board determines not to disclose, the Board shall describe in

general terms in the relevant minutes the reason for such nondisclosure.

Section 6. NOTICE AND COMMENT ON POLICY ACTIONS

1. With respect to any policies that are being considered by the Board for adoption that substantially affect the operation of the Internet or third parties, including the imposition of any fees or charges, ICANN shall:

a. provide public notice on the Website explaining what policies are being considered for adoption and why, at least twenty-one days (and if practical, earlier) prior to any action by the Board;

b. provide a reasonable opportunity for parties to comment on the adoption of the proposed policies, to see the comments of others, and to reply to those comments, prior to any action by the Board; and

c. in those cases where the policy action affects public policy concerns, to request the opinion of the Governmental Advisory Committee and take duly into account any advice timely presented by the Governmental Advisory Committee on its own initiative or at the Board's request.

2. Where both practically feasible and consistent with the relevant policy development process, an in-person public forum shall also be held for discussion of any proposed policies as described in [Section 6\(1\)\(b\) of this Article](#), prior to any final Board action.

3. After taking action on any policy subject to this Section, the Board shall publish in the meeting minutes the reasons for any action taken, the vote of each Director voting on the action, and the separate statement of any Director desiring publication of such a statement.

Section 7. TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENTS

As appropriate and to the extent provided in the ICANN budget, ICANN shall facilitate the translation of final published documents into various appropriate languages.

ARTICLE IV: ACCOUNTABILITY AND REVIEW

Section 1. PURPOSE

In carrying out its mission as set out in these Bylaws, ICANN should be accountable to the community for operating in a manner that is consistent with these Bylaws, and with due regard for the core values set forth in [Article I of these Bylaws](#). The provisions of this Article, creating processes for reconsideration and independent review of ICANN actions and periodic review of ICANN's structure and procedures, are intended to reinforce the various accountability mechanisms otherwise set forth in these Bylaws, including the transparency provisions of [Article III](#) and the Board and other selection mechanisms set forth throughout these Bylaws.

Section 2. RECONSIDERATION

1. ICANN shall have in place a process by which any person or entity materially affected by an action of ICANN may request review or reconsideration of that action by the Board.
2. Any person or entity may submit a request for reconsideration or review of an ICANN action or inaction ("Reconsideration Request") to the extent that he, she, or it have been adversely affected by:
 - a. one or more staff actions or inactions that contradict established ICANN policy(ies); or
 - b. one or more actions or inactions of the ICANN Board that have been taken or refused to be taken without consideration of material information, except where the party submitting the request could have submitted, but did not submit, the information for the Board's consideration at the time of action or refusal to act; or
 - c. one or more actions or inactions of the ICANN Board that are taken as a result of the Board's reliance on false or inaccurate material information.
3. The Board has designated the Board Governance Committee to review and consider any such

Reconsideration Requests. The Board Governance Committee shall have the authority to:

- a. evaluate requests for review or reconsideration;
 - b. summarily dismiss insufficient requests;
 - c. evaluate requests for urgent consideration;
 - d. conduct whatever factual investigation is deemed appropriate;
 - e. request additional written submissions from the affected party, or from other parties;
 - f. make a final determination on Reconsideration Requests regarding staff action or inaction, without reference to the Board of Directors; and
 - g. make a recommendation to the Board of Directors on the merits of the request, as necessary.
4. ICANN shall absorb the normal administrative costs of the reconsideration process. It reserves the right to recover from a party requesting review or reconsideration any costs that are deemed to be extraordinary in nature. When such extraordinary costs can be foreseen, that fact and the reasons why such costs are necessary and appropriate to evaluating the Reconsideration Request shall be communicated to the party seeking reconsideration, who shall then have the option of withdrawing the request or agreeing to bear such costs.
5. All Reconsideration Requests must be submitted to an e-mail address designated by the Board Governance Committee within fifteen days after:
- a. for requests challenging Board actions, the date on which information about the challenged Board action is first published in a resolution, unless the posting of the resolution is not accompanied by a rationale. In that instance, the request must be submitted within 15 days from the initial posting of the rationale; or

- b. for requests challenging staff actions, the date on which the party submitting the request became aware of, or reasonably should have become aware of, the challenged staff action; or
 - c. for requests challenging either Board or staff inaction, the date on which the affected person reasonably concluded, or reasonably should have concluded, that action would not be taken in a timely manner.
6. To properly initiate a Reconsideration process, all requestors must review and follow the Reconsideration Request form posted on the ICANN website. at <http://www.icann.org/en/groups/board/governance/reconsideration> Requestors must also acknowledge and agree to the terms and conditions set forth in the form when filing.
7. Requestors shall not provide more than 25 pages (double-spaced, 12-point font) of argument in support of a Reconsideration Request. Requestors may submit all documentary evidence necessary to demonstrate why the action or inaction should be reconsidered, without limitation.
8. The Board Governance Committee shall have authority to consider Reconsideration Requests from different parties in the same proceeding so long as: (i) the requests involve the same general action or inaction; and (ii) the parties submitting Reconsideration Requests are similarly affected by such action or inaction. In addition, consolidated filings may be appropriate if the alleged causal connection and the resulting harm is the same for all of the requestors. Every requestor must be able to demonstrate that it has been materially harmed and adversely impacted by the action or inaction giving rise to the request.
9. The Board Governance Committee shall review each Reconsideration Request upon its receipt to determine if it is sufficiently stated. The Board Governance Committee may summarily dismiss a Reconsideration Request if: (i) the requestor fails to meet the requirements for bringing a Reconsideration Request; (ii) it is frivolous, querulous or vexatious; or (iii) the requestor had notice and opportunity to, but did not,

participate in the public comment period relating to the contested action, if applicable. The Board Governance Committee's summary dismissal of a Reconsideration Request shall be posted on the Website.

10. For all Reconsideration Requests that are not summarily dismissed, the Board Governance Committee shall promptly proceed to review and consideration.
11. The Board Governance Committee may ask the ICANN staff for its views on the matter, which comments shall be made publicly available on the Website.
12. The Board Governance Committee may request additional information or clarifications from the requestor, and may elect to conduct a meeting with the requestor by telephone, email or, if acceptable to the party requesting reconsideration, in person. A requestor may ask for an opportunity to be heard; the Board Governance Committee's decision on any such request is final. To the extent any information gathered in such a meeting is relevant to any recommendation by the Board Governance Committee, it shall so state in its recommendation.
13. The Board Governance Committee may also request information relevant to the request from third parties. To the extent any information gathered is relevant to any recommendation by the Board Governance Committee, it shall so state in its recommendation. Any information collected from third parties shall be provided to the requestor.
14. The Board Governance Committee shall act on a Reconsideration Request on the basis of the public written record, including information submitted by the party seeking reconsideration or review, by the ICANN staff, and by any third party.
15. For all Reconsideration Requests brought regarding staff action or inaction, the Board Governance Committee shall be delegated the authority by the Board of Directors to make a final determination and recommendation on the matter. Board consideration of the recommendation is not required. As the Board Governance Committee deems necessary, it may make

recommendation to the Board for consideration and action. The Board Governance Committee's determination on staff action or inaction shall be posted on the Website. The Board Governance Committee's determination is final and establishes precedential value.

16. The Board Governance Committee shall make a final determination or a recommendation to the Board with respect to a Reconsideration Request within thirty days following its receipt of the request, unless impractical, in which case it shall report to the Board the circumstances that prevented it from making a final recommendation and its best estimate of the time required to produce such a final determination or recommendation. The final recommendation shall be posted on ICANN's website.
17. The Board shall not be bound to follow the recommendations of the Board Governance Committee. The final decision of the Board shall be made public as part of the preliminary report and minutes of the Board meeting at which action is taken. The Board shall issue its decision on the recommendation of the Board Governance Committee within 60 days of receipt of the Reconsideration Request or as soon thereafter as feasible. Any circumstances that delay the Board from acting within this timeframe must be identified and posted on ICANN's website. The Board's decision on the recommendation is final.
18. If the requestor believes that the Board action or inaction posed for Reconsideration is so urgent that the timing requirements of the Reconsideration process are too long, the requestor may apply to the Board Governance Committee for urgent consideration. Any request for urgent consideration must be made within two business days (calculated at ICANN's headquarters in Los Angeles, California) of the posting of the resolution at issue. A request for urgent consideration must include a discussion of why the matter is urgent for reconsideration and must demonstrate a likelihood of success with the Reconsideration Request.

19. The Board Governance Committee shall respond to the request for urgent consideration within two business days after receipt of such request. If the Board Governance Committee agrees to consider the matter with urgency, it will cause notice to be provided to the requestor, who will have two business days after notification to complete the Reconsideration Request. The Board Governance Committee shall issue a recommendation on the urgent Reconsideration Request within seven days of the completion of the filing of the Request, or as soon thereafter as feasible. If the Board Governance Committee does not agree to consider the matter with urgency, the requestor may still file a Reconsideration Request within the regular time frame set forth within these Bylaws.
20. The Board Governance Committee shall submit a report to the Board on an annual basis containing at least the following information for the preceding calendar year:
 - a. the number and general nature of Reconsideration Requests received, including an identification if the requests were acted upon, summarily dismissed, or remain pending;
 - b. for any Reconsideration Requests that remained pending at the end of the calendar year, the average length of time for which such Reconsideration Requests have been pending, and a description of the reasons for any request pending for more than ninety (90) days;
 - c. an explanation of any other mechanisms available to ensure that ICANN is accountable to persons materially affected by its decisions; and
 - d. whether or not, in the Board Governance Committee's view, the criteria for which reconsideration may be requested should be revised, or another process should be adopted or modified, to ensure that all persons materially affected by ICANN decisions have meaningful access to a review process that ensures fairness while limiting frivolous claims.

Section 3. INDEPENDENT REVIEW OF BOARD ACTIONS

1. In addition to the reconsideration process described in [Section 2 of this Article](#), ICANN shall have in place a separate process for independent third-party review of Board actions alleged by an affected party to be inconsistent with the Articles of Incorporation or Bylaws.
2. Any person materially affected by a decision or action by the Board that he or she asserts is inconsistent with the Articles of Incorporation or Bylaws may submit a request for independent review of that decision or action. In order to be materially affected, the person must suffer injury or harm that is directly and causally connected to the Board's alleged violation of the Bylaws or the Articles of Incorporation, and not as a result of third parties acting in line with the Board's action.
3. A request for independent review must be filed within thirty days of the posting of the minutes of the Board meeting (and the accompanying Board Briefing Materials, if available) that the requesting party contends demonstrates that ICANN violated its Bylaws or Articles of Incorporation. Consolidated requests may be appropriate when the causal connection between the circumstances of the requests and the harm is the same for each of the requesting parties.
4. Requests for such independent review shall be referred to an Independent Review Process Panel ("IRP Panel"), which shall be charged with comparing contested actions of the Board to the Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws, and with declaring whether the Board has acted consistently with the provisions of those Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws. The IRP Panel must apply a defined standard of review to the IRP request, focusing on:
 - a. did the Board act without conflict of interest in taking its decision?;
 - b. did the Board exercise due diligence and care in having a reasonable amount of facts in front of them?; and

- c. did the Board members exercise independent judgment in taking the decision, believed to be in the best interests of the company?
5. Requests for independent review shall not exceed 25 pages (double-spaced, 12-point font) of argument. ICANN's response shall not exceed that same length. Parties may submit documentary evidence supporting their positions without limitation. In the event that parties submit expert evidence, such evidence must be provided in writing and there will be a right of reply to the expert evidence.
6. There shall be an omnibus standing panel of between six and nine members with a variety of expertise, including jurisprudence, judicial experience, alternative dispute resolution and knowledge of ICANN's mission and work from which each specific IRP Panel shall be selected. The panelists shall serve for terms that are staggered to allow for continued review of the size of the panel and the range of expertise. A Chair of the standing panel shall be appointed for a term not to exceed three years. Individuals holding an official position or office within the ICANN structure are not eligible to serve on the standing panel. In the event that an omnibus standing panel: (i) is not in place when an IRP Panel must be convened for a given proceeding, the IRP proceeding will be considered by a one- or three-member panel comprised in accordance with the rules of the IRP Provider; or (ii) is in place but does not have the requisite diversity of skill and experience needed for a particular proceeding, the IRP Provider shall identify one or more panelists, as required, from outside the omnibus standing panel to augment the panel members for that proceeding.
7. All IRP proceedings shall be administered by an international dispute resolution provider appointed from time to time by ICANN ("the IRP Provider"). The membership of the standing panel shall be coordinated by the IRP Provider subject to approval by ICANN.
8. Subject to the approval of the Board, the IRP Provider shall establish operating rules and procedures, which shall implement and be consistent with this [Section 3](#).

9. Either party may request that the IRP be considered by a one- or three-member panel; the Chair of the standing panel shall make the final determination of the size of each IRP panel, taking into account the wishes of the parties and the complexity of the issues presented.
10. The IRP Provider shall determine a procedure for assigning members from the standing panel to individual IRP panels.
11. The IRP Panel shall have the authority to:
 - a. summarily dismiss requests brought without standing, lacking in substance, or that are frivolous or vexatious;
 - b. request additional written submissions from the party seeking review, the Board, the Supporting Organizations, or from other parties;
 - c. declare whether an action or inaction of the Board was inconsistent with the Articles of Incorporation or Bylaws; and
 - d. recommend that the Board stay any action or decision, or that the Board take any interim action, until such time as the Board reviews and acts upon the opinion of the IRP;
 - e. consolidate requests for independent review if the facts and circumstances are sufficiently similar; and
 - f. determine the timing for each proceeding.
12. In order to keep the costs and burdens of independent review as low as possible, the IRP Panel should conduct its proceedings by email and otherwise via the Internet to the maximum extent feasible. Where necessary, the IRP Panel may hold meetings by telephone. In the unlikely event that a telephonic or in-person hearing is convened, the hearing shall be limited to argument only; all evidence, including witness statements, must be submitted in writing in advance.
13. All panel members shall adhere to conflicts-of-interest policy stated in the IRP Provider's operating rules and procedures, as approved by the Board.

14. Prior to initiating a request for independent review, the complainant is urged to enter into a period of cooperative engagement with ICANN for the purpose of resolving or narrowing the issues that are contemplated to be brought to the IRP. The cooperative engagement process is published on ICANN.org and is incorporated into this Section 3 of the Bylaws.
15. Upon the filing of a request for an independent review, the parties are urged to participate in a conciliation period for the purpose of narrowing the issues that are stated within the request for independent review. A conciliator will be appointed from the members of the omnibus standing panel by the Chair of that panel. The conciliator shall not be eligible to serve as one of the panelists presiding over that particular IRP. The Chair of the standing panel may deem conciliation unnecessary if cooperative engagement sufficiently narrowed the issues remaining in the independent review.
16. Cooperative engagement and conciliation are both voluntary. However, if the party requesting the independent review does not participate in good faith in the cooperative engagement and the conciliation processes, if applicable, and ICANN is the prevailing party in the request for independent review, the IRP Panel must award to ICANN all reasonable fees and costs incurred by ICANN in the proceeding, including legal fees.
17. All matters discussed during the cooperative engagement and conciliation phases are to remain confidential and not subject to discovery or as evidence for any purpose within the IRP, and are without prejudice to either party.
18. The IRP Panel should strive to issue its written declaration no later than six months after the filing of the request for independent review. The IRP Panel shall make its declaration based solely on the documentation, supporting materials, and arguments submitted by the parties, and in its declaration shall specifically designate the prevailing party. The party not prevailing shall ordinarily be responsible for bearing all costs of the IRP Provider, but in an extraordinary case

the IRP Panel may in its declaration allocate up to half of the costs of the IRP Provider to the prevailing party based upon the circumstances, including a consideration of the reasonableness of the parties' positions and their contribution to the public interest. Each party to the IRP proceedings shall bear its own expenses.

19. The IRP operating procedures, and all petitions, claims, and declarations, shall be posted on ICANN's website when they become available.
20. The IRP Panel may, in its discretion, grant a party's request to keep certain information confidential, such as trade secrets.
21. Where feasible, the Board shall consider the IRP Panel declaration at the Board's next meeting. The declarations of the IRP Panel, and the Board's subsequent action on those declarations, are final and have precedential value.

Section 4. PERIODIC REVIEW OF ICANN STRUCTURE AND OPERATIONS

1. The Board shall cause a periodic review of the performance and operation of each Supporting Organization, each Supporting Organization Council, each Advisory Committee (other than the Governmental Advisory Committee), and the Nominating Committee by an entity or entities independent of the organization under review. The goal of the review, to be undertaken pursuant to such criteria and standards as the Board shall direct, shall be to determine (i) whether that organization has a continuing purpose in the ICANN structure, and (ii) if so, whether any change in structure or operations is desirable to improve its effectiveness.

These periodic reviews shall be conducted no less frequently than every five years, based on feasibility as determined by the Board. Each five-year cycle will be computed from the moment of the reception by the Board of the final report of the relevant review Working Group.

The results of such reviews shall be posted on the Website for public review and comment, and shall be considered by the Board no later than the second scheduled meeting of the

Board after such results have been posted for 30 days. The consideration by the Board includes the ability to revise the structure or operation of the parts of ICANN being reviewed by a two-thirds vote of all members of the Board.

2. The Governmental Advisory Committee shall provide its own review mechanisms.

ARTICLE V: OMBUDSMAN

Section 1. OFFICE OF OMBUDSMAN

1. There shall be an Office of Ombudsman, to be managed by an Ombudsman and to include such staff support as the Board determines is appropriate and feasible. The Ombudsman shall be a full-time position, with salary and benefits appropriate to the function, as determined by the Board.

2. The Ombudsman shall be appointed by the Board for an initial term of two years, subject to renewal by the Board.

3. The Ombudsman shall be subject to dismissal by the Board only upon a three-fourths (3/4) vote of the entire Board.

4. The annual budget for the Office of Ombudsman shall be established by the Board as part of the annual ICANN budget process. The Ombudsman shall submit a proposed budget to the President, and the President shall include that budget submission in its entirety and without change in the general ICANN budget recommended by the ICANN President to the Board. Nothing in this Article shall prevent the President from offering separate views on the substance, size, or other features of the Ombudsman's proposed budget to the Board.

Section 2. CHARTER

The charter of the Ombudsman shall be to act as a neutral dispute resolution practitioner for those matters for which the provisions of the Reconsideration Policy set forth in [Section 2 of Article IV](#) or the Independent Review Policy set forth in [Section 3 of Article IV](#) have not been invoked. The principal function of the Ombudsman shall be to provide an independent internal evaluation of complaints by members of the ICANN community who believe that the ICANN staff, Board or an ICANN constituent body has treated them unfairly. The Ombudsman shall serve as an objective advocate for fairness, and shall seek to evaluate and where possible resolve complaints about unfair or inappropriate

treatment by ICANN staff, the Board, or ICANN constituent bodies, clarifying the issues and using conflict resolution tools such as negotiation, facilitation, and "shuttle diplomacy" to achieve these results.

Section 3. OPERATIONS

The Office of Ombudsman shall:

1. facilitate the fair, impartial, and timely resolution of problems and complaints that affected members of the ICANN community (excluding employees and vendors/suppliers of ICANN) may have with specific actions or failures to act by the Board or ICANN staff which have not otherwise become the subject of either the Reconsideration or Independent Review Policies;
2. exercise discretion to accept or decline to act on a complaint or question, including by the development of procedures to dispose of complaints that are insufficiently concrete, substantive, or related to ICANN's interactions with the community so as to be inappropriate subject matters for the Ombudsman to act on. In addition, and without limiting the foregoing, the Ombudsman shall have no authority to act in any way with respect to internal administrative matters, personnel matters, issues relating to membership on the Board, or issues related to vendor/supplier relations;
3. have the right to have access to (but not to publish if otherwise confidential) all necessary information and records from ICANN staff and constituent bodies to enable an informed evaluation of the complaint and to assist in dispute resolution where feasible (subject only to such confidentiality obligations as are imposed by the complainant or any generally applicable confidentiality policies adopted by ICANN);
4. heighten awareness of the Ombudsman program and functions through routine interaction with the ICANN community and online availability;
5. maintain neutrality and independence, and have no bias or personal stake in an outcome; and
6. comply with all ICANN conflicts-of-interest and confidentiality policies.

Section 4. INTERACTION WITH ICANN AND OUTSIDE ENTITIES

1. No ICANN employee, Board member, or other participant in Supporting Organizations or Advisory Committees shall prevent or impede the Ombudsman's contact with the ICANN community (including employees of ICANN). ICANN employees and Board members shall direct members of the ICANN community who voice problems, concerns, or complaints about ICANN to the Ombudsman, who shall advise complainants about the various options available for review of such problems, concerns, or complaints.
2. ICANN staff and other ICANN participants shall observe and respect determinations made by the Office of Ombudsman concerning confidentiality of any complaints received by that Office.
3. Contact with the Ombudsman shall not constitute notice to ICANN of any particular action or cause of action.
4. The Ombudsman shall be specifically authorized to make such reports to the Board as he or she deems appropriate with respect to any particular matter and its resolution or the inability to resolve it. Absent a determination by the Ombudsman, in his or her sole discretion, that it would be inappropriate, such reports shall be posted on the Website.
5. The Ombudsman shall not take any actions not authorized in these Bylaws, and in particular shall not institute, join, or support in any way any legal actions challenging ICANN structure, procedures, processes, or any conduct by the ICANN Board, staff, or constituent bodies.

Section 5. ANNUAL REPORT

The Office of Ombudsman shall publish on an annual basis a consolidated analysis of the year's complaints and resolutions, appropriately dealing with confidentiality obligations and concerns. Such annual report should include a description of any trends or common elements of complaints received during the period in question, as well as recommendations for steps that could be taken to minimize future complaints. The annual report shall be posted on the Website.

ARTICLE VI: BOARD OF DIRECTORS

Section 1. COMPOSITION OF THE BOARD

The ICANN Board of Directors ("Board") shall consist of sixteen voting members ("Directors"). In addition, four non-voting liaisons ("Liaisons") shall be designated for the purposes set forth in [Section 9 of this Article](#). Only Directors shall be included in determining the existence of quorums, and in establishing the validity of votes taken by the ICANN Board.

Section 2. DIRECTORS AND THEIR SELECTION; ELECTION OF CHAIRMAN AND VICE-CHAIRMAN

1. The Directors shall consist of:

a. Eight voting members selected by the Nominating Committee established by [Article VII of these Bylaws](#). These seats on the Board of Directors are referred to in these Bylaws as Seats 1 through 8.

b. Two voting members selected by the Address Supporting Organization according to the provisions of [Article VIII of these Bylaws](#). These seats on the Board of Directors are referred to in these Bylaws as Seat 9 and Seat 10.

c. Two voting members selected by the Country-Code Names Supporting Organization according to the provisions of [Article IX of these Bylaws](#). These seats on the Board of Directors are referred to in these Bylaws as Seat 11 and Seat 12.

d. Two voting members selected by the Generic Names Supporting Organization according to the provisions of [Article X of these Bylaws](#). These seats on the Board of Directors are referred to in these Bylaws as Seat 13 and Seat 14.

e. One voting member selected by the At-Large Community according to the provisions of [Article XI of these Bylaws](#). This seat on the Board of Directors is referred to in these Bylaws as Seat 15.

f. The President ex officio, who shall be a voting member.

2. In carrying out its responsibilities to fill Seats 1 through 8, the Nominating Committee shall seek to ensure that the ICANN Board is composed of members who in the aggregate

display diversity in geography, culture, skills, experience, and perspective, by applying the criteria set forth in [Section 3 of this Article](#). At no time when it makes its selection shall the Nominating Committee select a Director to fill any vacancy or expired term whose selection would cause the total number of Directors (not including the President) from countries in any one Geographic Region (as defined in [Section 5 of this Article](#)) to exceed five; and the Nominating Committee shall ensure when it makes its selections that the Board includes at least one Director who is from a country in each ICANN Geographic Region ("Diversity Calculation").

For purposes of this sub-section 2 of Article VI, Section 2 of the ICANN Bylaws, if any candidate for director maintains citizenship of more than one country, or has been domiciled for more than five years in a country of which the candidate does not maintain citizenship ("Domicile"), that candidate may be deemed to be from either country and must select in his/her Statement of Interest the country of citizenship or Domicile that he/she wants the Nominating Committee to use for Diversity Calculation purposes. For purposes of this sub-section 2 of Article VI, Section 2 of the ICANN Bylaws, a person can only have one "Domicile," which shall be determined by where the candidate has a permanent residence and place of habitation.

3. In carrying out their responsibilities to fill Seats 9 through 15, the Supporting Organizations and the At-Large Community shall seek to ensure that the ICANN Board is composed of members that in the aggregate display diversity in geography, culture, skills, experience, and perspective, by applying the criteria set forth in [Section 3 of this Article](#). At any given time, no two Directors selected by a Supporting Organization shall be citizens from the same country or of countries located in the same Geographic Region.

For purposes of this sub-section 3 of Article VI, Section 2 of the ICANN Bylaws, if any candidate for director maintains citizenship of more than one country, or has been domiciled for more than five years in a country of which the candidate does not maintain citizenship ("Domicile"), that candidate may be deemed to be from either country and must select in his/her Statement of Interest the country of citizenship or Domicile that he/she wants the Supporting Organization or the At-Large Community to use for selection purposes. For purposes of this sub-section 3 of Article VI, Section 2 of the ICANN Bylaws, a

person can only have one "Domicile," which shall be determined by where the candidate has a permanent residence and place of habitation.

4. The Board shall annually elect a Chairman and a Vice-Chairman from among the Directors, not including the President.

Section 3. CRITERIA FOR SELECTION OF DIRECTORS

ICANN Directors shall be:

1. Accomplished persons of integrity, objectivity, and intelligence, with reputations for sound judgment and open minds, and a demonstrated capacity for thoughtful group decision-making;
2. Persons with an understanding of ICANN's mission and the potential impact of ICANN decisions on the global Internet community, and committed to the success of ICANN;
3. Persons who will produce the broadest cultural and geographic diversity on the Board consistent with meeting the other criteria set forth in this Section;
4. Persons who, in the aggregate, have personal familiarity with the operation of gTLD registries and registrars; with ccTLD registries; with IP address registries; with Internet technical standards and protocols; with policy-development procedures, legal traditions, and the public interest; and with the broad range of business, individual, academic, and non-commercial users of the Internet; and
5. Persons who are able to work and communicate in written and spoken English.

Section 4. ADDITIONAL QUALIFICATIONS

1. Notwithstanding anything herein to the contrary, no official of a national government or a multinational entity established by treaty or other agreement between national governments may serve as a Director. As used herein, the term "official" means a person (i) who holds an elective governmental office or (ii) who is employed by such government or multinational entity and whose primary function with such government or

entity is to develop or influence governmental or public policies.

2. No person who serves in any capacity (including as a liaison) on any Supporting Organization Council shall simultaneously serve as a Director or liaison to the Board. If such a person accepts a nomination to be considered for selection by the Supporting Organization Council or the At-Large Community to be a Director, the person shall not, following such nomination, participate in any discussion of, or vote by, the Supporting Organization Council or the committee designated by the At-Large Community relating to the selection of Directors by the Council or Community, until the Council or committee(s) designated by the At-Large Community has selected the full complement of Directors it is responsible for selecting. In the event that a person serving in any capacity on a Supporting Organization Council accepts a nomination to be considered for selection as a Director, the constituency group or other group or entity that selected the person may select a replacement for purposes of the Council's selection process. In the event that a person serving in any capacity on the At-Large Advisory Committee accepts a nomination to be considered for selection by the At-Large Community as a Director, the Regional At-Large Organization or other group or entity that selected the person may select a replacement for purposes of the Community's selection process.

3. Persons serving in any capacity on the Nominating Committee shall be ineligible for selection to positions on the Board as provided by [Article VII, Section 8](#).

Section 5. INTERNATIONAL REPRESENTATION

In order to ensure broad international representation on the Board, the selection of Directors by the Nominating Committee, each Supporting Organization and the At-Large Community shall comply with all applicable diversity provisions of these Bylaws or of any Memorandum of Understanding referred to in these Bylaws concerning the Supporting Organization. One intent of these diversity provisions is to ensure that at all times each Geographic Region shall have at least one Director, and at all times no region shall have more than five Directors on the Board (not including the President). As used in these Bylaws, each of the following is considered to be a "Geographic Region": Europe; Asia/Australia/Pacific; Latin America/Caribbean islands; Africa; and North America. The specific

countries included in each Geographic Region shall be determined by the Board, and this Section shall be reviewed by the Board from time to time (but at least every three years) to determine whether any change is appropriate, taking account of the evolution of the Internet.

Section 6. DIRECTORS' CONFLICTS OF INTEREST

The Board, through the Board Governance Committee, shall require a statement from each Director not less frequently than once a year setting forth all business and other affiliations that relate in any way to the business and other affiliations of ICANN. Each Director shall be responsible for disclosing to ICANN any matter that could reasonably be considered to make such Director an "interested director" within the meaning of Section 5233 of the California Nonprofit Public Benefit Corporation Law ("CNPBCL"). In addition, each Director shall disclose to ICANN any relationship or other factor that could reasonably be considered to cause the Director to be considered to be an "interested person" within the meaning of Section 5227 of the CNPBCL. The Board shall adopt policies specifically addressing Director, Officer, and Supporting Organization conflicts of interest. No Director shall vote on any matter in which he or she has a material and direct financial interest that would be affected by the outcome of the vote.

Section 7. DUTIES OF DIRECTORS

Directors shall serve as individuals who have the duty to act in what they reasonably believe are the best interests of ICANN and not as representatives of the entity that selected them, their employers, or any other organizations or constituencies.

Section 8. TERMS OF DIRECTORS

1. The regular term of office of Director Seats 1 through 15 shall begin as follows:
 - a. The regular terms of Seats 1 through 3 shall begin at the conclusion of ICANN's annual meeting in 2003 and each ICANN annual meeting every third year after 2003;
 - b. The regular terms of Seats 4 through 6 shall begin at the conclusion of ICANN's annual meeting in 2004 and each ICANN annual meeting every third year after 2004;

c. The regular terms of Seats 7 and 8 shall begin at the conclusion of ICANN's annual meeting in 2005 and each ICANN annual meeting every third year after 2005;

d. The terms of Seats 9 and 12 shall continue until the conclusion of ICANN's ICANN's annual meeting in 2015. The next terms of Seats 9 and 12 shall begin at the conclusion of ICANN's annual meeting in 2015 and each ICANN annual meeting every third year after 2015;

e. The terms of Seats 10 and 13 shall continue until the conclusion of ICANN's annual meeting in 2013. The next terms of Seats 10 and 13 shall begin at the conclusion of ICANN's annual meeting in 2013 and each ICANN annual meeting every third year after 2013; and

f. The terms of Seats 11, 14 and 15 shall continue until the conclusion of ICANN's annual meeting in 2014. The next terms of Seats 11, 14 and 15 shall begin at the conclusion of ICANN's annual meeting in 2014 and each ICANN annual meeting every third year after 2014.

2. Each Director holding any of Seats 1 through 15, including a Director selected to fill a vacancy, shall hold office for a term that lasts until the next term for that Seat commences and until a successor has been selected and qualified or until that Director resigns or is removed in accordance with these Bylaws.

3. At least two months before the commencement of each annual meeting, the Nominating Committee shall give the Secretary of ICANN written notice of its selection of Directors for seats with terms beginning at the conclusion of the annual meeting.

4. At least six months before the date specified for the commencement of the term as specified in paragraphs 1.d-f above, any Supporting Organization or the At-Large community entitled to select a Director for a Seat with a term beginning that year shall give the Secretary of ICANN written notice of its selection.

5. Subject to the provisions of the Transition Article of these Bylaws, no Director may serve more than three consecutive terms. For these purposes, a person selected to fill a vacancy in a term shall not be deemed to have served that term. (Note: In the period prior to the beginning of the first regular term of Seat 15 in 2010, Seat 15 was deemed vacant for the purposes of calculation of terms of service.)
6. The term as Director of the person holding the office of President shall be for as long as, and only for as long as, such person holds the office of President.

Section 9. NON-VOTING LIAISONS

1. The non-voting liaisons shall include:
 - a. One appointed by the [Governmental Advisory Committee](#);
 - b. One appointed by the Root Server System Advisory Committee established by [Article XI of these Bylaws](#);
 - c. One appointed by the Security and Stability Advisory Committee established by [Article XI of these Bylaws](#);
 - d. One appointed by the Internet Engineering Task Force.
2. The non-voting liaisons shall serve terms that begin at the conclusion of each annual meeting. At least one month before the commencement of each annual meeting, each body entitled to appoint a non-voting liaison shall give the Secretary of [ICANN](#) written notice of its appointment.
3. Each non-voting liaison may be reappointed, and shall remain in that position until a successor has been appointed or until the liaison resigns or is removed in accordance with these Bylaws.
4. The non-voting liaisons shall be entitled to attend Board meetings, participate in Board discussions and deliberations, and have access (under conditions established by the Board) to materials provided to Directors for use in Board discussions, deliberations and meetings, but shall otherwise not have any

of the rights and privileges of Directors. Non-voting liaisons shall be entitled (under conditions established by the Board) to use any materials provided to them pursuant to this Section for the purpose of consulting with their respective committee or organization.

Section 10. RESIGNATION OF A DIRECTOR OR NON-VOTING LIAISON

Subject to Section 5226 of the CNPBCL, any Director or non-voting liaison may resign at any time, either by oral tender of resignation at any meeting of the Board (followed by prompt written notice to the Secretary of ICANN) or by giving written notice thereof to the President or the Secretary of ICANN. Such resignation shall take effect at the time specified, and, unless otherwise specified, the acceptance of such resignation shall not be necessary to make it effective. The successor shall be selected pursuant to [Section 12 of this Article](#).

Section 11. REMOVAL OF A DIRECTOR OR NON-VOTING LIAISON

1. Any Director may be removed, following notice to that Director, by a three-fourths (3/4) majority vote of all Directors; provided, however, that the Director who is the subject of the removal action shall not be entitled to vote on such an action or be counted as a voting member of the Board when calculating the required three-fourths (3/4) vote; and provided further, that each vote to remove a Director shall be a separate vote on the sole question of the removal of that particular Director. If the Director was selected by a Supporting Organization, notice must be provided to that Supporting Organization at the same time notice is provided to the Director. If the Director was selected by the At-Large Community, notice must be provided to the At-Large Advisory Committee at the same time notice is provided to the Director.

2. With the exception of the non-voting liaison appointed by the Governmental Advisory Committee, any non-voting liaison may be removed, following notice to that liaison and to the organization by which that liaison was selected, by a three-fourths (3/4) majority vote of all Directors if the selecting organization fails to promptly remove that liaison following such notice. The Board may request the Governmental Advisory Committee to consider the replacement of the non-voting liaison appointed by that Committee if the Board, by a

three-fourths (3/4) majority vote of all Directors, determines that such an action is appropriate.

Section 12. VACANCIES

1. A vacancy or vacancies in the Board of Directors shall be deemed to exist in the case of the death, resignation, or removal of any Director; if the authorized number of Directors is increased; or if a Director has been declared of unsound mind by a final order of court or convicted of a felony or incarcerated for more than 90 days as a result of a criminal conviction or has been found by final order or judgment of any court to have breached a duty under Sections 5230 et seq. of the CNPBCL. Any vacancy occurring on the Board of Directors shall be filled by the Nominating Committee, unless (a) that Director was selected by a Supporting Organization, in which case that vacancy shall be filled by that Supporting Organization, or (b) that Director was the President, in which case the vacancy shall be filled in accordance with the provisions of [Article XIII of these Bylaws](#). The selecting body shall give written notice to the Secretary of ICANN of their appointments to fill vacancies. A Director selected to fill a vacancy on the Board shall serve for the unexpired term of his or her predecessor in office and until a successor has been selected and qualified. No reduction of the authorized number of Directors shall have the effect of removing a Director prior to the expiration of the Director's term of office.

2. The organizations selecting the non-voting liaisons identified in [Section 9 of this Article](#) are responsible for determining the existence of, and filling, any vacancies in those positions. They shall give the Secretary of ICANN written notice of their appointments to fill vacancies.

Section 13. ANNUAL MEETINGS

Annual meetings of ICANN shall be held for the purpose of electing Officers and for the transaction of such other business as may come before the meeting. Each annual meeting for ICANN shall be held at the principal office of ICANN, or any other appropriate place of the Board's time and choosing, provided such annual meeting is held within 14 months of the immediately preceding annual meeting. If the Board determines that it is practical, the annual meeting should be distributed in real-time and archived video and audio formats on the Internet.

Section 14. REGULAR MEETINGS

Regular meetings of the Board shall be held on dates to be determined by the Board. In the absence of other designation, regular meetings shall be held at the principal office of ICANN.

Section 15. SPECIAL MEETINGS

Special meetings of the Board may be called by or at the request of one-quarter (1/4) of the members of the Board or by the Chairman of the Board or the President. A call for a special meeting shall be made by the Secretary of ICANN. In the absence of designation, special meetings shall be held at the principal office of ICANN.

Section 16. NOTICE OF MEETINGS

Notice of time and place of all meetings shall be delivered personally or by telephone or by electronic mail to each Director and non-voting liaison, or sent by first-class mail (air mail for addresses outside the United States) or facsimile, charges prepaid, addressed to each Director and non-voting liaison at the Director's or non-voting liaison's address as it is shown on the records of ICANN. In case the notice is mailed, it shall be deposited in the United States mail at least fourteen (14) days before the time of the holding of the meeting. In case the notice is delivered personally or by telephone or facsimile or electronic mail it shall be delivered personally or by telephone or facsimile or electronic mail at least forty-eight (48) hours before the time of the holding of the meeting. Notwithstanding anything in this Section to the contrary, notice of a meeting need not be given to any Director who signed a waiver of notice or a written consent to holding the meeting or an approval of the minutes thereof, whether before or after the meeting, or who attends the meeting without protesting, prior thereto or at its commencement, the lack of notice to such Director. All such waivers, consents and approvals shall be filed with the corporate records or made a part of the minutes of the meetings.

Section 17. QUORUM

At all annual, regular, and special meetings of the Board, a majority of the total number of Directors then in office shall constitute a quorum for the transaction of business, and the act of a majority of the Directors present at any meeting at which there is a quorum shall be the act of the Board, unless otherwise provided herein or by law. If a quorum shall not be present at any meeting of the Board, the Directors present thereat may adjourn the meeting from time to time to another place, time, or date. If the meeting is adjourned for more than twenty-four (24) hours, notice shall

be given to those Directors not at the meeting at the time of the adjournment.

Section 18. ACTION BY TELEPHONE MEETING OR BY OTHER COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT

Members of the Board or any Committee of the Board may participate in a meeting of the Board or Committee of the Board through use of (i) conference telephone or similar communications equipment, provided that all Directors participating in such a meeting can speak to and hear one another or (ii) electronic video screen communication or other communication equipment; provided that (a) all Directors participating in such a meeting can speak to and hear one another, (b) all Directors are provided the means of fully participating in all matters before the Board or Committee of the Board, and (c) ICANN adopts and implements means of verifying that (x) a person participating in such a meeting is a Director or other person entitled to participate in the meeting and (y) all actions of, or votes by, the Board or Committee of the Board are taken or cast only by the members of the Board or Committee and not persons who are not members. Participation in a meeting pursuant to this Section constitutes presence in person at such meeting. ICANN shall make available at the place of any meeting of the Board the telecommunications equipment necessary to permit members of the Board to participate by telephone.

Section 19. ACTION WITHOUT MEETING

Any action required or permitted to be taken by the Board or a Committee of the Board may be taken without a meeting if all of the Directors entitled to vote thereat shall individually or collectively consent in writing to such action. Such written consent shall have the same force and effect as the unanimous vote of such Directors. Such written consent or consents shall be filed with the minutes of the proceedings of the Board.

Section 20. ELECTRONIC MAIL

If permitted under applicable law, communication by electronic mail shall be considered equivalent to any communication otherwise required to be in writing. ICANN shall take such steps as it deems appropriate under the circumstances to assure itself that communications by electronic mail are authentic.

Section 21. RIGHTS OF INSPECTION

Every Director shall have the right at any reasonable time to inspect and copy all books, records and documents of every kind, and to inspect the physical properties of ICANN. ICANN shall establish reasonable

procedures to protect against the inappropriate disclosure of confidential information.

Section 22. COMPENSATION

1. Except for the President of ICANN, who serves ex officio as a voting member of the Board, each of the Directors shall be entitled to receive compensation for his/her services as a Director. The President shall receive only his/her compensation for service as President and shall not receive additional compensation for service as a Director.

2. If the Board determines to offer a compensation arrangement to one or more Directors other than the President of ICANN for services to ICANN as Directors, the Board shall follow a process that is calculated to pay an amount for service as a Director that is in its entirety Reasonable Compensation for such service under the standards set forth in §53.4958-4(b) of the Treasury Regulations.

3. As part of the process, the Board shall retain an Independent Valuation Expert to consult with and to advise the Board regarding Director compensation arrangements and to issue to the Board a Reasoned Written Opinion from such expert regarding the ranges of Reasonable Compensation for any such services by a Director. The expert's opinion shall address all relevant factors affecting the level of compensation to be paid a Director, including offices held on the Board, attendance at Board and Committee meetings, the nature of service on the Board and on Board Committees, and appropriate data as to comparability regarding director compensation arrangements for U.S.-based, nonprofit, tax-exempt organizations possessing a global employee base.

4. After having reviewed the expert's written opinion, the Board shall meet with the expert to discuss the expert's opinion and to ask questions of the expert regarding the expert's opinion, the comparability data obtained and relied upon, and the conclusions reached by the expert.

5. The Board shall adequately document the basis for any determination the Board makes regarding a Director compensation arrangement concurrently with making that determination.

6. In addition to authorizing payment of compensation for services as Directors as set forth in this Section 22, the Board may also authorize the reimbursement of actual and necessary reasonable expenses incurred by any Director and by non-voting liaisons performing their duties as Directors or non-voting liaisons.

7. As used in this Section 22, the following terms shall have the following meanings:

(a) An "Independent Valuation Expert" means a person retained by ICANN to value compensation arrangements that: (i) holds itself out to the public as a compensation consultant; (ii) performs valuations regarding compensation arrangements on a regular basis, with a majority of its compensation consulting services performed for persons other than ICANN; (iii) is qualified to make valuations of the type of services involved in any engagement by and for ICANN; (iv) issues to ICANN a Reasoned Written Opinion regarding a particular compensation arrangement; and (v) includes in its Reasoned Written Opinion a certification that it meets the requirements set forth in (i) through (iv) of this definition.

(b) A "Reasoned Written Opinion" means a written opinion of a valuation expert who meets the requirements of subparagraph 7(a) (i) through (iv) of this Section. To be reasoned, the opinion must be based upon a full disclosure by ICANN to the valuation expert of the factual situation regarding the compensation arrangement that is the subject of the opinion, the opinion must articulate the applicable valuation standards relevant in valuing such compensation arrangement, and the opinion must apply those standards to such compensation arrangement, and the opinion must arrive at a conclusion regarding the whether the compensation arrangement is within the range of Reasonable Compensation for the services covered by the arrangement. A written opinion is reasoned even though it reaches a conclusion that is subsequently determined to be incorrect so long as the opinion addresses itself to the facts and the

applicable standards. However, a written opinion is not reasoned if it does nothing more than recite the facts and express a conclusion.

(c) "Reasonable Compensation" shall have the meaning set forth in §53.4958-4(b)(1)(ii) of the Regulations issued under §4958 of the Code.

8. Each of the non-voting liaisons to the Board, with the exception of the Governmental Advisory Committee liaison, shall be entitled to receive compensation for his/her services as a non-voting liaison. If the Board determines to offer a compensation arrangement to one or more non-voting liaisons, the Board shall approve that arrangement by a required three-fourths (3/4) vote.

Section 23. PRESUMPTION OF ASSENT

A Director present at a Board meeting at which action on any corporate matter is taken shall be presumed to have assented to the action taken unless his or her dissent or abstention is entered in the minutes of the meeting, or unless such Director files a written dissent or abstention to such action with the person acting as the secretary of the meeting before the adjournment thereof, or forwards such dissent or abstention by registered mail to the Secretary of ICANN immediately after the adjournment of the meeting. Such right to dissent or abstain shall not apply to a Director who voted in favor of such action.

ARTICLE VII: NOMINATING COMMITTEE

Section 1. DESCRIPTION

There shall be a Nominating Committee of ICANN, responsible for the selection of all ICANN Directors except the President and those Directors selected by ICANN's Supporting Organizations, and for such other selections as are set forth in these Bylaws.

Section 2. COMPOSITION

The Nominating Committee shall be composed of the following persons:

1. A non-voting Chair, appointed by the ICANN Board;
2. A non-voting Chair-Elect, appointed by the ICANN Board as a non-voting advisor;

3. A non-voting liaison appointed by the [ICANN Root Server System Advisory Committee](#) established by [Article XI of these Bylaws](#);
4. A non-voting liaison appointed by the [ICANN Security and Stability Advisory Committee](#) established by [Article XI of these Bylaws](#);
5. A non-voting liaison appointed by the [Governmental Advisory Committee](#);
6. Subject to the provisions of the Transition Article of these Bylaws, five voting delegates selected by the At-Large Advisory Committee established by [Article XI of these Bylaws](#);
7. Voting delegates to the Nominating Committee shall be selected from the Generic Names Supporting Organization, established by [Article X of these Bylaws](#), as follows:
 - a. One delegate from the Registries Stakeholder Group;
 - b. One delegate from the Registrars Stakeholder Group;
 - c. Two delegates from the Business Constituency, one representing small business users and one representing large business users;
 - d. One delegate from the Internet Service Providers Constituency;
 - e. One delegate from the Intellectual Property Constituency; and
 - f. One delegate from consumer and civil society groups, selected by the Non-Commercial Users Constituency.
8. One voting delegate each selected by the following entities:
 - a. The Council of the Country Code Names Supporting Organization established by [Article IX of these Bylaws](#);

b. The Council of the Address Supporting Organization established by [Article VIII of these Bylaws](#); and

c. The Internet Engineering Task Force.

9. A non-voting Associate Chair, who may be appointed by the Chair, at his or her sole discretion, to serve during all or part of the term of the Chair. The Associate Chair may not be a person who is otherwise a member of the same Nominating Committee. The Associate Chair shall assist the Chair in carrying out the duties of the Chair, but shall not serve, temporarily or otherwise, in the place of the Chair.

Section 3. TERMS

Subject to the provisions of the [Transition Article of these Bylaws](#):

1. Each voting delegate shall serve a one-year term. A delegate may serve at most two successive one-year terms, after which at least two years must elapse before the individual is eligible to serve another term.

2. The regular term of each voting delegate shall begin at the conclusion of an ICANN annual meeting and shall end at the conclusion of the immediately following ICANN annual meeting.

3. Non-voting liaisons shall serve during the term designated by the entity that appoints them. The Chair, the Chair-Elect, and any Associate Chair shall serve as such until the conclusion of the next ICANN annual meeting.

4. It is anticipated that upon the conclusion of the term of the Chair-Elect, the Chair-Elect will be appointed by the Board to the position of Chair. However, the Board retains the discretion to appoint any other person to the position of Chair. At the time of appointing a Chair-Elect, if the Board determines that the person identified to serve as Chair shall be appointed as Chair for a successive term, the Chair-Elect position shall remain vacant for the term designated by the Board.

5. Vacancies in the positions of delegate, non-voting liaison, Chair or Chair-Elect shall be filled by the entity entitled to select the delegate, non-voting liaison, Chair or Chair-Elect involved. For any term that the Chair-Elect position is vacant

pursuant to paragraph 4 of this Article, or until any other vacancy in the position of Chair-Elect can be filled, a non-voting advisor to the Chair may be appointed by the Board from among persons with prior service on the Board or a Nominating Committee, including the immediately previous Chair of the Nominating Committee. A vacancy in the position of Associate Chair may be filled by the Chair in accordance with the criteria established by Section 2(9) of this Article.

6. The existence of any vacancies shall not affect the obligation of the Nominating Committee to carry out the responsibilities assigned to it in these Bylaws.

Section 4. CRITERIA FOR SELECTION OF NOMINATING COMMITTEE DELEGATES

Delegates to the ICANN Nominating Committee shall be:

1. Accomplished persons of integrity, objectivity, and intelligence, with reputations for sound judgment and open minds, and with experience and competence with collegial large group decision-making;
2. Persons with wide contacts, broad experience in the Internet community, and a commitment to the success of ICANN;
3. Persons whom the selecting body is confident will consult widely and accept input in carrying out their responsibilities;
4. Persons who are neutral and objective, without any fixed personal commitments to particular individuals, organizations, or commercial objectives in carrying out their Nominating Committee responsibilities;
5. Persons with an understanding of ICANN's mission and the potential impact of ICANN's activities on the broader Internet community who are willing to serve as volunteers, without compensation other than the reimbursement of certain expenses; and
6. Persons who are able to work and communicate in written and spoken English.

Section 5. DIVERSITY

In carrying out its responsibilities to select members of the ICANN Board (and selections to any other ICANN bodies as the Nominating Committee is responsible for under these Bylaws), the Nominating Committee shall take into account the continuing membership of the ICANN Board (and such other bodies), and seek to ensure that the persons selected to fill vacancies on the ICANN Board (and each such other body) shall, to the extent feasible and consistent with the other criteria required to be applied by [Section 4 of this Article](#), make selections guided by Core Value 4 in [Article I, Section 2](#) .

Section 6. ADMINISTRATIVE AND OPERATIONAL SUPPORT

ICANN shall provide administrative and operational support necessary for the Nominating Committee to carry out its responsibilities.

Section 7. PROCEDURES

The Nominating Committee shall adopt such operating procedures as it deems necessary, which shall be published on the Website.

Section 8. INELIGIBILITY FOR SELECTION BY NOMINATING COMMITTEE

No person who serves on the Nominating Committee in any capacity shall be eligible for selection by any means to any position on the Board or any other ICANN body having one or more membership positions that the Nominating Committee is responsible for filling, until the conclusion of an ICANN annual meeting that coincides with, or is after, the conclusion of that person's service on the Nominating Committee.

Section 9. INELIGIBILITY FOR SERVICE ON NOMINATING COMMITTEE

No person who is an employee of or paid consultant to ICANN (including the Ombudsman) shall simultaneously serve in any of the Nominating Committee positions described in [Section 2 of this Article](#).

ARTICLE VIII: ADDRESS SUPPORTING ORGANIZATION

Section 1. DESCRIPTION

1. The Address Supporting Organization (ASO) shall advise the Board with respect to policy issues relating to the operation, assignment, and management of Internet addresses.

2. The ASO shall be the entity established by the Memorandum of Understanding entered on 21 October 2004 between ICANN and the Number Resource Organization (NRO), an organization of the existing regional Internet registries (RIRs).

Section 2. ADDRESS COUNCIL

1. The ASO shall have an Address Council, consisting of the members of the NRO Number Council.
2. The Address Council shall select Directors to those seats on the Board designated to be filled by the ASO.

ARTICLE IX: COUNTRY-CODE NAMES SUPPORTING ORGANIZATION

Section 1. DESCRIPTION

There shall be a policy-development body known as the Country-Code Names Supporting Organization (ccNSO), which shall be responsible for:

1. developing and recommending to the Board global policies relating to country-code top-level domains;
2. Nurturing consensus across the ccNSO's community, including the name-related activities of ccTLDs; and
3. Coordinating with other ICANN Supporting Organizations, committees, and constituencies under ICANN.

Policies that apply to ccNSO members by virtue of their membership are only those policies developed according to section 4.10 and 4.11 of this Article. However, the ccNSO may also engage in other activities authorized by its members. Adherence to the results of these activities will be voluntary and such activities may include: seeking to develop voluntary best practices for ccTLD managers, assisting in skills building within the global community of ccTLD managers, and enhancing operational and technical cooperation among ccTLD managers.

Section 2. ORGANIZATION

The ccNSO shall consist of (i) ccTLD managers that have agreed in writing to be members of the ccNSO (see [Section 4\(2\) of this Article](#)) and (ii) a ccNSO Council responsible for managing the policy-development process of the ccNSO.

Section 3. ccNSO COUNCIL

1. The ccNSO Council shall consist of (a) three ccNSO Council members selected by the ccNSO members within each of [ICANN's Geographic Regions](#) in the manner described in [Section 4\(7\) through \(9\) of this Article](#); (b) three ccNSO Council members selected by the ICANN Nominating Committee; (c) liaisons as described in [paragraph 2 of this Section](#); and (iv) observers as described in [paragraph 3 of this Section](#).

2. There shall also be one liaison to the ccNSO Council from each of the following organizations, to the extent they choose to appoint such a liaison: (a) the Governmental Advisory Committee; (b) the At-Large Advisory Committee; and (c) each of the Regional Organizations described in [Section 5 of this Article](#). These liaisons shall not be members of or entitled to vote on the ccNSO Council, but otherwise shall be entitled to participate on equal footing with members of the ccNSO Council. Appointments of liaisons shall be made by providing written notice to the ICANN Secretary, with a notification copy to the ccNSO Council Chair, and shall be for the term designated by the appointing organization as stated in the written notice. The appointing organization may recall from office or replace its liaison at any time by providing written notice of the recall or replacement to the ICANN Secretary, with a notification copy to the ccNSO Council Chair.

3. The ccNSO Council may agree with the Council of any other ICANN Supporting Organization to exchange observers. Such observers shall not be members of or entitled to vote on the ccNSO Council, but otherwise shall be entitled to participate on equal footing with members of the ccNSO Council. The appointing Council may designate its observer (or revoke or change the designation of its observer) on the ccNSO Council at any time by providing written notice to the ICANN Secretary, with a notification copy to the ccNSO Council Chair.

4. Subject to the provisions of the [Transition Article of these Bylaws](#): (a) the regular term of each ccNSO Council member shall begin at the conclusion of an ICANN annual meeting and shall end at the conclusion of the third ICANN annual meeting thereafter; (b) the regular terms of the three ccNSO Council members selected by the ccNSO members within each ICANN Geographic Region shall be staggered so that one member's

term begins in a year divisible by three, a second member's term begins in the first year following a year divisible by three, and the third member's term begins in the second year following a year divisible by three; and (c) the regular terms of the three ccNSO Council members selected by the Nominating Committee shall be staggered in the same manner. Each ccNSO Council member shall hold office during his or her regular term and until a successor has been selected and qualified or until that member resigns or is removed in accordance with these Bylaws.

5. A ccNSO Council member may resign at any time by giving written notice to the ICANN Secretary, with a notification copy to the ccNSO Council Chair.

6. ccNSO Council members may be removed for not attending three consecutive meetings of the ccNSO Council without sufficient cause or for grossly inappropriate behavior, both as determined by at least a 66% vote of all of the members of the ccNSO Council.

7. A vacancy on the ccNSO Council shall be deemed to exist in the case of the death, resignation, or removal of any ccNSO Council member. Vacancies in the positions of the three members selected by the Nominating Committee shall be filled for the unexpired term involved by the Nominating Committee giving the ICANN Secretary written notice of its selection, with a notification copy to the ccNSO Council Chair. Vacancies in the positions of the ccNSO Council members selected by ccNSO members shall be filled for the unexpired term by the procedure described in [Section 4\(7\) through \(9\) of this Article](#).

8. The role of the ccNSO Council is to administer and coordinate the affairs of the ccNSO (including coordinating meetings, including an annual meeting, of ccNSO members as described in [Section 4\(6\) of this Article](#)) and to manage the development of policy recommendations in accordance with Section 6 of this Article. The ccNSO Council shall also undertake such other roles as the members of the ccNSO shall decide from time to time.

9. The ccNSO Council shall make selections to fill Seats 11 and 12 on the Board by written ballot or by action at a meeting; any such selection must have affirmative votes of a majority of all the members of the ccNSO Council then in office.

Notification of the ccNSO Council's selections shall be given by the ccNSO Council Chair in writing to the ICANN Secretary, consistent with Article VI, [Sections 8\(4\)](#) and [12\(1\)](#).

10. The ccNSO Council shall select from among its members the ccNSO Council Chair and such Vice Chair(s) as it deems appropriate. Selections of the ccNSO Council Chair and Vice Chair(s) shall be by written ballot or by action at a meeting; any such selection must have affirmative votes of a majority of all the members of the ccNSO Council then in office. The term of office of the ccNSO Council Chair and any Vice Chair(s) shall be as specified by the ccNSO Council at or before the time the selection is made. The ccNSO Council Chair or any Vice Chair(s) may be recalled from office by the same procedure as used for selection.

11. The ccNSO Council, subject to direction by the ccNSO members, shall adopt such rules and procedures for the ccNSO as it deems necessary, provided they are consistent with these Bylaws. Rules for ccNSO membership and operating procedures adopted by the ccNSO Council shall be published on the Website.

12. Except as provided by [paragraphs 9 and 10 of this Section](#), the ccNSO Council shall act at meetings. The ccNSO Council shall meet regularly on a schedule it determines, but not fewer than four times each calendar year. At the discretion of the ccNSO Council, meetings may be held in person or by other means, provided that all ccNSO Council members are permitted to participate by at least one means described in [paragraph 14 of this Section](#). Except where determined by a majority vote of the members of the ccNSO Council present that a closed session is appropriate, physical meetings shall be open to attendance by all interested persons. To the extent practicable, ccNSO Council meetings should be held in conjunction with meetings of the Board, or of one or more of ICANN's other Supporting Organizations.

13. Notice of time and place (and information about means of participation other than personal attendance) of all meetings of the ccNSO Council shall be provided to each ccNSO Council member, liaison, and observer by e-mail, telephone, facsimile, or a paper notice delivered personally or by postal mail. In case the notice is sent by postal mail, it shall be sent at least 21 days before the day of the meeting. In case the notice is

delivered personally or by telephone, facsimile, or e-mail it shall be provided at least seven days before the day of the meeting. At least seven days in advance of each ccNSO Council meeting (or if not practicable, as far in advance as is practicable), a notice of such meeting and, to the extent known, an agenda for the meeting shall be posted.

14. Members of the ccNSO Council may participate in a meeting of the ccNSO Council through personal attendance or use of electronic communication (such as telephone or video conference), provided that (a) all ccNSO Council members participating in the meeting can speak to and hear one another, (b) all ccNSO Council members participating in the meeting are provided the means of fully participating in all matters before the ccNSO Council, and (c) there is a reasonable means of verifying the identity of ccNSO Council members participating in the meeting and their votes. A majority of the ccNSO Council members (i.e. those entitled to vote) then in office shall constitute a quorum for the transaction of business, and actions by a majority vote of the ccNSO Council members present at any meeting at which there is a quorum shall be actions of the ccNSO Council, unless otherwise provided in these Bylaws. The ccNSO Council shall transmit minutes of its meetings to the ICANN Secretary, who shall cause those minutes to be posted to the Website as soon as practicable following the meeting, and no later than 21 days following the meeting.

Section 4. MEMBERSHIP

1. The ccNSO shall have a membership consisting of ccTLD managers. Any ccTLD manager that meets the membership qualifications stated in [paragraph 2 of this Section](#) shall be entitled to be members of the ccNSO. For purposes of this Article, a ccTLD manager is the organization or entity responsible for managing an ISO 3166 country-code top-level domain and referred to in the IANA database under the current heading of "Sponsoring Organization", or under any later variant, for that country-code top-level domain.

2. Any ccTLD manager may become a ccNSO member by submitting an application to a person designated by the ccNSO Council to receive applications. Subject to the provisions of the Transition Article of these Bylaws, the application shall be in writing in a form designated by the

ccNSO Council. The application shall include the ccTLD manager's recognition of the role of the ccNSO within the ICANN structure as well as the ccTLD manager's agreement, for the duration of its membership in the ccNSO, (a) to adhere to rules of the ccNSO, including membership rules, (b) to abide by policies developed and recommended by the ccNSO and adopted by the Board in the manner described by paragraphs 10 and 11 of this Section, and (c) to pay ccNSO membership fees established by the ccNSO Council under [Section 7\(3\) of this Article](#). A ccNSO member may resign from membership at any time by giving written notice to a person designated by the ccNSO Council to receive notices of resignation. Upon resignation the ccTLD manager ceases to agree to (a) adhere to rules of the ccNSO, including membership rules, (b) to abide by policies developed and recommended by the ccNSO and adopted by the Board in the manner described by paragraphs 10 and 11 of this Section, and (c) to pay ccNSO membership fees established by the ccNSO Council under [Section 7\(3\) of this Article](#). In the absence of designation by the ccNSO Council of a person to receive applications and notices of resignation, they shall be sent to the ICANN Secretary, who shall notify the ccNSO Council of receipt of any such applications and notices.

3. Neither membership in the ccNSO nor membership in any Regional Organization described in [Section 5 of this Article](#) shall be a condition for access to or registration in the IANA database. Any individual relationship a ccTLD manager has with ICANN or the ccTLD manager's receipt of IANA services is not in any way contingent upon membership in the ccNSO.

4. The Geographic Regions of ccTLDs shall be as described in [Article VI, Section 5 of these Bylaws](#). For purposes of this Article, managers of ccTLDs within a Geographic Region that are members of the ccNSO are referred to as ccNSO members "within" the Geographic Region, regardless of the physical location of the ccTLD manager. In cases where the Geographic Region of a ccNSO member is unclear, the ccTLD member should self-select according to procedures adopted by the ccNSO Council.

5. Each ccTLD manager may designate in writing a person, organization, or entity to represent the ccTLD manager. In the absence of such a designation, the ccTLD manager shall be

represented by the person, organization, or entity listed as the administrative contact in the IANA database.

6. There shall be an annual meeting of ccNSO members, which shall be coordinated by the ccNSO Council. Annual meetings should be open for all to attend, and a reasonable opportunity shall be provided for ccTLD managers that are not members of the ccNSO as well as other non-members of the ccNSO to address the meeting. To the extent practicable, annual meetings of the ccNSO members shall be held in person and should be held in conjunction with meetings of the Board, or of one or more of ICANN's other Supporting Organizations.

7. The ccNSO Council members selected by the ccNSO members from each Geographic Region (see [Section 3\(1\)\(a\) of this Article](#)) shall be selected through nomination, and if necessary election, by the ccNSO members within that Geographic Region. At least 90 days before the end of the regular term of any ccNSO-member-selected member of the ccNSO Council, or upon the occurrence of a vacancy in the seat of such a ccNSO Council member, the ccNSO Council shall establish a nomination and election schedule, which shall be sent to all ccNSO members within the Geographic Region and posted on the Website.

8. Any ccNSO member may nominate an individual to serve as a ccNSO Council member representing the ccNSO member's Geographic Region. Nominations must be seconded by another ccNSO member from the same Geographic Region. By accepting their nomination, individuals nominated to the ccNSO Council agree to support the policies committed to by ccNSO members.

9. If at the close of nominations there are no more candidates nominated (with seconds and acceptances) in a particular Geographic Region than there are seats on the ccNSO Council available for that Geographic Region, then the nominated candidates shall be selected to serve on the ccNSO Council. Otherwise, an election by written ballot (which may be by e-mail) shall be held to select the ccNSO Council members from among those nominated (with seconds and acceptances), with ccNSO members from the Geographic Region being entitled to vote in the election through their designated representatives. In such an election, a majority of all ccNSO

members in the Geographic Region entitled to vote shall constitute a quorum, and the selected candidate must receive the votes of a majority of those cast by ccNSO members within the Geographic Region. The ccNSO Council Chair shall provide the ICANN Secretary prompt written notice of the selection of ccNSO Council members under this paragraph.

10. Subject to clause 4(11), ICANN policies shall apply to ccNSO members by virtue of their membership to the extent, and only to the extent, that the policies (a) only address issues that are within scope of the ccNSO according to Article IX, Section 6 and Annex C; (b) have been developed through the ccPDP as described in [Section 6 of this Article](#), and (c) have been recommended as such by the ccNSO to the Board, and (d) are adopted by the Board as policies, provided that such policies do not conflict with the law applicable to the ccTLD manager which shall, at all times, remain paramount. In addition, such policies shall apply to ICANN in its activities concerning ccTLDs.

11. A ccNSO member shall not be bound if it provides a declaration to the ccNSO Council stating that (a) implementation of the policy would require the member to breach custom, religion, or public policy (not embodied in the applicable law described in [paragraph 10 of this Section](#)), and (b) failure to implement the policy would not impair DNS operations or interoperability, giving detailed reasons supporting its statements. After investigation, the ccNSO Council will provide a response to the ccNSO member's declaration. If there is a ccNSO Council consensus disagreeing with the declaration, which may be demonstrated by a vote of 14 or more members of the ccNSO Council, the response shall state the ccNSO Council's disagreement with the declaration and the reasons for disagreement. Otherwise, the response shall state the ccNSO Council's agreement with the declaration. If the ccNSO Council disagrees, the ccNSO Council shall review the situation after a six-month period. At the end of that period, the ccNSO Council shall make findings as to (a) whether the ccNSO members' implementation of the policy would require the member to breach custom, religion, or public policy (not embodied in the applicable law described in [paragraph 10 of this Section](#)) and (b) whether failure to implement the policy would impair DNS operations or interoperability. In making any findings disagreeing with the declaration, the ccNSO Council shall proceed by consensus,

which may be demonstrated by a vote of 14 or more members of the ccNSO Council.

Section 5. REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

The ccNSO Council may designate a Regional Organization for each ICANN Geographic Region, provided that the Regional Organization is open to full membership by all ccNSO members within the Geographic Region. Decisions to designate or de-designate a Regional Organization shall require a 66% vote of all of the members of the ccNSO Council and shall be subject to review according to procedures established by the Board.

Section 6. ccNSO POLICY-DEVELOPMENT PROCESS AND SCOPE

1. The scope of the ccNSO's policy-development role shall be as stated in [Annex C to these Bylaws](#); any modifications to the scope shall be recommended to the Board by the ccNSO by use of the procedures of the ccPDP, and shall be subject to approval by the Board.

2. In developing global policies within the scope of the ccNSO and recommending them to the Board, the ccNSO shall follow the ccNSO Policy-Development Process (ccPDP). The ccPDP shall be as stated in [Annex B to these Bylaws](#); modifications shall be recommended to the Board by the ccNSO by use of the procedures of the ccPDP, and shall be subject to approval by the Board.

Section 7. STAFF SUPPORT AND FUNDING

1. Upon request of the ccNSO Council, a member of the ICANN staff may be assigned to support the ccNSO and shall be designated as the ccNSO Staff Manager. Alternatively, the ccNSO Council may designate, at ccNSO expense, another person to serve as ccNSO Staff Manager. The work of the ccNSO Staff Manager on substantive matters shall be assigned by the Chair of the ccNSO Council, and may include the duties of ccPDP Issue Manager.

2. Upon request of the ccNSO Council, ICANN shall provide administrative and operational support necessary for the ccNSO to carry out its responsibilities. Such support shall not include an obligation for ICANN to fund travel expenses incurred by ccNSO participants for travel to any meeting of the ccNSO or for any other purpose. The ccNSO Council may

make provision, at ccNSO expense, for administrative and operational support in addition or as an alternative to support provided by ICANN.

3. The ccNSO Council shall establish fees to be paid by ccNSO members to defray ccNSO expenses as described in [paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Section](#), as approved by the ccNSO members.

4. Written notices given to the ICANN Secretary under this Article shall be permanently retained, and shall be made available for review by the ccNSO Council on request. The ICANN Secretary shall also maintain the roll of members of the ccNSO, which shall include the name of each ccTLD manager's designated representative, and which shall be posted on the Website.

ARTICLE X: GENERIC NAMES SUPPORTING ORGANIZATION

Section 1. DESCRIPTION

There shall be a policy-development body known as the Generic Names Supporting Organization (GNSO), which shall be responsible for developing and recommending to the ICANN Board substantive policies relating to generic top-level domains.

Section 2. ORGANIZATION

The GNSO shall consist of:

- (i) A number of Constituencies, where applicable, organized within the Stakeholder Groups as described in [Section 5 of this Article](#);
- (ii) Four Stakeholder Groups organized within Houses as described in [Section 5 of this Article](#);
- (iii) Two Houses within the GNSO Council as described in [Section 3\(8\) of this Article](#); and
- (iv) a GNSO Council responsible for managing the policy development process of the GNSO, as described in [Section 3 of this Article](#).

Except as otherwise defined in these Bylaws, the four Stakeholder Groups and the Constituencies will be responsible for defining their own charters with the approval of their members and of the ICANN Board of Directors.

Section 3. GNSO COUNCIL

1. Subject to the provisions of [Transition Article XX, Section 5 of these Bylaws](#) and as described in [Section 5 of Article X](#), the GNSO Council shall consist of:

- a. three representatives selected from the Registries Stakeholder Group;
- b. three representatives selected from the Registrars Stakeholder Group;
- c. six representatives selected from the Commercial Stakeholder Group;
- d. six representatives selected from the Non-Commercial Stakeholder Group; and
- e. three representatives selected by the ICANN Nominating Committee, one of which shall be non-voting, but otherwise entitled to participate on equal footing with other members of the GNSO Council including, e.g. the making and seconding of motions and of serving as Chair if elected. One Nominating Committee Appointee voting representative shall be assigned to each House (as described in [Section 3\(8\) of this Article](#)) by the Nominating Committee.

No individual representative may hold more than one seat on the GNSO Council at the same time.

Stakeholder Groups should, in their charters, ensure their representation on the GNSO Council is as diverse as possible and practicable, including considerations of geography, GNSO Constituency, sector, ability and gender.

There may also be liaisons to the GNSO Council from other ICANN Supporting Organizations and/or Advisory Committees, from time to time. The appointing organization shall designate, revoke, or change its liaison on the GNSO Council by providing written notice to the Chair of the GNSO Council and

to the ICANN Secretary. Liaisons shall not be members of or entitled to vote, to make or second motions, or to serve as an officer on the GNSO Council, but otherwise liaisons shall be entitled to participate on equal footing with members of the GNSO Council.

2. Subject to the provisions of the [Transition Article XX, and Section 5 of these Bylaws](#), the regular term of each GNSO Council member shall begin at the conclusion of an ICANN annual meeting and shall end at the conclusion of the second ICANN annual meeting thereafter. The regular term of two representatives selected from Stakeholder Groups with three Council seats shall begin in even-numbered years and the regular term of the other representative selected from that Stakeholder Group shall begin in odd-numbered years. The regular term of three representatives selected from Stakeholder Groups with six Council seats shall begin in even-numbered years and the regular term of the other three representatives selected from that Stakeholder Group shall begin in odd-numbered years. The regular term of one of the three members selected by the Nominating Committee shall begin in even-numbered years and the regular term of the other two of the three members selected by the Nominating Committee shall begin in odd-numbered years. Each GNSO Council member shall hold office during his or her regular term and until a successor has been selected and qualified or until that member resigns or is removed in accordance with these Bylaws.

Except in a "special circumstance," such as, but not limited to, meeting geographic or other diversity requirements defined in the Stakeholder Group charters, where no alternative representative is available to serve, no Council member may be selected to serve more than two consecutive terms, in such a special circumstance a Council member may serve one additional term. For these purposes, a person selected to fill a vacancy in a term shall not be deemed to have served that term. A former Council member who has served two consecutive terms must remain out of office for one full term prior to serving any subsequent term as Council member. A "special circumstance" is defined in the GNSO Operating Procedures.

3. A vacancy on the GNSO Council shall be deemed to exist in the case of the death, resignation, or removal of any member.

Vacancies shall be filled for the unexpired term by the appropriate Nominating Committee or Stakeholder Group that selected the member holding the position before the vacancy occurred by giving the GNSO Secretariat written notice of its selection. Procedures for handling Stakeholder Group-appointed GNSO Council member vacancies, resignations, and removals are prescribed in the applicable Stakeholder Group Charter.

A GNSO Council member selected by the Nominating Committee may be removed for cause: i) stated by a three-fourths (3/4) vote of all members of the applicable House to which the Nominating Committee appointee is assigned; or ii) stated by a three-fourths (3/4) vote of all members of each House in the case of the non-voting Nominating Committee appointee (see [Section 3\(8\) of this Article](#)). Such removal shall be subject to reversal by the ICANN Board on appeal by the affected GNSO Council member.

4. The GNSO Council is responsible for managing the policy development process of the GNSO. It shall adopt such procedures (the "GNSO Operating Procedures") as it sees fit to carry out that responsibility, provided that such procedures are approved by a majority vote of each House. The GNSO Operating Procedures shall be effective upon the expiration of a twenty-one (21) day public comment period, and shall be subject to Board oversight and review. Until any modifications are recommended by the GNSO Council, the applicable procedures shall be as set forth in [Section 6 of this Article](#).

5. No more than one officer, director or employee of any particular corporation or other organization (including its subsidiaries and affiliates) shall serve on the GNSO Council at any given time.

6. The GNSO shall make selections to fill Seats 13 and 14 on the ICANN Board by written ballot or by action at a meeting. Each of the two voting Houses of the GNSO, as described in [Section 3\(8\) of this Article](#), shall make a selection to fill one of two ICANN Board seats, as outlined below; any such selection must have affirmative votes comprising sixty percent (60%) of all the respective voting House members:

a. the Contracted Party House shall select a representative to fill Seat 13; and

b. the Non-Contracted Party House shall select a representative to fill Seat 14

Election procedures are defined in the GNSO Operating Procedures.

Notification of the Board seat selections shall be given by the GNSO Chair in writing to the ICANN Secretary, consistent with Article VI, Sections [8\(4\)](#) and [12\(1\)](#).

7. The GNSO Council shall select the GNSO Chair for a term the GNSO Council specifies, but not longer than one year. Each House (as described in [Section 3.8 of this Article](#)) shall select a Vice-Chair, who will be a Vice-Chair of the whole of the GNSO Council, for a term the GNSO Council specifies, but not longer than one year. The procedures for selecting the Chair and any other officers are contained in the GNSO Operating Procedures. In the event that the GNSO Council has not elected a GNSO Chair by the end of the previous Chair's term, the Vice-Chairs will serve as Interim GNSO Co-Chairs until a successful election can be held.

8. Except as otherwise required in these Bylaws, for voting purposes, the GNSO Council (see [Section 3\(1\) of this Article](#)) shall be organized into a bicameral House structure as described below:

a. the Contracted Parties House includes the Registries Stakeholder Group (three members), the Registrars Stakeholder Group (three members), and one voting member appointed by the ICANN Nominating Committee for a total of seven voting members; and

b. the Non Contracted Parties House includes the Commercial Stakeholder Group (six members), the Non-Commercial Stakeholder Group (six members), and one voting member appointed by the ICANN Nominating Committee to that House for a total of thirteen voting members.

Except as otherwise specified in these Bylaws, each member of a voting House is entitled to cast one vote in each separate matter before the GNSO Council.

9. Except as otherwise specified in these Bylaws, [Annex A](#) hereto, or the GNSO Operating Procedures, the default threshold to pass a GNSO Council motion or other voting

action requires a simple majority vote of each House. The voting thresholds described below shall apply to the following GNSO actions:

- a. Create an Issues Report: requires an affirmative vote of more than one-fourth (1/4) vote of each House or majority of one House.
- b. Initiate a Policy Development Process ("PDP") Within Scope (as described in [Annex A](#)): requires an affirmative vote of more than one-third (1/3) of each House or more than two-thirds (2/3) of one House.
- c. Initiate a PDP Not Within Scope: requires an affirmative vote of GNSO Supermajority.
- d. Approve a PDP Team Charter for a PDP Within Scope: requires an affirmative vote of more than one-third (1/3) of each House or more than two-thirds (2/3) of one House.
- e. Approve a PDP Team Charter for a PDP Not Within Scope: requires an affirmative vote of a GNSO Supermajority.
- f. Changes to an Approved PDP Team Charter: For any PDP Team Charter approved under d. or e. above, the GNSO Council may approve an amendment to the Charter through a simple majority vote of each House.
- g. Terminate a PDP: Once initiated, and prior to the publication of a Final Report, the GNSO Council may terminate a PDP only for significant cause, upon a motion that passes with a GNSO Supermajority Vote in favor of termination.
- h. Approve a PDP Recommendation Without a GNSO Supermajority: requires an affirmative vote of a majority of each House and further requires that one GNSO Council member representative of at least 3 of the 4 Stakeholder Groups supports the Recommendation.

i. Approve a PDP Recommendation With a GNSO Supermajority: requires an affirmative vote of a GNSO Supermajority,

j. Approve a PDP Recommendation Imposing New Obligations on Certain Contracting Parties: where an ICANN contract provision specifies that "a two-thirds vote of the council" demonstrates the presence of a consensus, the GNSO Supermajority vote threshold will have to be met or exceeded.

k. Modification of Approved PDP Recommendation: Prior to Final Approval by the ICANN Board, an Approved PDP Recommendation may be modified or amended by the GNSO Council with a GNSO Supermajority vote.

l. A "GNSO Supermajority" shall mean: (a) two-thirds (2/3) of the Council members of each House, or (b) three-fourths (3/4) of one House and a majority of the other House."

Section 4. STAFF SUPPORT AND FUNDING

1. A member of the ICANN staff shall be assigned to support the GNSO, whose work on substantive matters shall be assigned by the Chair of the GNSO Council, and shall be designated as the GNSO Staff Manager (Staff Manager).

2. ICANN shall provide administrative and operational support necessary for the GNSO to carry out its responsibilities. Such support shall not include an obligation for ICANN to fund travel expenses incurred by GNSO participants for travel to any meeting of the GNSO or for any other purpose. ICANN may, at its discretion, fund travel expenses for GNSO participants under any travel support procedures or guidelines that it may adopt from time to time.

Section 5. STAKEHOLDER GROUPS

1. The following Stakeholder Groups are hereby recognized as representative of a specific group of one or more Constituencies or interest groups and subject to the provisions of the [Transition Article XX, Section 5 of these Bylaws](#):

- a. Registries Stakeholder Group representing all gTLD registries under contract to ICANN;
 - b. Registrars Stakeholder Group representing all registrars accredited by and under contract to ICANN;
 - c. Commercial Stakeholder Group representing the full range of large and small commercial entities of the Internet; and
 - d. Non-Commercial Stakeholder Group representing the full range of non-commercial entities of the Internet.
2. Each Stakeholder Group is assigned a specific number of Council seats in accordance with [Section 3\(1\) of this Article](#).
 3. Each Stakeholder Group identified in [paragraph 1 of this Section](#) and each of its associated Constituencies, where applicable, shall maintain recognition with the ICANN Board. Recognition is granted by the Board based upon the extent to which, in fact, the entity represents the global interests of the stakeholder communities it purports to represent and operates to the maximum extent feasible in an open and transparent manner consistent with procedures designed to ensure fairness. Stakeholder Group and Constituency Charters may be reviewed periodically as prescribed by the Board.
 4. Any group of individuals or entities may petition the Board for recognition as a new or separate Constituency in the Non-Contracted Parties House. Any such petition shall contain:
 - a. A detailed explanation of why the addition of such a Constituency will improve the ability of the GNSO to carry out its policy-development responsibilities;
 - b. A detailed explanation of why the proposed new Constituency adequately represents, on a global basis, the stakeholders it seeks to represent;
 - c. A recommendation for organizational placement within a particular Stakeholder Group; and

- d. A proposed charter that adheres to the principles and procedures contained in these Bylaws.

Any petition for the recognition of a new Constituency and the associated charter shall be posted for public comment.

5. The Board may create new Constituencies as described in [Section 5\(3\)](#) in response to such a petition, or on its own motion, if the Board determines that such action would serve the purposes of ICANN. In the event the Board is considering acting on its own motion it shall post a detailed explanation of why such action is necessary or desirable, set a reasonable time for public comment, and not make a final decision on whether to create such new Constituency until after reviewing all comments received. Whenever the Board posts a petition or recommendation for a new Constituency for public comment, the Board shall notify the GNSO Council and the appropriate Stakeholder Group affected and shall consider any response to that notification prior to taking action.

Section 6. POLICY DEVELOPMENT PROCESS

The policy-development procedures to be followed by the GNSO shall be as stated in [Annex A](#) to these Bylaws. These procedures may be supplemented or revised in the manner stated in [Section 3\(4\) of this Article](#).

ARTICLE XI: ADVISORY COMMITTEES

Section 1. GENERAL

The Board may create one or more Advisory Committees in addition to those set forth in this Article. Advisory Committee membership may consist of Directors only, Directors and non-directors, or non-directors only, and may also include non-voting or alternate members. Advisory Committees shall have no legal authority to act for ICANN, but shall report their findings and recommendations to the Board.

Section 2. SPECIFIC ADVISORY COMMITTEES

There shall be at least the following Advisory Committees:

1. Governmental Advisory Committee

- a. The Governmental Advisory Committee should consider and provide advice on the activities of

ICANN as they relate to concerns of governments, particularly matters where there may be an interaction between ICANN's policies and various laws and international agreements or where they may affect public policy issues.

b. Membership in the Governmental Advisory Committee shall be open to all national governments. Membership shall also be open to Distinct Economies as recognized in international fora, and multinational governmental organizations and treaty organizations, on the invitation of the Governmental Advisory Committee through its Chair.

c. The Governmental Advisory Committee may adopt its own charter and internal operating principles or procedures to guide its operations, to be published on the Website.

d. The chair of the Governmental Advisory Committee shall be elected by the members of the Governmental Advisory Committee pursuant to procedures adopted by such members.

e. Each member of the Governmental Advisory Committee shall appoint one accredited representative to the Committee. The accredited representative of a member must hold a formal official position with the member's public administration. The term "official" includes a holder of an elected governmental office, or a person who is employed by such government, public authority, or multinational governmental or treaty organization and whose primary function with such government, public authority, or organization is to develop or influence governmental or public policies.

f. The Governmental Advisory Committee shall annually appoint one non-voting liaison to the ICANN Board of Directors, without limitation on reappointment, and shall annually appoint one non-voting liaison to the ICANN Nominating Committee.

g. The Governmental Advisory Committee may designate a non-voting liaison to each of the Supporting Organization Councils and Advisory Committees, to the extent the Governmental Advisory Committee deems it appropriate and useful to do so.

h. The Board shall notify the Chair of the Governmental Advisory Committee in a timely manner of any proposal raising public policy issues on which it or any of ICANN's supporting organizations or advisory committees seeks public comment, and shall take duly into account any timely response to that notification prior to taking action.

i. The Governmental Advisory Committee may put issues to the Board directly, either by way of comment or prior advice, or by way of specifically recommending action or new policy development or revision to existing policies.

j. The advice of the Governmental Advisory Committee on public policy matters shall be duly taken into account, both in the formulation and adoption of policies. In the event that the ICANN Board determines to take an action that is not consistent with the Governmental Advisory Committee advice, it shall so inform the Committee and state the reasons why it decided not to follow that advice. The Governmental Advisory Committee and the ICANN Board will then try, in good faith and in a timely and efficient manner, to find a mutually acceptable solution.

k. If no such solution can be found, the ICANN Board will state in its final decision the reasons why the Governmental Advisory Committee advice was not followed, and such statement will be without prejudice to the rights or obligations of Governmental Advisory Committee members with regard to public policy issues falling within their responsibilities.

2. Security and Stability Advisory Committee

a. The role of the Security and Stability Advisory Committee ("SSAC") is to advise the ICANN community and Board on matters relating to the security and integrity of the Internet's naming and address allocation systems. It shall have the following responsibilities:

1. To communicate on security matters with the Internet technical community and the operators and managers of critical DNS infrastructure services, to include the root name server operator community, the top-level domain registries and registrars, the operators of the reverse delegation trees such as in-addr.arpa and ip6.arpa, and others as events and developments dictate. The Committee shall gather and articulate requirements to offer to those engaged in technical revision of the protocols related to DNS and address allocation and those engaged in operations planning.
2. To engage in ongoing threat assessment and risk analysis of the Internet naming and address allocation services to assess where the principal threats to stability and security lie, and to advise the ICANN community accordingly. The Committee shall recommend any necessary audit activity to assess the current status of DNS and address allocation security in relation to identified risks and threats.
3. To communicate with those who have direct responsibility for Internet naming and address allocation security matters (IETF, RSSAC, RIRs, name registries, etc.), to ensure that its advice on security risks, issues, and priorities is properly synchronized with existing standardization, deployment, operational, and coordination activities.

The Committee shall monitor these activities and inform the ICANN community and Board on their progress, as appropriate.

4. To report periodically to the Board on its activities.

5. To make policy recommendations to the ICANN community and Board.

b. The SSAC's chair and members shall be appointed by the Board. SSAC membership appointment shall be for a three-year term, commencing on 1 January and ending the second year thereafter on 31 December. The chair and members may be re-appointed, and there are no limits to the number of terms the chair or members may serve. The SSAC chair may provide recommendations to the Board regarding appointments to the SSAC. The SSAC chair shall stagger appointment recommendations so that approximately one-third (1/3) of the membership of the SSAC is considered for appointment or re-appointment each year. The Board shall also have to power to remove SSAC appointees as recommended by or in consultation with the SSAC. (Note: The first full term under this paragraph shall commence on 1 January 2011 and end on 31 December 2013. Prior to 1 January 2011, the SSAC shall be comprised as stated in the Bylaws as amended 25 June 2010, and the SSAC chair shall recommend the re-appointment of all current SSAC members to full or partial terms as appropriate to implement the provisions of this paragraph.)

c. The SSAC shall annually appoint a non-voting liaison to the ICANN Board according to [Section 9 of Article VI](#).

3. Root Server System Advisory Committee

a. The role of the Root Server System Advisory Committee ("RSSAC") is to advise the ICANN

community and Board on matters relating to the operation, administration, security, and integrity of the Internet's Root Server System. It shall have the following responsibilities:

1. Communicate on matters relating to the operation of the Root Servers and their multiple instances with the Internet technical community and the ICANN community. The Committee shall gather and articulate requirements to offer to those engaged in technical revision of the protocols and best common practices related to the operation of DNS servers.

2. Communicate on matters relating to the administration of the Root Zone with those who have direct responsibility for that administration. These matters include the processes and procedures for the production of the Root Zone File.

3. Engage in ongoing threat assessment and risk analysis of the Root Server System and recommend any necessary audit activity to assess the current status of root servers and the root zone.

4. Respond to requests for information or opinions from the ICANN Board of Directors.

5. Report periodically to the Board on its activities.

6. Make policy recommendations to the ICANN community and Board.

- b. The RSSAC shall be led by two co-chairs. The RSSAC's chairs and members shall be appointed by the Board.

1. RSSAC membership appointment shall be for a three-year term,

commencing on 1 January and ending the second year thereafter on 31 December. Members may be re-appointed, and there are no limits to the number of terms the members may serve. The RSSAC chairs shall provide recommendations to the Board regarding appointments to the RSSAC. If the board declines to appoint a person nominated by the RSSAC then it will provide the rationale for its decision. The RSSAC chairs shall stagger appointment recommendations so that approximately one-third (1/3) of the membership of the RSSAC is considered for appointment or re-appointment each year. The Board shall also have to power to remove RSSAC appointees as recommended by or in consultation with the RSSAC. (Note: The first term under this paragraph shall commence on 1 July 2013 and end on 31 December 2015, and shall be considered a full term for all purposes. All other full terms under this paragraph shall begin on 1 January of the corresponding year. Prior to 1 July 2013, the RSSAC shall be comprised as stated in the Bylaws as amended 16 March 2012, and the RSSAC chairs shall recommend the re-appointment of all current RSSAC members to full or partial terms as appropriate to implement the provisions of this paragraph.)

2. The RSSAC shall recommend the appointment of the chairs to the board following a nomination process that it devises and documents.

c. The RSSAC shall annually appoint a non-voting liaison to the ICANN Board according to Section 9 of Article VI.

4. At-Large Advisory Committee

a. The At-Large Advisory Committee (ALAC) is the primary organizational home within ICANN for individual Internet users. The role of the ALAC shall be to consider and provide advice on the activities of ICANN, insofar as they relate to the interests of individual Internet users. This includes policies created through ICANN's Supporting Organizations, as well as the many other issues for which community input and advice is appropriate. The ALAC, which plays an important role in ICANN's accountability mechanisms, also coordinates some of ICANN's outreach to individual Internet users.

b. The ALAC shall consist of (i) two members selected by each of the Regional At-Large Organizations ("RALOs") established according to paragraph 4(g) of this Section, and (ii) five members selected by the Nominating Committee. The five members selected by the Nominating Committee shall include one citizen of a country within each of the five Geographic Regions established according to Section 5 of Article VI.

c. Subject to the provisions of the Transition Article of these Bylaws, the regular terms of members of the ALAC shall be as follows:

1. The term of one member selected by each RALO shall begin at the conclusion of an ICANN annual meeting in an even-numbered year.
2. The term of the other member selected by each RALO shall begin at the conclusion of an ICANN annual meeting in an odd-numbered year.
3. The terms of three of the members selected by the Nominating Committee shall begin at the conclusion of an annual meeting in an odd-numbered year and the terms of the other two

members selected by the Nominating Committee shall begin at the conclusion of an annual meeting in an even-numbered year.

4. The regular term of each member shall end at the conclusion of the second ICANN annual meeting after the term began.

d. The Chair of the ALAC shall be elected by the members of the ALAC pursuant to procedures adopted by the Committee.

e. The ALAC shall, after consultation with each RALO, annually appoint five voting delegates (no two of whom shall be citizens of countries in the same Geographic Region, as defined according to [Section 5 of Article VI](#)) to the Nominating Committee.

f. Subject to the provisions of the [Transition Article of these Bylaws](#), the At-Large Advisory Committee may designate non-voting liaisons to each of the ccNSO Council and the GNSO Council.

g. There shall be one RALO for each Geographic Region established according to [Section 5 of Article VI](#). Each RALO shall serve as the main forum and coordination point for public input to ICANN in its Geographic Region and shall be a non-profit organization certified by ICANN according to criteria and standards established by the Board based on recommendations of the At-Large Advisory Committee. An organization shall become the recognized RALO for its Geographic Region upon entering a Memorandum of Understanding with ICANN addressing the respective roles and responsibilities of ICANN and the RALO regarding the process for selecting ALAC members and requirements of openness, participatory opportunities, transparency, accountability, and diversity in the RALO's structure and procedures, as well as criteria and standards for the RALO's constituent At-Large Structures.

h. Each RALO shall be comprised of self-supporting At-Large Structures within its Geographic Region that have been certified to meet the requirements of the RALO's Memorandum of Understanding with ICANN according to [paragraph 4\(i\) of this Section](#). If so provided by its Memorandum of Understanding with ICANN, a RALO may also include individual Internet users who are citizens or residents of countries within the RALO's Geographic Region.

i. Membership in the At-Large Community

1. The criteria and standards for the certification of At-Large Structures within each Geographic Region shall be established by the Board based on recommendations from the ALAC and shall be stated in the Memorandum of Understanding between ICANN and the RALO for each Geographic Region.
2. The criteria and standards for the certification of At-Large Structures shall be established in such a way that participation by individual Internet users who are citizens or residents of countries within the Geographic Region (as defined in [Section 5 of Article VI](#)) of the RALO will predominate in the operation of each At-Large Structure within the RALO, while not necessarily excluding additional participation, compatible with the interests of the individual Internet users within the region, by others.
3. Each RALO's Memorandum of Understanding shall also include provisions designed to allow, to the greatest extent possible, every individual Internet user who is a citizen of a country within the RALO's Geographic Region to participate in at least one of the RALO's At-Large Structures.
4. To the extent compatible with these objectives, the criteria and standards should

also afford to each RALO the type of structure that best fits the customs and character of its Geographic Region.

5. Once the criteria and standards have been established as provided in this Clause i, the ALAC, with the advice and participation of the RALO where the applicant is based, shall be responsible for certifying organizations as meeting the criteria and standards for At-Large Structure accreditation.
6. Decisions to certify or decertify an At-Large Structure shall be made as decided by the ALAC in its Rules of Procedure, save always that any changes made to the Rules of Procedure in respect of ALS applications shall be subject to review by the RALOs and by the ICANN Board.
7. Decisions as to whether to accredit, not to accredit, or disaccredit an At-Large Structure shall be subject to review according to procedures established by the Board.
8. On an ongoing basis, the ALAC may also give advice as to whether a prospective At-Large Structure meets the applicable criteria and standards.

j. The ALAC is also responsible, working in conjunction with the RALOs, for coordinating the following activities:

1. Making a selection by the At-Large Community to fill Seat 15 on the Board. Notification of the At-Large Community's selection shall be given by the ALAC Chair in writing to the ICANN Secretary, consistent with Article VI, Sections 8(4) and 12(1).

2. Keeping the community of individual Internet users informed about the significant news from ICANN;
3. Distributing (through posting or otherwise) an updated agenda, news about ICANN, and information about items in the ICANN policy-development process;
4. Promoting outreach activities in the community of individual Internet users;
5. Developing and maintaining on-going information and education programs, regarding ICANN and its work;
6. Establishing an outreach strategy about ICANN issues in each RALO's Region;
7. Participating in the ICANN policy development processes and providing input and advice that accurately reflects the views of individual Internet users;
8. Making public, and analyzing, ICANN's proposed policies and its decisions and their (potential) regional impact and (potential) effect on individuals in the region;
9. Offering Internet-based mechanisms that enable discussions among members of At-Large structures; and
10. Establishing mechanisms and processes that enable two-way communication between members of At-Large Structures and those involved in ICANN decision-making, so interested individuals can share their views on pending ICANN issues.

Section 3. PROCEDURES

Each Advisory Committee shall determine its own rules of procedure and quorum requirements.

Section 4. TERM OF OFFICE

The chair and each member of a committee shall serve until his or her successor is appointed, or until such committee is sooner terminated, or until he or she is removed, resigns, or otherwise ceases to qualify as a member of the committee.

Section 5. VACANCIES

Vacancies on any committee shall be filled in the same manner as provided in the case of original appointments.

Section 6. COMPENSATION

Committee members shall receive no compensation for their services as a member of a committee. The Board may, however, authorize the reimbursement of actual and necessary expenses incurred by committee members, including Directors, performing their duties as committee members.

ARTICLE XI-A: OTHER ADVISORY MECHANISMS

Section 1. EXTERNAL EXPERT ADVICE

1. Purpose. The purpose of seeking external expert advice is to allow the policy-development process within ICANN to take advantage of existing expertise that resides in the public or private sector but outside of ICANN. In those cases where there are relevant public bodies with expertise, or where access to private expertise could be helpful, the Board and constituent bodies should be encouraged to seek advice from such expert bodies or individuals.

2. Types of Expert Advisory Panels.

a. On its own initiative or at the suggestion of any ICANN body, the Board may appoint, or authorize the President to appoint, Expert Advisory Panels consisting of public or private sector individuals or entities. If the advice sought from such Panels concerns issues of public policy, the provisions of [Section 1\(3\)\(b\) of this Article](#) shall apply.

b. In addition, in accordance with [Section 1\(3\) of this Article](#), the Board may refer issues of public policy pertinent to matters within ICANN's mission to a multinational governmental or treaty organization.

3. Process for Seeking Advice-Public Policy Matters.

a. The Governmental Advisory Committee may at any time recommend that the Board seek advice concerning one or more issues of public policy from an external source, as set out above.

b. In the event that the Board determines, upon such a recommendation or otherwise, that external advice should be sought concerning one or more issues of public policy, the Board shall, as appropriate, consult with the Governmental Advisory Committee regarding the appropriate source from which to seek the advice and the arrangements, including definition of scope and process, for requesting and obtaining that advice.

c. The Board shall, as appropriate, transmit any request for advice from a multinational governmental or treaty organization, including specific terms of reference, to the Governmental Advisory Committee, with the suggestion that the request be transmitted by the Governmental Advisory Committee to the multinational governmental or treaty organization.

4. Process for Seeking and Advice-Other Matters. Any reference of issues not concerning public policy to an Expert Advisory Panel by the Board or President in accordance with [Section 1\(2\)\(a\) of this Article](#) shall be made pursuant to terms of reference describing the issues on which input and advice is sought and the procedures and schedule to be followed.

5. Receipt of Expert Advice and its Effect. External advice pursuant to this Section shall be provided in written form. Such advice is advisory and not binding, and is intended to augment the information available to the Board or other ICANN body in carrying out its responsibilities.

6. Opportunity to Comment. The Governmental Advisory Committee, in addition to the Supporting Organizations and other Advisory Committees, shall have an opportunity to comment upon any external advice received prior to any decision by the Board.

Section 2. TECHNICAL LIAISON GROUP

1. Purpose. The quality of ICANN's work depends on access to complete and authoritative information concerning the technical standards that underlie ICANN's activities. ICANN's relationship to the organizations that produce these standards is therefore particularly important. The Technical Liaison Group (TLG) shall connect the Board with appropriate sources of technical advice on specific matters pertinent to ICANN's activities.

2. TLG Organizations. The TLG shall consist of four organizations: the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI), the International Telecommunications Union's Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T), the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C), and the Internet Architecture Board (IAB).

3. Role. The role of the TLG organizations shall be to channel technical information and guidance to the Board and to other ICANN entities. This role has both a responsive component and an active "watchdog" component, which involve the following responsibilities:

a. In response to a request for information, to connect the Board or other ICANN body with appropriate sources of technical expertise. This component of the TLG role covers circumstances in which ICANN seeks an authoritative answer to a specific technical question. Where information is requested regarding a particular technical standard for which a TLG organization is responsible, that request shall be directed to that TLG organization.

b. As an ongoing "watchdog" activity, to advise the Board of the relevance and progress of technical developments in the areas covered by each organization's scope that could affect Board decisions or other ICANN actions, and to draw

attention to global technical standards issues that affect policy development within the scope of ICANN's mission. This component of the TLG role covers circumstances in which ICANN is unaware of a new development, and would therefore otherwise not realize that a question should be asked.

4. TLG Procedures. The TLG shall not have officers or hold meetings, nor shall it provide policy advice to the Board as a committee (although TLG organizations may individually be asked by the Board to do so as the need arises in areas relevant to their individual charters). Neither shall the TLG debate or otherwise coordinate technical issues across the TLG organizations; establish or attempt to establish unified positions; or create or attempt to create additional layers or structures within the TLG for the development of technical standards or for any other purpose.

5. Technical Work with the IETF. The TLG shall have no involvement with the ICANN's work for the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), Internet Research Task Force, or the Internet Architecture Board (IAB), as described in the IETF-ICANN Memorandum of Understanding Concerning the Technical Work of the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority ratified by the Board on 10 March 2000.

6. Individual Technical Experts. Each TLG organization shall designate two individual technical experts who are familiar with the technical standards issues that are relevant to ICANN's activities. These 8 experts shall be available as necessary to determine, through an exchange of e-mail messages, where to direct a technical question from ICANN when ICANN does not ask a specific TLG organization directly.

ARTICLE XII: BOARD AND TEMPORARY COMMITTEES

Section 1. BOARD COMMITTEES

The Board may establish one or more committees of the Board, which shall continue to exist until otherwise determined by the Board. Only Directors may be appointed to a Committee of the Board. If a person appointed to a Committee of the Board ceases to be a Director, such person shall also cease to be a member of any Committee of the Board. Each Committee of the Board shall consist of two or more Directors. The

Board may designate one or more Directors as alternate members of any such committee, who may replace any absent member at any meeting of the committee. Committee members may be removed from a committee at any time by a two-thirds (2/3) majority vote of all members of the Board; provided, however, that any Director or Directors which are the subject of the removal action shall not be entitled to vote on such an action or be counted as a member of the Board when calculating the required two-thirds (2/3) vote; and, provided further, however, that in no event shall a Director be removed from a committee unless such removal is approved by not less than a majority of all members of the Board.

Section 2. POWERS OF BOARD COMMITTEES

1. The Board may delegate to Committees of the Board all legal authority of the Board except with respect to:

- a. The filling of vacancies on the Board or on any committee;
- b. The amendment or repeal of Bylaws or the Articles of Incorporation or the adoption of new Bylaws or Articles of Incorporation;
- c. The amendment or repeal of any resolution of the Board which by its express terms is not so amendable or repealable;
- d. The appointment of committees of the Board or the members thereof;
- e. The approval of any self-dealing transaction, as such transactions are defined in Section 5233(a) of the CNPBCL;
- f. The approval of the annual budget required by [Article XVI](#); or
- g. The compensation of any officer described in [Article XIII](#).

2. The Board shall have the power to prescribe the manner in which proceedings of any Committee of the Board shall be conducted. In the absence of any such prescription, such committee shall have the power to prescribe the manner in which its proceedings shall be conducted. Unless these Bylaws, the Board or such committee shall otherwise provide,

the regular and special meetings shall be governed by the provisions of [Article VI](#) applicable to meetings and actions of the Board. Each committee shall keep regular minutes of its proceedings and shall report the same to the Board from time to time, as the Board may require.

Section 3. TEMPORARY COMMITTEES

The Board may establish such temporary committees as it sees fit, with membership, duties, and responsibilities as set forth in the resolutions or charters adopted by the Board in establishing such committees.

ARTICLE XIII: OFFICERS

Section 1. OFFICERS

The officers of ICANN shall be a President (who shall serve as Chief Executive Officer), a Secretary, and a Chief Financial Officer. ICANN may also have, at the discretion of the Board, any additional officers that it deems appropriate. Any person, other than the President, may hold more than one office, except that no member of the Board (other than the President) shall simultaneously serve as an officer of ICANN.

Section 2. ELECTION OF OFFICERS

The officers of ICANN shall be elected annually by the Board, pursuant to the recommendation of the President or, in the case of the President, of the Chairman of the ICANN Board. Each such officer shall hold his or her office until he or she resigns, is removed, is otherwise disqualified to serve, or his or her successor is elected.

Section 3. REMOVAL OF OFFICERS

Any Officer may be removed, either with or without cause, by a two-thirds (2/3) majority vote of all the members of the Board. Should any vacancy occur in any office as a result of death, resignation, removal, disqualification, or any other cause, the Board may delegate the powers and duties of such office to any Officer or to any Director until such time as a successor for the office has been elected.

Section 4. PRESIDENT

The President shall be the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of ICANN in charge of all of its activities and business. All other officers and staff shall report to the President or his or her delegate, unless stated otherwise in these Bylaws. The President shall serve as an ex officio member of the

Board, and shall have all the same rights and privileges of any Board member. The President shall be empowered to call special meetings of the Board as set forth herein, and shall discharge all other duties as may be required by these Bylaws and from time to time may be assigned by the Board.

Section 5. SECRETARY

The Secretary shall keep or cause to be kept the minutes of the Board in one or more books provided for that purpose, shall see that all notices are duly given in accordance with the provisions of these Bylaws or as required by law, and in general shall perform all duties as from time to time may be prescribed by the President or the Board.

Section 6. CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER

The Chief Financial Officer ("CFO") shall be the chief financial officer of ICANN. If required by the Board, the CFO shall give a bond for the faithful discharge of his or her duties in such form and with such surety or sureties as the Board shall determine. The CFO shall have charge and custody of all the funds of ICANN and shall keep or cause to be kept, in books belonging to ICANN, full and accurate amounts of all receipts and disbursements, and shall deposit all money and other valuable effects in the name of ICANN in such depositories as may be designated for that purpose by the Board. The CFO shall disburse the funds of ICANN as may be ordered by the Board or the President and, whenever requested by them, shall deliver to the Board and the President an account of all his or her transactions as CFO and of the financial condition of ICANN. The CFO shall be responsible for ICANN's financial planning and forecasting and shall assist the President in the preparation of ICANN's annual budget. The CFO shall coordinate and oversee ICANN's funding, including any audits or other reviews of ICANN or its Supporting Organizations. The CFO shall be responsible for all other matters relating to the financial operation of ICANN.

Section 7. ADDITIONAL OFFICERS

In addition to the officers described above, any additional or assistant officers who are elected or appointed by the Board shall perform such duties as may be assigned to them by the President or the Board.

Section 8. COMPENSATION AND EXPENSES

The compensation of any Officer of ICANN shall be approved by the Board. Expenses incurred in connection with performance of their officer duties may be reimbursed to Officers upon approval of the President (in

the case of Officers other than the President), by another Officer designated by the Board (in the case of the President), or the Board.

Section 9. CONFLICTS OF INTEREST

The Board, through the Board Governance Committee, shall establish a policy requiring a statement from each Officer not less frequently than once a year setting forth all business and other affiliations that relate in any way to the business and other affiliations of ICANN.

ARTICLE XIV: INDEMNIFICATION OF DIRECTORS, OFFICERS, EMPLOYEES, AND OTHER AGENTS

ICANN shall, to maximum extent permitted by the CNPBCL, indemnify each of its agents against expenses, judgments, fines, settlements, and other amounts actually and reasonably incurred in connection with any proceeding arising by reason of the fact that any such person is or was an agent of ICANN, provided that the indemnified person's acts were done in good faith and in a manner that the indemnified person reasonably believed to be in ICANN's best interests and not criminal. For purposes of this Article, an "agent" of ICANN includes any person who is or was a Director, Officer, employee, or any other agent of ICANN (including a member of any Supporting Organization, any Advisory Committee, the Nominating Committee, any other ICANN committee, or the Technical Liaison Group) acting within the scope of his or her responsibility; or is or was serving at the request of ICANN as a Director, Officer, employee, or agent of another corporation, partnership, joint venture, trust, or other enterprise. The Board may adopt a resolution authorizing the purchase and maintenance of insurance on behalf of any agent of ICANN against any liability asserted against or incurred by the agent in such capacity or arising out of the agent's status as such, whether or not ICANN would have the power to indemnify the agent against that liability under the provisions of this Article.

ARTICLE XV: GENERAL PROVISIONS

Section 1. CONTRACTS

The Board may authorize any Officer or Officers, agent or agents, to enter into any contract or execute or deliver any instrument in the name of and on behalf of ICANN, and such authority may be general or confined to specific instances. In the absence of a contrary Board authorization, contracts and instruments may only be executed by the following Officers: President, any Vice President, or the CFO. Unless authorized or ratified by the Board, no other Officer, agent, or employee shall have any power

or authority to bind ICANN or to render it liable for any debts or obligations.

Section 2. DEPOSITS

All funds of ICANN not otherwise employed shall be deposited from time to time to the credit of ICANN in such banks, trust companies, or other depositories as the Board, or the President under its delegation, may select.

Section 3. CHECKS

All checks, drafts, or other orders for the payment of money, notes, or other evidences of indebtedness issued in the name of ICANN shall be signed by such Officer or Officers, agent or agents, of ICANN and in such a manner as shall from time to time be determined by resolution of the Board.

Section 4. LOANS

No loans shall be made by or to ICANN and no evidences of indebtedness shall be issued in its name unless authorized by a resolution of the Board. Such authority may be general or confined to specific instances; provided, however, that no loans shall be made by ICANN to its Directors or Officers.

ARTICLE XVI: FISCAL MATTERS

Section 1. ACCOUNTING

The fiscal year end of ICANN shall be determined by the Board.

Section 2. AUDIT

At the end of the fiscal year, the books of ICANN shall be closed and audited by certified public accountants. The appointment of the fiscal auditors shall be the responsibility of the Board.

Section 3. ANNUAL REPORT AND ANNUAL STATEMENT

The Board shall publish, at least annually, a report describing its activities, including an audited financial statement and a description of any payments made by ICANN to Directors (including reimbursements of expenses). ICANN shall cause the annual report and the annual statement of certain transactions as required by the CNPBCL to be prepared and sent to each member of the Board and to such other

persons as the Board may designate, no later than one hundred twenty (120) days after the close of ICANN's fiscal year.

Section 4. ANNUAL BUDGET

At least forty-five (45) days prior to the commencement of each fiscal year, the President shall prepare and submit to the Board, a proposed annual budget of ICANN for the next fiscal year, which shall be posted on the Website. The proposed budget shall identify anticipated revenue sources and levels and shall, to the extent practical, identify anticipated material expense items by line item. The Board shall adopt an annual budget and shall publish the adopted Budget on the Website.

Section 5. FEES AND CHARGES

The Board may set fees and charges for the services and benefits provided by ICANN, with the goal of fully recovering the reasonable costs of the operation of ICANN and establishing reasonable reserves for future expenses and contingencies reasonably related to the legitimate activities of ICANN. Such fees and charges shall be fair and equitable, shall be published for public comment prior to adoption, and once adopted shall be published on the Website in a sufficiently detailed manner so as to be readily accessible.

ARTICLE XVII: MEMBERS

ICANN shall not have members, as defined in the California Nonprofit Public Benefit Corporation Law ("CNPBCL"), notwithstanding the use of the term "Member" in these Bylaws, in any ICANN document, or in any action of the ICANN Board or staff.

ARTICLE XVIII: OFFICES AND SEAL

Section 1. OFFICES

The principal office for the transaction of the business of ICANN shall be in the County of Los Angeles, State of California, United States of America. ICANN may also have an additional office or offices within or outside the United States of America as it may from time to time establish.

Section 2. SEAL

The Board may adopt a corporate seal and use the same by causing it or a facsimile thereof to be impressed or affixed or reproduced or otherwise.

ARTICLE XIX: AMENDMENTS

Except as otherwise provided in the Articles of Incorporation or these Bylaws, the Articles of Incorporation or Bylaws of ICANN may be altered, amended, or repealed and new Articles of Incorporation or Bylaws adopted only upon action by a two-thirds (2/3) vote of all members of the Board.

ARTICLE XX: TRANSITION ARTICLE

Section 1. PURPOSE

This Transition Article sets forth the provisions for the transition from the processes and structures defined by the ICANN Bylaws, as amended and restated on 29 October 1999 and amended through 12 February 2002 (the "[Old Bylaws](#)"), to the processes and structures defined by the Bylaws of which this Article is a part (the "[New Bylaws](#)"). [Explanatory Note (dated 10 December 2009): For Section 5(3) of this Article, reference to the Old Bylaws refers to the Bylaws as amended and restated through to 20 March 2009.]

Section 2. BOARD OF DIRECTORS

1. For the period beginning on the adoption of this Transition Article and ending on the Effective Date and Time of the New Board, as defined in [paragraph 5 of this Section 2](#), the Board of Directors of the Corporation ("Transition Board") shall consist of the members of the Board who would have been Directors under the Old Bylaws immediately after the conclusion of the annual meeting in 2002, except that those At-Large members of the Board under the Old Bylaws who elect to do so by notifying the Secretary of the Board on 15 December 2002 or in writing or by e-mail no later than 23 December 2002 shall also serve as members of the Transition Board. Notwithstanding the provisions of [Article VI, Section 12 of the New Bylaws](#), vacancies on the Transition Board shall not be filled. The Transition Board shall not have liaisons as provided by [Article VI, Section 9 of the New Bylaws](#). The Board Committees existing on the date of adoption of this Transition Article shall continue in existence, subject to any change in Board Committees or their membership that the Transition Board may adopt by resolution.

2. The Transition Board shall elect a Chair and Vice-Chair to serve until the Effective Date and Time of the New Board.

3. The "New Board" is that Board described in [Article VI, Section 2\(1\) of the New Bylaws](#).
4. Promptly after the adoption of this Transition Article, a Nominating Committee shall be formed including, to the extent feasible, the delegates and liaisons described in [Article VII, Section 2 of the New Bylaws](#), with terms to end at the conclusion of the ICANN annual meeting in 2003. The Nominating Committee shall proceed without delay to select Directors to fill Seats 1 through 8 on the New Board, with terms to conclude upon the commencement of the first regular terms specified for those Seats in [Article VI, Section 8\(1\)\(a\)-\(c\) of the New Bylaws](#), and shall give the ICANN Secretary written notice of that selection.
5. The Effective Date and Time of the New Board shall be a time, as designated by the Transition Board, during the first regular meeting of ICANN in 2003 that begins not less than seven calendar days after the ICANN Secretary has received written notice of the selection of Directors to fill at least ten of Seats 1 through 14 on the New Board. As of the Effective Date and Time of the New Board, it shall assume from the Transition Board all the rights, duties, and obligations of the ICANN Board of Directors. Subject to Section 4 of this Article, the Directors ([Article VI, Section 2\(1\)\(a\)-\(d\)](#)) and non-voting liaisons ([Article VI, Section 9](#)) as to which the ICANN Secretary has received notice of selection shall, along with the President ([Article VI, Section 2\(1\)\(e\)](#)), be seated upon the Effective Date and Time of the New Board, and thereafter any additional Directors and non-voting liaisons shall be seated upon the ICANN Secretary's receipt of notice of their selection.
6. The New Board shall elect a Chairman and Vice-Chairman as its first order of business. The terms of those Board offices shall expire at the end of the annual meeting in 2003.
7. Committees of the Board in existence as of the Effective Date and Time of the New Board shall continue in existence according to their existing charters, but the terms of all members of those committees shall conclude at the Effective Date and Time of the New Board. Temporary committees in existence as of the Effective Date and Time of the New Board shall continue in existence with their existing charters and membership, subject to any change the New Board may adopt by resolution.

8. In applying the term-limitation provision of [Section 8\(5\) of Article VI](#), a Director's service on the Board before the Effective Date and Time of the New Board shall count as one term.

Section 3. ADDRESS SUPPORTING ORGANIZATION

The Address Supporting Organization shall continue in operation according to the provisions of the [Memorandum of Understanding originally entered on 18 October 1999](#) between [ICANN](#) and a group of regional Internet registries (RIRs), and [amended in October 2000](#), until a replacement Memorandum of Understanding becomes effective. Promptly after the adoption of this Transition Article, the Address Supporting Organization shall make selections, and give the [ICANN](#) Secretary written notice of those selections, of:

1. Directors to fill Seats 9 and 10 on the New Board, with terms to conclude upon the commencement of the first regular terms specified for each of those Seats in [Article VI, Section 8\(1\)\(d\) and \(e\) of the New Bylaws](#); and
2. the delegate to the Nominating Committee selected by the Council of the Address Supporting Organization, as called for in [Article VII, Section 2\(8\)\(f\) of the New Bylaws](#).

With respect to the [ICANN](#) Directors that it is entitled to select, and taking into account the need for rapid selection to ensure that the New Board becomes effective as soon as possible, the Address Supporting Organization may select those Directors from among the persons it previously selected as [ICANN](#) Directors pursuant to the Old Bylaws. To the extent the Address Supporting Organization does not provide the [ICANN](#) Secretary written notice, on or before 31 March 2003, of its selections for Seat 9 and Seat 10, the Address Supporting Organization shall be deemed to have selected for Seat 9 the person it selected as an [ICANN](#) Director pursuant to the Old Bylaws for a term beginning in 2001 and for Seat 10 the person it selected as an [ICANN](#) Director pursuant to the Old Bylaws for a term beginning in 2002.

Section 4. COUNTRY-CODE NAMES SUPPORTING ORGANIZATION

1. Upon the enrollment of thirty [ccTLD](#) managers (with at least four within each Geographic Region) as members of the [ccNSO](#), written notice shall be posted on the Website. As soon as feasible after that notice, the members of the initial [ccNSO](#) Council to be selected by the [ccNSO](#) members shall be

selected according to the procedures stated in [Article IX, Section 4\(8\) and \(9\)](#). Upon the completion of that selection process, a written notice that the ccNSO Council has been constituted shall be posted on the Website. Three ccNSO Council members shall be selected by the ccNSO members within each Geographic Region, with one member to serve a term that ends upon the conclusion of the first ICANN annual meeting after the ccNSO Council is constituted, a second member to serve a term that ends upon the conclusion of the second ICANN annual meeting after the ccNSO Council is constituted, and the third member to serve a term that ends upon the conclusion of the third ICANN annual meeting after the ccNSO Council is constituted. (The definition of "ccTLD manager" stated in [Article IX, Section 4\(1\)](#) and the definitions stated in [Article IX, Section 4\(4\)](#) shall apply within this Section 4 of Article XX.)

2. After the adoption of [Article IX of these Bylaws](#), the Nominating Committee shall select the three members of the ccNSO Council described in [Article IX, Section 3\(1\)\(b\)](#). In selecting three individuals to serve on the ccNSO Council, the Nominating Committee shall designate one to serve a term that ends upon the conclusion of the first ICANN annual meeting after the ccNSO Council is constituted, a second member to serve a term that ends upon the conclusion of the second ICANN annual meeting after the ccNSO Council is constituted, and the third member to serve a term that ends upon the conclusion of the third ICANN annual meeting after the ccNSO Council is constituted. The three members of the ccNSO Council selected by the Nominating Committee shall not take their seats before the ccNSO Council is constituted.

3. Upon the ccNSO Council being constituted, the At-Large Advisory Committee and the Governmental Advisory Committee may designate one liaison each to the ccNSO Council, as provided by [Article IX, Section 3\(2\)\(a\) and \(b\)](#).

4. Upon the ccNSO Council being constituted, the Council may designate Regional Organizations as provided in [Article IX, Section 5](#). Upon its designation, a Regional Organization may appoint a liaison to the ccNSO Council.

5. Until the ccNSO Council is constituted, Seats 11 and 12 on the New Board shall remain vacant. Promptly after the ccNSO Council is constituted, the ccNSO shall, through the ccNSO

Council, make selections of Directors to fill Seats 11 and 12 on the New Board, with terms to conclude upon the commencement of the next regular term specified for each of those Seats in [Article VI, Section 8\(1\)\(d\) and \(f\) of the New Bylaws](#), and shall give the ICANN Secretary written notice of its selections.

6. Until the ccNSO Council is constituted, the delegate to the Nominating Committee established by the New Bylaws designated to be selected by the ccNSO shall be appointed by the Transition Board or New Board, depending on which is in existence at the time any particular appointment is required, after due consultation with members of the ccTLD community. Upon the ccNSO Council being constituted, the delegate to the Nominating Committee appointed by the Transition Board or New Board according to this Section 4(9) then serving shall remain in office, except that the ccNSO Council may replace that delegate with one of its choosing within three months after the conclusion of ICANN's annual meeting, or in the event of a vacancy. Subsequent appointments of the Nominating Committee delegate described in [Article VII, Section 2\(8\)\(c\)](#) shall be made by the ccNSO Council.

Section 5. GENERIC NAMES SUPPORTING ORGANIZATION

1. The Generic Names Supporting Organization ("GNSO"), upon the adoption of this Transition Article, shall continue its operations; however, it shall be restructured into four new Stakeholder Groups which shall represent, organizationally, the former Constituencies of the GNSO, subject to ICANN Board approval of each individual Stakeholder Group Charter:

- a. The gTLD Registries Constituency shall be assigned to the Registries Stakeholder Group;
- b. The Registrars Constituency shall be assigned to the Registrars Stakeholder Group;
- c. The Business Constituency shall be assigned to the Commercial Stakeholder Group;
- d. The Intellectual Property Constituency shall be assigned to the Commercial Stakeholder Group;

e. The Internet Services Providers Constituency shall be assigned to the Commercial Stakeholder Group; and

f. The Non-Commercial Users Constituency shall be assigned to the Non-Commercial Stakeholder Group.

2. Each GNSO Constituency described in paragraph 1 of this subsection shall continue operating substantially as before and no Constituency official, working group, or other activity shall be changed until further action of the Constituency, provided that each GNSO Constituency described in paragraph 1 (c-f) shall submit to the ICANN Secretary a new or revised Charter inclusive of its operating procedures, adopted according to the Constituency's processes and consistent with these Bylaws Amendments, no later than the ICANN meeting in October 2009, or another date as the Board may designate by resolution.

3. Prior to the commencement of the ICANN meeting in October 2009, or another date the Board may designate by resolution, the GNSO Council shall consist of its current Constituency structure and officers as described in [Article X, Section 3\(1\) of the Bylaws](#) (as amended and restated on 29 October 1999 and amended through 20 March 2009 (the "Old Bylaws")). Thereafter, the composition of the GNSO Council shall be as provided in these Bylaws, as they may be amended from time to time. All committees, task forces, working groups, drafting committees, and similar groups established by the GNSO Council and in existence immediately before the adoption of this Transition Article shall continue in existence with the same charters, membership, and activities, subject to any change by action of the GNSO Council or ICANN Board.

4. Beginning with the commencement of the ICANN Meeting in October 2009, or another date the Board may designate by resolution (the "Effective Date of the Transition"), the GNSO Council seats shall be assigned as follows:

a. The three seats currently assigned to the Registry Constituency shall be reassigned as three seats of the Registries Stakeholder Group;

- b. The three seats currently assigned to the Registrar Constituency shall be reassigned as three seats of the Registrars Stakeholder Group;
- c. The three seats currently assigned to each of the Business Constituency, the Intellectual Property Constituency, and the Internet Services Provider Constituency (nine total) shall be decreased to be six seats of the Commercial Stakeholder Group;
- d. The three seats currently assigned to the Non-Commercial Users Constituency shall be increased to be six seats of the Non-Commercial Stakeholder Group;
- e. The three seats currently selected by the Nominating Committee shall be assigned by the Nominating Committee as follows: one voting member to the Contracted Party House, one voting member to the Non-Contracted Party House, and one non-voting member assigned to the GNSO Council at large.

Representatives on the GNSO Council shall be appointed or elected consistent with the provisions in each applicable Stakeholder Group Charter, approved by the Board, and sufficiently in advance of the October 2009 ICANN Meeting that will permit those representatives to act in their official capacities at the start of said meeting.

5. The GNSO Council, as part of its Restructure Implementation Plan, will document: (a) how vacancies, if any, will be handled during the transition period; (b) for each Stakeholder Group, how each assigned Council seat to take effect at the 2009 ICANN annual meeting will be filled, whether through a continuation of an existing term or a new election or appointment; (c) how it plans to address staggered terms such that the new GNSO Council preserves as much continuity as reasonably possible; and (d) the effect of Bylaws term limits on each Council member.

6. As soon as practical after the commencement of the ICANN meeting in October 2009, or another date the Board may designate by resolution, the GNSO Council shall, in accordance with [Article X, Section 3\(7\)](#) and its GNSO

Operating Procedures, elect officers and give the ICANN Secretary written notice of its selections.

Section 6. PROTOCOL SUPPORTING ORGANIZATION

The [Protocol Supporting Organization referred to in the Old Bylaws](#) is discontinued.

Section 7. ADVISORY COMMITTEES AND TECHNICAL LIAISON GROUP

1. Upon the adoption of the New Bylaws, the Governmental Advisory Committee shall continue in operation according to its existing operating principles and practices, until further action of the committee. The Governmental Advisory Committee may designate liaisons to serve with other ICANN bodies as contemplated by the New Bylaws by providing written notice to the ICANN Secretary. Promptly upon the adoption of this Transition Article, the Governmental Advisory Committee shall notify the ICANN Secretary of the person selected as its delegate to the Nominating Committee, as set forth in [Article VII, Section 2 of the New Bylaws](#).

2. The organizations designated as members of the Technical Liaison Group under [Article XI-A, Section 2\(2\) of the New Bylaws](#) shall each designate the two individual technical experts described in [Article XI-A, Section 2\(6\) of the New Bylaws](#), by providing written notice to the ICANN Secretary. As soon as feasible, the delegate from the Technical Liaison Group to the Nominating Committee shall be selected according to [Article XI-A, Section 2\(7\) of the New Bylaws](#).

3. Upon the adoption of the New Bylaws, the [Security and Stability Advisory Committee](#) shall continue in operation according to its existing operating principles and practices, until further action of the committee. Promptly upon the adoption of this Transition Article, the Security and Stability Advisory Committee shall notify the ICANN Secretary of the person selected as its delegate to the Nominating Committee, as set forth in [Article VII, Section 2\(4\) of the New Bylaws](#).

4. Upon the adoption of the New Bylaws, the [Root Server System Advisory Committee](#) shall continue in operation according to its existing operating principles and practices, until further action of the committee. Promptly upon the

adoption of this Transition Article, the Root Server Advisory Committee shall notify the ICANN Secretary of the person selected as its delegate to the Nominating Committee, as set forth in [Article VII, Section 2\(3\) of the New Bylaws](#).

5. At-Large Advisory Committee

a. There shall exist an Interim At-Large Advisory Committee until such time as ICANN recognizes, through the entry of a Memorandum of Understanding, all of the Regional At-Large Organizations (RALOs) identified in [Article XI, Section 2\(4\) of the New Bylaws](#). The Interim At-Large Advisory Committee shall be composed of (i) ten individuals (two from each ICANN region) selected by the ICANN Board following nominations by the At-Large Organizing Committee and (ii) five additional individuals (one from each ICANN region) selected by the initial Nominating Committee as soon as feasible in accordance with the principles established in [Article VII, Section 5 of the New Bylaws](#). The initial Nominating Committee shall designate two of these individuals to serve terms until the conclusion of the ICANN annual meeting in 2004 and three of these individuals to serve terms until the conclusion of the ICANN annual meeting in 2005.

b. Upon the entry of each RALO into such a Memorandum of Understanding, that entity shall be entitled to select two persons who are citizens and residents of that Region to be members of the At-Large Advisory Committee established by [Article XI, Section 2\(4\) of the New Bylaws](#). Upon the entity's written notification to the ICANN Secretary of such selections, those persons shall immediately assume the seats held until that notification by the Interim At-Large Advisory Committee members previously selected by the Board from the RALO's region.

c. Upon the seating of persons selected by all five RALOs, the Interim At-Large Advisory Committee shall become the At-Large Advisory Committee, as established by [Article XI, Section 2\(4\) of the New](#)

[Bylaws](#). The five individuals selected to the Interim At-Large Advisory Committee by the Nominating Committee shall become members of the At-Large Advisory Committee for the remainder of the terms for which they were selected.

d. Promptly upon its creation, the Interim At-Large Advisory Committee shall notify the [ICANN Secretary](#) of the persons selected as its delegates to the Nominating Committee, as set forth in [Article VII, Section 2\(6\) of the New Bylaws](#).

Section 8. OFFICERS

[ICANN officers](#) (as defined in [Article XIII of the New Bylaws](#)) shall be elected by the then-existing Board of [ICANN](#) at the annual meeting in 2002 to serve until the annual meeting in 2003.

Section 9. GROUPS APPOINTED BY THE PRESIDENT

Notwithstanding the adoption or effectiveness of the New Bylaws, task forces and other groups appointed by the [ICANN President](#) shall continue unchanged in membership, scope, and operation until changes are made by the President.

Section 10. CONTRACTS WITH [ICANN](#)

Notwithstanding the adoption or effectiveness of the New Bylaws, all agreements, including employment and consulting agreements, entered by [ICANN](#) shall continue in effect according to their terms.

Annex A: [GNSO Policy Development Process](#)

The following process shall govern the [GNSO](#) policy development process ("[PDP](#)") until such time as modifications are recommended to and approved by the [ICANN Board of Directors](#) ("[Board](#)"). The role of the [GNSO](#) is outlined in Article X of these Bylaws. If the [GNSO](#) is conducting activities that are not intended to result in a Consensus Policy, the Council may act through other processes.

Section 1. Required Elements of a Policy Development Process

The following elements are required at a minimum to form Consensus Policies as defined within [ICANN](#) contracts, and any other policies for which the [GNSO Council](#) requests application of this Annex A:

- a. Final Issue Report requested by the Board, the GNSO Council ("Council") or Advisory Committee, which should include at a minimum a) the proposed issue raised for consideration, b) the identity of the party submitting the issue, and c) how that party is affected by the issue;
- b. Formal initiation of the Policy Development Process by the Council;
- c. Formation of a Working Group or other designated work method;
- d. Initial Report produced by a Working Group or other designated work method;
- e. Final Report produced by a Working Group, or other designated work method, and forwarded to the Council for deliberation;
- f. Council approval of PDP Recommendations contained in the Final Report, by the required thresholds;
- g. PDP Recommendations and Final Report shall be forwarded to the Board through a Recommendations Report approved by the Council]; and
- h. Board approval of PDP Recommendations.

Section 2. Policy Development Process Manual

The GNSO shall maintain a Policy Development Process Manual (PDP Manual) within the operating procedures of the GNSO maintained by the GNSO Council. The PDP Manual shall contain specific additional guidance on completion of all elements of a PDP, including those elements that are not otherwise defined in these Bylaws. The PDP Manual and any amendments thereto are subject to a twenty-one (21) day public comment period at minimum, as well as Board oversight and review, as specified at Article X, Section 3.6.

Section 3. Requesting an Issue Report

Board Request. The Board may request an Issue Report by instructing the GNSO Council ("Council") to begin the process outlined the PDP Manual. In the event the Board makes a request for an Issue Report, the Board should provide a mechanism by which the GNSO Council can consult with

the Board to provide information on the scope, timing, and priority of the request for an Issue Report.

Council Request. The GNSO Council may request an Issue Report by a vote of at least one-fourth (1/4) of the members of the Council of each House or a majority of one House.

Advisory Committee Request. An Advisory Committee may raise an issue for policy development by action of such committee to request an Issue Report, and transmission of that request to the Staff Manager and GNSO Council.

Section 4. **Creation of an Issue Report**

Within forty-five (45) calendar days after receipt of either (i) an instruction from the Board; (ii) a properly supported motion from the GNSO Council; or (iii) a properly supported motion from an Advisory Committee, the Staff Manager will create a report (a "Preliminary Issue Report"). In the event the Staff Manager determines that more time is necessary to create the Preliminary Issue Report, the Staff Manager may request an extension of time for completion of the Preliminary Issue Report.

The following elements should be considered in the Issue Report:

- a) The proposed issue raised for consideration;
- b) The identity of the party submitting the request for the Issue Report;
- c) How that party is affected by the issue, if known;
- d) Support for the issue to initiate the PDP, if known;
- e) The opinion of the ICANN General Counsel regarding whether the issue proposed for consideration within the Policy Development Process is properly within the scope of the ICANN's mission, policy process and more specifically the role of the GNSO as set forth in the Bylaws.
- f) The opinion of ICANN Staff as to whether the Council should initiate the PDP on the issue

Upon completion of the Preliminary Issue Report, the Preliminary Issue Report shall be posted on the ICANN website for a public comment period that complies with the designated practice for public comment periods within ICANN.

The Staff Manager is responsible for drafting a summary and analysis of the public comments received on the Preliminary Issue Report and producing a Final Issue Report based upon the comments received. The Staff Manager should forward the Final Issue Report, along with any summary and analysis of the public comments received, to the Chair of the GNSO Council for consideration for initiation of a PDP.

Section 5. **Initiation of the PDP**

The Council may initiate the PDP as follows:

Board Request: If the Board requested an Issue Report, the Council, within the timeframe set forth in the PDP Manual, shall initiate a PDP. No vote is required for such action.

GNSO Council or Advisory Committee Requests: The Council may only initiate the PDP by a vote of the Council. Initiation of a PDP requires a vote as set forth in [Article X, Section 3, paragraph 9\(b\) and \(c\)](#) in favor of initiating the PDP.

Section 6. **Reports**

An Initial Report should be delivered to the GNSO Council and posted for a public comment period that complies with the designated practice for public comment periods within ICANN, which time may be extended in accordance with the PDP Manual. Following the review of the comments received and, if required, additional deliberations, a Final Report shall be produced for transmission to the Council.

Section 7. **Council Deliberation**

Upon receipt of a Final Report, whether as the result of a working group or otherwise, the Council chair will (i) distribute the Final Report to all Council members; and (ii) call for Council deliberation on the matter in accordance with the PDP Manual.

The Council approval process is set forth in [Article X, Section 3, paragraph 9\(d\) through \(g\)](#), as supplemented by the PDP Manual.

Section 8. **Preparation of the Board Report**

If the PDP recommendations contained in the Final Report are approved by the GNSO Council, a Recommendations Report shall be approved by the GNSO Council for delivery to the ICANN Board.

Section 9. **Board Approval Processes**

The Board will meet to discuss the GNSO Council recommendation as soon as feasible, but preferably not later than the second meeting after receipt of the Board Report from the Staff Manager. Board deliberation on the PDP Recommendations contained within the Recommendations Report shall proceed as follows:

a. Any PDP Recommendations approved by a GNSO Supermajority Vote shall be adopted by the Board unless, by a vote of more than two-thirds (2/3) of the Board, the Board determines that such policy is not in the best interests of the ICANN community or ICANN. If the GNSO Council recommendation was approved by less than a GNSO Supermajority Vote, a majority vote of the Board will be sufficient to determine that such policy is not in the best interests of the ICANN community or ICANN.

b. In the event that the Board determines, in accordance with paragraph a above, that the policy recommended by a GNSO Supermajority Vote or less than a GNSO Supermajority vote is not in the best interests of the ICANN community or ICANN (the Corporation), the Board shall (i) articulate the reasons for its determination in a report to the Council (the "Board Statement"); and (ii) submit the Board Statement to the Council.

c. The Council shall review the Board Statement for discussion with the Board as soon as feasible after the Council's receipt of the Board Statement. The Board shall determine the method (e.g., by teleconference, e-mail, or otherwise) by which the Council and Board will discuss the Board Statement.

d. At the conclusion of the Council and Board discussions, the Council shall meet to affirm or modify its recommendation, and communicate that conclusion (the "Supplemental Recommendation") to the Board, including an explanation for the then-current recommendation. In the event that the Council is able to reach a GNSO Supermajority Vote on the Supplemental Recommendation, the Board shall adopt the recommendation unless more than two-thirds (2/3) of the Board determines that such policy is not in the interests of the ICANN community or ICANN. For any Supplemental Recommendation approved by less than a GNSO Supermajority Vote, a majority vote of the Board shall be sufficient to determine that the policy in the Supplemental

Recommendation is not in the best interest of the ICANN community or ICANN.

Section 10. **Implementation of Approved Policies**

Upon a final decision of the Board adopting the policy, the Board shall, as appropriate, give authorization or direction to ICANN staff to work with the GNSO Council to create an implementation plan based upon the implementation recommendations identified in the Final Report, and to implement the policy. The GNSO Council may, but is not required to, direct the creation of an implementation review team to assist in implementation of the policy.

Section 11. **Maintenance of Records**

Throughout the PDP, from policy suggestion to a final decision by the Board, ICANN will maintain on the Website, a status web page detailing the progress of each PDP issue. Such status page will outline the completed and upcoming steps in the PDP process, and contain links to key resources (e.g. Reports, Comments Fora, WG Discussions, etc.).

Section 12. **Additional Definitions**

"Comment Site", "Comment Forum", "Comments For a" and "Website" refer to one or more websites designated by ICANN on which notifications and comments regarding the PDP will be posted.

"Supermajority Vote" means a vote of more than sixty-six (66) percent of the members present at a meeting of the applicable body, with the exception of the GNSO Council.

"Staff Manager" means an ICANN staff person(s) who manages the PDP.

"GNSO Supermajority Vote" shall have the meaning set forth in the Bylaws.

Section 13. **Applicability**

The procedures of this Annex A shall be applicable to all requests for Issue Reports and PDPs initiated after 8 December 2011. For all ongoing PDPs initiated prior to 8 December 2011, the Council shall determine the feasibility of transitioning to the procedures set forth in this Annex A for all remaining steps within the PDP. If the Council determines that any ongoing PDP cannot be feasibly transitioned to these updated procedures, the PDP shall be concluded according to the procedures set forth in Annex A in force on 7 December 2011.

Annex B: ccNSO Policy-Development Process (ccPDP)

The following process shall govern the ccNSO policy-development process ("PDP").

1. Request for an Issue Report

An Issue Report may be requested by any of the following:

- a. *Council.* The ccNSO Council (in this Annex B, the "Council") may call for the creation of an Issue Report by an affirmative vote of at least seven of the members of the Council present at any meeting or voting by e-mail.
- b. *Board.* The ICANN Board may call for the creation of an Issue Report by requesting the Council to begin the policy-development process.
- c. *Regional Organization.* One or more of the Regional Organizations representing ccTLDs in the ICANN recognized Regions may call for creation of an Issue Report by requesting the Council to begin the policy-development process.
- d. *ICANN Supporting Organization or Advisory Committee.* An ICANN Supporting Organization or an ICANN Advisory Committee may call for creation of an Issue Report by requesting the Council to begin the policy-development process.
- e. *Members of the ccNSO.* The members of the ccNSO may call for the creation of an Issue Report by an affirmative vote of at least ten members of the ccNSO present at any meeting or voting by e-mail.

Any request for an Issue Report must be in writing and must set out the issue upon which an Issue Report is requested in sufficient detail to enable the Issue Report to be prepared. It shall be open to the Council to request further information or undertake further research or investigation for the purpose of determining whether or not the requested Issue Report should be created.

2. Creation of the Issue Report and Initiation Threshold

Within seven days after an affirmative vote as outlined in Item 1(a) above or the receipt of a request as outlined in Items 1 (b), (c), or (d) above the

Council shall appoint an Issue Manager. The Issue Manager may be a staff member of ICANN (in which case the costs of the Issue Manager shall be borne by ICANN) or such other person or persons selected by the Council (in which case the ccNSO shall be responsible for the costs of the Issue Manager).

Within fifteen (15) calendar days after appointment (or such other time as the Council shall, in consultation with the Issue Manager, deem to be appropriate), the Issue Manager shall create an Issue Report. Each Issue Report shall contain at least the following:

- a. The proposed issue raised for consideration;
- b. The identity of the party submitting the issue;
- c. How that party is affected by the issue;
- d. Support for the issue to initiate the PDP;
- e. A recommendation from the Issue Manager as to whether the Council should move to initiate the PDP for this issue (the "Manager Recommendation"). Each Manager Recommendation shall include, and be supported by, an opinion of the ICANN General Counsel regarding whether the issue is properly within the scope of the ICANN policy process and within the scope of the ccNSO. In coming to his or her opinion, the General Counsel shall examine whether:

- 1) The issue is within the scope of ICANN's mission statement;
- 2) Analysis of the relevant factors according to [Article IX, Section 6\(2\)](#) and [Annex C](#) affirmatively demonstrates that the issue is within the scope of the ccNSO;

In the event that the General Counsel reaches an opinion in the affirmative with respect to points 1 and 2 above then the General Counsel shall also consider whether the issue:

- 3) Implicates or affects an existing ICANN policy;
- 4) Is likely to have lasting value or applicability, albeit with the need for occasional updates, and to establish a guide or framework for future decision-making.

In all events, consideration of revisions to the ccPDP (this [Annex B](#)) or to the scope of the [ccNSO](#) ([Annex C](#)) shall be within the scope of [ICANN](#) and the [ccNSO](#).

In the event that General Counsel is of the opinion the issue is not properly within the scope of the [ccNSO](#) Scope, the Issue Manager shall inform the Council of this opinion. If after an analysis of the relevant factors according to Article IX, Section 6 and Annex C a majority of 10 or more Council members is of the opinion the issue is within scope the Chair of the [ccNSO](#) shall inform the Issue Manager accordingly. General Counsel and the [ccNSO](#) Council shall engage in a dialogue according to agreed rules and procedures to resolve the matter. In the event no agreement is reached between General Counsel and the Council as to whether the issue is within or outside Scope of the [ccNSO](#) then by a vote of 15 or more members the Council may decide the issue is within scope. The Chair of the [ccNSO](#) shall inform General Counsel and the Issue Manager accordingly. The Issue Manager shall then proceed with a recommendation whether or not the Council should move to initiate the [PDP](#) including both the opinion and analysis of General Counsel and Council in the Issues Report.

f. In the event that the Manager Recommendation is in favor of initiating the [PDP](#), a proposed time line for conducting each of the stages of [PDP](#) outlined herein ([PDP](#) Time Line).

g. If possible, the issue report shall indicate whether the resulting output is likely to result in a policy to be approved by the [ICANN](#) Board. In some circumstances, it will not be possible to do this until substantive discussions on the issue have taken place. In these cases, the issue report should indicate this uncertainty. Upon completion of the Issue Report, the Issue Manager shall distribute it to the full Council for a vote on whether to initiate the [PDP](#).

3. Initiation of [PDP](#)

The Council shall decide whether to initiate the [PDP](#) as follows:

a. Within 21 days after receipt of an Issue Report from the Issue Manager, the Council shall vote on whether to initiate the [PDP](#). Such vote should be taken at a meeting held in any manner deemed appropriate by the Council, including in

person or by conference call, but if a meeting is not feasible the vote may occur by e-mail.

b. A vote of ten or more Council members in favor of initiating the PDP shall be required to initiate the PDP provided that the Issue Report states that the issue is properly within the scope of the ICANN mission statement and the ccNSO Scope.

4. Decision Whether to Appoint Task Force; Establishment of Time Line

At the meeting of the Council where the PDP has been initiated (or, where the Council employs a vote by e-mail, in that vote) pursuant to Item 3 above, the Council shall decide, by a majority vote of members present at the meeting (or voting by e-mail), whether or not to appoint a task force to address the issue. If the Council votes:

- a. In favor of convening a task force, it shall do so in accordance with Item 7 below.
- b. Against convening a task force, then it shall collect information on the policy issue in accordance with Item 8 below.

The Council shall also, by a majority vote of members present at the meeting or voting by e-mail, approve or amend and approve the PDP Time Lineset out in the Issue Report.

5. Composition and Selection of Task Forces

- a. Upon voting to appoint a task force, the Council shall invite each of the Regional Organizations (see [Article IX, Section 6](#)) to appoint two individuals to participate in the task force (the "Representatives"). Additionally, the Council may appoint up to three advisors (the "Advisors") from outside the ccNSO and, following formal request for GAC participation in the Task Force, accept up to two Representatives from the Governmental Advisory Committee to sit on the task force. The Council may increase the number of Representatives that may sit on a task force in its discretion in circumstances that it deems necessary or appropriate.
- b. Any Regional Organization wishing to appoint Representatives to the task force must provide the names of the Representatives to the Issue Manager within ten (10) calendar days after such request so that they are included on

the task force. Such Representatives need not be members of the Council, but each must be an individual who has an interest, and ideally knowledge and expertise, in the subject matter, coupled with the ability to devote a substantial amount of time to the task force's activities.

c. The Council may also pursue other actions that it deems appropriate to assist in the PDP, including appointing a particular individual or organization to gather information on the issue or scheduling meetings for deliberation or briefing. All such information shall be submitted to the Issue Manager in accordance with the PDP Time Line.

6. Public Notification of Initiation of the PDP and Comment Period

After initiation of the PDP, ICANN shall post a notification of such action to the Website and to the other ICANN Supporting Organizations and Advisory Committees. A comment period (in accordance with the PDP Time Line, and ordinarily at least 21 days long) shall be commenced for the issue. Comments shall be accepted from ccTLD managers, other Supporting Organizations, Advisory Committees, and from the public. The Issue Manager, or some other designated Council representative shall review the comments and incorporate them into a report (the "Comment Report") to be included in either the Preliminary Task Force Report or the Initial Report, as applicable.

7. Task Forces

a. *Role of Task Force.* If a task force is created, its role shall be responsible for (i) gathering information documenting the positions of the ccNSO members within the Geographic Regions and other parties and groups; and (ii) otherwise obtaining relevant information that shall enable the Task Force Report to be as complete and informative as possible to facilitate the Council's meaningful and informed deliberation.

The task force shall not have any formal decision-making authority. Rather, the role of the task force shall be to gather information that shall document the positions of various parties or groups as specifically and comprehensively as possible, thereby enabling the Council to have a meaningful and informed deliberation on the issue.

b. *Task Force Charter or Terms of Reference.* The Council, with the assistance of the Issue Manager, shall develop a

charter or terms of reference for the task force (the "Charter") within the time designated in the PDP Time Line. Such Charter shall include:

1. The issue to be addressed by the task force, as such issue was articulated for the vote before the Council that initiated the PDP;
2. The specific time line that the task force must adhere to, as set forth below, unless the Council determines that there is a compelling reason to extend the timeline; and
3. Any specific instructions from the Council for the task force, including whether or not the task force should solicit the advice of outside advisors on the issue.

The task force shall prepare its report and otherwise conduct its activities in accordance with the Charter. Any request to deviate from the Charter must be formally presented to the Council and may only be undertaken by the task force upon a vote of a majority of the Council members present at a meeting or voting by e-mail. The quorum requirements of [Article IX, Section 3\(14\)](#) shall apply to Council actions under this Item 7 (b).

c. Appointment of Task Force Chair. The Issue Manager shall convene the first meeting of the task force within the time designated in the PDP Time Line. At the initial meeting, the task force members shall, among other things, vote to appoint a task force chair. The chair shall be responsible for organizing the activities of the task force, including compiling the Task Force Report. The chair of a task force need not be a member of the Council.

d. Collection of Information.

1. *Regional Organization Statements.* The Representatives shall each be responsible for soliciting the position of the Regional Organization for their Geographic Region, at a minimum, and may solicit other comments, as each Representative deems appropriate, including the comments of the ccNSO members in that region

that are not members of the Regional Organization, regarding the issue under consideration. The position of the Regional Organization and any other comments gathered by the Representatives should be submitted in a formal statement to the task force chair (each, a "Regional Statement") within the time designated in the PDP Time Line. Every Regional Statement shall include at least the following:

- (i) If a Supermajority Vote (as defined by the Regional Organization) was reached, a clear statement of the Regional Organization's position on the issue;
- (ii) If a Supermajority Vote was not reached, a clear statement of all positions espoused by the members of the Regional Organization;
- (iii) A clear statement of how the Regional Organization arrived at its position(s). Specifically, the statement should detail specific meetings, teleconferences, or other means of deliberating an issue, and a list of all members who participated or otherwise submitted their views;
- (iv) A statement of the position on the issue of any ccNSO members that are not members of the Regional Organization;
- (v) An analysis of how the issue would affect the Region, including any financial impact on the Region; and
- (vi) An analysis of the period of time that would likely be necessary to implement the policy.

2. *Outside Advisors*. The task force may, in its discretion, solicit the opinions of outside advisors, experts, or other members of the public. Such

opinions should be set forth in a report prepared by such outside advisors, and (i) clearly labeled as coming from outside advisors; (ii) accompanied by a detailed statement of the advisors' (a) qualifications and relevant experience and (b) potential conflicts of interest. These reports should be submitted in a formal statement to the task force chair within the time designated in the PDP Time Line.

e. *Task Force Report*. The chair of the task force, working with the Issue Manager, shall compile the Regional Statements, the Comment Report, and other information or reports, as applicable, into a single document ("Preliminary Task Force Report") and distribute the Preliminary Task Force Report to the full task force within the time designated in the PDP Time Line. The task force shall have a final task force meeting to consider the issues and try and reach a Supermajority Vote. After the final task force meeting, the chair of the task force and the Issue Manager shall create the final task force report (the "Task Force Report") and post it on the Website and to the other ICANN Supporting Organizations and Advisory Committees. Each Task Force Report must include:

1. A clear statement of any Supermajority Vote (being 66% of the task force) position of the task force on the issue;
2. If a Supermajority Vote was not reached, a clear statement of all positions espoused by task force members submitted within the time line for submission of constituency reports. Each statement should clearly indicate (i) the reasons underlying the position and (ii) the Regional Organizations that held the position;
3. An analysis of how the issue would affect each Region, including any financial impact on the Region;
4. An analysis of the period of time that would likely be necessary to implement the policy; and
5. The advice of any outside advisors appointed to the task force by the Council, accompanied by a

detailed statement of the advisors' (i) qualifications and relevant experience and (ii) potential conflicts of interest.

8. Procedure if No Task Force is Formed

a. If the Council decides not to convene a task force, each Regional Organization shall, within the time designated in the PDP Time Line, appoint a representative to solicit the Region's views on the issue. Each such representative shall be asked to submit a Regional Statement to the Issue Manager within the time designated in the PDP Time Line.

b. The Council may, in its discretion, take other steps to assist in the PDP, including, for example, appointing a particular individual or organization, to gather information on the issue or scheduling meetings for deliberation or briefing. All such information shall be submitted to the Issue Manager within the time designated in the PDP Time Line.

c. The Council shall formally request the Chair of the GAC to offer opinion or advice.

d. The Issue Manager shall take all Regional Statements, the Comment Report, and other information and compile (and post on the Website) an Initial Report within the time designated in the PDP Time Line. Thereafter, the Issue Manager shall, in accordance with Item 9 below, create a Final Report.

9. Comments to the Task Force Report or Initial Report

a. A comment period (in accordance with the PDP Time Line, and ordinarily at least 21 days long) shall be opened for comments on the Task Force Report or Initial Report. Comments shall be accepted from ccTLD managers, other Supporting Organizations, Advisory Committees, and from the public. All comments shall include the author's name, relevant experience, and interest in the issue.

b. At the end of the comment period, the Issue Manager shall review the comments received and may, in the Issue Manager's reasonable discretion, add appropriate comments to the Task Force Report or Initial Report, to prepare the "Final Report". The Issue Manager shall not be obligated to include all comments made during the comment period, nor shall the

Issue Manager be obligated to include all comments submitted by any one individual or organization.

c. The Issue Manager shall prepare the Final Report and submit it to the Council chair within the time designated in the PDP Time Line.

10. Council Deliberation

a. Upon receipt of a Final Report, whether as the result of a task force or otherwise, the Council chair shall (i) distribute the Final Report to all Council members; (ii) call for a Council meeting within the time designated in the PDP Time Line wherein the Council shall work towards achieving a recommendation to present to the Board; and (iii) formally send to the GAC Chair an invitation to the GAC to offer opinion or advice. Such meeting may be held in any manner deemed appropriate by the Council, including in person or by conference call. The Issue Manager shall be present at the meeting.

b. The Council may commence its deliberation on the issue prior to the formal meeting, including via in-person meetings, conference calls, e-mail discussions, or any other means the Council may choose.

c. The Council may, if it so chooses, solicit the opinions of outside advisors at its final meeting. The opinions of these advisors, if relied upon by the Council, shall be (i) embodied in the Council's report to the Board, (ii) specifically identified as coming from an outside advisor; and (iii) accompanied by a detailed statement of the advisor's (a) qualifications and relevant experience and (b) potential conflicts of interest.

11. Recommendation of the Council

In considering whether to make a recommendation on the issue (a "Council Recommendation"), the Council shall seek to act by consensus. If a minority opposes a consensus position, that minority shall prepare and circulate to the Council a statement explaining its reasons for opposition. If the Council's discussion of the statement does not result in consensus, then a recommendation supported by 14 or more of the Council members shall be deemed to reflect the view of the Council, and shall be conveyed to the Members as the Council's Recommendation. Notwithstanding the

foregoing, as outlined below, all viewpoints expressed by Council members during the PDP must be included in the Members Report.

12. Council Report to the Members

In the event that a Council Recommendation is adopted pursuant to Item 11 then the Issue Manager shall, within seven days after the Council meeting, incorporate the Council's Recommendation together with any other viewpoints of the Council members into a Members Report to be approved by the Council and then to be submitted to the Members (the "Members Report"). The Members Report must contain at least the following:

- a. A clear statement of the Council's recommendation;
- b. The Final Report submitted to the Council; and
- c. A copy of the minutes of the Council's deliberation on the policy issue (see Item 10), including all the opinions expressed during such deliberation, accompanied by a description of who expressed such opinions.

13. Members Vote

Following the submission of the Members Report and within the time designated by the PDP Time Line, the ccNSO members shall be given an opportunity to vote on the Council Recommendation. The vote of members shall be electronic and members' votes shall be lodged over such a period of time as designated in the PDP Time Line (at least 21 days long).

In the event that at least 50% of the ccNSO members lodge votes within the voting period, the resulting vote will be employed without further process. In the event that fewer than 50% of the ccNSO members lodge votes in the first round of voting, the first round will not be employed and the results of a final, second round of voting, conducted after at least thirty days notice to the ccNSO members, will be employed if at least 50% of the ccNSO members lodge votes. In the event that more than 66% of the votes received at the end of the voting period shall be in favor of the Council Recommendation, then the recommendation shall be conveyed to the Board in accordance with Item 14 below as the ccNSO Recommendation.

14. Board Report

The Issue Manager shall within seven days after a ccNSO Recommendation being made in accordance with Item 13 incorporate the ccNSO Recommendation into a report to be approved by the Council and then to be submitted to the Board (the "Board Report"). The Board Report must contain at least the following:

- a. A clear statement of the ccNSO recommendation;
- b. The Final Report submitted to the Council; and
- c. the Members' Report.

15. Board Vote

- a. The Board shall meet to discuss the ccNSO Recommendation as soon as feasible after receipt of the Board Report from the Issue Manager, taking into account procedures for Board consideration.
- b. The Board shall adopt the ccNSO Recommendation unless by a vote of more than 66% the Board determines that such policy is not in the best interest of the ICANN community or of ICANN.
 1. In the event that the Board determines not to act in accordance with the ccNSO Recommendation, the Board shall (i) state its reasons for its determination not to act in accordance with the ccNSO Recommendation in a report to the Council (the "Board Statement"); and (ii) submit the Board Statement to the Council.
 2. The Council shall discuss the Board Statement with the Board within thirty days after the Board Statement is submitted to the Council. The Board shall determine the method (e.g., by teleconference, e-mail, or otherwise) by which the Council and Board shall discuss the Board Statement. The discussions shall be held in good faith and in a timely and efficient manner, to find a mutually acceptable solution.
 3. At the conclusion of the Council and Board discussions, the Council shall meet to affirm or modify its Council Recommendation. A recommendation supported by 14 or more of the

Council members shall be deemed to reflect the view of the Council (the Council's "Supplemental Recommendation"). That Supplemental Recommendation shall be conveyed to the Members in a Supplemental Members Report, including an explanation for the Supplemental Recommendation. Members shall be given an opportunity to vote on the Supplemental Recommendation under the same conditions outlined in Item 13. In the event that more than 66% of the votes cast by ccNSO Members during the voting period are in favor of the Supplemental Recommendation then that recommendation shall be conveyed to Board as the ccNSO Supplemental Recommendation and the Board shall adopt the recommendation unless by a vote of more than 66% of the Board determines that acceptance of such policy would constitute a breach of the fiduciary duties of the Board to the Company.

4. In the event that the Board does not accept the ccNSO Supplemental Recommendation, it shall state its reasons for doing so in its final decision ("Supplemental Board Statement").

5. In the event the Board determines not to accept a ccNSO Supplemental Recommendation, then the Board shall not be entitled to set policy on the issue addressed by the recommendation and the status quo shall be preserved until such time as the ccNSO shall, under the ccPDP, make a recommendation on the issue that is deemed acceptable by the Board.

16. Implementation of the Policy

Upon adoption by the Board of a ccNSO Recommendation or ccNSO Supplemental Recommendation, the Board shall, as appropriate, direct or authorize ICANN staff to implement the policy.

17. Maintenance of Records

With respect to each ccPDP for which an Issue Report is requested (see Item 1), ICANN shall maintain on the Website a status web page detailing the progress of each ccPDP, which shall provide a list of relevant dates

for the ccPDP and shall also link to the following documents, to the extent they have been prepared pursuant to the ccPDP:

- a. Issue Report;
- b. PDP Time Line;
- c. Comment Report;
- d. Regional Statement(s);
- e. Preliminary Task Force Report;
- f. Task Force Report;
- g. Initial Report;
- h. Final Report;
- i. Members' Report;
- j. Board Report;
- k. Board Statement;
- l. Supplemental Members' Report; and
- m. Supplemental Board Statement.

In addition, ICANN shall post on the Website comments received in electronic written form specifically suggesting that a ccPDP be initiated.

Annex C: The Scope of the ccNSO

This annex describes the scope and the principles and method of analysis to be used in any further development of the scope of the ccNSO's policy-development role. As provided in [Article IX, Section 6\(2\)](#) of the Bylaws, that scope shall be defined according to the procedures of the ccPDP.

The scope of the ccNSO's authority and responsibilities must recognize the complex relation between ICANN and ccTLD managers/registries with regard to policy issues. This annex shall assist the ccNSO, the ccNSO Council, and the ICANN Board and staff in delineating relevant global policy issues.

Policy areas

The ccNSO's policy role should be based on an analysis of the following functional model of the DNS:

1. Data is registered/maintained to generate a zone file,
2. A zone file is in turn used in TLD name servers.

Within a TLD two functions have to be performed (these are addressed in greater detail below):

1. Entering data into a database (Data Entry Function) and
2. Maintaining and ensuring upkeep of name-servers for the TLD (Name Server Function).

These two core functions must be performed at the ccTLD registry level as well as at a higher level (IANA function and root servers) and at lower levels of the DNS hierarchy. This mechanism, as RFC 1591 points out, is recursive:

There are no requirements on sub domains of top-level domains beyond the requirements on higher-level domains themselves. That is, the requirements in this memo are applied recursively. In particular, all sub domains shall be allowed to operate their own domain name servers, providing in them whatever information the sub domain manager sees fit (as long as it is true and correct).

The Core Functions

1. Data Entry Function (DEF):

Looking at a more detailed level, the first function (entering and maintaining data in a database) should be fully defined by a naming policy. This naming policy must specify the rules and conditions:

- (a) under which data will be collected and entered into a database or data changed (at the TLD level among others, data to reflect a transfer from registrant to registrant or changing registrar) in the database.
- (b) for making certain data generally and publicly available (be it, for example, through Whois or nameservers).

2. The Name-Server Function (NSF)

The name-server function involves essential interoperability and stability issues at the heart of the domain name system. The importance of this function extends to nameservers at the ccTLD level, but also to the root servers (and root-server system) and nameservers at lower levels.

On its own merit and because of interoperability and stability considerations, properly functioning nameservers are of utmost importance to the individual, as well as to the local and the global Internet communities.

With regard to the nameserver function, therefore, policies need to be defined and established. Most parties involved, including the majority of ccTLD registries, have accepted the need for common policies in this area by adhering to the relevant RFCs, among others RFC 1591.

Respective Roles with Regard to Policy, Responsibilities, and Accountabilities

It is in the interest of ICANN and ccTLD managers to ensure the stable and proper functioning of the domain name system. ICANN and the ccTLD registries each have a distinctive role to play in this regard that can be defined by the relevant policies. The scope of the ccNSO cannot be established without reaching a common understanding of the allocation of authority between ICANN and ccTLD registries.

Three roles can be distinguished as to which responsibility must be assigned on any given issue:

- Policy role: i.e. the ability and power to define a policy;
- Executive role: i.e. the ability and power to act upon and implement the policy; and
- Accountability role: i.e. the ability and power to hold the responsible entity accountable for exercising its power.

Firstly, responsibility presupposes a policy and this delineates the policy role. Depending on the issue that needs to be addressed those who are involved in defining and setting the policy need to be determined and defined. Secondly, this presupposes an executive role defining the power to implement and act within the boundaries of a policy. Finally, as a counter-balance to the executive role, the accountability role needs to be defined and determined.

The information below offers an aid to:

1. delineate and identify specific policy areas;
2. define and determine roles with regard to these specific policy areas.

This annex defines the scope of the ccNSO with regard to developing policies. The scope is limited to the policy role of the ccNSO policy-development process for functions and levels explicitly stated below. It is anticipated that the accuracy of the assignments of policy, executive, and accountability roles shown below will be considered during a scope-definition ccPDP process.

Name Server Function (as to ccTLDs)

Level 1: Root Name Servers

Policy role: IETF, RSSAC (ICANN)

Executive role: Root Server System Operators

Accountability role: RSSAC (ICANN), (US DoC-ICANN MoU)

Level 2: ccTLD Registry Name Servers in respect to interoperability

Policy role: ccNSO Policy Development Process (ICANN), for best practices a ccNSO process can be organized

Executive role: ccTLD Manager

Accountability role: part ICANN (IANA), part Local Internet Community, including local government

Level 3: User's Name Servers

Policy role: ccTLD Manager, IETF (RFC)

Executive role: Registrant

Accountability role: ccTLD Manager

Data Entry Function (as to ccTLDs)

Level 1: Root Level Registry

Policy role: ccNSO Policy Development Process (ICANN)

Executive role: ICANN (IANA)

Accountability role: ICANN community, ccTLD Managers, US DoC, (national authorities in some cases)

Level 2: ccTLD Registry

Policy role: Local Internet Community, including local government, and/or ccTLD Manager according to local structure

Executive role: ccTLD Manager

Accountability role: Local Internet Community, including national authorities in some cases

Level 3: Second and Lower Levels

Policy role: Registrant

Executive role: Registrant

Accountability role: Registrant, users of lower-level domain names



You Tube



Twitter



LinkedIn



Flickr



Facebook



RSS Feeds



Community Wiki



ICANN Blog

Who We Are

Get Started
Learning
Participate
Board
CEO
Staff
Careers
Newsletter

Contact Us

Security Team
PGP Keys
Certificate Authority
Registry Liaison
AOC Review
Organizational Reviews
Request a Speaker
Offices
For Journalists

Accountability & Transparency

Governance
Agreements
Accountability Mechanisms
Independent Review Process
Request for Reconsideration
Ombudsman
AOC Review
Annual Report

Financials
Document Disclosure
Planning
Correspondence
Dashboard
RFPs
Litigation

Help

Dispute Resolution
Domain Name Dispute Resolution
Name Collision
Registrar Problems
WHOIS

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APPENDIX B

Translations Français Español

Log In Sign Up

العربية Русский 中文



GET STARTED

NEWS & MEDIA

POLICY

PUBLIC COMMENT

RESOURCES

COMMUNITY

IANA STEWARDSHIP

Resources

▼ About [ICANN](#)

▼ Board

▼ Accountability
&
Transparency

▼ Governance

▼ Governance
Documents

Guidelines

Articles of
Incorporation

▼ Bylaws

Board
Code of
Conduct

Board
Conflicts
of Interest
Policy

Board
Statements
of Interest

ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION OF INTERNET CORPORATION FOR ASSIGNED NAMES AND NUMBERS

As Revised November 21, 1998

1. The name of this corporation is Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (the "Corporation").

2. The name of the Corporation's initial agent for service of process in the State of California, United States of America is C T Corporation System.

3. This Corporation is a nonprofit public benefit corporation and is not organized for the private gain of any person. It is organized under the California Nonprofit Public Benefit Corporation Law for charitable and public purposes. The Corporation is organized, and will be operated, exclusively for charitable, educational, and scientific purposes within the meaning of § 501 (c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended (the "Code"), or the corresponding provision of any future United States tax code. Any reference in these Articles to the Code shall include the corresponding provisions of any further United States tax code. In furtherance of the foregoing purposes, and in recognition of the fact that the Internet is an international network of networks,

Summary of Conflicts of Interest and Ethics Practices Review	owned by no single nation, individual or organization, the Corporation shall, except as limited by Article 5 hereof, pursue the charitable and public purposes of lessening the burdens of government and promoting the global public interest in the operational stability of the Internet by (i) coordinating the assignment of Internet technical parameters as needed to maintain universal connectivity on the Internet; (ii) performing and overseeing functions related to the coordination of the Internet Protocol ("IP") address space; (iii) performing and overseeing functions related to the coordination of the Internet domain name system ("DNS"), including the development of policies for determining the circumstances under which new top-level domains are added to the DNS root system; (iv) overseeing operation of the authoritative Internet DNS root server system; and (v) engaging in any other related lawful activity in furtherance of items (i) through (iv).
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▼ Agreements ▼ AOC Review Annual Report ▼ Financials ▼ Document Disclosure ▼ Planning 	
Presentations	4. The Corporation shall operate for the benefit of the Internet community as a whole, carrying out its activities in conformity with relevant principles of international law and applicable international conventions and local law and, to the extent appropriate and consistent with these Articles and its Bylaws, through open and transparent processes that enable competition and open entry in Internet-related markets. To this effect, the Corporation shall cooperate as appropriate with relevant international organizations.
RFPs	
Litigation	
Newsletter	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▼ Correspondence 	
▼ Groups	
▼ Contractual Compliance	5. Notwithstanding any other provision (other than Article 8) of these Articles:
▼ Registrars	a. The Corporation shall not carry on any other activities not permitted to be carried on (i) by a corporation exempt from United States income tax under § 501 (c)(3) of the Code or (ii) by a corporation, contributions to which are deductible under § 170 (c)(2) of the Code.
▼ Registries	
▼ ccTLDs	
▼ Internationalized Domain Names	b. No substantial part of the activities of the Corporation shall be the carrying on of propaganda, or otherwise attempting to influence legislation, and the Corporation shall be empowered to make the election under § 501 (h) of the Code.
▼ Universal Acceptance Initiative	

▼ Policy

▼ Public
Comment

▼ Contact

▼ Help

c. The Corporation shall not participate in, or intervene in (including the publishing or distribution of statements) any political campaign on behalf of or in opposition to any candidate for public office.

d. No part of the net earnings of the Corporation shall inure to the benefit of or be distributable to its members, directors, trustees, officers, or other private persons, except that the Corporation shall be authorized and empowered to pay reasonable compensation for services rendered and to make payments and distributions in furtherance of the purposes set forth in Article 3 hereof.

e. In no event shall the Corporation be controlled directly or indirectly by one or more "disqualified persons" (as defined in § 4946 of the Code) other than foundation managers and other than one or more organizations described in paragraph (1) or (2) of § 509 (a) of the Code.

6. To the full extent permitted by the California Nonprofit Public Benefit Corporation Law or any other applicable laws presently or hereafter in effect, no director of the Corporation shall be personally liable to the Corporation or its members, should the Corporation elect to have members in the future, for or with respect to any acts or omissions in the performance of his or her duties as a director of the Corporation. Any repeal or modification of this Article 6 shall not adversely affect any right or protection of a director of the Corporation existing immediately prior to such repeal or modification.

7. Upon the dissolution of the Corporation, the Corporation's assets shall be distributed for one or more of the exempt purposes set forth in Article 3 hereof and, if possible, to a § 501 (c)(3) organization organized and operated exclusively to lessen the burdens of government and promote the global public interest in the operational stability of the Internet, or shall be distributed to a governmental entity for such purposes, or for such other charitable and public purposes that lessen the burdens of government by providing for the operational stability of the Internet. Any assets not so disposed of shall be disposed of by a court of competent jurisdiction of the county in which the principal office of the

Corporation is then located, exclusively for such purposes or to such organization or organizations, as such court shall determine, that are organized and operated exclusively for such purposes, unless no such corporation exists, and in such case any assets not disposed of shall be distributed to a § 501(c)(3) corporation chosen by such court.

8. Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in these Articles, if the Corporation determines that it will not be treated as a corporation exempt from federal income tax under § 501(c)(3) of the Code, all references herein to § 501(c)(3) of the Code shall be deemed to refer to § 501(c)(6) of the Code and Article 5(a)(ii), (b), (c) and (e) shall be deemed not to be a part of these Articles.

9. These Articles may be amended by the affirmative vote of at least two-thirds of the directors of the Corporation. When the Corporation has members, any such amendment must be ratified by a two-thirds (2/3) majority of the members voting on any proposed amendment.



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APPENDIX C



gTLD Applicant Guidebook

(v. 2012-06-04)

Module 3

4 June 2012

Module 3

Objection Procedures

This module describes two types of mechanisms that may affect an application:

- I. The procedure by which ICANN's Governmental Advisory Committee may provide GAC Advice on New gTLDs to the ICANN Board of Directors concerning a specific application. This module describes the purpose of this procedure, and how GAC Advice on New gTLDs is considered by the ICANN Board once received.
- II. The dispute resolution procedure triggered by a formal objection to an application by a third party. This module describes the purpose of the objection and dispute resolution mechanisms, the grounds for lodging a formal objection to a gTLD application, the general procedures for filing or responding to an objection, and the manner in which dispute resolution proceedings are conducted.

This module also discusses the guiding principles, or standards, that each dispute resolution panel will apply in reaching its expert determination.

All applicants should be aware of the possibility that a formal objection may be filed against any application, and of the procedures and options available in the event of such an objection.

3.1 GAC Advice on New gTLDs

ICANN's Governmental Advisory Committee was formed to consider and provide advice on the activities of ICANN as they relate to concerns of governments, particularly matters where there may be an interaction between ICANN's policies and various laws and international agreements or where they may affect public policy issues.

The process for GAC Advice on New gTLDs is intended to address applications that are identified by governments to be problematic, e.g., that potentially violate national law or raise sensitivities.

GAC members can raise concerns about any application to the GAC. The GAC as a whole will consider concerns

raised by GAC members, and agree on GAC advice to forward to the ICANN Board of Directors.

The GAC can provide advice on any application. For the Board to be able to consider the GAC advice during the evaluation process, the GAC advice would have to be submitted by the close of the Objection Filing Period (see Module 1).

GAC Advice may take one of the following forms:

- I. The GAC advises ICANN that it is the consensus of the GAC that a particular application should not proceed. This will create a strong presumption for the ICANN Board that the application should not be approved.
- II. The GAC advises ICANN that there are concerns about a particular application "dot-example." The ICANN Board is expected to enter into dialogue with the GAC to understand the scope of concerns. The ICANN Board is also expected to provide a rationale for its decision.
- III. The GAC advises ICANN that an application should not proceed unless remediated. This will raise a strong presumption for the Board that the application should not proceed unless there is a remediation method available in the Guidebook (such as securing the approval of one or more governments), that is implemented by the applicant.

Where GAC Advice on New gTLDs is received by the Board concerning an application, ICANN will publish the Advice and endeavor to notify the relevant applicant(s) promptly. The applicant will have a period of 21 calendar days from the publication date in which to submit a response to the ICANN Board.

ICANN will consider the GAC Advice on New gTLDs as soon as practicable. The Board may consult with independent experts, such as those designated to hear objections in the New gTLD Dispute Resolution Procedure, in cases where the issues raised in the GAC advice are pertinent to one of the subject matter areas of the objection procedures. The receipt of GAC advice will not toll the processing of any application (i.e., an application will not be suspended but will continue through the stages of the application process).

3.2 *Public Objection and Dispute Resolution Process*

The independent dispute resolution process is designed to protect certain interests and rights. The process provides a path for formal objections during evaluation of the applications. It allows a party with standing to have its objection considered before a panel of qualified experts.

A formal objection can be filed only on four enumerated grounds, as described in this module. A formal objection initiates a dispute resolution proceeding. In filing an application for a gTLD, the applicant agrees to accept the applicability of this gTLD dispute resolution process. Similarly, an objector accepts the applicability of this gTLD dispute resolution process by filing its objection.

As described in section 3.1 above, ICANN's Governmental Advisory Committee has a designated process for providing advice to the ICANN Board of Directors on matters affecting public policy issues, and these objection procedures would not be applicable in such a case. The GAC may provide advice on any topic and is not limited to the grounds for objection enumerated in the public objection and dispute resolution process.

3.2.1 *Grounds for Objection*

A formal objection may be filed on any one of the following four grounds:

String Confusion Objection – The applied-for gTLD string is confusingly similar to an existing TLD or to another applied-for gTLD string in the same round of applications.

Legal Rights Objection – The applied-for gTLD string infringes the existing legal rights of the objector.

Limited Public Interest Objection – The applied-for gTLD string is contrary to generally accepted legal norms of morality and public order that are recognized under principles of international law.

Community Objection – There is substantial opposition to the gTLD application from a significant portion of the community to which the gTLD string may be explicitly or implicitly targeted.

The rationales for these objection grounds are discussed in the final report of the ICANN policy development process for new gTLDs. For more information on this process, see

<http://gnso.icann.org/issues/new-gtlds/pdp-dec05-fr-part-08aug07.htm>.

3.2.2 *Standing to Object*

Objectors must satisfy standing requirements to have their objections considered. As part of the dispute proceedings, all objections will be reviewed by a panel of experts designated by the applicable Dispute Resolution Service Provider (DRSP) to determine whether the objector has standing to object. Standing requirements for the four objection grounds are:

Objection ground	Who may object
String confusion	Existing TLD operator or gTLD applicant in current round. In the case where an IDN ccTLD Fast Track request has been submitted before the public posting of gTLD applications received, and the Fast Track requestor wishes to file a string confusion objection to a gTLD application, the Fast Track requestor will be granted standing.
Legal rights	Rightholders
Limited public interest	No limitations on who may file – however, subject to a “quick look” designed for early conclusion of frivolous and/or abusive objections
Community	Established institution associated with a clearly delineated community

3.2.2.1 *String Confusion Objection*

Two types of entities have standing to object:

- An existing TLD operator may file a string confusion objection to assert string confusion between an applied-for gTLD and the TLD that it currently operates.
- Any gTLD applicant in this application round may file a string confusion objection to assert string confusion between an applied-for gTLD and the gTLD for which it has applied, where string confusion between the two applicants has not already been found in the Initial Evaluation. That is, an applicant does not have standing to object to another application with which it is already in a contention set as a result of the Initial Evaluation.

In the case where an existing TLD operator successfully asserts string confusion with an applicant, the application will be rejected.

In the case where a gTLD applicant successfully asserts string confusion with another applicant, the only possible

outcome is for both applicants to be placed in a contention set and to be referred to a contention resolution procedure (refer to Module 4, String Contention Procedures). If an objection by one gTLD applicant to another gTLD application is unsuccessful, the applicants may both move forward in the process without being considered in direct contention with one another.

3.2.2.2 *Legal Rights Objection*

A rightsholder has standing to file a legal rights objection. The source and documentation of the existing legal rights the objector is claiming (which may include either registered or unregistered trademarks) are infringed by the applied-for gTLD must be included in the filing.

An intergovernmental organization (IGO) is eligible to file a legal rights objection if it meets the criteria for registration of a .INT domain name¹:

- a) An international treaty between or among national governments must have established the organization; and
- b) The organization that is established must be widely considered to have independent international legal personality and must be the subject of and governed by international law.

The specialized agencies of the UN and the organizations having observer status at the UN General Assembly are also recognized as meeting the criteria.

3.2.2.3 *Limited Public Interest Objection*

Anyone may file a Limited Public Interest Objection. Due to the inclusive standing base, however, objectors are subject to a "quick look" procedure designed to identify and eliminate frivolous and/or abusive objections. An objection found to be manifestly unfounded and/or an abuse of the right to object may be dismissed at any time.

A Limited Public Interest objection would be manifestly unfounded if it did not fall within one of the categories that have been defined as the grounds for such an objection (see subsection 3.5.3).

A Limited Public Interest objection that is manifestly unfounded may also be an abuse of the right to object. An objection may be framed to fall within one of the

¹ See also <http://www.iana.org/domains/int/policy/>.

accepted categories for Limited Public Interest objections, but other facts may clearly show that the objection is abusive. For example, multiple objections filed by the same or related parties against a single applicant may constitute harassment of the applicant, rather than a legitimate defense of legal norms that are recognized under general principles of international law. An objection that attacks the applicant, rather than the applied-for string, could be an abuse of the right to object.²

The quick look is the Panel's first task, after its appointment by the DRSP and is a review on the merits of the objection. The dismissal of an objection that is manifestly unfounded and/or an abuse of the right to object would be an Expert Determination, rendered in accordance with Article 21 of the New gTLD Dispute Resolution Procedure.

In the case where the quick look review does lead to the dismissal of the objection, the proceedings that normally follow the initial submissions (including payment of the full advance on costs) will not take place, and it is currently contemplated that the filing fee paid by the applicant would be refunded, pursuant to Procedure Article 14(e).

3.2.2.4 Community Objection

Established institutions associated with clearly delineated communities are eligible to file a community objection. The community named by the objector must be a community strongly associated with the applied-for gTLD string in the application that is the subject of the objection. To qualify for standing for a community objection, the objector must prove both of the following:

² The jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights offers specific examples of how the term "manifestly ill-founded" has been interpreted in disputes relating to human rights. Article 35(3) of the European Convention on Human Rights provides: "The Court shall declare inadmissible any individual application submitted under Article 34 which it considers incompatible with the provisions of the Convention or the protocols thereto, manifestly ill-founded, or an abuse of the right of application." The ECHR renders reasoned decisions on admissibility, pursuant to Article 35 of the Convention. (Its decisions are published on the Court's website <http://www.echr.coe.int>.) In some cases, the Court briefly states the facts and the law and then announces its decision, without discussion or analysis. E.g., Decision as to the Admissibility of Application No. 34328/96 by Egbert Peree against the Netherlands (1998). In other cases, the Court reviews the facts and the relevant legal rules in detail, providing an analysis to support its conclusion on the admissibility of an application. Examples of such decisions regarding applications alleging violations of Article 10 of the Convention (freedom of expression) include: *Décision sur la recevabilité de la requête no 65831/01 présentée par Roger Garaudy contre la France* (2003); *Décision sur la recevabilité de la requête no 65297/01 présentée par Eduardo Fernando Alves Costa contre le Portugal* (2004).

The jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights also provides examples of the abuse of the right of application being sanctioned, in accordance with ECHR Article 35(3). See, for example, *Décision partielle sur la recevabilité de la requête no 61164/00 présentée par Gérard Duringer et autres contre la France et de la requête no 18589/02 contre la France* (2003).

It is an established institution – Factors that may be considered in making this determination include, but are not limited to:

- Level of global recognition of the institution;
- Length of time the institution has been in existence; and
- Public historical evidence of its existence, such as the presence of a formal charter or national or international registration, or validation by a government, inter-governmental organization, or treaty. The institution must not have been established solely in conjunction with the gTLD application process.

It has an ongoing relationship with a clearly delineated community – Factors that may be considered in making this determination include, but are not limited to:

- The presence of mechanisms for participation in activities, membership, and leadership;
- Institutional purpose related to the benefit of the associated community;
- Performance of regular activities that benefit the associated community; and
- The level of formal boundaries around the community.

The panel will perform a balancing of the factors listed above, as well as other relevant information, in making its determination. It is not expected that an objector must demonstrate satisfaction of each and every factor considered in order to satisfy the standing requirements.

3.2.3 Dispute Resolution Service Providers

To trigger a dispute resolution proceeding, an objection must be filed by the posted deadline date, directly with the appropriate DRSP for each objection ground.

- The International Centre for Dispute Resolution has agreed to administer disputes brought pursuant to string confusion objections.
- The Arbitration and Mediation Center of the World Intellectual Property Organization has agreed to administer disputes brought pursuant to legal rights objections.

- The International Center of Expertise of the International Chamber of Commerce has agreed to administer disputes brought pursuant to Limited Public Interest and Community Objections.

ICANN selected DRSPs on the basis of their relevant experience and expertise, as well as their willingness and ability to administer dispute proceedings in the new gTLD Program. The selection process began with a public call for expressions of interest³ followed by dialogue with those candidates who responded. The call for expressions of interest specified several criteria for providers, including established services, subject matter expertise, global capacity, and operational capabilities. An important aspect of the selection process was the ability to recruit panelists who will engender the respect of the parties to the dispute.

3.2.4 Options in the Event of Objection

Applicants whose applications are the subject of an objection have the following options:

The applicant can work to reach a settlement with the objector, resulting in withdrawal of the objection or the application;

The applicant can file a response to the objection and enter the dispute resolution process (refer to Section 3.2); or

The applicant can withdraw, in which case the objector will prevail by default and the application will not proceed further.

If for any reason the applicant does not file a response to an objection, the objector will prevail by default.

3.2.5 Independent Objector

A formal objection to a gTLD application may also be filed by the Independent Objector (IO). The IO does not act on behalf of any particular persons or entities, but acts solely in the best interests of the public who use the global Internet.

In light of this public interest goal, the Independent Objector is limited to filing objections on the grounds of Limited Public Interest and Community.

³ See <http://www.icann.org/en/announcements/announcement-21dec07.htm>.

Neither ICANN staff nor the ICANN Board of Directors has authority to direct or require the IO to file or not file any particular objection. If the IO determines that an objection should be filed, he or she will initiate and prosecute the objection in the public interest.

Mandate and Scope - The IO may file objections against “highly objectionable” gTLD applications to which no objection has been filed. The IO is limited to filing two types of objections: (1) Limited Public Interest objections and (2) Community objections. The IO is granted standing to file objections on these enumerated grounds, notwithstanding the regular standing requirements for such objections (see subsection 3.1.2).

The IO may file a Limited Public Interest objection against an application even if a Community objection has been filed, and vice versa.

The IO may file an objection against an application, notwithstanding the fact that a String Confusion objection or a Legal Rights objection was filed.

Absent extraordinary circumstances, the IO is not permitted to file an objection to an application where an objection has already been filed on the same ground.

The IO may consider public comment when making an independent assessment whether an objection is warranted. The IO will have access to application comments received during the comment period.

In light of the public interest goal noted above, the IO shall not object to an application unless at least one comment in opposition to the application is made in the public sphere.

Selection – The IO will be selected by ICANN, through an open and transparent process, and retained as an independent consultant. The Independent Objector will be an individual with considerable experience and respect in the Internet community, unaffiliated with any gTLD applicant.

Although recommendations for IO candidates from the community are welcomed, the IO must be and remain independent and unaffiliated with any of the gTLD applicants. The various rules of ethics for judges and international arbitrators provide models for the IO to declare and maintain his/her independence.

The IO's (renewable) tenure is limited to the time necessary to carry out his/her duties in connection with a single round of gTLD applications.

Budget and Funding – The IO's budget would comprise two principal elements: (a) salaries and operating expenses, and (b) dispute resolution procedure costs – both of which should be funded from the proceeds of new gTLD applications.

As an objector in dispute resolution proceedings, the IO is required to pay filing and administrative fees, as well as advance payment of costs, just as all other objectors are required to do. Those payments will be refunded by the DRSP in cases where the IO is the prevailing party.

In addition, the IO will incur various expenses in presenting objections before DRSP panels that will not be refunded, regardless of the outcome. These expenses include the fees and expenses of outside counsel (if retained) and the costs of legal research or factual investigations.

3.3 *Filing Procedures*

The information included in this section provides a summary of procedures for filing:

- Objections; and
- Responses to objections.

For a comprehensive statement of filing requirements applicable generally, refer to the New gTLD Dispute Resolution Procedure ("Procedure") included as an attachment to this module. In the event of any discrepancy between the information presented in this module and the Procedure, the Procedure shall prevail.

Note that the rules and procedures of each DRSP specific to each objection ground must also be followed. See <http://newgtlds.icann.org/en/program-status/objection-dispute-resolution>.

3.3.1 *Objection Filing Procedures*

The procedures outlined in this subsection must be followed by any party wishing to file a formal objection to an application that has been posted by ICANN. Should an applicant wish to file a formal objection to another gTLD application, it would follow these same procedures.

- All objections must be filed electronically with the appropriate DRSP by the posted deadline date.

Objections will not be accepted by the DRSPs after this date.

- All objections must be filed in English.
- Each objection must be filed separately. An objector wishing to object to several applications must file a separate objection and pay the accompanying filing fees for each application that is the subject of an objection. If an objector wishes to object to an application on more than one ground, the objector must file separate objections and pay the accompanying filing fees for each objection ground.

Each objection filed by an objector must include:

- The name and contact information of the objector.
- A statement of the objector's basis for standing; that is, why the objector believes it meets the standing requirements to object.
- A description of the basis for the objection, including:
 - A statement giving the specific ground upon which the objection is being filed.
 - A detailed explanation of the validity of the objection and why it should be upheld.
- Copies of any documents that the objector considers to be a basis for the objection.

Objections are limited to 5000 words or 20 pages, whichever is less, excluding attachments.

An objector must provide copies of all submissions to the DRSP associated with the objection proceedings to the applicant.

The DRSP will publish, and regularly update a list on its website identifying all objections as they are filed. ICANN will post on its website a notice of all objections filed once the objection filing period has closed.

3.3.2 Objection Filing Fees

At the time an objection is filed, the objector is required to pay a filing fee in the amount set and published by the relevant DRSP. If the filing fee is not paid, the DRSP will

dismiss the objection without prejudice. See Section 1.5 of Module 1 regarding fees.

Funding from ICANN for objection filing fees, as well as for advance payment of costs (see subsection 3.4.7 below) is available to the At-Large Advisory Committee (ALAC). Funding for ALAC objection filing and dispute resolution fees is contingent on publication by ALAC of its approved process for considering and making objections. At a minimum, the process for objecting to a gTLD application will require: bottom-up development of potential objections, discussion and approval of objections at the Regional At-Large Organization (RALO) level, and a process for consideration and approval of the objection by the At-Large Advisory Committee.

Funding from ICANN for objection filing fees, as well as for advance payment of costs, is available to individual national governments in the amount of USD 50,000 with the guarantee that a minimum of one objection per government will be fully funded by ICANN where requested. ICANN will develop a procedure for application and disbursement of funds.

Funding available from ICANN is to cover costs payable to the dispute resolution service provider and made directly to the dispute resolution service provider; it does not cover other costs such as fees for legal advice.

3.3.3 Response Filing Procedures

Upon notification that ICANN has published the list of all objections filed (refer to subsection 3.3.1), the DRSPs will notify the parties that responses must be filed within 30 calendar days of receipt of that notice. DRSPs will not accept late responses. Any applicant that fails to respond to an objection within the 30-day response period will be in default, which will result in the objector prevailing.

- All responses must be filed in English.
- Each response must be filed separately. That is, an applicant responding to several objections must file a separate response and pay the accompanying filing fee to respond to each objection.
- Responses must be filed electronically.

Each response filed by an applicant must include:

- The name and contact information of the applicant.

- A point-by-point response to the claims made by the objector.
- Any copies of documents that it considers to be a basis for the response.

Responses are limited to 5000 words or 20 pages, whichever is less, excluding attachments.

Each applicant must provide copies of all submissions to the DRSP associated with the objection proceedings to the objector.

3.3.4 Response Filing Fees

At the time an applicant files its response, it is required to pay a filing fee in the amount set and published by the relevant DRSP, which will be the same as the filing fee paid by the objector. If the filing fee is not paid, the response will be disregarded, which will result in the objector prevailing.

3.4 Objection Processing Overview

The information below provides an overview of the process by which DRSPs administer dispute proceedings that have been initiated. For comprehensive information, please refer to the New gTLD Dispute Resolution Procedure (included as an attachment to this module).

3.4.1 Administrative Review

Each DRSP will conduct an administrative review of each objection for compliance with all procedural rules within 14 calendar days of receiving the objection. Depending on the number of objections received, the DRSP may ask ICANN for a short extension of this deadline.

If the DRSP finds that the objection complies with procedural rules, the objection will be deemed filed, and the proceedings will continue. If the DRSP finds that the objection does not comply with procedural rules, the DRSP will dismiss the objection and close the proceedings without prejudice to the objector's right to submit a new objection that complies with procedural rules. The DRSP's review or rejection of the objection will not interrupt the time limit for filing an objection.

3.4.2 Consolidation of Objections

Once the DRSP receives and processes all objections, at its discretion the DRSP may elect to consolidate certain objections. The DRSP shall endeavor to decide upon

consolidation prior to issuing its notice to applicants that the response should be filed and, where appropriate, shall inform the parties of the consolidation in that notice.

An example of a circumstance in which consolidation might occur is multiple objections to the same application based on the same ground.

In assessing whether to consolidate objections, the DRSP will weigh the efficiencies in time, money, effort, and consistency that may be gained by consolidation against the prejudice or inconvenience consolidation may cause. The DRSPs will endeavor to have all objections resolved on a similar timeline. It is intended that no sequencing of objections will be established.

New gTLD applicants and objectors also will be permitted to propose consolidation of objections, but it will be at the DRSP's discretion whether to agree to the proposal.

ICANN continues to strongly encourage all of the DRSPs to consolidate matters whenever practicable.

3.4.3 *Mediation*

The parties to a dispute resolution proceeding are encouraged—but not required—to participate in mediation aimed at settling the dispute. Each DRSP has experts who can be retained as mediators to facilitate this process, should the parties elect to do so, and the DRSPs will communicate with the parties concerning this option and any associated fees.

If a mediator is appointed, that person may not serve on the panel constituted to issue an expert determination in the related dispute.

There are no automatic extensions of time associated with the conduct of negotiations or mediation. The parties may submit joint requests for extensions of time to the DRSP according to its procedures, and the DRSP or the panel, if appointed, will decide whether to grant the requests, although extensions will be discouraged. Absent exceptional circumstances, the parties must limit their requests for extension to 30 calendar days.

The parties are free to negotiate without mediation at any time, or to engage a mutually acceptable mediator of their own accord.

3.4.4 Selection of Expert Panels

A panel will consist of appropriately qualified experts appointed to each proceeding by the designated DRSP. Experts must be independent of the parties to a dispute resolution proceeding. Each DRSP will follow its adopted procedures for requiring such independence, including procedures for challenging and replacing an expert for lack of independence.

There will be one expert in proceedings involving a string confusion objection.

There will be one expert, or, if all parties agree, three experts with relevant experience in intellectual property rights disputes in proceedings involving an existing legal rights objection.

There will be three experts recognized as eminent jurists of international reputation, with expertise in relevant fields as appropriate, in proceedings involving a Limited Public Interest objection.

There will be one expert in proceedings involving a community objection.

Neither the experts, the DRSP, ICANN, nor their respective employees, directors, or consultants will be liable to any party in any action for damages or injunctive relief for any act or omission in connection with any proceeding under the dispute resolution procedures.

3.4.5 Adjudication

The panel may decide whether the parties shall submit any written statements in addition to the filed objection and response, and may specify time limits for such submissions.

In order to achieve the goal of resolving disputes rapidly and at reasonable cost, procedures for the production of documents shall be limited. In exceptional cases, the panel may require a party to produce additional evidence.

Disputes will usually be resolved without an in-person hearing. The panel may decide to hold such a hearing only in extraordinary circumstances.

3.4.6 Expert Determination

The DRSPs' final expert determinations will be in writing and will include:

- A summary of the dispute and findings;

- An identification of the prevailing party; and
- The reasoning upon which the expert determination is based.

Unless the panel decides otherwise, each DRSP will publish all decisions rendered by its panels in full on its website.

The findings of the panel will be considered an expert determination and advice that ICANN will accept within the dispute resolution process.

3.4.7 Dispute Resolution Costs

Before acceptance of objections, each DRSP will publish a schedule of costs or statement of how costs will be calculated for the proceedings that it administers under this procedure. These costs cover the fees and expenses of the members of the panel and the DRSP's administrative costs.

ICANN expects that string confusion and legal rights objection proceedings will involve a fixed amount charged by the panelists while Limited Public Interest and community objection proceedings will involve hourly rates charged by the panelists.

Within ten (10) calendar days of constituting the panel, the DRSP will estimate the total costs and request advance payment in full of its costs from both the objector and the applicant. Each party must make its advance payment within ten (10) calendar days of receiving the DRSP's request for payment and submit to the DRSP evidence of such payment. The respective filing fees paid by the parties will be credited against the amounts due for this advance payment of costs.

The DRSP may revise its estimate of the total costs and request additional advance payments from the parties during the resolution proceedings.

Additional fees may be required in specific circumstances; for example, if the DRSP receives supplemental submissions or elects to hold a hearing.

If an objector fails to pay these costs in advance, the DRSP will dismiss its objection and no fees paid by the objector will be refunded.

If an applicant fails to pay these costs in advance, the DRSP will sustain the objection and no fees paid by the applicant will be refunded.

After the hearing has taken place and the panel renders its expert determination, the DRSP will refund the advance payment of costs to the prevailing party.

3.5 Dispute Resolution Principles (Standards)

Each panel will use appropriate general principles (standards) to evaluate the merits of each objection. The principles for adjudication on each type of objection are specified in the paragraphs that follow. The panel may also refer to other relevant rules of international law in connection with the standards.

The objector bears the burden of proof in each case.

The principles outlined below are subject to evolution based on ongoing consultation with DRSPs, legal experts, and the public.

3.5.1 String Confusion Objection

A DRSP panel hearing a string confusion objection will consider whether the applied-for gTLD string is likely to result in string confusion. String confusion exists where a string so nearly resembles another that it is likely to deceive or cause confusion. For a likelihood of confusion to exist, it must be probable, not merely possible that confusion will arise in the mind of the average, reasonable Internet user. Mere association, in the sense that the string brings another string to mind, is insufficient to find a likelihood of confusion.

3.5.2 Legal Rights Objection

In interpreting and giving meaning to GNSO Recommendation 3 (“Strings must not infringe the existing legal rights of others that are recognized or enforceable under generally accepted and internationally recognized principles of law”), a DRSP panel of experts presiding over a legal rights objection will determine whether the potential use of the applied-for gTLD by the applicant takes unfair advantage of the distinctive character or the reputation of the objector’s registered or unregistered trademark or service mark (“mark”) or IGO name or acronym (as identified in the treaty establishing the organization), or unjustifiably impairs the distinctive character or the reputation of the objector’s mark or IGO name or acronym, or otherwise creates an impermissible likelihood of confusion between the applied-for gTLD and the objector’s mark or IGO name or acronym.

In the case where the objection is based on trademark rights, the panel will consider the following non-exclusive factors:

1. Whether the applied-for gTLD is identical or similar, including in appearance, phonetic sound, or meaning, to the objector's existing mark.
2. Whether the objector's acquisition and use of rights in the mark has been bona fide.
3. Whether and to what extent there is recognition in the relevant sector of the public of the sign corresponding to the gTLD, as the mark of the objector, of the applicant or of a third party.
4. Applicant's intent in applying for the gTLD, including whether the applicant, at the time of application for the gTLD, had knowledge of the objector's mark, or could not have reasonably been unaware of that mark, and including whether the applicant has engaged in a pattern of conduct whereby it applied for or operates TLDs or registrations in TLDs which are identical or confusingly similar to the marks of others.
5. Whether and to what extent the applicant has used, or has made demonstrable preparations to use, the sign corresponding to the gTLD in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services or a bona fide provision of information in a way that does not interfere with the legitimate exercise by the objector of its mark rights.
6. Whether the applicant has marks or other intellectual property rights in the sign corresponding to the gTLD, and, if so, whether any acquisition of such a right in the sign, and use of the sign, has been bona fide, and whether the purported or likely use of the gTLD by the applicant is consistent with such acquisition or use.
7. Whether and to what extent the applicant has been commonly known by the sign corresponding to the gTLD, and if so, whether any purported or likely use of the gTLD by the applicant is consistent therewith and bona fide.
8. Whether the applicant's intended use of the gTLD would create a likelihood of confusion with the objector's mark as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation, or endorsement of the gTLD.

In the case where a legal rights objection has been filed by an IGO, the panel will consider the following non-exclusive factors:

1. Whether the applied-for gTLD is identical or similar, including in appearance, phonetic sound or meaning, to the name or acronym of the objecting IGO;
2. Historical coexistence of the IGO and the applicant's use of a similar name or acronym. Factors considered may include:
 - a. Level of global recognition of both entities;
 - b. Length of time the entities have been in existence;
 - c. Public historical evidence of their existence, which may include whether the objecting IGO has communicated its name or abbreviation under Article 6^{ter} of the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property.
3. Whether and to what extent the applicant has used, or has made demonstrable preparations to use, the sign corresponding to the TLD in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services or a bona fide provision of information in a way that does not interfere with the legitimate exercise of the objecting IGO's name or acronym;
4. Whether and to what extent the applicant has been commonly known by the sign corresponding to the applied-for gTLD, and if so, whether any purported or likely use of the gTLD by the applicant is consistent therewith and bona fide; and
5. Whether the applicant's intended use of the applied-for gTLD would create a likelihood of confusion with the objecting IGO's name or acronym as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation, or endorsement of the TLD.

3.5.3 Limited Public Interest Objection

An expert panel hearing a Limited Public Interest objection will consider whether the applied-for gTLD string is contrary to general principles of international law for morality and public order.

Examples of instruments containing such general principles include:

- The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)

- The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)
- The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW)
- The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
- Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women
- The International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights
- The Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
- The International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of all Migrant Workers and Members of their Families
- Slavery Convention
- Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
- Convention on the Rights of the Child

Note that these are included to serve as examples, rather than an exhaustive list. It should be noted that these instruments vary in their ratification status. Additionally, states may limit the scope of certain provisions through reservations and declarations indicating how they will interpret and apply certain provisions. National laws not based on principles of international law are not a valid ground for a Limited Public Interest objection.

Under these principles, everyone has the right to freedom of expression, but the exercise of this right carries with it special duties and responsibilities. Accordingly, certain limited restrictions may apply.

The grounds upon which an applied-for gTLD string may be considered contrary to generally accepted legal norms relating to morality and public order that are recognized under principles of international law are:

- Incitement to or promotion of violent lawless action;
- Incitement to or promotion of discrimination based upon race, color, gender, ethnicity, religion or national origin, or other similar types of

discrimination that violate generally accepted legal norms recognized under principles of international law;

- Incitement to or promotion of child pornography or other sexual abuse of children; or
- A determination that an applied-for gTLD string would be contrary to specific principles of international law as reflected in relevant international instruments of law.

The panel will conduct its analysis on the basis of the applied-for gTLD string itself. The panel may, if needed, use as additional context the intended purpose of the TLD as stated in the application.

3.5.4 Community Objection

The four tests described here will enable a DRSP panel to determine whether there is substantial opposition from a significant portion of the community to which the string may be targeted. For an objection to be successful, the objector must prove that:

- The community invoked by the objector is a clearly delineated community; and
- Community opposition to the application is substantial; and
- There is a strong association between the community invoked and the applied-for gTLD string; and
- The application creates a likelihood of material detriment to the rights or legitimate interests of a significant portion of the community to which the string may be explicitly or implicitly targeted. Each of these tests is described in further detail below.

Community – The objector must prove that the community expressing opposition can be regarded as a clearly delineated community. A panel could balance a number of factors to determine this, including but not limited to:

- The level of public recognition of the group as a community at a local and/or global level;
- The level of formal boundaries around the community and what persons or entities are considered to form the community;

- The length of time the community has been in existence;
- The global distribution of the community (this may not apply if the community is territorial); and
- The number of people or entities that make up the community.

If opposition by a number of people/entities is found, but the group represented by the objector is not determined to be a clearly delineated community, the objection will fail.

Substantial Opposition – The objector must prove substantial opposition within the community it has identified itself as representing. A panel could balance a number of factors to determine whether there is substantial opposition, including but not limited to:

- Number of expressions of opposition relative to the composition of the community;
- The representative nature of entities expressing opposition;
- Level of recognized stature or weight among sources of opposition;
- Distribution or diversity among sources of expressions of opposition, including:
 - Regional
 - Subsectors of community
 - Leadership of community
 - Membership of community
- Historical defense of the community in other contexts; and
- Costs incurred by objector in expressing opposition, including other channels the objector may have used to convey opposition.

If some opposition within the community is determined, but it does not meet the standard of substantial opposition, the objection will fail.

Targeting – The objector must prove a strong association between the applied-for gTLD string and the community represented by the objector. Factors that could be

balanced by a panel to determine this include but are not limited to:

- Statements contained in application;
- Other public statements by the applicant;
- Associations by the public.

If opposition by a community is determined, but there is no strong association between the community and the applied-for gTLD string, the objection will fail.

Detriment – The objector must prove that the application creates a likelihood of material detriment to the rights or legitimate interests of a significant portion of the community to which the string may be explicitly or implicitly targeted. An allegation of detriment that consists only of the applicant being delegated the string instead of the objector will not be sufficient for a finding of material detriment.


Factors that could be used by a panel in making this determination include but are not limited to:

- Nature and extent of damage to the reputation of the community represented by the objector that would result from the applicant's operation of the applied-for gTLD string;
- Evidence that the applicant is not acting or does not intend to act in accordance with the interests of the community or of users more widely, including evidence that the applicant has not proposed or does not intend to institute effective security protection for user interests;
- Interference with the core activities of the community that would result from the applicant's operation of the applied-for gTLD string;
- Dependence of the community represented by the objector on the DNS for its core activities;
- Nature and extent of concrete or economic damage to the community represented by the objector that would result from the applicant's operation of the applied-for gTLD string; and
- Level of certainty that alleged detrimental outcomes would occur.

If opposition by a community is determined, but there is no likelihood of material detriment to the targeted community resulting from the applicant's operation of the applied-for gTLD, the objection will fail.

The objector must meet all four tests in the standard for the objection to prevail.

DRAFT - New gTLD Program – Objection and Dispute Resolution



Attachment to Module 3

New gTLD Dispute Resolution Procedure

These Procedures were designed with an eye toward timely and efficient dispute resolution. As part of the New gTLD Program, these Procedures apply to all proceedings administered by each of the dispute resolution service providers (DRSP). Each of the DRSPs has a specific set of rules that will also apply to such proceedings.

NEW gTLD DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCEDURE

Article 1. ICANN's New gTLD Program

- (a) The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers ("ICANN") has implemented a program for the introduction of new generic Top-Level Domain Names ("gTLDs") in the internet. There will be a succession of rounds, during which applicants may apply for new gTLDs, in accordance with terms and conditions set by ICANN.
- (b) The new gTLD program includes a dispute resolution procedure, pursuant to which disputes between a person or entity who applies for a new gTLD and a person or entity who objects to that gTLD are resolved in accordance with this New gTLD Dispute Resolution Procedure (the "Procedure").
- (c) Dispute resolution proceedings shall be administered by a Dispute Resolution Service Provider ("DRSP") in accordance with this Procedure and the applicable DRSP Rules that are identified in Article 4(b).
- (d) By applying for a new gTLD, an applicant accepts the applicability of this Procedure and the applicable DRSP's Rules that are identified in Article 4(b); by filing an objection to a new gTLD, an objector accepts the applicability of this Procedure and the applicable DRSP's Rules that are identified in Article 4(b). The parties cannot derogate from this Procedure without the express approval of ICANN and from the applicable DRSP Rules without the express approval of the relevant DRSP.

Article 2. Definitions

- (a) The "Applicant" or "Respondent" is an entity that has applied to ICANN for a new gTLD and that will be the party responding to the Objection.
- (b) The "Objector" is one or more persons or entities who have filed an objection against a new gTLD for which an application has been submitted.
- (c) The "Panel" is the panel of Experts, comprising one or three "Experts," that has been constituted by a DRSP in accordance with this Procedure and the applicable DRSP Rules that are identified in Article 4(b).
- (d) The "Expert Determination" is the decision upon the merits of the Objection that is rendered by a Panel in a proceeding conducted under this Procedure and the applicable DRSP Rules that are identified in Article 4(b).
- (e) The grounds upon which an objection to a new gTLD may be filed are set out in full in Module 3 of the Applicant Guidebook. Such grounds are identified in this Procedure, and are based upon the Final Report on the Introduction of New Generic Top-Level Domains, dated 7 August 2007, issued by the ICANN Generic Names Supporting Organization (GNSO), as follows:
 - (i) "String Confusion Objection" refers to the objection that the string comprising the potential gTLD is confusingly similar to an existing top-level domain or another string applied for in the same round of applications.
 - (ii) "Existing Legal Rights Objection" refers to the objection that the string comprising the potential new gTLD infringes the existing legal rights of others

that are recognized or enforceable under generally accepted and internationally recognized principles of law.

- (iii) "Limited Public Interest Objection" refers to the objection that the string comprising the potential new gTLD is contrary to generally accepted legal norms relating to morality and public order that are recognized under principles of international law.
 - (iv) "Community Objection" refers to the objection that there is substantial opposition to the application from a significant portion of the community to which the string may be explicitly or implicitly targeted.
- (f) "DRSP Rules" are the rules of procedure of a particular DRSP that have been identified as being applicable to objection proceedings under this Procedure.

Article 3. Dispute Resolution Service Providers

The various categories of disputes shall be administered by the following DRSPs:

- (a) String Confusion Objections shall be administered by the International Centre for Dispute Resolution.
- (b) Existing Legal Rights Objections shall be administered by the Arbitration and Mediation Center of the World Intellectual Property Organization.
- (c) Limited Public Interest Objections shall be administered by the International Centre for Expertise of the International Chamber of Commerce.
- (d) Community Objections shall be administered by the International Centre for Expertise of the International Chamber of Commerce.

Article 4. Applicable Rules

- (a) All proceedings before the Panel shall be governed by this Procedure and by the DRSP Rules that apply to a particular category of objection. The outcome of the proceedings shall be deemed an Expert Determination, and the members of the Panel shall act as experts.
- (b) The applicable DRSP Rules are the following:
 - (i) For a String Confusion Objection, the applicable DRSP Rules are the ICDR Supplementary Procedures for ICANN's New gTLD Program.
 - (ii) For an Existing Legal Rights Objection, the applicable DRSP Rules are the WIPO Rules for New gTLD Dispute Resolution.
 - (iii) For a Limited Public Interest Objection, the applicable DRSP Rules are the Rules for Expertise of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), as supplemented by the ICC as needed.
 - (iv) For a Community Objection, the applicable DRSP Rules are the Rules for Expertise of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), as supplemented by the ICC as needed.
- (c) In the event of any discrepancy between this Procedure and the applicable DRSP Rules, this Procedure shall prevail.

- (d) The place of the proceedings, if relevant, shall be the location of the DRSP that is administering the proceedings.
- (e) In all cases, the Panel shall ensure that the parties are treated with equality, and that each party is given a reasonable opportunity to present its position.

Article 5. Language

- (a) The language of all submissions and proceedings under this Procedure shall be English.
- (b) Parties may submit supporting evidence in its original language, provided and subject to the authority of the Panel to determine otherwise, that such evidence is accompanied by a certified or otherwise official English translation of all relevant text.

Article 6. Communications and Time Limits

- (a) All communications by the Parties with the DRSPs and Panels must be submitted electronically. A Party that wishes to make a submission that is not available in electronic form (e.g., evidentiary models) shall request leave from the Panel to do so, and the Panel, in its sole discretion, shall determine whether to accept the non-electronic submission.
- (b) The DRSP, Panel, Applicant, and Objector shall provide copies to one another of all correspondence (apart from confidential correspondence between the Panel and the DRSP and among the Panel) regarding the proceedings.
- (c) For the purpose of determining the date of commencement of a time limit, a notice or other communication shall be deemed to have been received on the day that it is transmitted in accordance with paragraphs (a) and (b) of this Article.
- (d) For the purpose of determining compliance with a time limit, a notice or other communication shall be deemed to have been sent, made or transmitted if it is dispatched in accordance with paragraphs (a) and (b) of this Article prior to or on the day of the expiration of the time limit.
- (e) For the purpose of calculating a period of time under this Procedure, such period shall begin to run on the day following the day when a notice or other communication is received.
- (f) Unless otherwise stated, all time periods provided in the Procedure are calculated on the basis of calendar days

Article 7. Filing of the Objection

- (a) A person wishing to object to a new gTLD for which an application has been submitted may file an objection ("Objection"). Any Objection to a proposed new gTLD must be filed before the published closing date for the Objection Filing period.
- (b) The Objection must be filed with the appropriate DRSP, using a model form made available by that DRSP, with copies to ICANN and the Applicant.
- (c) The electronic addresses for filing Objections (the specific addresses shall be made available once they are created by providers):
 - (i) A String Confusion Objection must be filed at: [●].

- (ii) An Existing Legal Rights Objection must be filed at: [●].
 - (iii) A Limited Public Interest Objection must be filed at: [●].
 - (iv) A Community Objection must be filed at: [●].
- (d) All Objections must be filed separately:
- (i) An Objector who wishes to object to an application on more than one ground must file separate objections with the appropriate DRSP(s).
 - (ii) An Objector who wishes to object to more than one gTLD must file separate objections to each gTLD with the appropriate DRSP(s).
- (e) If an Objection is filed with the wrong DRSP, that DRSP shall promptly notify the Objector of the error and that DRSP shall not process the incorrectly filed Objection. The Objector may then cure the error by filing its Objection with the correct DRSP within seven (7) days of receipt of the error notice, failing which the Objection shall be disregarded. If the Objection is filed with the correct DRSP within seven (7) days of receipt of the error notice but after the lapse of the time for submitting an Objection stipulation by Article 7(a) of this Procedure, it shall be deemed to be within this time limit.

Article 8. Content of the Objection

- (a) The Objection shall contain, *inter alia*, the following information:
- (i) The names and contact information (address, telephone number, email address, etc.) of the Objector;
 - (ii) A statement of the Objector's basis for standing; and
 - (iii) A description of the basis for the Objection, including:
 - (aa) A statement of the ground upon which the Objection is being filed, as stated in Article 2(e) of this Procedure;
 - (bb) An explanation of the validity of the Objection and why the objection should be upheld.
- (b) The substantive portion of the Objection shall be limited to 5,000 words or 20 pages, whichever is less, excluding attachments. The Objector shall also describe and provide copies of any supporting or official documents upon which the Objection is based.
- (c) At the same time as the Objection is filed, the Objector shall pay a filing fee in the amount set in accordance with the applicable DRSP Rules and include evidence of such payment in the Objection. In the event that the filing fee is not paid within ten (10) days of the receipt of the Objection by the DRSP, the Objection shall be dismissed without prejudice.

Article 9. Administrative Review of the Objection

- (a) The DRSP shall conduct an administrative review of the Objection for the purpose of verifying compliance with Articles 5-8 of this Procedure and the applicable DRSP Rules, and inform the Objector, the Applicant and ICANN of the result of its review within

fourteen (14) days of its receipt of the Objection. The DRSP may extend this time limit for reasons explained in the notification of such extension.

- (b) If the DRSP finds that the Objection complies with Articles 5-8 of this Procedure and the applicable DRSP Rules, the DRSP shall confirm that the Objection shall be registered for processing.
- (c) If the DRSP finds that the Objection does not comply with Articles 5-8 of this Procedure and the applicable DRSP Rules, the DRSP shall have the discretion to request that any administrative deficiencies in the Objection be corrected within five (5) days. If the deficiencies in the Objection are cured within the specified period but after the lapse of the time limit for submitting an Objection stipulated by Article 7(a) of this Procedure, the Objection shall be deemed to be within this time limit.
- (d) If the DRSP finds that the Objection does not comply with Articles 5-8 of this Procedure and the applicable DRSP Rules, and the deficiencies in the Objection are not corrected within the period specified in Article 9(c), the DRSP shall dismiss the Objection and close the proceedings, without prejudice to the Objector's submission of a new Objection that complies with this Procedure, provided that the Objection is filed within the deadline for filing such Objections. The DRSP's review of the Objection shall not interrupt the running of the time limit for submitting an Objection stipulated by Article 7(a) of this Procedure.
- (e) Immediately upon registering an Objection for processing, pursuant to Article 9(b), the DRSP shall post the following information about the Objection on its website: (i) the proposed string to which the Objection is directed; (ii) the names of the Objector and the Applicant; (iii) the grounds for the Objection; and (iv) the dates of the DRSP's receipt of the Objection.

Article 10. ICANN's Dispute Announcement

- (a) Within thirty (30) days of the deadline for filing Objections in relation to gTLD applications in a given round, ICANN shall publish a document on its website identifying all of the admissible Objections that have been filed (the "Dispute Announcement"). ICANN shall also directly inform each DRSP of the posting of the Dispute Announcement.
- (b) ICANN shall monitor the progress of all proceedings under this Procedure and shall take steps, where appropriate, to coordinate with any DRSP in relation to individual applications for which objections are pending before more than one DRSP.

Article 11. Response to the Objection

- (a) Upon receipt of the Dispute Announcement, each DRSP shall promptly send a notice to: (i) each Applicant for a new gTLD to which one or more admissible Objections have been filed with that DRSP; and (ii) the respective Objector(s).
- (b) The Applicant shall file a response to each Objection (the "Response"). The Response shall be filed within thirty (30) days of the transmission of the notice by the DRSP pursuant to Article 11(a).
- (c) The Response must be filed with the appropriate DRSP, using a model form made available by that DRSP, with copies to ICANN and the Objector.

- (d) The Response shall contain, inter alia, the following information:
 - (i) The names and contact information (address, telephone number, email address, etc.) of the Applicant; and
 - (ii) A point-by-point response to the statements made in the Objection.
- (e) The substantive portion of the Response shall be limited to 5,000 words or 20 pages, whichever is less, excluding attachments. The Applicant shall also describe and provide copies of any supporting or official documents upon which the Response is based.
- (f) At the same time as the Response is filed, the Applicant shall pay a filing fee in the amount set and published by the relevant DRSP (which shall be the same as the filing fee paid by the Objector) and include evidence of such payment in the Response. In the event that the filing fee is not paid within ten (10) days of the receipt of the Response by the DRSP, the Applicant shall be deemed to be in default, any Response disregarded and the Objection shall be deemed successful.
- (g) If the DRSP finds that the Response does not comply with Articles 11(c) and (d)(1) of this Procedure and the applicable DRSP Rules, the DRSP shall have the discretion to request that any administrative deficiencies in the Response be corrected within five (5) days. If the administrative deficiencies in the Response are cured within the specified period but after the lapse of the time limit for submitting a Response pursuant to this Procedure, the Response shall be deemed to be within this time limit.
- (g) If the Applicant fails to file a Response to the Objection within the 30-day time limit, the Applicant shall be deemed to be in default and the Objection shall be deemed successful. No fees paid by the Applicant will be refunded in case of default.

Article 12. Consolidation of Objections

- (a) The DRSP is encouraged, whenever possible and practicable, and as may be further stipulated in the applicable DRSP Rules, to consolidate Objections, for example, when more than one Objector has filed an Objection to the same gTLD on the same grounds. The DRSP shall endeavor to decide upon consolidation prior to issuing its notice pursuant to Article 11(a) and, where appropriate, shall inform the parties of the consolidation in that notice.
- (b) If the DRSP itself has not decided to consolidate two or more Objections, any Applicant or Objector may propose the consolidation of Objections within seven (7) days of the notice given by the DRSP pursuant to Article 11(a). If, following such a proposal, the DRSP decides to consolidate certain Objections, which decision must be made within 14 days of the notice given by the DRSP pursuant to Article 11(a), the deadline for the Applicant's Response in the consolidated proceeding shall be thirty (30) days from the Applicant's receipt of the DRSP's notice of consolidation.
- (c) In deciding whether to consolidate Objections, the DRSP shall weigh the benefits (in terms of time, cost, consistency of decisions, etc.) that may result from the consolidation against the possible prejudice or inconvenience that the consolidation may cause. The DRSP's determination on consolidation shall be final and not subject to appeal.
- (d) Objections based upon different grounds, as summarized in Article 2(e), shall not be consolidated.

Article 13. The Panel

- (a) The DRSP shall select and appoint the Panel of Expert(s) within thirty (30) days after receiving the Response.
- (b) Number and specific qualifications of Expert(s):
 - (i) There shall be one Expert in proceedings involving a String Confusion Objection.
 - (ii) There shall be one Expert or, if all of the Parties so agree, three Experts with relevant experience in intellectual property rights disputes in proceedings involving an Existing Legal Rights Objection.
 - (iii) There shall be three Experts recognized as eminent jurists of international reputation, one of whom shall be designated as the Chair. The Chair shall be of a nationality different from the nationalities of the Applicant and of the Objector, in proceedings involving a Limited Public Interest Objection.
 - (iv) There shall be one Expert in proceedings involving a Community Objection.
- (c) All Experts acting under this Procedure shall be impartial and independent of the parties. The applicable DRSP Rules stipulate the manner by which each Expert shall confirm and maintain their impartiality and independence.
- (d) The applicable DRSP Rules stipulate the procedures for challenging an Expert and replacing an Expert.
- (e) Unless required by a court of law or authorized in writing by the parties, an Expert shall not act in any capacity whatsoever, in any pending or future proceedings, whether judicial, arbitral or otherwise, relating to the matter referred to expert determination under this Procedure.

Article 14. Costs

- (a) Each DRSP shall determine the costs for the proceedings that it administers under this Procedure in accordance with the applicable DRSP Rules. Such costs shall cover the fees and expenses of the members of the Panel, as well as the administrative fees of the DRSP (the "Costs").
- (b) Within ten (10) days of constituting the Panel, the DRSP shall estimate the total Costs and request the Objector and the Applicant/Respondent each to pay in advance the full amount of the Costs to the DRSP. Each party shall make its advance payment of Costs within ten (10) days of receiving the DRSP's request for payment and submit to the DRSP evidence of such payment. The respective filing fees paid by the Parties shall be credited against the amounts due for this advance payment of Costs.
- (c) The DRSP may revise its estimate of the total Costs and request additional advance payments from the parties during the proceedings.
- (d) Failure to make an advance payment of Costs:
 - (i) If the Objector fails to make the advance payment of Costs, its Objection shall be dismissed and no fees that it has paid shall be refunded.

- (ii) If the Applicant fails to make the advance payment of Costs, the Objection will be deemed to have been sustained and no fees that the Applicant has paid shall be refunded.
- (e) Upon the termination of the proceedings, after the Panel has rendered its Expert Determination, the DRSP shall refund to the prevailing party, as determined by the Panel, its advance payment(s) of Costs.

Article 15. Representation and Assistance

- (a) The parties may be represented or assisted by persons of their choice.
- (b) Each party or party representative shall communicate the name, contact information and function of such persons to the DRSP and the other party (or parties in case of consolidation).

Article 16. Negotiation and Mediation

- (a) The parties are encouraged, but not required, to participate in negotiations and/or mediation at any time throughout the dispute resolution process aimed at settling their dispute amicably.
- (b) Each DRSP shall be able to propose, if requested by the parties, a person who could assist the parties as mediator.
- (c) A person who acts as mediator for the parties shall not serve as an Expert in a dispute between the parties under this Procedure or any other proceeding under this Procedure involving the same gTLD.
- (d) The conduct of negotiations or mediation shall not, *ipso facto*, be the basis for a suspension of the dispute resolution proceedings or the extension of any deadline under this Procedure. Upon the joint request of the parties, the DRSP or (after it has been constituted) the Panel may grant the extension of a deadline or the suspension of the proceedings. Absent exceptional circumstances, such extension or suspension shall not exceed thirty (30) days and shall not delay the administration of any other Objection.
- (e) If, during negotiations and/or mediation, the parties agree on a settlement of the matter referred to the DRSP under this Procedure, the parties shall inform the DRSP, which shall terminate the proceedings, subject to the parties' payment obligation under this Procedure having been satisfied, and inform ICANN and the parties accordingly.

Article 17. Additional Written Submissions

- (a) The Panel may decide whether the parties shall submit any written statements in addition to the Objection and the Response, and it shall fix time limits for such submissions.
- (b) The time limits fixed by the Panel for additional written submissions shall not exceed thirty (30) days, unless the Panel, having consulted the DRSP, determines that exceptional circumstances justify a longer time limit.

Article 18. Evidence

In order to achieve the goal of resolving disputes over new gTLDs rapidly and at reasonable cost, procedures for the production of documents shall be limited. In exceptional cases, the Panel may require a party to provide additional evidence.

Article 19. Hearings

- (a) Disputes under this Procedure and the applicable DRSP Rules will usually be resolved without a hearing.
- (b) The Panel may decide, on its own initiative or at the request of a party, to hold a hearing only in extraordinary circumstances.
- (c) In the event that the Panel decides to hold a hearing:
 - (i) The Panel shall decide how and where the hearing shall be conducted.
 - (ii) In order to expedite the proceedings and minimize costs, the hearing shall be conducted by videoconference if possible.
 - (iii) The hearing shall be limited to one day, unless the Panel decides, in exceptional circumstances, that more than one day is required for the hearing.
 - (iv) The Panel shall decide whether the hearing will be open to the public or conducted in private.

Article 20. Standards

- (a) For each category of Objection identified in Article 2(e), the Panel shall apply the standards that have been defined by ICANN.
- (b) In addition, the Panel may refer to and base its findings upon the statements and documents submitted and any rules or principles that it determines to be applicable.
- (c) The Objector bears the burden of proving that its Objection should be sustained in accordance with the applicable standards.

Article 21. The Expert Determination

- (a) The DRSP and the Panel shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the Expert Determination is rendered within forty-five (45) days of the constitution of the Panel. In specific circumstances such as consolidated cases and in consultation with the DRSP, if significant additional documentation is requested by the Panel, a brief extension may be allowed.
- (b) The Panel shall submit its Expert Determination in draft form to the DRSP's scrutiny as to form before it is signed, unless such scrutiny is specifically excluded by the applicable DRSP Rules. The modifications proposed by the DRSP to the Panel, if any, shall address only the form of the Expert Determination. The signed Expert Determination shall be communicated to the DRSP, which in turn will communicate that Expert Determination to the Parties and ICANN.
- (c) When the Panel comprises three Experts, the Expert Determination shall be made by a majority of the Experts.

- (d) The Expert Determination shall be in writing, shall identify the prevailing party and shall state the reasons upon which it is based. The remedies available to an Applicant or an Objector pursuant to any proceeding before a Panel shall be limited to the success or dismissal of an Objection and to the refund by the DRSP to the prevailing party, as determined by the Panel in its Expert Determination, of its advance payment(s) of Costs pursuant to Article 14(e) of this Procedure and any relevant provisions of the applicable DRSP Rules.
- (e) The Expert Determination shall state the date when it is made, and it shall be signed by the Expert(s). If any Expert fails to sign the Expert Determination, it shall be accompanied by a statement of the reason for the absence of such signature.
- (f) In addition to providing electronic copies of its Expert Determination, the Panel shall provide a signed hard copy of the Expert Determination to the DRSP, unless the DRSP Rules provide for otherwise.
- (g) Unless the Panel decides otherwise, the Expert Determination shall be published in full on the DRSP's website.

Article 22. Exclusion of Liability

In addition to any exclusion of liability stipulated by the applicable DRSP Rules, neither the Expert(s), nor the DRSP and its employees, nor ICANN and its Board members, employees and consultants shall be liable to any person for any act or omission in connection with any proceeding conducted under this Procedure.

Article 23. Modification of the Procedure

- (a) ICANN may from time to time, in accordance with its Bylaws, modify this Procedure.
- (b) The version of this Procedure that is applicable to a dispute resolution proceeding is the version that was in effect on the day when the relevant application for a new gTLD is submitted.

APPENDIX D

Translations Français Español

العربية Русский 中文

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▼ Registries

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▼ Internationalized Domain Names

▼ Universal Acceptance Initiative

AFFIRMATION OF COMMITMENTS BY THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE AND THE INTERNET CORPORATION FOR ASSIGNED NAMES AND NUMBERS

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1. This document constitutes an Affirmation of Commitments (Affirmation) by the United States Department of Commerce ("DOC") and the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers ("ICANN"), a not-for-profit corporation. In recognition of the conclusion of the Joint Project Agreement and to institutionalize and memorialize the technical coordination of the Internet's domain name and addressing system (DNS)¹, globally by a private sector led organization, the parties agree as follows:

2. The Internet is a transformative technology that will continue to empower people around the globe, spur innovation, facilitate trade and commerce, and enable the free and unfettered flow of information. One of the elements of the Internet's success is a highly decentralized network that enables and encourages decision-making at a local level. Notwithstanding this

▼ Policy	decentralization, global technical coordination of the Internet's underlying infrastructure - the <u>DNS</u> - is required to ensure interoperability.
▼ Public Comment	3. This document affirms key commitments by <u>DOC</u> and <u>ICANN</u> , including commitments to: (a) ensure that decisions made related to the global technical coordination of the <u>DNS</u> are made in the public interest and are accountable and transparent; (b) preserve the security, stability and resiliency of the <u>DNS</u> ; (c) promote competition, consumer trust, and consumer choice in the <u>DNS</u> marketplace; and (d) facilitate international participation in <u>DNS</u> technical coordination.
▼ Contact	
▼ Help	

4. DOC affirms its commitment to a multi-stakeholder, private sector led, bottom-up policy development model for DNS technical coordination that acts for the benefit of global Internet users. A private coordinating process, the outcomes of which reflect the public interest, is best able to flexibly meet the changing needs of the Internet and of Internet users. ICANN and DOC recognize that there is a group of participants that engage in ICANN's processes to a greater extent than Internet users generally. To ensure that its decisions are in the public interest, and not just the interests of a particular set of stakeholders, ICANN commits to perform and publish analyses of the positive and negative effects of its decisions on the public, including any financial impact on the public, and the positive or negative impact (if any) on the systemic security, stability and resiliency of the DNS.

5. DOC recognizes the importance of global Internet users being able to use the Internet in their local languages and character sets, and endorses the rapid introduction of internationalized country code top level domain names (ccTLDs), provided related security, stability and resiliency issues are first addressed. Nothing in this document is an expression of support by DOC of any specific plan or proposal for the implementation of new generic top level domain names (gTLDs) or is an expression by DOC of a view that the potential consumer benefits of new gTLDs outweigh the potential costs.

6. DOC also affirms the United States Government's commitment to ongoing participation in ICANN's Governmental Advisory

Committee (GAC). DOC recognizes the important role of the GAC with respect to ICANN decision-making and execution of tasks and of the effective consideration by ICANN of GAC input on the public policy aspects of the technical coordination of the Internet DNS.

7. ICANN commits to adhere to transparent and accountable budgeting processes, fact-based policy development, cross-community deliberations, and responsive consultation procedures that provide detailed explanations of the basis for decisions, including how comments have influenced the development of policy consideration, and to publish each year an annual report that sets out ICANN's progress against ICANN's bylaws, responsibilities, and strategic and operating plans. In addition, ICANN commits to provide a thorough and reasoned explanation of decisions taken, the rationale thereof and the sources of data and information on which ICANN relied.

8. ICANN affirms its commitments to: (a) maintain the capacity and ability to coordinate the Internet DNS at the overall level and to work for the maintenance of a single, interoperable Internet; (b) remain a not for profit corporation, headquartered in the United States of America with offices around the world to meet the needs of a global community; and (c) to operate as a multi-stakeholder, private sector led organization with input from the public, for whose benefit ICANN shall in all events act. ICANN is a private organization and nothing in this Affirmation should be construed as control by any one entity.

9. Recognizing that ICANN will evolve and adapt to fulfill its limited, but important technical mission of coordinating the DNS, ICANN further commits to take the following specific actions together with ongoing commitment reviews specified below:

9.1 Ensuring accountability, transparency and the interests of global Internet users: ICANN commits to maintain and improve robust mechanisms for public input, accountability, and transparency so as to ensure that the outcomes of its decision-making will reflect the public interest and be accountable to all stakeholders by: (a) continually assessing and improving ICANN

Board of Directors (Board) governance which shall include an ongoing evaluation of Board performance, the Board selection process, the extent to which Board composition meets ICANN's present and future needs, and the consideration of an appeal mechanism for Board decisions; (b) assessing the role and effectiveness of the GAC and its interaction with the Board and making recommendations for improvement to ensure effective consideration by ICANN of GAC input on the public policy aspects of the technical coordination of the DNS; (c) continually assessing and improving the processes by which ICANN receives public input (including adequate explanation of decisions taken and the rationale thereof); (d) continually assessing the extent to which ICANN's decisions are embraced, supported and accepted by the public and the Internet community; and (e) assessing the policy development process to facilitate enhanced cross community deliberations, and effective and timely policy development. ICANN will organize a review of its execution of the above commitments no less frequently than every three years, with the first such review concluding no later than December 31, 2010. The review will be performed by volunteer community members and the review team will be constituted and published for public comment, and will include the following (or their designated nominees): the Chair of the GAC, the Chair of the Board of ICANN, the Assistant Secretary for Communications and Information of the DOC, representatives of the relevant ICANN Advisory Committees and Supporting Organizations and independent experts. Composition of the review team will be agreed jointly by the Chair of the GAC (in consultation with GAC members) and the Chair of the Board of ICANN. Resulting recommendations of the reviews will be provided to the Board and posted for public comment. The Board will take action within six months of receipt of the recommendations. Each of the foregoing reviews shall consider the extent to which the assessments and

actions undertaken by ICANN have been successful in ensuring that ICANN is acting transparently, is accountable for its decision-making, and acts in the public interest. Integral to the foregoing reviews will be assessments of the extent to which the Board and staff have implemented the recommendations arising out of the other commitment reviews enumerated below.

9.2 Preserving security, stability and resiliency: ICANN has developed a plan to enhance the operational stability, reliability, resiliency, security, and global interoperability of the DNS, which will be regularly updated by ICANN to reflect emerging threats to the DNS. ICANN will organize a review of its execution of the above commitments no less frequently than every three years. The first such review shall commence one year from the effective date of this Affirmation. Particular attention will be paid to: (a) security, stability and resiliency matters, both physical and network, relating to the secure and stable coordination of the Internet DNS; (b) ensuring appropriate contingency planning; and (c) maintaining clear processes. Each of the reviews conducted under this section will assess the extent to which ICANN has successfully implemented the security plan, the effectiveness of the plan to deal with actual and potential challenges and threats, and the extent to which the security plan is sufficiently robust to meet future challenges and threats to the security, stability and resiliency of the Internet DNS, consistent with ICANN's limited technical mission. The review will be performed by volunteer community members and the review team will be constituted and published for public comment, and will include the following (or their designated nominees): the Chair of the GAC, the CEO of ICANN, representatives of the relevant Advisory Committees and Supporting Organizations, and independent experts. Composition of the review team will be agreed jointly by the Chair of the GAC (in consultation with GAC members) and the CEO of ICANN. Resulting

recommendations of the reviews will be provided to the Board and posted for public comment. The Board will take action within six months of receipt of the recommendations.

9.3 Promoting competition, consumer trust, and consumer choice: ICANN will ensure that as it contemplates expanding the top-level domain space, the various issues that are involved (including competition, consumer protection, security, stability and resiliency, malicious abuse issues, sovereignty concerns, and rights protection) will be adequately addressed prior to implementation. If and when new gTLDs (whether in ASCII or other language character sets) have been in operation for one year, ICANN will organize a review that will examine the extent to which the introduction or expansion of gTLDs has promoted competition, consumer trust and consumer choice, as well as effectiveness of (a) the application and evaluation process, and (b) safeguards put in place to mitigate issues involved in the introduction or expansion. ICANN will organize a further review of its execution of the above commitments two years after the first review, and then no less frequently than every four years. The reviews will be performed by volunteer community members and the review team will be constituted and published for public comment, and will include the following (or their designated nominees): the Chair of the GAC, the CEO of ICANN, representatives of the relevant Advisory Committees and Supporting Organizations, and independent experts. Composition of the review team will be agreed jointly by the Chair of the GAC (in consultation with GAC members) and the CEO of ICANN. Resulting recommendations of the reviews will be provided to the Board and posted for public comment. The Board will take action within six months of receipt of the recommendations.

9.3.1 ICANN additionally commits to enforcing its existing policy relating to WHOIS, subject to applicable laws. Such existing policy requires that ICANN implement measures to maintain timely, unrestricted and public access to accurate and complete WHOIS information, including registrant, technical, billing, and administrative contact information. One year from the effective date of this document and then no less frequently than every three years thereafter, ICANN will organize a review of WHOIS policy and its implementation to assess the extent to which WHOIS policy is effective and its implementation meets the legitimate needs of law enforcement and promotes consumer trust. The review will be performed by volunteer community members and the review team will be constituted and published for public comment, and will include the following (or their designated nominees): the Chair of the GAC, the CEO of ICANN, representatives of the relevant Advisory Committees and Supporting Organizations, as well as experts, and representatives of the global law enforcement community, and global privacy experts. Composition of the review team will be agreed jointly by the Chair of the GAC (in consultation with GAC members) and the CEO of ICANN. Resulting recommendations of the reviews will be provided to the Board and posted for public comment. The Board will take action within six months of receipt of the recommendations.

10. To facilitate transparency and openness in ICANN's deliberations and operations, the terms and output of each of the reviews will be published for public comment. Each review team will consider such public comment and amend the review as it deems appropriate before it issues its final report to the Board.

11. The DOC enters into this Affirmation of Commitments pursuant to its authority under 15 U.S.C. 1512 and 47 U.S.C. 902. ICANN commits to this Affirmation according to its Articles of Incorporation and its Bylaws. This agreement will become effective October 1, 2009. The agreement is intended to be long-

standing, but may be amended at any time by mutual consent of the parties. Any party may terminate this Affirmation of Commitments by providing 120 days written notice to the other party. This Affirmation contemplates no transfer of funds between the parties. In the event this Affirmation of Commitments is terminated, each party shall be solely responsible for the payment of any expenses it has incurred. All obligations of the DOC under this Affirmation of Commitments are subject to the availability of funds.

FOR THE NATIONAL
TELECOMMUNICATIONS
INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION:

Name: Lawrence E. Strickling
Title: Assistant Secretary for
Communications and Information

Date: September 30, 2009

FOR THE INTERNET CORPORATION
AND FOR ASSIGNED NAMES AND
NUMBERS:

Name: Rod Beckstrom
Title: President and CEO

Date: September 30, 2009

¹For the purposes of this Affirmation the Internet's domain name and addressing system (DNS) is defined as: domain names; Internet protocol addresses and autonomous system numbers; protocol port and parameter numbers. ICANN coordinates these identifiers at the overall level, consistent with its mission.

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APPENDIX E

INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION

ICDR Case No. 50 117 T 00224 08

In the Matter of an Independent Review Process:

ICM REGISTRY, LLC,

Claimant,

v.

INTERNET CORPORATION FOR ASSIGNED NAMES
AND NUMBERS ("ICANN"),

Respondent

DECLARATION OF THE INDEPENDENT REVIEW PANEL

Judge Stephen M. Schwebel, *Presiding*
Mr. Jan Paulsson
Judge Dickran Tevrizian

February 19, 2010

PART ONE: INTRODUCTION

1. From its beginning in 1965, an exchange over a telephone line between a computer at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and a computer in California, to the communications colossus that the Internet has become, the Internet has constituted a transformative technology. Its protocols and domain name system standards and software were invented, perfected, and for some 25 years before the formation of the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), essentially overseen, by a small group of researchers working under contracts financed by agencies of the Government of the United States of America, most notably by the late Professor Jon Postel of the Information Sciences Institute of the University of Southern California and Dr. Vinton Cerf, founder of the Internet Society. Dr. Cerf, later the distinguished leader of ICANN, played a major role in the early development of the Internet and has continued to do so. European research centers also contributed. From the origin of the Internet domain name system in 1980 until the incorporation of ICANN in 1998, a small community of American computer scientists controlled the management of Internet identifiers. However the utility, reach, influence and exponential growth of the Internet quickly became quintessentially international. In 1998, in recognition of that fact, but at the same time determined to keep that management within the private sector rather than to subject it to the ponderous and politicized processes of international governmental control, the U.S. Department of Commerce, which then contracted on behalf of the U.S. Government with the managers of the Internet, transferred operational responsibility over the protocol and domain names system of the Internet to the newly formed Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers ("ICANN").

2. ICANN, according to Article 3 of its Articles of Incorporation of November 21, 1998, is a nonprofit public benefit corporation organized under the California Nonprofit Public Benefit Corporation Law "in recognition of the fact that the Internet is an international network of networks, owned by no single nation, individual or organization..." ICANN is charged with

"promoting the global public interest in the operational stability of the Internet by (i) coordinating the assignment of Internet technical parameters as needed to maintain universal connectivity on the Internet; (ii) performing and overseeing functions related to the coordination of the Internet Protocol ("IP") address space; (iii) performing and overseeing functions related to the coordination of the Internet domain name system ("DNS"), including the development of

policies for determining the circumstances under which new top-level domains are added to the DNS root system; (iv) overseeing operation of the authoritative Internet DNS root server system..." (Claimant's Exhibits, hereafter "C", at C-4.)

ICANN was formed as a California corporation apparently because early proposals for it were prepared at the instance of Professor Postel, who lived and worked in Marina del Rey, California, which became the site of ICANN's headquarters.

3. ICANN, Article 4 of its Articles of Incorporation provides,

"shall operate for the benefit of the Internet community as a whole, carrying out its activities in conformity with relevant principles of international law and applicable international conventions and local law and, to the extent appropriate and consistent with these Articles and its Bylaws, through open and transparent processes that enable competition and open entry in Internet-related markets. To this effect, the Corporation shall cooperate as appropriate with relevant international organizations."

4. ICANN's Bylaws, as amended effective May 29, 2008, in Section 1, define the mission of ICANN as that of coordination of the allocation and assignment

"of the three sets of unique identifiers for the Internet, ...(a) domain names forming a system referred to as "DNS", (b) ...Internet protocol ("IP") addresses and autonomous system ("AS") numbers and (c) Protocol port and parameter numbers". ICANN "coordinates the operation and evolution of the DNS root server system" as well as "policy development reasonably and appropriately related to these technical functions." (C-5.)

5. Section 2 of ICANN's Bylaws provides that, in performing its mission, core values shall apply, among them:

"1. Preserving and enhancing the operational stability, reliability, security, and global interoperability of the Internet.

"2. Respecting the creativity, innovation, and flow of information made possible by the Internet by limiting ICANN's activities to those matters within ICANN's mission requiring or significantly benefiting from global coordination.

"3. To the extent feasible and appropriate, delegating coordination functions to or recognizing the policy role of other responsible entities that reflect the interest of affected parties.

"4. Seeking and supporting broad, informed participation reflecting the functional, geographic, and cultural diversity of the Internet at all levels of policy development and decision-making.

...

"6. Introducing and promoting competition in the registration of domain names where practicable and beneficial in the public interest.

...

"8. Making decisions by applying documented policies neutrally and objectively, with integrity and fairness.

...

"11. While remaining rooted in the private sector, recognizing that governments and public authorities are responsible for public policy and duly taking into account governments' or public authorities' recommendations." (C-5.)

6. The Bylaws provide in Article II that the powers of ICANN shall be exercised and controlled by its Board, whose international composition, representative of various stakeholders, is otherwise detailed in the Bylaws. Article VI, Section 4.1 of the Bylaws provides that "no official of a national government or a multinational entity established by treaty or other agreement between national governments may serve as a Director". They specify that "ICANN shall not apply its standards, policies, procedures, or practices inequitably, or single out any particular party for disparate treatment unless justified by substantial and reasonable cause, such as the promotion of effective competition." ICANN is to operate in an open and transparent manner "and consistent with procedures designed to ensure fairness" (Article III, Section 1.) In those cases "where the policy action affects public policy concerns," ICANN shall "request the opinion of the Governmental Advisory Committee and take duly into account any advice timely presented by the Governmental Advisory Committee on its own initiative or at the Board's request" (Article III, Section 6).

7. Article IV of the Bylaws, Section 3, provides that: "ICANN shall have in place a separate process for independent third-party review of Board actions alleged by an affected party to be inconsistent with the Articles of Incorporation or Bylaws." Any person materially affected by a decision or action of the Board that he or she asserts "is inconsistent" with those Articles and Bylaws may submit a request for independent review which shall be referred to an Independent Review Panel ("IRP"). That Panel "shall be charged with declaring whether the Board has acted consistently with the provisions of those Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws". "The IRP shall be operated by an international arbitration provider appointed from time to time by ICANN...using arbitrators...nominated by that provider." The IRP shall have the authority to "declare whether an action or inaction of the Board was inconsistent with the Articles of Incorporation or the Bylaws" and "recommend that the Board stay any action or decision, or that the Board take any interim action, until such time as the Board reviews and acts upon the opinion of the IRP". Section 3 further specifies that declarations of the IRP shall be in writing, based solely on the documentation and arguments of the parties, and shall "specifically designate the prevailing party." The Section concludes by providing that, "Where feasible, the Board shall consider the IRP declaration at the Board's next meeting."

8. The international arbitration provider appointed by ICANN is the International Centre for Dispute Resolution ("ICDR") of the American Arbitration Association. It appointed the members of the instant Independent Review Panel in September 2008. Thereafter exchanges of written pleadings and extensive exhibits took place, followed by five days of oral hearings in Washington, D.C. September 21-25, 2009.

9. Article XI of ICANN's Bylaws provides, *inter alia*, for a Governmental Advisory Committee ("GAC") to "consider and provide advice on the activities of ICANN as they relate to concerns of governments, particularly matters where there may be an interaction between ICANN's policies and various laws and international agreements or where they may affect public policy issues". It further provides that the Board shall notify the Chair of the GAC in a timely manner of any proposal raising public policy issues. "The advice of the Governmental Advisory Committee on public policy matters shall be duly taken into account, both in the formulation and adoption of policies. In the event that the ICANN Board determines to take an action that is not consistent with the Governmental Advisory Committee advice, it shall so inform the Committee and state the reasons why it decided not to follow that advice. The Governmental Advisory Committee and the ICANN Board will then try, in good faith and in a timely and efficient manner, to find a mutually

acceptable solution." If no such solution can be found, the Board will state in its final decision the reasons why the GAC's advice was not followed.

PART TWO: FACTUAL BACKGROUND OF THE DISPUTE

10. The Domain Name System ("DNS"), a hierarchical name system, is at the heart of the Internet. At its summit is the so-called "root", managed by ICANN, although the U.S. Department of Commerce retains the ultimate capacity of implementing decisions of ICANN to insert new top-level domains into the root. The "root zone file" is the list of top-level domains. Top-level domains ("TLDs"), are identified by readable, comprehensible, "user-friendly" addresses, such as ".com", ".org", and ".net". There are "country-code TLDs" (ccTLDs), two letter codes that identify countries, such as .uk (United Kingdom), .jp (Japan), etc. There are generic TLDs ("gTLDs"), which are subdivided into sponsored TLDs ("sTLDs") and unsponsored TLDs ("gTLDs"). An unsponsored TLD operates under policies established by the global Internet community directly through ICANN, while a sponsored TLD is a specialized TLD that has a sponsor representing the narrower community that is most affected by the TLD. The sponsor is delegated, and carries out, policy-formulation responsibilities over matters concerning the TLD. Thus, under the root, top-level domains are divided into gTLDs such as .com, .net, and .info, and sTLDs such as .aero, .coop, and .museum. And there are ccTLDs, such as .fr (France). Second level domains, under the top-level domains, are legion; e.g., Microsoft.com, dassault.fr. While the global network of computers communicate with one another through a decentralized data routing mechanism, the Internet is centralized in its naming and numbering system. This system matches the unique Internet Protocol address of each computer in the world -- a string of numbers -- with a recognizable domain name. Computers around the world can communicate with one another through the Internet because their Internet Protocol addresses uniquely and reliably correlate with domain names.

11. When ICANN was formed in 1998, there were three generic TLDs: .com, .org, and .net. They were complemented by a few limited-use TLDs, .edu, .gov, .mil, and .int. Since its formation, ICANN has endeavored to introduce new TLDs. In 2000, ICANN opened an application process for the introduction of new gTLDs. This initial round was a preliminary effort to test a "proof of concept" in respect of new gTLDs. ICANN received forty-seven applications for both sponsored and unsponsored TLDs.

12. Among them was an application by the Claimant in these proceedings, ICM Registry (then under another ownership), for an unsponsored .XXX TLD,

which would responsibly present “adult” entertainment (*i.e.*, pornographic entertainment). ICANN staff recommended that the Board not select .XXX during the “proof of concept” round because “it did not appear to meet unmet needs”, there was “controversy” surrounding the application, and the definition of benefits of .XXX was “poor”. It observed that, “at this early ‘proof of concept’ stage with a limited number of new TLDs contemplated, other proposed TLDs without the controversy of an adult TLD would better serve the goals of this initial introduction of new TLDs.” (C-127, p. 230.) In the event, the ICANN Board authorized ICANN’s President and General Counsel to commence contract negotiations with seven applicants including three sponsored TLDs, .museum, .aero and .coop. Agreements were “subject to further Board approval or ratification.” (Minutes of the Second Annual Meeting of the Board, November 16, 2000, ICANN Exhibit G.)

13. In 2003, the ICANN Board passed resolutions for the introduction of new sponsored TLDs in another Round. The Board resolved that “upon the successful completion of the sTLD selection process, an agreement reflecting the commercial and technical terms shall be negotiated.” (C-78.) It posted a “Request for Proposals” (“RFP”), which included an application form setting out the selection criteria that would be used to evaluate proposals. The RFP’s explanatory notes provided that the sponsorship criteria required “the proposed sTLD [to] address the needs and interest of a ‘clearly defined community’...which can benefit from the establishment of a TLD operating in a policy formulation environment in which the community would participate.” Applicants had to show that the Sponsored TLD Community was (a) “Precisely defined, so it can readily be determined which persons or entities make up that community” and (b) “Comprised of persons that have needs and interests in common but which are differentiated from those of the general global Internet community”. (ICANN, New gTLD Program, ICANN Exhibit N.) The sponsorship criteria further required applicants to provide an explanation of the Sponsoring Organization’s policy-formulation procedures. They additionally required the applicant to demonstrate “broad-based support” from the sponsored TLD community. None of the criteria explicitly addressed “morality” issues or the content of websites to be registered in the new sponsored domains.

14. ICANN in 2004 received ten sTLD applications, including that of ICM Registry of March 16, 2004 for a .XXX sTLD. ICM’s application was posted on ICANN’s website. Its application stated that it was to

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] and who are interested in the [REDACTED] [REDACTED] (C-Confidential Exh. B.) The International Foundation for Online Responsibility (“IFFOR”), a Canadian organization whose creation by ICM was in process, was proposed to be ICM’s sponsoring organization. The President of ICM Registry, Stuart Lawley, a British entrepreneur, was to explain that the XXX sTLD is a

“significant step towards the goal of protecting children from adult content, and [to] facilitate the efforts of anyone who wishes to identify, filter or avoid adult content. Thus, the presence of “.XXX” in a web address would serve a dual role: both indicating to users that the website contained adult content, thereby allowing users to choose to avoid it, and also indicating to potential adult-entertainment consumers that the websites could be trusted to avoid questionable business practices.” (Lawley Witness Statement, para. 15.)

15. ICANN constituted an independent panel of experts (the “Evaluation Panel”) to review and recommend those sTLD applications that met the selection criteria. That Panel found that two of the ten applicants met all the selection criteria; that three met some of the criteria; and that four had deficiencies that could not be remedied within the applicant’s proposed framework. As for .XXX, the Evaluation Panel found that ICM was among the latter four; it fully met the technical and financial criteria but not some of the sponsorship criteria. The three-member Evaluation Panel, headed by Ms. Elizabeth Williams of Australia, that analyzed sponsorship and community questions did not believe that the .XXX application represented “a clearly defined community”; it found that “the extreme variability of definitions of what constitutes the content which defines this community makes it difficult to establish which content and associated persons or services would be in or out of the community”. The Evaluation Panel further found that the lack of cohesion in the community and the planned involvement of child advocates and free expression interest groups would preclude effective formulation of policy for the community; it was unconvinced of sufficient support outside of North America; and “did not agree that the application added new value to the Internet name space”. Its critical evaluation of ICM’s application concluded that it fell into the category of those “whose deficiencies cannot be remedied with the applicant’s proposed framework” (C-110.)

16. Because only two of ten applicants were recommended by the Evaluation Panel, and because the Board remained desirous of expanding the number of sTLDs, the ICANN Board resolved to give the other sTLD applicants further opportunity to address deficiencies found by the

Evaluation Panel. ICM Registry responded with an application revised as of December 7, 2004. It noted that the independent teams that evaluated the technical merits and business soundness of ICM's application had unreservedly recommended its approval. It submitted, contrary to the analysis of the Evaluation Panel, that ICM and IFFOR also met the sponsorship criteria. "Nonetheless, the Applicants fully understand that the topic of adult entertainment on the Internet is controversial. The Applicants also understand that the Board might be criticized whether it approves or disapproves the Proposal." (C-127, p. 176.) In accordance with ICANN's practice, ICM's application again was publicly posted on ICANN's website.

17. Following discussion of its application in the Board, ICM was invited to give a presentation to the Board, which it did in April 2005, in Mar del Plata, Argentina. Child protection and free speech advocates were among the representatives of ICM Registry. The Chairman of the Governmental Advisory Committee, Mohamed Sharil Tarmizi, was in attendance for part of the meeting as well as other meetings of the Board. ICM offered then and at ICANN meetings in Capetown (December 2004) and Luxembourg (July 2005) to discuss its proposal with the GAC or any of its members, a proposal that was not taken up (C-127, p. 231; C-170, p.2). In a letter of April 3, 2005, the GAC Chairman informed the ICANN President and CEO, Paul Twomey, that: "No GAC members have expressed specific reservations or comments, in the GAC, about applications for sTLDs in the current round." (C-158, p.1.) ICM's Mar del Plata presentation to the ICANN Board included the results of a poll conducted by XBiz in February 2005 of "adult" websites that asked: "What do you think of Internet suffixes (.sex, .xxx) to designate adult sites?" 22% of the responders checked, "A Horrible Idea"; 57% checked, "A Good Idea"; 21% checked, "It's No Big Deal Either Way". ICM, while recognizing that its proposal aroused some opposition in the adult entertainment community, maintained throughout that it fully met the RFP requirement of demonstrating that it had "broad-based support from the community to be represented". (C-45.)

18. The ICANN Board held a special meeting by teleconference on May 3, 2005, the Chairman of the ICANN Board, Dr. Vinton G. Cerf, presiding. The minutes record, in respect of the .XXX sTLD application, that there was broad discussion of whether ICM's application met the RFP criteria, "particularly relating to whether or not there was a 'sponsored community'". It was agreed to "discuss this issue" at the next Board meeting. (C-134.)

19. On June 1, 2005, the Board met by teleconference and after considerable discussion adopted the following resolutions, with a 6-3 vote in favor, 2 abstentions and 4 Board members absent:

“Resolved...the Board authorizes the President and General Counsel to enter into negotiations relating to proposed commercial and technical terms for the .XXX sponsored top-level domain (sTLD) with the applicant.”

“Resolved...if after entering into negotiations with the .XXX sTLD applicant the President and General Counsel are able to negotiate a set of proposed commercial and technical terms for a contractual arrangement, the President shall present such proposed terms to this board, for approval and authorization to enter into an agreement relating to the delegation of the sTLD.” (C-120.)

20. While a few of the other applications that were similarly cleared to enter into negotiations relating to proposed commercial and technical terms, e.g., those of .JOBS, and .MOBI, contained conditions, the foregoing resolutions relating to ICM Registry contained no conditions. The .JOBS resolution, for example, specified that

“the board authorizes the President and General Counsel to enter into negotiations relating to proposed commercial and technical terms for the .JOBS sponsored top-level domain (sTLD) with the applicant. During these negotiations, the board requests that special consideration be taken as to how broad-based policy-making would be created for the sponsored community, and how this sTLD would be differentiated in the name space.”

In contrast, the .XXX resolutions do not refer to further negotiations concerning sponsorship, nor do the resolutions refer to further consideration by the Board of the matter of sponsorship. Upon the successful conclusion of the negotiation, the terms of an agreement with ICM Registry were to be presented to the Board “for approval and authorization to enter into an agreement relating to the delegation of the sTLD”.

21. At the meeting of the Governmental Advisory Committee in Luxembourg July 11-12, 2005, under the chairmanship of Mr. Tarmizi, the foregoing resolutions gave rise to comment. The minutes contain the following summary reports:

"The Netherlands, supported by several members, including Brazil, EC and Egypt, raised the point about what appears to be a change in policy as regards the evaluation for the .xxx TLD.

"On that issue, the Chair stressed that the Board came to a decision after a very difficult and intense debate which has included the moral aspects. He wondered what the GAC could have done in this context.

"Brazil asked clarification about the process to provide GAC advice to the ICANN Board and to consult relevant communities on matter such as the creation of new gTLDs. The general public was likely to assume that GAC had discussed and approved the proposal; otherwise GAC might be perceived as failing to address the matter. This is a public policy issue rather than a moral issue.

"Denmark commented on the fact that the issue of the creation of the .xxx extension should have been presented to the GAC as a public policy issue. EC drew attention to the 2000 Evaluation report on .xxx that had concluded negatively.

"France asked about the methodology to be followed for the evaluation of new gTLDs in future and if an early warning system could be put in place. Egypt wished to clarify whether the issue was the approval by ICANN or the apparent change in policy.

"USA remarked that GAC had several opportunities to raise questions, notably at Working Group level, as the process had been open for several years. In addition there are not currently sufficient resources in the WGI to put sufficient attention to it. We should be working on an adequate methodology for the future. Netherlands commented that the ICANN decision making process was not sufficiently transparent for GAC to know in time when to reach [sic; react] to proposals.

"The Chair thanked the GAC for these comments which will be given to the attention of the ICANN Board." (C-139, p. 3.)

22. There followed a meeting of the GAC with the ICANN Board, at which the following statements are recorded in the summary minutes:

"Netherlands asked about the new criteria to be retained for new TLDs as it seems there was a shift in policy during the evaluation process.

"Mr. Twomey replied that there might be key policy differences due to learning experiences, for example it is now accepted not to put a limit on the number of new TLDs. He also noted that no comments had been received from governments regarding .xxx.

"Dr. Cerf added, taking the example of .xxx that there was a variety of proposals for TLDs before, including for this extension, but this time the way to cope with the selection was different. The proposal this time met the three main criteria, financial, technical and sponsorship. They [sic: There] were doubts expressed about the last criteria [sic] which were discussed extensively and the Board reached a positive decision considering that ICANN should not be involved in content matters.

"France remarked that there might be cases where the TLD string did infer the content matter. Therefore the GAC could be involved if public policies issues are to be raised.

"Dr. Cerf replied that in practice there is no correlation between the TLD string and the content. The TLD system is neutral, although filtering systems could be solutions promoted by governments. However, to the extent the governments do have concerns they relate to the issues across TLDs. Furthermore one could not slip into censorship.

"Chile and Denmark asked about the availability of the evaluation Report for .xxx and wondered if the process was in compliance with the ICANN Bylaws.

"Brazil asserted that content issues are relevant when ICANN is creating a space linked to pornography. He considered the matter as a public policy issue in the Brazilian context and repeated that the outside world would assume that GAC had been fully cognizant of the decision-making process.

"Mr. Twomey referred to the procedure for attention for GAC in the ICANN Bylaws that could be initiated if needed. The bylaws could work both ways: GAC could bring matters to ICANN's attention. Dr. Cerf invited GAC to comment in the context of the ICANN public

comments process. Spain suggested that ICANN should formally request GAC advice in such cases.

"The Chair [Dr. Cerf] noted in conclusion that it is not always clear what the public policy issues are and that an early warning mechanism is called for." (C-139, P. 5.)

23. When it came to drafting the GAC Communique, the following further exchanges were summarized:

"Brazil referred to the decision taken for the creation of .xxx and asked if anything could be done at this stage...

"On .xxx, USA thought that it would be very difficult to express some views at this late stage. The process had been public since the beginning, and the matter could have been raised before at Plenary or Working group level...

"Italy would be in favour of inserting the process for the creation of new TLDs in the Communique as GAC failed in some way to examine in good time the current set of proposal [sic] for questions of methodology and lack of resources.

"Malaysia recalled the difficult situation in which governments are faced with the evolution of the DNS system and the ICANN environment. ICANN and GAC should be more responsive to common issues...

"Canada raise [sic] the point of the advisory role of the GAC vis-à-vis ICANN and it would be difficult to go beyond this function for the time being.

"Denmark agreed with Canada but considered that the matter could have been raised before within the framework of the GAC; if necessary issues could be raised directly in Plenary.

"France though [sic] that the matter should be referred to in the Communique. Since ICANN was apparently limiting its consideration to financial, technical and sponsorship aspects, the content aspects should be treated as a problem for the GAC from the point of view of the general public interest."

"The Chair took note of the comments that had been made. He mentioned that the issues of new gTLDs...would be mentioned in the Communique." (C-139, p. 7.)

24. Finally, in respect of "New Top Level Domains"

"...the Chair recalled that members had made comments during the consultation period regarding the *.tel* and *.mobi* proposals, but not regarding other sTLD proposals.

"The GAC has requested ICANN to provide the Evaluation Report on the basis of which the application for *.xxx* was approved. GAC considered that some aspects of content related to top level extensions might give rise of [sic] public policies [sic] issues.

"The Chair confirmed that, having consulted the ICANN Legal Counsel, GAC could still advise ICANN about the *.xxx* proposal, should it decide to do so. However, no member has yet raised this as an issue for formal comments to be given to ICANN in the Communique." (C-139, p. 13.)

25. The Luxembourg Communique of the GAC as adopted made no express reference to the application of ICM Registry nor to the June 1, 2005 ICANN Board resolutions adopted in response to it. In respect of "New Top Level Domains", the Communique stated:

"The GAC notes from recent experience that the introduction of new TLDs can give rise to significant public policy issues, including content. Accordingly, the GAC welcomes the initiative of ICANN to hold consultations with respect to the implementation of the new Top Level Domains strategy. The GAC looks forward to providing advice to the process." (C-159, p. 1.)

26. Negotiations on commercial and technical terms for a contract between ICANN's General Counsel, John Jeffrey, and the counsel of ICM Registry, Ms. J. Beckwith Burr, in pursuance of the ICANN Board's resolutions of June 1, 2005, progressed smoothly, resulting in the posting in early August 2005 of the First Draft Registry Agreement. It was expected that the Board would vote on the contract at its meeting of August 16, 2005.

27. This expectation was overturned by ICANN's receipt of two letters. On August 11, 2005, Michael D. Gallagher, Assistant Secretary for

Communications and Information of the U.S. Department of Commerce, wrote Dr. Cerf, with a copy to Mr. Twomey, as follows:

"I understand that the Board of Directors of the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) is scheduled to consider approval of an agreement with the ICM Registry to operate the .xxx top level domain (TLD) on August 16, 2005. I am writing to urge the Board to ensure that the concerns of all members of the Internet community on this issue have been adequately heard and resolved before the Board takes action on this application.

"Since the ICANN Board voted to negotiate a contract with ICM Registry for the .xxx TLD in June 2005, this issue has garnered widespread public attention and concern outside of the ICANN community. The Department of Commerce has received nearly 6000 letters and emails from individuals expressing concern about the impact of pornography on families and children and opposing the creation of a new top level domain devoted to adult content. We also understand that other countries have significant reservations regarding the creation of a .xxx TLD. I believe that ICANN has also received many of these concerned comments. The volume of correspondence opposed to the creation of a .xxx TLD is unprecedented. Given the extent of the negative reaction, I request that the Board will provide a proper process and adequate additional time for these concerns to be voiced and addressed before any additional action takes place on this issue.

"It is of paramount importance that the Board ensure the best interests of the Internet community as a whole are fully considered as it evaluates the addition to this new top level domain..." (C-162, p. 1.)

28. On August 12, 2005, Mohamed Sharil Tarmizi, Chairman, GAC, wrote to the ICANN Board of Directors, in his personal capacity and not on behalf of the GAC, with a copy to the GAC, as follows:

"As you know, the Board is scheduled to consider approval of a contract for a new top level domain intended to be used for adult content...

"You may recall that during the session between the GAC and the Board in Luxembourg that some countries had expressed strong positions to the Board on this issue. In other GAC sessions, a number of other governments also expressed some concern with the potential

introduction of this TLD. The views are diverse and wide ranging. Although not necessarily well articulated in Luxembourg, as Chairman, I believe there remains a strong sense of discomfort in the GAC about the TLD, notwithstanding the explanations to date.

“I have been approached by some of these governments and I have advised them that apart from the advice given in relation to the creation of new TLDs in the Luxembourg Communiqué that implicitly refers to the proposed TLD, sovereign governments are also free to write directly to ICANN about their specific concerns.

“In this regard, I would like to bring to the Board’s attention the possibility that several governments will choose to take this course of action. I would like to request that in any further debate that we may have with regard to this TLD that we keep this background in mind.

“Based on the foregoing, I believe that the Board should allow time for additional governmental and public policy concerns to be expressed before reaching a final decision on this TLD.”

29. The *volte face* in the position of the United States Government evidenced by the letter of Mr. Gallagher appeared to have been stimulated by a cascade of protests by American domestic organizations such as the Family Research Council and Focus on the Family. Thousands of email messages of identical text poured into the Department of Commerce demanding that .XXX be stopped. Copies of messages obtained by ICM under the Freedom of Information Act show that while officials of the Department of Commerce concerned with Internet questions earlier did not oppose and indeed apparently favored ICANN’s approval of the application of ICM, the Department of Commerce was galvanized into opposition by the generated torrent of negative demands, and by representations by leading figures of the so-called “religious right”, such as Jim Dobson, who had influential access to high level officials of the U.S. Administration. There was even indication in the Department of Commerce that, if ICANN were to approve a top level domain for adult material, it would not be entered into the root if the United States Government did not approve (C-165, C-166.) The intervention of the United States came at a singularly delicate juncture, in the run-up to a United Nations sponsored conference on the Internet, the World Summit on the Information Society, which was anticipated to be the forum for concentration of criticism of the continuing influence of the United States over the Internet. The *Congressional Quarterly Weekly* ran a story entitled, “Web Neutrality vs. Morality” which said: “The flap over .xxx has put ICANN

in an almost impossible position. It is facing mounting pressure from within the United States and other countries to reject the domain. But if it goes back on its earlier decision, many countries will see that as evidence of its allegiance to and lack of independence from the U.S. government. 'The politics of this are amazing,' said Cerf. 'We're damned if we do and damned if we don't.' (C-284.)

30. Doubt about the desirability of allocating a top-level domain to ICM Registry, or opposition to so doing, was not confined to the U.S. Department of Commerce, as illustrated by the proceedings at Luxembourg quoted above. A number of other governments also expressed reservations or raised questions about ICM's application on various grounds, including, at a later stage, those of Australia (letter from the Minister for Communications, Information Technology and the Arts of February 28, 2007 expressing Australia's "strong opposition to the creation of a .XXX sTLD"), Canada (comment expressing concern that ICANN may be drawn into becoming a global Internet content regulator, Exhibit DJ) and the United Kingdom (letter of May 4, 2006 stressing the importance of ICM's monitoring all .XXX content from "day one", C-182). The EC expressed the view that consultation with the GAC had been inadequate. The Deputy Director-General of the European Commission on September 16, 2005 wrote Dr. Cerf stating that the June 1, 2005 resolutions were adopted without the benefit of such consultation and added:

"Moreover, while the .xxx TLD raises obvious and predictable public policy issues, the fact that a similar application from the same applicants had been rejected in 2000 (following a negative evaluation) had, not surprisingly, led many GAC representatives to expect that a similar decision would have been reached on this occasion...such a change in approach would benefit from an explanation to the GAC.

"I would therefore ask ICANN to reconsider the decision to proceed with this application until the GAC have had an opportunity to review the evaluation report." (C-172, p. 1.)

31. The State Secretary for Communications and Regional Policy of the Government of Sweden, Jonas Bjelfvenstam, wrote Dr. Twomey a letter carrying the date of November 23, 2005, as follows:

"I have followed recent discussions by the Board of Directors of ...ICANN concerning the proposed top level domain (TLD) .xxx. I appreciate that the Board has deferred further discussions on the

subject...taking account of requests from the applicant ICM, as well as the ...GAC Chairman's and the US Department of Commerce's request to allow for additional time for comments by interested parties.

"Sweden strongly supports the ICANN mission and the process making ICANN an organization independent of the US Government. We appreciate the achievements of ICANN in the outstanding technical and innovative development of the Internet, an ICANN exercising open, transparent and multilateral procedures.

"The Swedish line on pornography is that it is not compatible with gender equality goals. The constant exposure of pornography and degrading pictures in our everyday lives normalizes the exploitation of women and children and the pornography industry profits on the documentation.

"A TLD dedicated for pornography might increase the volume of pornography on the Internet at the same time as foreseen advantages with a dedicated TLD might not materialize. These and other comments have been made in the many comments made directly to ICANN through the ICANN web site. There are a considerable number of negative reactions within and outside the Internet community.

"I know that all TLD applications are dealt with in procedures open to everyone for comment. However, in a case like this, where public interests clearly are involved, we feel it could have been appropriate for ICANN to request advice from GAC. Admittedly, GAC could have given advice to ICANN anyway at any point in time in the process and to my knowledge, no GAC members have raised the question before the GAC meeting July 9-12 in Luxembourg. However, we all probably rested assured that ICANN's negative opinion on .xxx, expressed in 2000, would stand.

"From the ICANN decision on June 1, 2005, there was too little time for GAC to have an informed discussion on the subject at its Luxembourg summer meeting. ..

"Therefore we would ask ICANN to postpone conclusive discussions on .xxx until after the upcoming GAC meeting in November 29-30 in Vancouver...In due time before that meeting, it would be helpful if ICANN could present in detail how it means that .xxx fulfils the criteria set in advance..." (C-168, p. 1.)

32. At its meeting by teleconference of September 15, 2005, the Board, "after lengthy discussion involving nearly all of the directors regarding the sponsorship criteria, the application, and additional supplemental materials, and the specific terms of the proposed agreement," adopted a resolution providing that:

" ...

"Whereas the ICANN Board has expressed concerns regarding issues relating to the compliance with the proposed .XXX Registry Agreement (including possible proposals for codes of conduct and ongoing obligations regarding potential changes in ownership)...

"Whereas, ICANN has received significant levels of correspondence from the Internet community users over recent weeks, as well as inquiries from a number of governments,

"Resolved...that the ICANN President and General Counsel are directed to discuss possible additional contractual provisions or modifications for inclusion in the XXX Registry Agreement, to ensure that there are effective provisions requiring development and implementation of policies consistent with the principles in the ICM application. Following such additional discussions, the President and General Counsel are requested to return to the board for additional approval, disapproval or advice." (C-119, p. 1.)

33. At the Vancouver meeting of the Board in December 2005, the GAC requested an explanation of the processes that led to the adoption of the Board's resolutions of June 1. Dr. Twomey replied with a lengthy and detailed letter of February 11, 2006. The following extracts are of interest:

"Where an applicant passed all three sets of criteria and there were no other issues associated with the application, the Board was briefed and the application was allowed to move on to the stage of technical and commercial negotiations designed to establish a new sTLD. One application – POST – was in this category. In other cases – where an evaluation team indicated that a set of criteria was not met, or there were other issues to be examined – each applicant was provided an opportunity to submit clarifying or additional documentation before presenting the evaluation panel's recommendation to the Board for a decision on whether the applicant could proceed to the next stage. The other nine applications, including .XXX, were in this category.

“Because of the more subjective nature of the sponsorship/community value issues being reviewed, it was decided to ask the Board to review these issues directly.

...

“It should be noted that, consistent with Article II, Section 1 of the Bylaws, it is the ICANN Board that has the authority to decide, upon the conclusion of technical and commercial negotiations, whether or not to approve the creation of a new sTLD...Responsibility for resolving issues relating to an applicant's readiness to proceed to technical and commercial negotiations and, subsequently, whether or not to approve delegation of a new sTLD, rests with the Board.

...

“Extensive Review of ICM Application

...

“On 3 May 2005, the Board held a ‘broad discussion...regarding whether or not there was a ‘sponsored community’ . The Board agreed that it would discuss this issue again at the next Board Meeting.’

“Based on the extensive public comments received, the independent evaluation panel's recommendations, the responses of ICM and the proposed Sponsoring Organization (IFFOR) to those evaluations, ...at its teleconference on June 1, 2005, the Board authorized the President and General Counsel to enter into negotiations relating to proposed commercial and technical terms with ICM. It also requested the President to present any such negotiated agreement to the Board for approval and authorization...” (C-175.)

34. Subsequent draft registry agreements of ICM were produced in response to specific requests of ICANN staff for amendments, to which requests ICM responded positively. In particular, a provision was included stating that all requirements for registration would be “in addition to the obligation to comply with all applicable law[s] and regulation[s]”. (Claimant's Memorial on the Merits, pp. 128-129.)

35. Just before the Board met in Wellington, New Zealand in March 2006, the GAC convened and, among other matters, discussed the above letter of the

ICANN President of February 11, 2006. Its Communique of March 28 states that the GAC

“does not believe that the February 11 letter provides sufficient detail regarding the rationale for the Board determination that the application [of ICM Registry] had overcome the deficiencies noted in the Evaluation Report. The Board would request a written explanation of the Board decision, particularly with regard to the sponsored community and public interest criteria outlined in the sponsored top level domain selection criteria.

“...ICM promised a range of public interest benefits as part of its bid to operate the .xxx domain. To the GAC’s knowledge, these undertakings have not yet been included as ICM obligations in the proposed .xxx Registry Agreement negotiated with ICANN.”

“The public policy aspects identified by members of the GAC include the degree to which the .xxx application would:

- Take appropriate measures to restrict access to illegal and offensive content;

- Support the development of tools and programs to protect vulnerable members of the community;

- Maintain accurate details of registrants and assist law enforcement agencies to identify and contact the owners of particular websites, if need be; and

“Without in any way implying an endorsement of the ICM application, the GAC would request confirmation from the Board that any contract currently under negotiation between ICANN and ICM Registry would include enforceable provisions covering all of ICM Registry’s commitments, and such information on the proposed contract being made available to member countries through the GAC.

“Nevertheless without prejudice to the above, several members of the GAC are emphatically opposed from a public policy perspective to the introduction of a .xxx sTLD.”

36. At the Board’s meeting in Wellington of March 31, 2006, a resolution was adopted by which it was:

“Resolved, the President and General Counsel are directed to analyze all publicly received inputs, to continue negotiations with ICM Registry, and to return to the Board with any recommendations regarding amendments to the proposed sTLD registry agreement, particularly to ensure that the TLD sponsor will have in place adequate mechanisms to address any potential registrant violations of the sponsor’s policies.” (C-184, p. 1.)

37. On May 4, 2006, Dr. Twomey sent a further letter to the Chairman and members of the GAC in response to the GAC’s request for information regarding the decision of the ICANN Board to proceed with several sTLD applications, notwithstanding negative reports from one or more evaluation teams. The following extracts are of interest:

“It is important to note that the Board decision as to the .XXX application is still pending. The decision by the ICANN Board during its 1 June 2005 Special Board Meeting reviewed the criteria against the materials supplied and the results of the independent evaluations. ...the board voted to authorize staff to enter into contractual negotiations without prejudicing the Board’s right to evaluate the resulting contract and to decide whether it meets all the criteria before the Board including public policy advice such as might be offered by the GAC. The final conclusion on the Board’s decision to accept or reject the .XXX application has not been made and will not be made until such time as the Board either approves or rejects the registry agreement relating to the .XXX application. In fact, it is important to note that the Board has reviewed previous proposed agreements with ICM for the .XXX registry and has expressed concerns regarding the compliance structures established in those drafts.

...

In some instances, such as with .XXX, while the additional materials provided sufficient clarification to proceed with contractual discussions, the Board still expressed concerns about whether the applicant met all of the criteria, but took the view that such concerns could possibly be addressed by contractual obligations to be stated in a registry agreement.” (C-188, pp. 1, 2.)

38. On May 10, 2006, the Board held a telephonic special meeting and addressed ICM’s by now Third Draft Registry Agreement. After a roll call, there were 9 votes against accepting the agreement and 5 in favor. Those

who voted against (including Board Chairman Cerf and President Twomey), in brief explanations of vote, indicated that they so voted because the undertakings of ICM could not in their view be fulfilled; because the conditions required by the GAC could not be met; because doubts about sponsorship remained and had magnified as a result of opposition from elements of the adult entertainment community; because the agreement's reference to "all applicable law" raised a wide and variable test of compliance and enforcement; and because guaranty of compliance with obligations of the contract was lacking. Those who voted in favor indicated that changing ICANN's position after an extended process weakens ICANN and encourages the exertions of pressure groups; found that there was sufficient support of the sponsoring community, while invariable support was not required; held it unfair to impose on ICM a complete compliance model before it is allowed to start, a requirement imposed on no other applicant; maintained that ICANN is not in the business and should not be in the business of judging content which rather is the province of each country, that ICANN should not be a "choke-point for content limitations of governments"; and contended that ICANN should avoid applying subjective and arbitrary criteria and should concern itself with the technical merits of applications. (C-189.) The vote of May 10, 2006 was not to approve the agreement as proposed "but it did not reject the application" of ICM (C-197.)

39. ICM Registry filed a Request for Reconsideration of Board Action on May 21, 2006, pursuant to Article IV, Section 2 of ICANN's Bylaws providing for reconsideration requests. (C-190.) However, after being informed by ICANN's general counsel that the Board would be prepared to consider still another revised draft agreement, ICM withdrew that request on October 29, 2006. Working as she had throughout in consultation with ICANN's staff, particularly its general counsel, Ms. Burr, on behalf of ICM, engaged in further negotiations with ICANN endeavoring to accommodate its requirements, demonstrate that the concerns raised by the GAC had been met to the extent possible, and provide ICANN with additional support for ICM's commitment to abide by the provisions of the proposed agreement. Among the materials provided, earlier and then, were a list of persons within the child safety community willing to serve on the board of IFFOR, commitments to enter into agreements with rating associations to provide tags for filtering .XXX websites and to monitor compliance with rules for the suppression of child pornography provisions, and data about a "pre-reservation service" for reservations for .XXX from webmasters operating adult sites on other ICANN-recognized top level domains. ICANN claimed to have registered more than 75,000 pre-reservations in the first six months that this service was publicly available. (Claimant's Memorial on the Merits,

pp. 138-139.) The proposed agreement was revised to include, *inter alia*, provision for imposing certain requirements on registrants; develop mechanisms for compliance with those requirements; create dispute resolution mechanisms; and engage independent monitors. ICM agreed to enter into a contract with the Family Online Safety Institute. The clause regarding registrants' obligations to comply with "all applicable law" was deleted because, in ICM's view, it had given rise to misunderstanding about whether ICANN would become involved in monitoring content. ICM maintains that, in the course of exchanges about making these revisions and preparing its Fourth Draft Registry Agreement, "ICANN never sought to have ICM attempt to re-define the sponsored community or otherwise demonstrate that it met any of the RFP criteria". (*Id.*, p. 141.)

40. On February 2, 2007, the Chairman and Chairman-Elect of the GAC wrote the Chairman of the ICANN Board, speaking for themselves and not necessarily for the GAC, as follows:

"We note that the Wellington Communique...requested clarification from the ICANN Board regarding its decision of 1 June 2005 authorising staff to enter into contractual negotiations with ICM Registry, despite deficiencies identified by the Sponsorship...Panel...we reiterate the GAC's request for a clear explanation of why the ICANN Board is satisfied that the .xxx application has overcome the deficiencies relating to the proposed sponsorship community.

"In Wellington, the GAC also requested confirmation from the ICANN Board that the proposed .xxx agreement would include enforceable provisions covering all of ICM Registry's commitments...

"...GAC members would urge the Board to defer any final decision on this application until the Lisbon meeting." (C-198.)

41. A special meeting of the ICANN Board on February 12, 2007, was held by teleconference. Consideration of the proposed .XXX Registry Agreement was introduced by Mr. Jeffrey, who asked the Board to consider (a) public comment on the proposed agreement (which had been posted by ICANN on its website) (b) advice proffered by the GAC and (c) "how ICM measures up against the RFP criteria" (C-199, p.1). He noted in relation to community input that since the initial ICM application over 200,000 pertinent emails had been sent to ICANN.

42. Rita Rodin, a new Board member, noted that she had not been on the Board at previous discussions of the ICM application, but based on her

review of the papers “she had some concerns about whether the proposal met the criteria set forth in the RFP. For example, she noted that it was not clear to her whether the sponsoring community seeking to run the domain genuinely could be said to represent the adult on-line community. However Rita requested that John Jeffrey and Paul Twomey confirm that this sort of discussion should take place during this meeting. She said that she did not want to reopen issues if they had already been decided by the Board.” (*Id.*, pp. 2-3.)

43. While there was no direct response to the foregoing request of Ms. Rodin, Dr. Cerf noted “that had been the subject of debate by the Board in earlier discussions in 2006...over the last six months, there seem to have been a more negative reaction from members of the online community to the proposal.” Rita Rodin agreed; “there seems to be a ‘splintering of support in the adult on-line community.” She was also concerned “that approval of this domain in these circumstances would cause ICM to become a de facto arbiter of policies for pornography on the Internet...she was not comfortable with ICANN saying to a self-defined group that they could define policy around pornography on the internet. This was not part of ICANN’s technical decision-making remit...” (*Id.*, p. 3) Dr. Twomey said that the Board needed to focus on whether there was a need for further public comment on the new version, the GAC comments, “and whether ICM had demonstrated to the Board’s satisfaction that it had met criteria against the RFP for sTLDs.” Dr. Cerf agreed that “the sponsorship grouping for a new TLD was difficult to define.”

44. Susan Crawford expressed the view that “no group can demonstrate in advance that they will meet the interests and concerns of all members in their community and that this was an unrealistic expectation to place on any applicant...if that test was applied to any sponsor group for a new sTLD, none would ever be approved.”

45. The Acting Chair conducted a “straw poll” of the Board as to whether members held “serious concerns” about the level of support for the creation of the domain from this sponsoring community. A majority indicated that they did, while a minority indicated that “it was an inappropriate burden to place on ICM to ensure that the entire adult online community was supportive of the proposed domain”. (*Id.*) The following resolution was unanimously adopted:

"Whereas a majority of the Board has serious concerns about whether the proposed .XXX domain has the support of a clearly-defined sponsored community as per the criteria for sponsored TLDs;

"Whereas a minority of the Board believed that the self-described community of sponsorship made known by the proponent of the .XXX domain, ICM Registry, was sufficient to meet the criteria for an sTLD.

"Resolved that:

- I. The revised version [now the fifth version of the draft agreement] be exposed to a public comment period of no less than 21 days, and
- II. ICANN staff consult with ICM and provide further information to the Board prior to its next meeting, so as to inform a decision by the Board about whether sponsorship criteria is [sic] met for the creation of a new .XXX sTLD." (*Id.*, p. 4.)

46. The Governmental Advisory Committee met in Lisbon on March 28, 2007 and issued "formal advice to the Board". It reaffirmed the Wellington Communique as "a valid and important expression of the GAC's views on .xxx. The GAC does not consider the information provided by the Board to have answered the GAC concerns as to whether the ICM application meets the sponsorship criteria." It called attention to an expression of concern by Canada that, with the revised proposed ICANN-ICM Registry agreement, "the Corporation could be moving towards assuming an ongoing management and oversight role regarding Internet content, which would be inconsistent with its technical mandate." (C-200, pp. 4, 5.) It also adopted "Principles Regarding New TLDs" which contain the following provision in respect of delegation of new gTLDs:

"2.5 The evaluation and selection procedure for new gTLD registries should respect the principles of fairness, transparency and non-discrimination. All applicants for a new gTLD registry should therefore be evaluated against transparent and predictable criteria, fully available to the applicants prior to the initiation of the process. Normally, therefore, no subsequent additional selection criteria should be used in the selection process." (*Id.*, p. 12.)

47. The climactic meeting of the ICANN Board took place in Lisbon, Portugal, on March 30, 2007. A resolution was adopted by a vote of nine to five, with one abstention (that of Dr. Twomey), whose operative paragraphs provide that:

"...the board has determined that

"ICM's application and the revised agreement failed to meet, among other things, the sponsored community criteria of the RFP specification.

"Based on the extensive public comment and from the GAC's communiqués, that this agreement raises public policy issues.

"Approval of the ICM application and revised agreement is not appropriate, as they do not resolve the issues raised in the GAC communiqués, and ICM's response does not address the GAC's concern for offensive content and similarly avoids the GAC's concern for the protection of vulnerable members of the community. The board does not believe these public policy concerns can be credibly resolved with the mechanisms proposed by the applicant.

"The ICM application raises significant law enforcement compliance issues because of countries' varying laws relating to content and practices that define the nature of the application, therefore obligating ICANN to acquire responsibility related to content and conduct.

"The board agrees with the reference in the GAC communiqué from Lisbon that under the revised agreement, there are credible scenarios that lead to circumstances in which ICANN would be forced to assume an ongoing management and oversight role regarding Internet content, which is inconsistent with its technical mandate.

Accordingly, it is resolved...that the proposed agreement with ICM concerning the .xxx sTLD is rejected and the application request for delegation of the .XXX sTLD is hereby denied."

48. Debate in the Board over adoption of the resolution was intense. Dr. Cerf, who was to vote in favor of the resolution (and hence against the ICM application) observed that he had voted in favor of proceeding to negotiate a contract.

"Part of the reason for that was to try to understand more deeply exactly how this proposal would be implemented, and seeing the contractual terms...would put much more meat on the bones of the initial proposal. I have been concerned about the definition of 'responsible'...there's uncertainty in my mind about what behavioral

patterns to expect...over time, the two years that we've considered this, there has been a growing disagreement within the adult content community as to the advisability of this proposal. As I looked at the contract...the mechanisms for assuring the behavior of the registrants in this top-level domain seemed, to me, uncertain. And I was persuaded ... that there were very credible scenarios in which the operation of IFFOR and ICM might still lead to ICANN being propelled into responding to complaints that some content on some of the registered .xxx sites didn't somehow meet the expectations of the general public this would propel ICANN and its staff into making decisions or having to examine content to decide whether or not it met the IFFOR criteria ... I would also point out that the GAC has raised public policy concerns about this particular top level domain." (C-201, p. 6.)

49. Rita Rodin said that she did not believe

"that this is an appropriate sponsored community...it's inappropriate to allow an applicant in any sTLD to simply define out ...any people that are not in favor of this TLD..as irresponsible...this will be an enforcement headache...for ICANN..way beyond the technical oversight role of ICANN's mandate...there's porn all over the Internet and...there isn't a mechanism with this TLD to have it all exclusively within one string to actually effect some of the purposes of the TLD...to be responsible with respect to the distribution of pornography, to prevent child pornography on the Internet..." (*id.*, p. 7.)

50. Peter Dengate Thrush, who favored acceptance of the ICM contract, voted against the resolution. On the issue of the sponsored community,

"there is on the evidence a sufficiently identifiable, distinct community which the TLD could serve. It's the adult content providers wanting to differentiate themselves by voluntary adoption of this labeling system. It's not affected ... by the fact that that's a self-selecting community...or impermanence of that community...This is the first time in any of these sTLD applications that we have had active opposition. And we have no metrics...to establish what level of opposition by members of the potential community might have caused us concern...the resolution I am voting against is particularly weak on this issue. On why the board thinks this community is not sufficiently identified. No fact or real rationale are provided in the resolution, and...given the considerable importance that the board has placed on this...and the cost and effort that the applicant has gone to answer the

board's concern demonstrating the existence of a sponsored community...this silence is disrespectful to the applicant and does a disservice to the community...I've also been concerned ... about the scale of the obligations accepted by the applicant...some of those have been forced upon them by the process..in the end I am satisfied that the compliance rules raise no new issues in kind from previous contracts. And I say that if ICANN is going to raise this kind of objection, then it better think seriously of getting out of the business of introducing new TLDs ... I do not think that this contract would make ICANN a content regulator..." (*Id.*, pp. 7-8.)

51. Njeri Ronge stated that, in addition to the reasons stated in the resolution, "the ICM proposal will not protect the relevant or interested community from the adult entertainment Web sites by a significant percentage; ... the ICM proposal focuses on content management which is not in ICANN's technical mandate." (*Id.*, p. 8.)

52. Susan Crawford dissented from the resolution, which she found "not only weak but unprincipled".

"I am troubled by the path the board has followed on this issue...ICANN only creates problems for itself when it acts in an ad hoc fashion in response to political pressures. ICANN...should resist efforts by governments to veto what it does...The most fundamental value of the global Internet community is that people who propose to use the Internet protocols and infrastructures for otherwise lawful purposes, without threatening the operational stability or security of the Internet, should be presumed to be entitled to do so. In a nutshell, everything not prohibited is permitted. This understanding...has led directly to the striking success of the Internet around the world. ICANN's role in gTLD policy development is to seek to assess and articulate the broadly shared values of the Internet community. We have very limited authority. I am personally not aware that any global consensus against the creation of a triple X domain exists. In the absence of such a prohibition, and given our mandate to create TLD competition, we have no authority to block the addition of this TLD to the root. It is very clear that we do not have a global shared set of values about content on line, save for the global norm against child pornography. But the global Internet community clearly does share the core value that no centralized authority should set itself up as the arbiter of what people may do together on line, absent a demonstration that most of those affected by the proposed activity agree that it should be banned...the

fact is that ICANN evaluated the strength of the sponsorship of triple X, the relationship between the applicant and the community behind the TLD, and...concluded that this criteria [sic] had been met as of June 2005. ICANN then went on to negotiate specific contractual terms with the applicant. Since then, real and AstroTurf comments – that’s an Americanism meaning filed comments claiming to be grass roots opposition that have actually been generated by organized campaigns – have come into ICANN that reflect opposition to this application. I do not find these recent comments sufficient to warrant revisiting the question of the sponsorship strength of this TLD which I personally believe to be closed. No applicant for any sponsored TLD could ever demonstrate unanimous, cheering approval for its application. We have no metric against which to measure this opposition....We will only get in the way of useful innovation if we take the view that every new TLD must prove itself to us before it can be added to the root...what is meant by sponsorship...is that there is enough interest in a particular TLD that it will be viable. We also have the idea that registrants should participate in and be bound by the creation of policies for a particular string. Both of these requirements have been met by this applicant. There is clearly enough interest, including more than 70,000 preregistrations from a thousand or more unique registrants who are member of the adult industry, and the applicant has undertaken to us that it will require adherence to its self-regulatory policies by all of its registrants...Many of my fellow board members are undoubtedly uncomfortable with the subject of adult entertainment material. Discomfort may have been sparked anew by first the letter from individual GAC members...and second the letter from the Australian Government. But the entire point of ICANN's creation was to avoid the operation of chokepoint control over the domain name system by individual or collective governments. The idea was the U.S. would serve as a good steward for other governmental concerns by staying in the background and...not engaging in content-related control. Australia’s letter and concerns expressed...by Brazil and other countries about triple X are explicitly content-based and, thus, inappropriate...If after the creation of a triple X TLD certain governments of the world want to ensure that their citizens do not see triple X content, it is within their prerogative as sovereigns to instruct Internet access providers physically located within their territory to block such content...But content-related censorship should not be ICANN's concern...To the extent there are public policy concerns with this TLD, they can be dealt with through local laws.” (*Id.*, pp. 9-11.)

53. Demi Getschko declared that her vote in favor of the resolution was her own decision “without any kind of pressure”. (*Id.*, p. 12.) Alejandro Pisanty denied that “the board has been swayed by political pressure of any kind” and affirmed that, “ICANN has acted carefully and strictly within the rules.” He accepted “that there is no universal set of values regarding adult content other than those related to child pornography...the resolution voted is based precisely on that view, not on any view of content itself.” (*Id.*

PART THREE: THE ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTIES

The Contentions of ICM Registry

54. ICM Registry contends that (a) the Independent Review Process is an arbitration; (b) that Process does not afford the ICANN Board a “deferential standard of review”; (c) the law to be applied by that Process comprises the relevant principles of international law and local law, *i.e.*, California law, and that the particularly relevant principle is good faith; (d) in its treatment and rejection of the application of ICM Registry, ICANN did not act consistently with its Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws.

The Nature of the Independent Review Process

55. In respect of the nature of the Independent Review Process, ICM, noting that these proceedings are the first such Process brought under ICANN’s Bylaws, maintains that they are arbitral and not advisory in character. It observes that the current provisions governing the Independent Review Process were added to the Bylaws in December 2002 partly as a result of international and domestic concern about ICANN’s lack of accountability. It recalls that ICANN’s then President, Stuart Lynn, announced in a U.S. Senate hearing in 2002 that ICANN planned to “strengthen ... confidence in the fairness of ICANN decision-making through... creating a workable mechanism for speedy independent review of ICANN Board actions by experienced arbitrators...” (Claimant’s Memorial on the Merits, p. 162). His successor, Dr. Twomey, stated to a committee of the U.S. House of Representatives in 2006 that, “ICANN does have well-established principles and processes for accountability in its decision-making and in its bylaws...there is ability for appeal to...independent arbitration.” (*Id.*, p. 163.) Article IV, Section 3, of ICANN’s Bylaws provides that: “The IRP shall be operated by an international arbitration provider appointed from time to time by ICANN...using arbitrators...nominated by that provider.” Pursuant to that provision, ICANN appointed the International Centre for Dispute Resolution (“ICDR”) of the American Arbitration Association as the international arbitration provider

(which in turn appointed the members of the instant Independent Review Panel). The term "arbitration" imports the binding resolution of a dispute. Courts in the United States – including the Supreme Court of California – have held that the term "arbitration" connotes a binding award. (*Id.*, pp. 168-169.) Article 27(1) of the ICDR Rules provides that "[a]wards...shall be final and binding on the parties. The parties undertake to carry out any such award without delay." (C-11.) The Supplementary Procedures for Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) Independent Review Process specify that "the ICDR's International Arbitration Rules...will govern the Process in combination with these Supplementary Procedures." They provide that the "Independent Review Panel (IRP) refers to the neutral(s) appointed to decide the issue(s) presented." "The Declaration shall specifically designate the prevailing party." (C-12.) In view of all of the foregoing, ICM maintains that the IRP is an arbitral process designed to produce a decision on the issues that is binding on the parties.

The Standard of Review is Not Deferential

56. ICM also maintains that, contrary to the position now advanced by counsel for ICANN, ICANN's assertion that the Panel must afford the ICANN Board "a deferential standard of review" has no support in the instruments governing this proceeding. The term "independent review" connotes a review that is not deferential. Both Federal law and California law treat provision for an independent review as the equivalent of *de novo* review. In California law, when an appellate court employs independent, *de novo* review, it generally gives no special deference to the findings or conclusions of the court from which appeal is taken. (Claimant's Memorial on the Merits, with citations, pp. 173-174.) ICANN's reliance on the "business judgment rule" and the related doctrine of "judicial deference" under California law is misplaced, because under California law the business judgment rule is employed to protect directors from personal liability (typically in shareholder suits) when the directors have made good faith business decisions on behalf of the corporation. The IRP is not a court action seeking to impose individual liability on the ICANN board of directors. Rather, this is an Independent Review Process with the specific purpose of declaring "whether an action or inaction of the Board was inconsistent with the Articles of Incorporation or Bylaws." As California courts have explicitly stated, "the rule of judicial deference to board decision-making can be limited ... by the association's governing documents." The IRP, to quote Dr. Twomey's testimony before Congress, is a process meant to establish a "final method of accountability."

The notion now advanced on behalf of ICANN, that this Panel should afford the Board “a deferential standard of review” and only “question” the Board’s actions upon “a showing of bad faith” is at odds with that purpose as well as with the plain meaning of “independent review”. (*Id.*, pp. 176-177.)

The Applicable Law of this Proceeding

57. Article 4 of ICANN’s Articles of Incorporation provides that, “The Corporation shall operate for the benefit of the Internet community as a whole, carrying out its activities in conformity with the relevant principles of international law and applicable international conventions and local law...” (C-4). The prior version of the draft Articles had provided for ICANN’s “carrying out its activities with due regard for applicable local and international law”. This language was regarded as inadequate, and was revised, as the then Interim Chairman of ICANN explained, “to mak[e] it clear that ICANN will comply with relevant and applicable international and local law”. (*Id.*, p. 180.) As ICANN’s President testified in the U.S. Congress in 2003, the International Review Process was put in place so that disputes could “be referred to an independent review panel operated by an international arbitration provider with an appreciation for and understanding of applicable international laws, as well as California not-for-profit corporation law.” (*Id.*, p. 182.) According to the Expert Report of Professor Jack Goldsmith, on which ICM relies:

“...in an attempt to bring accountability and thus legitimacy to its decisions, ICANN (a) assumed in its Articles of Incorporation an obligation to act in conformity with ‘relevant principles of international law’ and (b) in its Bylaws extended to adversely affected third parties a novel right of independent review in this arbitration proceeding for consistency with ICANN’s Articles and Bylaws. The parties have agreed to international arbitration in this forum to determine consistency with the international law standards set forth in Article 4 of the Articles of Incorporation. California law allows a California non-profit corporation to bind itself in this way.” (*Id.*, p. 11.)

In ICM’s view, Article 4 of ICANN’s Articles of Incorporation acts as a choice-of-law provision. It notes that Article 28 of the ICDR Arbitration Rules specifically provides that “the Tribunal shall apply the substantive law(s) or rules of law designated by the parties as applicable to this dispute.” (C-11.) It points out that the choice of a concurrent law clause – as in ICANN’s Articles providing for the application of relevant principles of both

international and domestic law – is not unusual, especially in transactions involving a public resource.

58. Professor Goldsmith observes that: "... "principles of international law and applicable international conventions and local law" refers to three types of law. Local law means the law of California. Applicable international conventions refers to treaties. "The term 'principles of international law' includes general principles of law. Given that the canonical reference to the sources of international law is Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, which lists international conventions, customary international law, and "the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations", the reference to "principles of international law" in ICANN's Articles must refer to customary international law and to the general principles of law. (Expert Report, p. 12.) Professor Goldsmith notes that the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal has interpreted the "principles of commercial and international law" to include the general principles of law. ICSID tribunals similarly have interpreted "the rules of international law" to include general principles of law.

"It is perfectly appropriate to apply general principles in this IRP even though ICANN is technically a non-profit corporation and ICM is a private corporation. ICANN voluntarily subjected itself to these general principles in its Articles of Incorporation, something that both California law permits and that is typical in international arbitrations, especially when public goods are at stake. The 'international' nature of this arbitration – ... is evidenced by the global impact of ICANN's decisions...ICANN is only nominally a private corporation. It exercises extraordinary authority, delegated from the U.S. Government, over one of the globe's most important resources...its control over the Internet naming and numbering system does make sense of its embrace of the 'general principles' standard. While there is no doubt that ICANN can and has bound itself to general principles of law as that phrase is understood in international law... the general principles relevant here complement, amplify and give detail to the requirements of independence, transparency and due process that ICANN has otherwise assumed in its Articles and Bylaws and under California law. General principles thus play their classic supplementary role in this proceeding." (*Id.*, pp. 15-16.)

59. Professor Goldsmith continues: "The general principle of good faith is 'the foundation of all law and all conventions'" (quoting the seminal work of Bin Cheng, *General Principles of Law as Applied by International Courts and*

Tribunals, p. 105). "As the International Court of Justice has noted, 'the principle of good faith is a well established principle of international law'". (*Case concerning the Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria, Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1998*, p. 296, with many citations.) Applications of the principle are "the requirement of good faith in complying with legal restrictions" and "the requirement of good faith in the exercise of discretion, also known as the doctrine of non-abuse of rights..." as well as the requirement of good faith in contractual negotiations. (*Id.*, pp. 17-18.) The principle is "equally applicable to relations between individuals and to relations between nations." (Cheng, *loc. cit.*).

60. Professor Goldsmith maintains that the abuse of right alleged by ICM that is

"most obvious is the clearly fictitious basis ICANN gave for denying ICM's application...the concern about 'law enforcement compliance issues because of countries' varying laws relating to content and practices that define the nature of the application' applies to many top-level domains besides .XXX. The website 'pornography.com' would be no less subject to various differing laws around the world than the website 'pornography.xxx.' ...a website on the .XXX domain is *easier* for nations to regulate and exclude from computers in their countries because they can block all sites on the .XXX domain with relative ease but have to look at the content, or make guesses based on domain names, to block unwanted pornography on .COM and other top level domains. In short, this reason for ICANN's denial, if genuine, would extend to many top-level domains and would certainly apply to all generic top-level domains (like .COM, .INFO, .NET and .ORG) where pornographic sites can be found. But ICANN has only applied this reason for denial to the .XXX domain. This strongly suggests that the reasons for the denial are pretextual and thus the denial is an abuse of right..."

61. Professor Goldsmith further argues that "similarly pretextual is ICANN's claim that 'there are credible scenarios that leads to circumstances in which ICANN would be forced to assume an ongoing management and oversight role regarding Internet content.'" He contends that the scenario is "unlikely", but, more importantly, "*the same logic applies to generic top level domains* like .COM. The identical scenario could arise if a national court ordered...the registry operator for .COM...to shut down one of the hundreds of thousands of pornography sites on .COM. But ICANN has only expressed concern about ICM..."

ICANN Did Not Act Consistently with its Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws

62. ICM Registry contends that ICANN failed to act consistently with its Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws in the following respects.

63. ICANN, ICM maintains, conducted the 2004 Round of applications for top-level domains as a two-step process, in which it was first determined whether or not each applicant met the RFP criteria. If the criteria were met, "upon the successful completion of the sTLD process" (ICANN Board resolution of October 31, 2003, C-78), the applicant then would proceed to negotiate the commercial and technical terms of a registry agreement. (This Declaration, paras. 13-16, *supra*.) The RFP included detailed description of the criteria to be met to enable the applicant to proceed to contract negotiations, and specified that the selection criteria would be applied "based on principles of objectivity, non-discrimination and transparency". (C-45.) On June 1, 2005, the ICANN Board concluded that ICM had met all of the RFP criteria - - financial, technical and sponsorship - and authorized ICANN's President and General Counsel to enter into negotiations over the "commercial and technical terms" of a registry agreement with ICM. "The record evidence in this case demonstrates overwhelmingly that when the Board approved ICM to proceed to contract negotiations on 1 June 2005, the Board concluded that ICM had met all of the RFP criteria - including, specifically, sponsorship." (Claimant's Post-Hearing Submission, p. 11.) While ICANN now claims that the sponsorship criterion remained open, and that the Board's resolution of June 1, 2005, authorized negotiations in which whether ICM met sponsorship requirements could be more fully tested, ICM argues that no credible evidence, in particular, no contemporary documentary evidence, supports these contentions. To the contrary, ICM:

- (a) recalls that ICANN's written announcement of applications received provided: "The applications will be reviewed by independent evaluation teams beginning in May 2004. The criteria for evaluation were posted with the RFP. All applicants that are found to satisfy the posted criteria will be eligible to enter into technical and commercial negotiations with ICANN for agreements for the allocation and sponsorship of the requested TLDs." (C-82.)

- (b) emphasizes that ICANN's Chairman of the Board, Dr. Cerf, is recorded in the GAC's Luxembourg minutes as stating, shortly after the adoption of the June 1, 2005, resolution, that the application of .xxx "this time met the three main criteria, financial, technical and sponsorship". Sponsorship was

extensively discussed "and the Board reached a positive decision considering that ICANN should not be involved in content matters." (C-139; *supra*, para. 22.)

- (c) notes that a letter of ICANN's President of February 11, 2006. states that: "...it is the ICANN Board that has the authority to decide, upon the conclusion of technical and commercial negotiations, whether or not to approve the creation of a new sTLD...Responsibility for resolving issues relating to an applicant's readiness to proceed to technical and commercial negotiations...rests with the Board." (*Supra*, paragraph 33.)

- (d) notes that the GAC's Wellington Communique states, in respect of a letter of February 11, 2006 of ICANN's President, that the GAC "does not believe that the February 11 letter provides sufficient detail regarding the rationale for the Board determination" that ICM's application "had overcome the deficiencies noted in the Evaluation Report". (*Supra*, paragraph 35.)

- (e) stresses that the ICANN Vice President in charge of the Round, Kurt Pritz, whom ICANN chose not to call as a witness in the hearing, stated in a public forum meeting in April 2005 that: "If it was determined that an application met those three baseline criteria, technical, commercial and sponsorship community, they, then, were informed that they would enter into a phase of commercial and technical negotiation with ICANN, the culmination of those negotiations is and was intended to result in the designation of the new top-level domain. At the conclusion of that, we would sign agreements that would be forwarded to the Board for their approval." (C-88.)

- (f) recalls that Dr. Pritz stated in Luxembourg that ICM was among the "applicants that have been found to satisfy the baseline criteria and they're presently in negotiation for the designation of registries..." (C-140, p. 28).

- (g) observes that the General Counsel of ICANN, Mr. Jeffery, in an exchange with Ms. Burr acting as counsel of ICM, accepted a draft press release in respect of the June 1, 2005 resolution stating that, "ICANN's board of directors today determined that the proposal for a new top level domain submitted by ICM Registry meets the criteria established by ICANN." (C-221.)

- (h) reproduces a Fox News Internet story of June 2, 2005, captioned, "Internet Group OKs New Suffix for Porn Sites," which cites ICANN spokesman Kieran Baker as saying that adult oriented sites, a \$12 billion industry, "could begin buying .xxx addresses as early as fall or winter depending on ICM's plans." (C-283.)

- (i) recalls that a member of the Board when the June 1, 2005 resolution was adopted, Joicho Ito, posted on his blog the next day that "the .XXX proposal, in my opinion, has met the criteria set out in the RFP. Our approval of .XXX is a decision based on whether .XXX met the criteria and does not endorse or condone any particular type of content or moral belief." (Burr Exhibit 35.)

ICM argues that ICANN's witnesses had no response to the foregoing evidence, other than to say that they could not remember or had not seen it (testimony of Dr. Cerf, Tr. 615:18-21, 660:9-12, 675:3-16; Testimony of Dr. Twomey, 914: 4-11, 915:2-11).

64. Dr. Cerf testified at the hearing that,

"At the point where the question arose whether we should proceed or could proceed to contract negotiation, in the absence of having decided that the sponsorship criteria had been met, the board consulted with counsel [the General Counsel, Mr. Jeffery] and my recollection of this discussion is that we could leave undetermined and undecided the question of sponsorship and could use the discussions with regard to the contract as a means of exposing and understanding more deeply whether the sponsorship criteria had been or could be adequately met...prior to the board vote on the question, should we proceed to contract, this question was raised, and it was my understanding that we were not deciding the question of sponsorship. We were using the contract negotiations as a means of clarifying whether or not...the sponsorship criteria could be or had been met or would be met..." (Tr. 600:6-18, 601: 1-8).

65. ICM however claims that Dr. Cerf's testimony "is flatly contradicted by the numerous contemporaneous statements of ICANN Board members and officials that ICM had, in fact, met the criteria, including Dr. Cerf's own contemporaneous statement to the GAC in Luxembourg..." (Claimant's Post-Hearing Submissions, p. 14.) ICM maintains that there is no contemporary documentary evidence that sustains Dr. Cerf's recollection. Nor did ICANN present Mr. Jeffery as a witness, despite his presence in the hearing room. No mention of reservations about sponsorship is to be found in the June 1, 2005 resolution; it contains no caveats, unlike the resolutions adopted in respect of the applications for .JOBS and .MOBI adopted by the Board in 2004.

66. ICANN further argues, ICM observes, that the June 1, 2005, resolution provides that the contract would be entered into "if" the parties were able to negotiate "commercial and technical terms"; therefore ICM should have known that all other issues also remained open. But, responds ICM, "Complete silence on an issue -- when other issues are specifically mentioned -- does not create ambiguity on the missing issue. It means that the missing issue is no longer an issue." (*Id.*, pp. 15-16.)

67. Shortly after adoption of the June 1, 2005 resolution, contract negotiations commenced. As predicted by Mr. Jeffrey in a June 13, 2005, email to Ms. Burr, the negotiations were "quick" and "straightforward". (C-150.) Agreement on the terms of a registry contract was reached between them by August 1, 2005. That draft registry agreement was posted on the ICANN website on August 9, 2005. The Board was scheduled to discuss it at a meeting to be held on August 16.

68. But then came the intervention of the U.S. Department of Commerce described *supra*, paragraphs 27 and 29. ICM argues that it is remarkable that the U.S. Government responded in the way it did to a lobbying campaign largely generated by the website of the Family Research Council. "What is even more remarkable is the extent to which ICANN altered its course of conduct with respect to ICM in response to the U.S. government's intervention." ICM contends that: "The unilateral intervention by the U.S. government was entirely inappropriate and ICANN knew it. But rather than adhere to the principles of its Articles and Bylaws, ICANN quickly bowed to the U.S. intervention, and, at the same time tried to conceal it." (Claimant's Post-Hearing Submission, p. 27.) The charge of concealment relates to Dr. Twomey's having "suggested" to the Chairman of the GAC that he write to ICANN requesting delay in considering the draft contract with ICM (*supra*, paragraph 28). Dr. Twomey acknowledged at the hearing that he so suggested but explained that the letter was nothing more than a confirmation of what Board members had heard weeks before from the GAC in Luxembourg. (Tr. 856:8-19, 859:1-12, 861:10-20, and *supra*, paragraphs 21-25.)

69. ICM invokes the witness statement provided by the chair of the Sponsorship Evaluation Team, Dr. Williams, who, as a fellow Australian, had a close working relationship with Dr. Twomey. She wrote that:

"The June 2005 vote should have marked the completion of the substantive discussions of the .XXX application, especially in light of the Board resolution that approved the .XXX application with no

reservations or caveats. Instead, following the vote, the ICANN Governmental Advisory Committee 'woke up' to the .XXX application, and ICANN began to feel pressure from a number of governments, especially from the United States and Australia...An open dispute with the United States would have been very damaging to ICANN's credibility, and it was therefore very difficult to resist pressure from the United States...Dr. Twomey expressed to me his anxiety about the .XXX registry agreement as a result of this [Gallagher] intervention. This concern went to the heart of ICANN's legitimacy as a quasi-independent technical regulatory organization with the power to establish the process by which new TLDs could be created and put on the root. If the United States Government disagreed with ICANN's process or decision at any point and did not enter a TLD accepted by ICANN to the root, it would call into question ICANN's authority, competence, and entire reason for existence." (Witness Statement of Elizabeth Williams, pp. 26-28.)

70. ICM points out that the Wellington Communique of the GAC (*supra*, paragraph 35) referred to "the Board determination that the [ICM] application had overcome the deficiencies noted in the Evaluation Report." ICM maintains that, at ICANN's staff prompting, ICM responded to all of the concerns raised in the GAC's Wellington Communique. Thus, the Third Draft Registry Agreement of April 18, 2006, included commitments of ICM to establish policies and procedures to label the sites on the domain, to use automated tools to detect and prevent child pornography, to maintain accurate lists of registrants and assist law enforcement agencies to identify and contact the owners of particular sites, and to ensure the intellectual property and trademark rights, personal names, country names, names of historical, cultural and religious significance and names of geographic identifiers, drawing on domain name registry best practices (C-171).

71. ICM construes a statement of Dr. Cerf at the hearing as indicating that the reason, or a reason, why ICM ultimately did not obtain a registry agreement was that ICM could not provide adequate solutions "to deal with the problem of pornography on the Net". It counters that ICM had never undertaken to "deal with" or solve "the problem of pornography on the Net". "The purpose of .XXX was to create an sTLD where responsible adult content providers would agree, *inter alia*, to submit to technological tools to help tag and filter their sites; allow their sites to be 'crawled' for indicia of child pornography (real or virtual); and otherwise adhere to best practices for responsible members of the industry (including practices to prevent credit card fraud, spam, misuse of personal data, the sending of unsolicited

promotional email, the 'capture' of visitors to their sites, *etc.*).” (Claimant’s Post-Hearing Submission, p. 42.) However, Dr. Twomey seized on a phrase in the Wellington Communique “in order to impose an impossible burden on ICM.” According to ICM, Dr. Twomey asserted that “the GAC was now insisting that ICM be responsible for ‘enforcing restrictions’ around the world on access to illegal and offensive content.” (*Id.*, pp. 42-43.) But, ICM argues, to the extent that the GAC was requesting ICM to enforce restrictions on illegal and offensive content, ICANN was

“not merely acting outside its mission. It was also imposing a requirement on ICM that had never been imposed on any other registrant for any other top level domain, and that, indeed, no registrant could possibly fulfil. .COM, for example, is unquestionably filled with content that is considered ‘illegal and offensive’ in many countries. Some of its content is considered ‘illegal and offensive’ in all countries. Adult content can be found on numerous other TLDs...Dr. Cerf had told the GAC in Luxembourg in July 2005, when he was explaining the Board’s determination that ICM had met the RFP criteria: ‘to the extent that governments do have concerns they relate to the issues across TLDs.’ ICANN has never suggested that the registries for those other TLDs must ‘enforce’ restrictions on access to illegal or offensive content for sites on their TLDs.” (*Id.*, pp. 43-44.)

72. ICM adds that if “the GAC was in fact asking ICANN to impose such an absurd requirement on ICM, then ICANN should have told the GAC that it could not do so.” The GAC is no more than an advisory body supposed to provide “advice” on a “timely” basis. “ICANN is by no means under any obligation to do whatever the GAC tells it to do.” Indeed, ICANN’s Bylaws specifically contemplate that the Board may decide not to follow the GAC’s advice. (*Id.*, p. 44.)

73. ICM invokes the terms of the Bylaws, Section 2(1)(j), which provide that:

“The advice of the Governmental Advisory Committee on public policy matters shall be duly taken into account, both in the formulation and adoption of policies. In the event that the ICANN Board determines to take an action that is not consistent with the Governmental Advisory Committee advice, it shall so inform the Committee and state the reasons why it decided not to follow that advice. The Governmental Advisory Committee and the ICANN Board will then try, in good faith and in a timely and efficient manner, to find a mutually acceptable solution. If no such solution can be found, the ICANN Board will state

in its final decision the reasons why the Governmental Advisory Committee's advice was not followed, and such statement will be without prejudice to the rights or obligations of Governmental Advisory Committee members with regard to public policy issues falling within their responsibilities." (C-5, and *supra*, paragraph 9.)

74. ICM further argues however that Dr. Twomey's reading of the Wellington Communique was not a reasonable one. The Wellington Communique recalls that "ICM promised a range of public interest benefits as part of its bid to operate the .xxx domain...The public policy aspects identified by members of the GAC include the degree to which .xxx application would: Take appropriate measures to restrict access to illegal and offensive content..." (*Id.* p. 45; C-181). As promised in its application, ICM in fact proposed numerous measures to restrict access to illegal and offensive content. But nowhere did the GAC state that ICM should be responsible for "enforcing" the restrictions of countries on access to illegal and offensive content. ICM argues that the very fact that the GAC wanted ICM to "maintain accurate details of registrants and assist law enforcement agencies to identify and contact the owners of particular websites" (C-181, p. 3) demonstrates that the GAC did *not* expect ICM to enforce various national restrictions on access to illegal and offensive content.

75. The numerous measures that ICM set out in its revised draft registry agreement in consultation with the staff of ICANN did not constitute an agreement or "representation to enforce the laws of the world on pornography" (testimony of Ms. Burr, Tr. 1044: 8-9). Actually the activation of an .XXX TLD would make it far easier for governments to restrict access to content that they deemed illegal or offensive. Indeed, as Dr. Cerf told the GAC in Luxembourg in July 2005 in defending ICANN's agreeing to enter into contract negotiations with ICM, "The TLD system is neutral, although filtering systems could be solutions promoted by governments." (C-139, p. 5.) "In other words," ICM argues, "the appropriate place for restricting access to content deemed illegal or offensive by any particular country is within that particular country. ICM offered far more tools for countries to effectuate such restrictions than have ever existed before. Thus, ICM provided 'appropriate measures to restrict access to illegal and offensive content.'" (Claimant's Post-Hearing Submission, p. 47.)

76. ICM alleges that, "Nonetheless, on 10 May 2006, the ICANN Board proceeded to reject ICM's registry agreement because, in Dr. Twomey's words, ICM had not demonstrated how it would 'ensure enforcement of these contractual terms' as they relate to various countries' individual laws

'concerning pornographic content' [citing C-189, p.6]. In other words, ICM's draft registry agreement was rejected on the basis of its inability to comply with a contractual undertaking to which it had never agreed in the first place." (*Id.*, p. 48.)

77. At that same meeting of the Board, Dr. Twomey drew attention to a letter of May 4, 2006 from Martin Boyle, UK Representative to the GAC, which read as follows:

"The discussions held by the Governmental Advisory Committee in Wellington in March have highlighted some of the key concerns, and strong opposition by some administrations, to the application for a new top-level domain for pornographic content, dot.xxx. I thought that it would be helpful to follow up those discussions by submitting directly to the ICANN Board the views of the UK Government. In preparing these views, we have consulted a number of stakeholders in the UK, including Internet safety groups...

"Having examined the proposal in detail, and recognizing ICANN's authority to grant such domain names, the UK expresses its firm view that if the dot .xxx domain name is to be authorized, it would be important that ICANN ensures that the benefits and safeguards proposed by the registry, ICM, including the monitoring of all dot.xxx content and rating of content on all servers pointed to by .xxx, are genuinely achieved from day one. Furthermore, it will be important to the integrity of ICANN's position as final approving authority for the dot.xxx domain name, to be seen as able to intervene promptly and effectively if for any reason failure on the part of ICM in any of these fundamental safeguards becomes apparent. It would also in our view be essential that ICM liaise with the relevant bodies in charge of policing illegal Internet content at national level, such as the Internet Watch Foundation (IWF) in the UK, so as to ensure the effectiveness of the solutions it proposes to avoid the further propagation of illegal content. Specifically, ICM should undertake to monitor all dot.xxx content as it proposed and cooperate closely with IWF and equivalent agencies.

"This is an important decision that the ICANN Board has to take and whatever you decide will probably attract criticism from one quarter or another. This makes it all the more important that in making a decision, you reach a clear view on the extent to which the benefits which ICM claim are likely to be sustainable and reliable." (C-182.)

78. Dr. Twomey said this about Mr. Boyle's position:

"...the contractual terms put forward by ICM to meet the sorts of public-policy concerns raised by the Governmental Advisory Committee in my view are very difficult to implement, and I retain concerns about their ability to actually be implemented in an international environment where the important phrase, 'all applicable law', would raise a very wide and variable test for enforcement and compliance. And I can't see how that will actually be achieved under the contract. The letter from the UK is an indication of the expectations of the international governmental community to ensure enforcement of these contractual terms as they individually interpret them against their own law concerning pornographic content. This will put ICANN in an untenable position." (C-189, p. 6.)

79. ICM contends that "it is impossible to reconcile the points made in Mr. Boyle's letter - *i.e.*, that ICANN should ensure that ICM delivered from "day one" on the 'benefits and safeguards' promised in its contract, and that ICM should liase with the IWF - as a requirement 'to ensure enforcement of the contractual terms as they each individually interpret them against their own law concerning pornographic content'. And even if Mr. Boyle had been making such a demand, it would have been entirely outside ICANN's mandate to impose it on ICM, and would have imposed a requirement on ICM that it has never imposed on any other registry." (Claimant's Post-Hearing Submission, p. 50.)

80. ICM however acknowledges that other members of the Board shared Dr. Twomey's analysis. It concludes that:

"...the ICANN Board was now imposing a requirement that was outside the mission of ICANN; that had never been imposed on any other registry; and that - had it been included in the RFP - would have kept any applicant from applying for an sTLD dealing with adult content." (*Id.*, p. 51.)

81. ICM observes that, following the ICANN Board's rejection of the ICM registry agreement on May 10, 2006, and then its renewed consideration of it after ICM withdrew its request for reconsideration (*supra*, paragraph 39), ICM responded to further requests of ICANN staff. It agreed to conclude a contract with what is now known as the Family Online Safety Institute ("FOSI") specifying that FOSI was "to use an automated tool to scan" the .XXX domain and develop other ways to monitor ICM's compliance with its

commitments. ICM notes that, throughout the entire negotiation process, the ICANN staff never asked ICM to change the definition of the sponsored community, which remained the same though each of the five renderings of the draft registry agreement.

82. At the Board's meeting of February 12, 2007, the question of the solidity of ICM's sponsorship was re-opened – in ICM's view, inappropriately --- as described above (*supra*, paragraphs 41-45 and C-199). ICM argues that the data that it responsively submitted to the ICANN Board in March 2007 demonstrated that its application met the RFP standard of "broad-based support from the community". 76,723 adult website names had been pre-reserved in .XXX since June 1, 2005; 1,217 adult webmasters from over 70 countries had registered on the ICM Registry website, saying that they supported .XXX. But, ICM observes, none of the Board members voting against acceptance of ICM's application at the dispositive meeting of March 30, 2007, mentioned the extensive evidence provided by ICM in support of sponsorship.

83. For the reasons set forth above in paragraphs 63-82, ICM contends that the Board's rejection of its application was not consistent with ICANN's Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws. As regards the five specific reasons for rejection set forth in the Board's resolution of March 30, 2007 (*supra*, paragraph 47), ICM makes the following allegations of inconsistency.

84. Reason 1: ICM's application and revised agreement fail to meet the sponsored community criteria of the RFP specification. ICM responds that the Board concluded by its resolution of June 1, 2005, that ICM had met the RFP's sponsorship criteria; and that the Board's abandonment of the two-step process and its reopening of sponsorship at the eleventh hour, and only in respect of ICM's application, violated ICANN's Articles and Bylaws. The manner in which it then "reapplied" the sponsorship criteria to ICM was "incoherent, discriminatory and pretextual". (Claimant's Post-Hearing Submission, pp. 61-62.) There was no evidence before the Board that ICM's support in the community was eroding. No other applicant was held to a similar standard of demonstrating community support. ICM produced sufficient evidence of what was required by the RFP: "broad-based support from the community".

85. ICANN also complained that ICM's community definition was self-identifying but that was true of numerous sTLDs; as Dr. Twomey acknowledged in a letter of May 6, 2006, "(m)embers of both .TEL and .MOBI communities are self-identified". Both sTLDs are now in the root.

86. ICANN further complained that the sponsored community as defined by ICM was not sufficiently differentiated from other adult entertainment providers. But, besides the fact that ICM had set forth numerous criteria by which members of its community would differentiate themselves from others providers of the adult community, this too could be said to apply to other TLDs. Thus .TRAVEL, much like .XXX, is designed to provide an sTLD for certain members of the industry that wish to follow the rules of a particular charter.

87. ICANN further complained that .XXX would merely duplicate content found elsewhere on the Internet. But again, the same was true for virtually all of the other sTLDs.

88. In sum "ICANN's reopening of the sponsorship criteria - which it did *only* for ICM - was unfair, discriminatory and pretextual, and a departure from transparent, fair and well documented policies...not done neutrally and objectively, with integrity and fairness...[it] singled out ICM for disparate treatment, without substantial and reasonable cause." (*Id.*, p. 65.)

89. Reason 2: based on the extensive comment and from the GAC's Communiques, ICM's agreement raises public policy issues. ICANN never precisely identified the "public policy" issues raised nor does it explain why they warrant rejection of the application. But, ICM argues, Reasons 2-5 all arise from the same flawed interpretation of the Wellington Communique and other governmental comments, namely, that ICM was to be responsible for enforcing the world's various and different laws and standards concerning pornography. That interpretation "was sufficiently absurd as to have been made in bad faith"; in any event it holds ICM to an "impossible standard", and is one never imposed on any other registrant and that no registrant could possibly perform. It led to further flawed conclusions, *viz.*, that if ICM could not meet its responsibility (and no one could) then ICANN would have to take it over, and, if it did so, ICANN would be taking on an oversight role regarding Internet content, which was beyond its technical mandate. ICANN's imposition of this impossible requirement on ICM alone was discriminatory. It rejected ICM's application on grounds that were not applied neutrally and objectively, which were suggestive of a "pretextual basis to 'cover' the real reason for rejecting .XXX, *i.e.*, that the U.S. government and several other powerful governments objected to its proposed content." (*Id.*, pp. 66-67.)

90. Reason 3: the ICM application and revised agreement do not resolve GAC's issues, its concern for offensive content and protection of the vulnerable; the Board finds that these public policy concerns cannot be

credibly resolved with the mechanisms proposed by the applicant. ICM responds that this is merely an elaboration of Reason 2. ICM's proposed agreement contained detailed provisions to address child pornography issues and detailed mechanisms that would permit the identification and filtration of content deemed to be illegal or offensive.

91. Reason 4: the ICM application raises significant law enforcement compliance issues because of countries' varying laws relating to content and practices that define the nature of the application, therefore obligating ICANN to acquire a responsibility related to content and conduct. ICM responds that this builds on the fallacy of Reasons 2 and 3: according to the Board's apparent reasoning, the GAC was requiring ICM to enforce local restrictions on access to illegal and offensive content and if proved unable to do so, ICANN would have to do so. ICM responds that ICANN could not properly require ICM to undertake such enforcement obligations, whether or not the GAC actually so requested. Given that it would have been discriminatory and unfeasible to require ICM to enforce varying national laws regarding adult content, ICANN would not have been obligated to take over that responsibility if ICANN were unable to fulfill it.

92. Reason 5: there are credible scenarios in which ICANN would be forced to assume an ongoing management and oversight role regarding Internet content, inconsistent with its technical mandate. ICM responds that this largely restates Reason 4. ICANN interpreted the GAC's advice to require ICM to be responsible for regulating content on the Internet - a task plainly outside ICANN's mandate. ICANN then criticized ICM for taking on that task and complained that it would have to undertake the task if ICM were unable to fulfill it. But ICANN could not properly require ICM to regulate content on the Internet and ICM did not undertake to do so.

93. The above exposition of the contentions of ICM, while long, does not exhaust the full range of its arguments, which were developed at length and in detail in its Memorial and in oral argument. It does not, for example, fully set out its contentions on the effect of international law and the local law on these proceedings. The essence of that argument is that ICANN is bound to act in good faith, an argument that the Panel does not find it necessary to expound since the conclusion is not open to challenge and is not challenged by counsel for ICANN. ICANN does not accept ICM's reliance on principles of international law but it agrees that the principle of good faith is found in the corporate law of California and hence is applicable in the instant dispute.

94. The "Relief Requested" by ICM Registry consists, *inter alia*, of requesting that the Panel declare that its Declaration is binding upon ICM and ICANN; and that ICANN acted inconsistently with its Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws by:

"i. Failing to conduct negotiations in good faith and to conclude an agreement with ICM to serve as registry operator for the .XXX sTLD;

"ii. Rejecting ICM's proposed agreement to serve as registry operator...

"iii. Rejecting ICM's application on 30 March 2007, after having previously concluded that it met the RFP criteria on 1 June 2005;

"iv. Rejecting ICM's application on 30 March 2007 on the basis of the five grounds set forth...none of which were based on criteria set forth in the RFP criteria...

"v. Rejecting ICM's application after ICANN had approved ICM to proceed to contract negotiations..." (Claimant's Memorial on the Merits, pp. 265-267.)

The Contentions of ICANN

95. ICANN maintains that (a) the Independent Review Process is advisory, not arbitral; (b) the judgments of the ICANN Board are to be deferentially appraised; (c) the governing law is that of the State of California, not the principles of international law; and (d) in its treatment and disposition of the application of ICM Registry, ICANN acted consistently with its Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws.

The Nature of the Independent Review Process

96. ICANN invokes the provisions of the Bylaws that govern the IRP process, entitled, "Independent Review of Board Actions". Article IV, Section 3, provides that:

"1. ...ICANN shall have in place a separate process for independent third-party review of Board actions alleged by an affected party to be inconsistent with the Articles of Incorporation or Bylaws.

"2. Any person materially affected by a decision or action of the Board that he or she asserts is inconsistent with the Articles of

Incorporation or Bylaws may submit a request for independent review of that decision or action.

"3. Requests for such independent review shall be referred to an Independent Review Panel ("IRP") which shall be charged with comparing contested actions of the Board to the Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws, and with declaring whether the Board has acted consistently with the provisions of those Articles and Bylaws.

"4. The IRP shall be operated by an international arbitration provider appointed from time to time by ICANN ("the IRP Provider") using arbitrators ...nominated by that provider.

"5. Subject to the approval of the Board, the IRP Provider shall establish operating rules and procedures, which shall implement and be consistent with this Section 3.

...

"8. The IRP shall have the authority to:

...

b. declare whether an action or inaction of the Board was inconsistent with the Articles of Incorporation or Bylaws; and

c. recommend that the Board stay any action or decision, or that the Board take any interim action, until such time as the Board reviews and acts upon the opinion of the IRP.

...

"12. Declarations of the IRP shall be in writing. The IRP shall make its declaration based solely on the documentation, supporting materials, and arguments submitted by the parties, and in its declaration shall specifically designate the prevailing party. The party not prevailing shall ordinarily be responsible for bearing all costs of the IRP Provider, but in an extraordinary case the IRP may in its declaration allocate up to half of the costs of the IRP Provider to the prevailing party based upon the circumstances, including a consideration of the reasonableness of the parties' positions and their contribution to the public interest. Each party to the IRP proceedings shall bear its own expenses.

"13. The IRP operating procedures, and all petitions, claims and declarations, shall be posted on the Website when they become available.

...

"15. Where feasible, the Board shall consider the IRP declaration at the Board's next meeting." (C-5.)

97. ICANN contends that the foregoing terms make it clear that the IRP's declarations are advisory and not binding. The IRP provisions commit the Board to review and consideration of declarations of the Panel. The Bylaws direct the Board to "consider" the declaration. "The direction to 'consider' the Panel's declaration necessarily means that the Board has discretion whether and how to implement it; if the declaration were binding such as with a court judgment or binding arbitration ruling, there would be nothing to consider, only an order to implement." (ICANN's Response to Claimant's Memorial on the Merits, p. 32.) ICANN's Board is specifically directed to "review" the Panel's declarations, not to implement them. Moreover, the Board is "not even required to review or consider the declaration immediately, or at any particular time," but is encouraged to do so at the next Board meeting, where "feasible", reinforcing the fact that the Board's review and consideration of the Panel's declaration does not require its acceptance. The Panel may "recommend", but not require, interim action. If final Panel declarations were binding, it would make no sense for interim remedies to be merely recommended to the Board. (*Id.*, p. 33.)

98. ICANN maintains that the preparatory work of the Bylaws demonstrates that the Independent Review Process was designed to be advisory. The Draft Principles for Independent Review state that the IRP's authority would be persuasive, "rest[ing] on its independence, on the prestige and professional standing of its members, and on the persuasiveness of its reasoned opinions". But "the ICANN Board should retain ultimate authority over ICANN's affairs – after all, it is the Board...that will be chosen by (and is directly accountable to) the membership and supporting organizations". (*Id.*, p. 34.) The primary pertinent document, "ICANN: A Blueprint for Reform," calls for the creation of "a process to require non-binding arbitration by an international arbitration body to review any allegation that the Board has acted in conflict with ICANN's Bylaws". ICM Registry's counsel in its negotiations with ICANN for a top-level domain, Ms. Burr, who as a senior official of the U.S. Department of Commerce was the principal official figure immediately involved in the creation and launching of ICANN, in addressing

the independent review process, observed that “decisions will be nonbinding, because the Board will retain final decision-making authority”. (*Ibid.*, p. 36.) In accepting recommendations for an independent review process that expressly disclaimed creation of a “Supreme Court” for ICANN, the Board changed the reference to “decisions” of the IRP to “declarations” precisely to avoid any inference that IRP determinations are binding decisions akin to those of a judicial or arbitral tribunal. (*Ibid.*, p. 38.)

99. ICANN further points out that, while the IRP Provider selected by it is the American Arbitration Association’s International Centre for Dispute Resolution, and while its Rules apply to IRP proceedings, those Rules in their application to IRP were amended to omit provision for the binding effect of an award.

The Standard of Review is Deferential

100. ICANN contends that the actions of the ICANN Board are entitled to substantial deference from this Panel. It maintains that that conclusion follows from the terms of Article 1, Section 2 of the Bylaws that set out the core values of ICANN (*supra*, paragraph 5). Article 1, Section 2 of the Bylaws provides that, “In performing its mission, the following core values should guide the decisions and actions of ICANN”; and the core values referred to in paragraph 5 of this Declaration are then spelled out. Section 2 concludes:

“These core values are deliberately expressed in very general terms, so that they may provide useful and relevant guidance in the broadest possible range of circumstances. Because they are not narrowly prescriptive, the specific way in which they apply, individually and collectively, to each new situation will necessarily depend on many factors that cannot be fully anticipated or enumerated; and because they are statements of principle rather than practice, situations will inevitably arise in which perfect fidelity to all eleven core values simultaneously is not possible. Any ICANN body making a recommendation or decision shall exercise its judgment to determine which core values are most relevant and how they apply to the specific circumstances of the case at hand and to determine, if necessary, an appropriate and defensible balance among competing values.” (C-5.)

101. ICANN argues that since, pursuant to the foregoing provision, the ICANN Board “shall exercise its judgment” in the application of competing core values, and since those core values embrace the neutral, objective and fair decision-making at issue in these proceedings, “the deference expressly

accorded to the Board in implementing the core values applies..." ICANN continues:

"Thus, by its terms, the Bylaws' conferral of discretionary authority makes clear that any reasonable decision of the ICANN Board is, *ipso facto*, not inconsistent with the Bylaws and consequently must be upheld. Indeed, the Bylaws even go so far as to provide that outright departure from a core value is permissible in the judgment of the Board, so long as the Board reasonably 'exercise[s] its judgment' in determining that other relevant principles outweighed that value in the particular circumstances at hand."

While in the instant case, in ICANN's view, there was not even an arguable departure from the Articles of Incorporation or Bylaws, "...because such substantial deference is in fact due, there is no basis whatsoever for a declaration in ICM's favor because the Board's decisions in this matter were, at a minimum, clearly justified and within the range of reasonable conduct." (ICANN's Response to Claimant's Memorial on the Merits, pp. 45-47.)

102. ICANN further argues that the Bylaws governing the independent review process sustain this conclusion. Article 4, Section 3, "strictly limits the scope of independent review proceedings to the narrow question of whether ICANN acted in a manner 'inconsistent with' the Articles of Incorporation and the Bylaws. In confining the inquiry into whether ICANN's conduct was *inconsistent with* its governing documents, the presumption is one of consistency so that inconsistency must be established, rather than the reverse...independent review is not to be used as a mechanism to upset arguable or reasonable actions of the Board." (*Ibid.*, p. 48.)

103. ICANN contends, moreover, that,

"Basic principles of corporate law supply an independent basis for the deference due to the reasonable judgments of the ICANN Board in this matter. It is black-letter law that 'there is a presumption that directors of a corporation have acted in good faith and to the best interest of the corporation'...In California...these principles require deference to actions of a corporate board of directors so long as the board acted 'upon reasonable investigation, in good faith and with regard for the best interests' of the corporation and 'exercised discretion within the scope of its authority'". This includes the boards of not-for-profit corporations." (*Ibid.*, pp. 49-50.)

The Applicable Law of This Proceeding

104. ICANN contests ICM's invocation of principles of international law, in particular the principle of good faith, and allied principles, estoppel, legitimate expectations and abuse of right. It notes that ICM's invocation of international law depends upon a two-step argument: first, ICM interprets Article 4 of the Articles of Incorporation, providing that ICANN will operate for the benefit of the Internet community "in conformity with relevant principles of international law", as a "choice-of-law" provision; second, ICM infers that "any violation of any principles of international law" constitutes a violation of Article 4 (thus allegedly falling within the Panel's jurisdiction to evaluate the consistency of ICANN's actions with its Articles and Bylaws).

105. ICANN contends that that two-step argument contravenes the plain language of the governing provisions as well as their drafting history. Article 4 of the Articles does not operate as a "choice-of-law" provision for the IRP processes prescribed in the Bylaws. Rather the provisions of the Bylaws and Articles, as construed in the light of the law of California, govern the claims before the Panel. Nor are the particular principles of international law invoked by ICM relevant to the circumstances at issue in these proceedings.

106. Article 4 is quoted in full in paragraph 3 of this Declaration. The specific activities that ICANN must carry out "in conformity with the relevant principles of international law and applicable international conventions and local law" are specified in Article 3 (*supra*, paragraph 2). Thus "relevant" in Article 4 means only principles of international law relevant to the activities specified in Article 3. "ICANN did not adopt principles of international law indiscriminately, but rather to ensure consistency between its policies developed for the world-wide Internet community and well-established substantive international law on matters relevant to various stakeholders in the global Internet community, such as general principles on trademark law and freedom of expression relevant to intellectual property constituencies and governments." (ICANN's Response to Claimant's Memorial on the Merits, pp. 59-60.) The principles of international law relied upon by ICM in this proceeding – the requirement of good faith and related doctrines – are principles of general applicability, and are not specially directed to concerns relating to the Internet, such as freedom of expression or trademark law. Therefore, ICANN argues, they are not "relevant". (*Ibid.*) Article 4 does not operate as a choice-of-law provision requiring ICANN to adapt its conduct to any and all principles of international law. It is not worded as choice-of-law clauses are. As ICANN's expert, Professor David D. Caron notes, it is unlikely that a choice-of-law clause would designate three sources of law on the

same level. It is the law of California, the place of ICANN's incorporation, that – by reason of ICANN's incorporation under the law of California -- governs how ICANN runs its business and interacts with another U.S. corporation regarding a contract to be performed within the United States. The IRP provisions of the Bylaws, drafted years after the Articles of Incorporation, and their drafting history, do not even mention Article 4 of the Articles.

107. Moreover, the specification of "relevant" principles of international law in Article 4 "must mean principles of international law that apply to a private entity such as ICANN" (*id.*, p. 66.) As a private party, ICANN is not subject to law governing sovereigns. International legal principles do not apply to a dispute between private entities located in the same nation because the dispute may have global effects.

108. Furthermore, ICM's cited general principles perform no clarifying role in this proceeding. The applicable rules set forth in ICANN's Bylaws and Articles as well as California law render resort to general principles unnecessary. In any event, California law and the Bylaws and Articles themselves provide sufficient guidance for the Panel's analysis.

ICANN Acted Consistently with its Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws

109. ICANN contends that each of ICM's key factual assertions is wrong. In view of the deference that should be accorded to the judgments of the ICANN Board, the Panel should declare that ICANN's conduct was not inconsistent with its Bylaws and Articles even if ICM's treatment of the facts were largely correct (as it is not). The issues presented to the ICANN Board by ICM's .XXX sTLD application were "difficult", ICANN's Board addressed them with "great care", and devoted "an enormous amount of time trying to determine the right course of action". ICM was fully heard; the Board deliberated openly and transparently. ICANN is unaware of a corporate deliberative process more open and transparent than its own. After this intensive process, the Board twice concluded that ICM's proposal should be rejected, "with no hint whatsoever of the 'bad faith' ICM alleges." (ICANN's Response to Claimant's Memorial on the Merits, pp. 79-80.)

110. ICM's claims "begin with the notion that ICANN adopted, and was bound by, an inflexible, two-step procedure for evaluating sTLD applications. First, according to ICM, applications would be reviewed by the Evaluation Panel for the baseline selection criteria. Second, only after applications were finally and irrevocably approved by the ICANN Board would the applications

proceed to contract negotiations with ICANN staff with no ability by the Board to address any of the issues that the Board had previously raised in conjunction with the sTLD application.” But the RFP refutes this contention. It does not suggest that the Board’s “allowance for an application to proceed to contract negotiations confirms the close of the evaluation process.” ICANN recalls the public statement of Mr. Pritz in Kuala Lumpur in 2004: “Upon completion of the technical and commercial negotiations, successful applicants will be presented to the ICANN Board with *all* the associated information, so the Board can independently review the findings along with the information and make their own adjustments. *And then* final decisions will be made by the Board, and they’ll authorize staff to complete or execute the agreements with the sponsoring organizations...” (*Ibid.*, pp. 81-82.) It observes that Dr. Cerf affirmed that: “ICANN never intended that this would be a formal, ‘two-step’ process, where proceeding to contract negotiations automatically constituted a *de facto* final and irrevocable approval with respect to the baseline selection criteria, including sponsorship.” (At p. 82, quoting V. Cerf Witness Statement, para. 15.) ICANN maintains that there were “two overlapping phases in the evaluation of the sTLDs” and the Board always retained the right “to vote against a proposed sTLD should the Board find deficiencies in the proposed registry agreement or in the sTLD proposal as a whole”. (P. 83.) There was a two-stage process but the two phases could and often did overlap in time. This is confirmed not only by Dr. Cerf but by Dr. Twomey and the then Vice-Chairman of the Board, Alejandro Pisanty. Each explains that the ICANN Board retained the authority to review and assess the baseline RFP selection criteria even after an applicant was allowed to proceed to contract negotiations. After the June 1, 2005, vote, members supporting ICM’s application did not argue that the Board had already approved the .XXX sTLD. The following exchange with Dr. Cerf took place in the course of the hearing:

“Q. Now, ICM’s position in this proceeding is that if the board voted to proceed to contract negotiations, the board was at that time making a finding that a particular applicant had satisfied the technical, financial and sponsorship criteria and that that issue was closed. Is that consistent with your understanding of how the process worked?

“A. Not, it’s not. The matter was discussed very explicitly during our consideration of the ICM proposal. We were using the contract negotiations as a means of clarifying whether or not...the sponsorship criteria could be or had been met...this was not a decision that all three of the criteria had been met.” (Tr. 601:4:13.)

111. ICM's evidence is not to the contrary. That evidence shows that there were two major steps in the evaluation process. It does not show that those steps could not be overlapping. The relevant question, not answered by ICM, is whether ICANN's Bylaws required these steps to be non-overlapping. "such that contract negotiations could not commence until the satisfaction of the RFP criteria was finally and irrevocably determined..." (*Ibid.*, p. 84.)

112. ICM's claims are also based on the argument that, by its terms, the Board's resolutions of June 1, 2005 gave "unconditional" approval of the .XXX sTLD application. (The June 1, 2005 resolutions are set out *supra*, paragraph 19.) But nothing in the resolutions actually says that ICM's application satisfied the RFP criteria, including sponsorship. In fact, nothing in the resolutions expresses approval at all because it provides that "if", after entering negotiations, the applicant is able to negotiate commercial and technical terms for a contractual arrangement, those terms shall be presented to the Board for approval and authorization to enter into an agreement relating to the delegation of the sTLD. "The plain language of the resolutions makes clear that they did not themselves constitute approval of the .XXX sTLD application. The resolutions thus track the RFP, which makes clear that a 'final decision will be made by the Board' only *after* 'completion of the technical and commercial negotiations'". (*Ibid.*, p. 86.)

113. ICANN maintains that as of June 2005, there remained numerous unanswered questions and concerns regarding ICM's ability to satisfy the baseline sponsorship criteria set forth in the RFP. An important purpose of the June 1 resolutions was to permit ICM to proceed to contract negotiations in an effort to determine whether ICM's sponsorship shortcomings could be resolved in the contract.

114. The ICANN Board also permitted other applicants for sTLDs -- .JOBS and .MOBI – to proceed to contract negotiations despite open questions relating to the initial RFP criteria. However, ICM was unique among the field of sTLD applicants due to "the extremely controversial nature of the proposed sTLD, and concerns as to whether ICM had identified a 'community' that existed and actually supported the proposed sTLD...there was a significant negative response to ICM's proposed .XXX sTLD by many adult entertainment providers, the very individuals and entities who logically would be in ICM's proposed community." (*Ibid.*, p. 87.)

115. ICM's position is further refuted by continued discussion by the Board of sponsorship criteria at meetings subsequent to June 1, 2005. The fact that most Board members expressed concern about sponsorship

shortcomings after the June 1, 2005, resolutions negates any notion that the Board had conclusively determined the sponsorship issue.

116. A member of the Board elected after the June 1, 2005, vote, Rita Rodin, expressed "some concerns about whether the [ICM] proposal met the criteria set forth in the RFP..." She said that she did not want to re-open issues if they had already been decided by the Board (*supra*, paragraphs 42-43). In response to her query, no one stated that the sponsorship issue had already been decided by the Board. (ICANN'S Response to Claimant's Memorial on the Merits, p. 90.)

117. ICANN also draws attention to Dr. Twomey's letter of May 4, 2006 (*supra*, paragraph 37) in which he wrote that the Board's decision of June 1, 2005, was without prejudice to the Board's right to decide whether the contract reached with ICM meets all the criteria before the Board.

118. ICANN recalls that within days of the posting of the June 1, 2005, resolutions, GAC Chairman Tarmizi wrote Dr. Cerf expressing the GAC's "diverse and wide-ranging concerns" with the .XXX sTLD. The ICANN Board was required by the ICANN Bylaws to take account of the views of the GAC. Nor could ICANN have ignored concerns expressed by the U.S. Government and other governments. ICANN recalls the concerns expressed thereafter, in the Wellington Communique and otherwise. It observes that "some countries were concerned that, because the .XXX application would not require all pornography to be located within the .XXX domain, a new .XXX sTLD would simply result in the expansion of the number of domain names that involved pornography." (*Ibid.*, p. 102.)

119. ICANN points out that:

"In revising its proposed registry agreement to address the GAC's concerns...ICM took the position that it would install 'appropriate measures to restrict access to illegal and offensive content,' including monitoring such content globally. This was immediately controversial among many ICANN Board members because complaints about ICM's 'monitoring' would inevitably be sent to ICANN, which is neither equipped nor authorized to monitor (much less resolve) 'content-based' objections to Internet sites." (*Ibid.*, pp. 103-104.)

120. ICANN recalls Board concerns that were canvassed at its meetings of May 10, 2006, (*supra*, paragraph 38) and February 12, 2007, (*supra*, paragraphs 41-45). Board members increasingly were concluding that the results promised by ICM were unachievable. Whether their conclusions were

or were not incorrect is “irrelevant for purposes of determining whether the Board violated its Bylaws or Articles in rejecting ICM’s application.” (*Ibid.*, p. 105.) Board doubts were accentuated by growing opposition to the .XXX sTLD from elements of the online adult entertainment industry (*ibid.*).

121. The Board’s May 10, 2006 vote (*supra*, paragraph 38) rejected ICM’s then current draft, but provided ICM “yet another opportunity to attempt to revise the agreement to conform to the RFP specifications. Notably, the Board’s decision to allow ICM to continue to work the problem is directly at odds with ICM’s position that the Board decided ‘for political reasons’ to reject ICM’s application; if so, it would have been much easier for the Board to reject ICM’s application in its entirety in 2006.” (*Ibid.*, p. 106.)

122. At its meeting of February 12, 2007, (*supra*, paragraphs 41-45), concerns in the Board about whether ICM’s application enjoyed the support of the community it purported to represent were amplified.

123. At the meeting of March 30, 2007 at which ICM’s application and agreement were definitively rejected, the majority was, first, concerned by ICM’s definition of its community to include only those members of the industry who supported the creation of .XXX sTLD and its exclusion from the sponsored community of all online adult entertainment industry members who opposed ICM’s application.

“Such self-selection and extreme subjectivity regarding what constituted the content that defined the .XXX community made it nearly impossible to determine which persons or services would be in or out of the community...without a precisely defined Sponsored TLD Community, the Board could not approve ICM’s sTLD application.” (*Ibid.*, pp. 108-109.)

124. Second, ICM’s proposed community was not adequately differentiated; ICM failed to demonstrate that excluded providers had separate needs or interests from the community it sought to represent. As contract negotiations progressed, it became increasingly evident that ICM was actually proposing an unsponsored TLD for adult entertainment, “a uTLD, disguised as an sTLD, just as ICM had proposed in 2000.” (*Ibid.*, p. 209.)

125. Third, whatever community support ICM may have had at one time, it had “fallen apart by early 2007” (*ibid.*). During the final public comment period in 2007, “a vast majority of the comments posted to the public forum and sent to ICANN staff opposed ICM’s .XXX sTLD...” (p. 110). “Broad-based support” was lacking. (P. 111.) 75,000 pre-registrations for .XXX... “Out of

the over 4.2 million adult content websites in operation" hardly represents broad-based support. (P. 115.)

126. Fourth, ICM could not demonstrate that it was adding new and valuable space to the Internet name space, as required by the RFP. "In fact, the existence of industry opposition to the .XXX sTLD demonstrated that the needs of online adult entertainment industry members were met via existing TLDs without any need for a new TLD." (P. 112.)

127. Fifth and finally, ICM and its supporting organization, IFFOR, proposed to "proactively reach out to governments and international organizations to provide information about IFFOR's activities and solicit input and participation". But such measures "diluted the possibility that their policies would be 'primarily in the interests of the Sponsored TLD Community' as required by the sponsorship selection criteria." (Pp. 112-113.)

128. ICANN concludes that, "despite the good-faith efforts of both ICANN and ICM over a lengthy period of time, the majority of the Board determined that ICM could not satisfy, among other things, the sponsorship requirements of the RFP." Reasonable people might disagree - as did a minority of the Board - "but that disagreement does not even approach a violation of a Bylaw or Article of Incorporation." (P. 113.)

129. The treatment of ICM's application was procedurally fair. It was not the object of discrimination. Applications for .JOBS and .MOBI were also allowed to proceed to contractual negotiations despite open questions relating to selection criteria. ICANN applied documented policies neutrally and objectively, with integrity and fairness. ICM was provided with every opportunity to address the concerns of the Board and the GAC. ICANN did not reject ICM's application only for reasons of public policy (although they were important). ICM's application was rejected because of its inability to show how the sTLD would meet sponsorship criteria. The Board ultimately rejected ICM's application for "many of the same sponsorship concerns noted in the initial recommendation of the Evaluation Panel." (*Ibid.*, p. 124.) It also rejected the application because ICM's proposed registry agreement "would have required ICANN to manage the content of the .XXX sTLD" (p. 126). The Board took into account the views of the GAC in arriving at its independent judgment. "Had the ICANN Board taken the view that the GAC's views must in every case be followed without independent judgment, the Board presumably would have rejected ICM's application in late 2005 or early 2006, rather than waiting another full year for the parties to try to identify a resolution that would have allowed the sTLD to proceed." (*Ibid.*)

130. As to whether ICM was treated unfairly and was the object of discrimination, ICANN relies on the following statement of Dr. Cerf at the hearing:

“...I am surprised at an assertion that ICM was treated unfairly...the board could have simply accepted the recommendations of the evaluation teams and rejected the proposal at the outset...the board went out of its way to try to work with ICM through the staff to achieve a satisfactory agreement. We spent more time on this particular proposal than any other...We repeatedly defended our continued consideration of this proposal...If...ICM believes that it was treated in a singular way, I would agree that we spent more time and effort on this than any other proposal that came to the board with regard to sponsored TLDs.” (Tr. 654:3-655:7.)

PART FOUR: THE ANALYSIS OF THE INDEPENDENT REVIEW PANEL

The Nature of the Independent Review Panel Process

131. ICM and ICANN differ on the question of whether the Declaration to be issued by the Independent Review Panel is binding upon the parties or advisory. The conflicting considerations advanced by them are summarized above at paragraphs 51 and 91-94. In the light of them, the Panel acknowledges that there is a measure of ambiguity in the pertinent provisions of the Bylaws and in their preparatory work.

132. ICANN's officers testified before committees of the U.S. Congress that ICANN had installed provision for appeal to “independent arbitration” (*supra*, paragraph 55). Article IV, Section 3 of ICANN's Bylaws specifies that, “The IRP shall be operated by an international arbitration provider appointed from time to time by ICANN...using arbitrators...nominated by that provider”. The provider so chosen is the American Arbitration Association's International Centre for Dispute Resolution (“ICDR”), whose Rules (at C-11) in Article 27 provide for the making of arbitral awards which “shall be final and binding on the parties. The parties undertake to carry out any such award without delay.” The Rules of the ICDR “govern the arbitration” (Article 1). It is unquestioned that the term, “arbitration” imports production of a binding award (in contrast to conciliation and mediation). Federal and California courts have so held. The Supplementary Procedures adopted to supplement the independent review procedures set forth in ICANN's Bylaws provide that the ICDR's “International Arbitration Rules...will govern the process in combination with these Supplementary Procedures”. (C-12.) They specify

that the Independent Review Panel refers to the neutrals “appointed to decide the issue(s) presented” and further specify that, “DECLARATION refers to the decisions/opinions of the IRP”. “The DECLARATION shall specifically designate the prevailing party.” All of these elements are suggestive of an arbitral process that produces a binding award.

133. But there are other indicia that cut the other way, and more deeply. The authority of the IRP is “to declare whether an action or inaction of the Board was inconsistent with the Articles of Incorporation or Bylaws” – to “declare”, not to “decide” or to “determine”. Section 3(8) of the Bylaws continues that the IRP shall have the authority to “recommend that the Board stay any action or decision, or that the Board take any interim action, until such time as the Board reviews and acts upon the opinion of the IRP”. The IRP cannot “order” interim measures but do no more than “recommend” them, and this until the Board “reviews” and “acts upon the opinion” of the IRP. A board charged with reviewing an opinion is not charged with implementing a binding decision. Moreover, Section 3(15) provides that, “Where feasible, the Board shall consider the IRP declaration at the Board’s next meeting.” This relaxed temporal proviso to do no more than “consider” the IRP declaration, and to do so at the next meeting of the Board “where feasible”, emphasizes that it is not binding. If the IRP’s Declaration were binding, there would be nothing to consider but rather a determination or decision to implement in a timely manner. The Supplementary Procedures adopted for IRP, in the article on “Form and Effect of an IRP Declaration”, significantly omit the provision of Article 27 of the ICDR Rules specifying that award “shall be final and binding on the parties”. (C-12.) Moreover, the preparatory work of the IRP provisions summarized above in paragraph 93 confirms that the intention of the drafters of the IRP process was to put in place a process that produced declarations that would not be binding and that left ultimate decision-making authority in the hands of the Board.

134. In the light of the foregoing considerations, it is concluded that the Panel’s Declaration is not binding, but rather advisory in effect.

The Standard of Review Applied by the Independent Review Process

135. For the reasons summarized above in paragraph 56, ICM maintains that this is a *de novo* review in which the decisions of the ICANN Board do not enjoy a deferential standard of review. For the reasons summarized above in paragraphs 100-103, ICANN maintains that the decisions of the Board are entitled to deference by the IRP.

136. The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers is a not-for-profit corporation established under the law of the State of California. That law embodies the “business judgment rule”. Section 309 of the California Corporations Code provides that a director must act “in good faith, in a manner such director believes to be in the best interests of the corporation and its shareholders...” and shields from liability directors who follow its provisions. However ICANN is no ordinary non-profit California corporation. The Government of the United States vested regulatory authority of vast dimension and pervasive global reach in ICANN. In “recognition of the fact that the Internet is an international network of networks, owned by no single nation, individual or organization” – including ICANN -- ICANN is charged with “promoting the global public interest in the operational stability of the Internet...” ICANN “shall operate for the benefit of the Internet community as a whole, carrying out its activities in conformity with relevant principles of international law and applicable international conventions and local law...” Thus, while a California corporation, it is governed particularly by the terms of its Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws, as the law of California allows. Those Articles and Bylaws, which require ICANN to carry out its activities in conformity with relevant principles of international law, do not specify or imply that the International Review Process provided for shall (or shall not) accord deference to the decisions of the ICANN Board. The fact that the Board is empowered to exercise its judgment in the application of ICANN’s sometimes competing core values does not necessarily import that that judgment must be treated deferentially by the IRP. In the view of the Panel, the judgments of the ICANN Board are to be reviewed and appraised by the Panel objectively, not deferentially. The business judgment rule of the law of California, applicable to directors of California corporations, profit and non-profit, in the case of ICANN is to be treated as a default rule that might be called upon in the absence of relevant provisions of ICANN’s Articles and Bylaws and of specific representations of ICANN – as in the RFP – that bear on the propriety of its conduct. In the instant case, it is those Articles and Bylaws, and those representations, measured against the facts as the Panel finds them, which are determinative.

The Applicable Law of this Proceeding

137. The contrasting positions of the parties on the applicable law of this proceeding are summarized above at paragraphs 59-62 and 104-109. Both parties agree that the “local law” referred to in the provision of Article 4 of the Articles of Incorporation – “The Corporation shall operate for the benefit of the Internet community as a whole, carrying out its activities in conformity with relevant principles of international law and applicable international

conventions and local law” – is the law of California. But they differ on what are “relevant principles of international law” and their applicability to the instant dispute.

138. In the view of ICM Registry, principles of international law are applicable; that straightforwardly follows from their specification in the foregoing phrase of Article 4 of the Articles, and from the reasons given in introducing that specification. (*Supra*, paragraphs 53-54.) Principles of international law in ICM’s analysis include the general principles of law recognized as a source of international law in Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. Those principles are not confined, as ICANN argues, to the few principles that may be relevant to the interests of Internet stakeholders, such as principles relating to trademark law and freedom of expression. Rather they include international legal principles of general applicability, such as the fundamental principle of good faith and allied principles such as estoppel and abuse of right. ICM’s expert, Professor Goldsmith, observes that there is ample precedent in international contracts and in the holdings of international tribunals for the proposition that non-sovereigns may choose to apply principles of international law to the determination of their rights and to the disposition of their disputes.

139. ICANN and its expert, Professor David Caron, maintain that international law essentially governs relations among sovereign States; and that to the extent that such principles are “relevant” in this case, it is those few principles that are applicable to a private non-profit corporation that bear on the activities of ICANN described in Article 3 of its Articles of Incorporation (*supra*, paragraph 2). General principles of law, such as that of good faith, are not imported by Article 4 of ICANN’s Articles of Incorporation; still less are principles derived from treaties that protect legitimate expectations. Nor is Article 4 of the Articles a choice-of-law provision; in fact, no governing law has been specified by the disputing parties in this case. If ICANN, by reason of its functions, is to be treated as analogous to public international organizations established by treaty (which it clearly is not), then a relevant principle to be extracted and applied from the jurisprudence of their administrative tribunals is that of deference to the discretionary authority of executive organs and of bodies whose decisions are subject to review.

140. In the view of the Panel, ICANN, in carrying out its activities “in conformity with the relevant principles of international law,” is charged with acting consistently with relevant principles of international law, including the general principles of law recognized as a source of international law.

That follows from the terms of Article 4 of its Articles of Incorporation and from the intentions that animated their inclusion in the Articles, an intention that the Panel understands to have been to subject ICANN to relevant international legal principles because of its governance of an intrinsically international resource of immense importance to global communications and economies. Those intentions might not be realized were Article 4 interpreted to exclude the applicability of general principles of law.

141. That said, the differences between the parties on the place of principles of international law in these proceedings are not of material moment to the conclusions that the Panel will reach. The paramount principle in play is agreed by both parties to be that of good faith, which is found in international law, in the general principles that are a source of international law, and in the corporate law of California.

The Consistency of the Action of the ICANN Board with the Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws

142. The principal – and difficult – issue that the Panel must resolve is whether the rejection by the ICANN Board of the proposed agreement with ICM Registry and its denial of the application’s request for delegation of the .XXX sTLD was or was not consistent with ICANN’s Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws. The conflicting contentions of the parties on this central issue have been set forth above (paragraphs 63-93, 109-131).

143. The Panel will initially consider the primary questions of whether by adopting the resolutions of June 1, 2005, the ICANN Board determined that the application of ICM Registry met the sponsorship criteria, and, if so, whether that determination was definitive and irrevocable.

144. The parties agree that, pursuant to the RFP, applications for sTLDs were to be dealt with in two stages. First, the Evaluation Panel was to review applications and recommend those that met the selection criteria. Second, those applicants that did meet the selection criteria were to proceed to negotiate commercial and technical terms of a contract with ICANN’s President and General Counsel. If and when those terms were agreed upon, the resultant draft contract was to be submitted to the Board for approval. As it turned out, the Board was not content with the fact that the Evaluation Panel positively recommended only a few applications. Accordingly the Board itself undertook to consider and decide whether the other applications met the selection criteria.

145. In the view of the Panel, which has weighed the diverse evidence with care, the Board did decide by adopting its resolutions of June 1, 2005, that the application of ICM Registry for a sTLD met the selection criteria, in particular the sponsorship criteria. ICM contends that that decision was definitive and irrevocable. ICANN contends that, while negotiating commercial and technical terms of the contract, its Board continued to consider whether or not ICM's application met sponsorship criteria, that it was entitled to do so, and that, in the course of that process, further questions about ICM's application arose that were not limited to matters of sponsorship, which the Board also ultimately determined adversely to ICM's application.

146. The considerations that militate in favor of ICM's position are considerable. They are summarized above in paragraphs 63, 65 and 66. ICM argues that these considerations must prevail because they are sustained by contemporary documentary evidence, whereas the contrary arguments of ICANN are not.

147. The Panel accepts the force of the foregoing argument of ICM insofar as it establishes that the June 1, 2005, resolutions accepted that ICM's application met the sponsorship criteria. The points summarized in subparagraphs (a) through (i) of paragraph 63 above are in the view of the Panel not adequately refuted by the recollections of ICANN's witnesses, distinguished as they are and candid as they were. Their current recollection, the sincerity of which the Panel does not doubt, is that it was their understanding in adopting the June 1, 2005 resolution that the Board was entitled to continue to examine whether ICM's application met the sponsorship criteria, even if it had by adopting that resolution found those criteria to have been provisionally met (which they challenge). While that understanding is not supported by factors (a) through (i) of paragraph 63, it nevertheless can muster substantial support on the question of whether any determination that sponsorship criteria had been met was subject to reconsideration.

148. Support on that aspect of the matter consists of the following:

- (a) The resolutions of June 1, 2005 (*supra*, paragraph 19) make no reference to the satisfaction of sponsorship criteria or to whether that question is definitively resolved.
- (b) Those resolutions however expressly provide that the approval and authorization of the Board is required to enter into an agreement relating to

the delegation of the sTLD; that being so, the Board viewed itself to be entitled to review all elements of the agreement before approving and authorizing it, including whether sponsorship criteria were met.

- (c) At the meeting of the GAC in July, 2005, some six weeks after the adoption by the Board of its resolutions of June 1, in the course of preparing the GAC Communique, the GAC Chair "confirmed that, having consulted the ICANN Legal Counsel, GAC could still advise ICANN about the .xxx proposal, should it decide to do so." (*Supra*, paragraph 24.) Since on the advice of counsel the GAC could still advise ICANN about the .XXX proposal, and since questions had been raised in the GAC about whether ICM's application met sponsorship criteria in the light of the appraisal of the Evaluation Panel, it may seem to follow that that advice could embrace the question of whether sponsorship criteria had been met and whether any such determination was subject to reconsideration. In point of fact, after June 1, 2005, a number of members of the GAC challenged or questioned the desirability of approving the ICM application on a variety of grounds, including sponsorship (*supra*, paragraphs 21-25, 40).

- (d) At its teleconference of September 15, 2005, there was "lengthy discussion involving nearly all of the directors regarding the sponsorship criteria..." (*supra*, paragraph 32). That imports that the members of the Board did not regard the question of sponsorship criteria to have been closed by the adoption of the resolutions of June 1, 2005.

- (e) In a letter of May 4, 2006, the President Twomey wrote the Chairman and Members of the GAC noting

"that the Board decision as to the .XXX application is still pending...the Board voted to authorize staff to enter into contractual negotiations without prejudicing the Board's right to evaluate the resulting contract and to decide whether it meets all of the criteria before the Board including public policy advice such as might be offered by the GAC... Due to the subjective nature of the sponsorship related criteria that were reviewed by the Sponsorship Evaluation Team, additional materials were requested from each applicant to be supplied directly for Board review and consideration...In some instances, such as with .XXX, while the additional materials provided sufficient clarification to proceed with contractual discussions, the Board still expressed concerns about whether the applicant met all of the criteria, but took the view that such concerns could possibly be

addressed by contractual obligations to be stated in a registry agreement." (C-188, and *supra*, paragraph 37.)

- (f) At a Board teleconference of February 12, 2007, ICANN's General Counsel asked the Board to consider "how ICM measures up against the RFP criteria," a request that implies that questions about whether such criteria had been met were not foreclosed. (*Supra*, paragraph 41.)
- (g) ICM provided data to ICANN staff, in the course of the preparation of its successive draft registry agreements, that bore on sponsorship. It has not placed in evidence contemporaneous statements that in its view such data was not relevant to continued consideration of its application on the ground that it had met sponsorship criteria or that the Board's June 1, 2005 resolutions foreclosed further consideration of sponsorship criteria. It is understandable that it did not do so, because it was in the process of endeavoring to respond positively to every request of the ICANN Board and staff that it could meet in the hope of promoting final approval of its application; but nevertheless that ICM took part in a continuing dialogue on sponsorship criteria suggests that it too did not regard, or at any rate, treat, that question as definitively resolved by adopted of the June 1, 2005 resolutions.
- (h) When Rita Rodin, a new member of the Board, raised concerns about ICM's meeting of sponsorship criteria at the Board's teleconference of February 12, 2007, she said that she did "not wish to reopen issues if they have already been decided by the Board" and asked the President and General Counsel to confirm that the question was open for discussion. There was no direct reply but the tenor of the subsequent discussion indicates that the Board did not view the question as closed. (During the Board's debate over adoption of its climactic resolution of March 30, 2007, Susan Crawford said that opposition to ICM's application was not sufficient "to warrant revisiting the question of the sponsorship strength of this TLD which I personally believe to be closed.") (*Supra*, paragraph 52.)

149. While the Panel has concluded that by adopting its resolutions of June 1, 2005, the Board found that ICM's application met financial, technical and sponsorship criteria, less clear is whether that determination was subject to reconsideration. The record is inconclusive, for the conflicting reasons set forth above in paragraphs 63, 65 and 66 (on behalf of ICM) and paragraph 149 (on behalf of ICANN). The Panel nevertheless is charged with arriving at a conclusion on the question. In appraising whether ICANN on this issue "applied documented policies, neutrally and objectively, with integrity and

fairness" (Bylaws, Section 2(8), the Panel finds instructive the documented policy stated in the Board's Carthage resolution of October 31, 2003 on "Finalization of New sTLD RFP," namely, that an agreement "reflecting the commercial and technical terms shall be negotiated upon the successful completion of the sTLD selection process." (C-78, p. 4.) In the Panel's view, the sTLD process was "successfully completed", as that term is used in the Carthage RFP resolution, in the case of ICM Registry with the adoption of the June 1, 2005, resolutions. ICANN should, pursuant to the Carthage documented policy, then have proceeded to conclude an agreement with ICM on commercial and technical terms, without reopening whether ICM's application met sponsorship criteria. As Dr. Williams, chair of the Evaluation Panel, testified, the RFP process did not contemplate that new criteria could be added after the [original] criteria had been satisfied. (Tr. 374: 1719). It is pertinent to observe that the GAC's proposals for new TLDs generally exclude consideration of new criteria (*supra*, paragraph 46).

150. In so concluding, the Panel does not question the integrity of the ICANN Board's disposition of the ICM Registry application, still less that of any of the Board's members. It does find that reconsideration of sponsorship criteria, once the Board had found them to have been met, was not in accord with documented policy. If, by way of analogy, there was a construction contract at issue, the party contracting with the builder could not be heard to argue that specifications and criteria defined in invitations to tender can be freely modified once past the qualification stage; the conditions of any such modifications are carefully circumscribed. Admittedly in the instant case the Board was not operating in a context of established business practice. That fact is extenuating, as are other considerations set out above. The majority of the Board appears to have believed that was acting appropriately in reconsidering the question of sponsorship (although a substantial minority vigorously differed). The Board was pressed to do so by the Government of the United States and by quite a number of other influential governments, and ICANN was bound to "duly take into account" the views of those governments. It is not at fault because it did so. It is not possible to estimate just how influential expressions of governmental positions were. They were undoubtedly very influential but it is not clear that they were decisive. If the Board simply had yielded to governmental pressure, it would have disposed of the ICM application much earlier. The Panel does not conclude that the Board, absent the expression of those governmental positions, would necessarily have arrived at a conclusion favorable to ICM. It accepts the affirmation of members of the Board that they did not vote against acceptance of ICM's application because of governmental pressure. Certainly there are those, including Board members,

who understandably react negatively to pornography, and, in some cases, their reactions may be more visceral than rational. But they may also have had doubts, as did the Board, that ICM would be able successfully to achieve what it claimed .XXX would achieve.

151. The Board's resolution of March 30, 2007, rejecting ICM's proposed agreement and denying its request for delegation of the .XXX sTLD lists four grounds for so holding in addition to failure to meet sponsored community criteria (*supra*, paragraph 47). The essence of these grounds appears to be the Board's understanding that the ICM application "raises significant law enforcement compliance issues ... therefore obligating ICANN to acquire responsibility related to content and conduct ... there are credible scenarios that lead to circumstances in which ICANN would be forced to assume an ongoing management and oversight role regarding Internet content, which is inconsistent with its technical mandate." ICM interprets these grounds, and statements of Dr. Twomey and Dr. Cerf, as seeking to impose on ICM responsibility for "enforcing restrictions around the world on access to illegal and offensive content" (*supra*, paragraph 66-67). ICM avers that it never undertook "to enforce the laws of the world on pornography", an undertaking that it could never discharge. It did undertake, in the event of the approval and activation of .XXX, to install tools that would make it far easier for governments to restrict access to content that they deemed illegal and offensive. ICM argues that its application was rejected in part because of its inability to comply with a contractual undertaking to which it never had agreed in the first place (*supra*, paragraphs 66-71). To the extent that this is so – and the facts and the conclusions drawn from the facts by the ICANN Board in its resolution of March 30, 2007, in this regard are not fully coherent – the Panel finds ground for questioning the neutral and objective performance of the Board, and the consistency of its so doing with its obligation not to single out ICM Registry for disparate treatment.

PART FIVE: CONCLUSIONS OF THE INDEPENDENT REVIEW PANEL

152. The Panel concludes, for the reasons stated above, that:

First, the holdings of the Independent Review Panel are advisory in nature; they do not constitute a binding arbitral award.

Second, the actions and decisions of the ICANN Board are not entitled to deference whether by application of the "business judgment" rule or otherwise; they are to be appraised not deferentially but objectively.


Third, the provision of Article 4 of ICANN's Articles of Incorporation prescribing that ICANN "shall operate for the benefit of the Internet community as a whole, carrying out its activities in conformity with relevant principles of international law and applicable international conventions and local law," requires ICANN to operate in conformity with relevant general principles of law (such as good faith) as well as relevant principles of international law, applicable international conventions, and the law of the State of California.

Fourth, the Board of ICANN in adopting its resolutions of June 1, 2005, found that the application of ICM Registry for the .XXX sTLD met the required sponsorship criteria.

Fifth, the Board's reconsideration of that finding was not consistent with the application of neutral, objective and fair documented policy.


Sixth, in respect of the first foregoing holding, ICANN prevails; in respect of the second foregoing holding, ICM Registry prevails; in respect of the third foregoing holding, ICM Registry prevails; in respect of the fourth foregoing holding, ICM Registry prevails; and in respect of the fifth foregoing holding, ICM Registry prevails. Accordingly, the prevailing party is ICM Registry. It follows that, in pursuance of Article IV, Section 3(12) of the Bylaws, ICANN shall be responsible for bearing all costs of the IRP Provider. Each party shall bear its own attorneys' fees. Therefore, the administrative fees and expenses of the International Centre for Dispute Resolution, totaling \$4,500.00, shall be borne entirely by ICANN, and the compensation and expenses of the Independent Review Panel, totaling \$473,744.91, shall be borne entirely by ICANN. ICANN shall accordingly reimburse ICM Registry with the sum of \$241,372.46, representing that portion of said fees and expenses in excess of the apportioned costs previously incurred by ICM Registry.

Judge Tevrizian is in agreement with the first foregoing conclusion but not the subsequent conclusions. His opinion follows.




Stephen M. Schwebel

Date: February 19, 2010



Jan Paulsson

Date: 16 February 2010



Dickran Tevrizian

Date: February 18, 2010

CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION

I concur and expressly join in the Panel's conclusion that the holdings of the Independent Review Panel are advisory in nature and do not constitute a binding arbitral award. I adopt the rationale and the reasons stated by the Panel on this issue only.

However, I must respectfully dissent from my learned colleagues as to the remainder of their findings. I am afraid that the majority opinion will undermine the governance of the internet community by permitting any disgruntled person, organization or governmental entity to second guess the administration of one of the world's most important technological resources.

I

INTRODUCTION

The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (hereinafter "ICANN") is a uniquely created institution: a global, private, not-for-profit organization incorporated under the laws of the State of California (Calif. Corp. Code 5100, et seq.) exercising plenary control over one of the world's most important technological resources: the Internet Domain Name System or "DNS." The DNS is the gateway to the nearly infinite universe of names and numbers that allow the Internet to function.

ICANN is a public benefit, non-profit corporation that was established under the law of the State of California on September 30, 1998. ICANN's Articles of Incorporation were finalized and adopted on November 21, 1998, and its By-Laws were finalized and adopted on the same day as its Articles of Incorporation.

Article 4 of ICANN's Articles of Incorporation sets forth the standard of conduct under which ICANN is required to carry out its activities and mission to protect the stability, integrity and utility of the Internet Domain Name System on behalf of the global Internet community pursuant to a series of agreements with the United States Department of Commerce. ICANN is headquartered in Marina del Rey, California, U.S.A.

Article 4 of ICANN's Articles of Incorporation specifically provide:

"The Corporation shall operate for the benefit of the Internet community as a whole, carrying out its activities in conformity with relevant principles of international law and applicable international conventions and local law and, to the extent appropriate and consistent with these Articles and its Bylaws, through open and transparent processes that enable competition and open entry in Internet-related markets. To this effect, the Corporation shall cooperate as appropriate with relevant international organizations."

ICANN serves the function as the DNS root zone administrator to ensure and is required by its Articles of Incorporation to be a neutral and open facilitator of Internet coordination. ICANN's function and purpose was never meant to be content driven in any respect.

The Articles of Incorporation provide that ICANN is managed by a Board of Directors ("Board"). The Board consists of 15 voting directors and 6 non-voting liaisons from around the world, "who in the aggregate [are to] display diversity in geography, culture, skills, experience and perspective." (Article VI, § 2). The voting directors are composed of: (1) six representatives of ICANN's Supporting Organizations, which are sub-groups dealing with specific sections of the policies under ICANN's purview; (2) eight independent representatives of the general public interest, currently selected through ICANN's Nominating Committee, in which all the constituencies of ICANN are represented; and (3) the President and CEO, who is appointed by the rest of the Board. Consistent with ICANN's mandate to provide private sector technical leadership in the management of the DNS, "no official of a national government" may serve as a director. (Article VI, § 4). In carrying out its functions, it is obvious that ICANN is expected to solicit and will receive input from a wide variety of Internet stakeholders and participants.

ICANN operates through its Board of Directors, a Staff, An Ombudsman, a Nominating Committee for Directors, three Supporting Organizations, four Advisory Committees and numerous other stakeholders that participate in the unique ICANN process. (By-Laws Articles V through XI).

As was stated earlier, ICANN was formed under the laws of the State of California as a public benefit, non-profit corporation. As such, it would appear that California Corporations Code Section 5100, et seq., together with ICANN's Articles of Incorporation and By-Laws, control its governance and accountability.

In general, a non-profit director's fiduciary duties include the duty of care, which includes an obligation of due inquiry and the duty of loyalty among others. The term "fiduciary" refers to anyone who holds a position requiring trust, confidence and scrupulous exercise of good faith and candor. It includes anyone who has a duty, created by a particular undertaking, to act primarily for the benefit of others in matters connected with the undertaking. A fiduciary relationship is one in which one person reposes trust and confidence in another person, who "must exercise a corresponding degree of fairness and good faith." (Blacks Law Dictionary). The type of persons who are commonly referred to as fiduciaries include corporate directors. The California Corporation's Code makes no distinction between

directors chosen by election and directors chosen by selection or designation in the application of fiduciary duties.

Directors of non-profit corporations in California owe a fiduciary duty to the corporation they serve and to its members, if any. See Raven's Cove Townhomes, Inc. v. Knuppe Dev. Co., (1981) 114 CA3d 783, 799; Burt v. Irvine Co., (1965) 237 CA2d 828, 852. See also, Harvey v. Landing Homeowners Assn., (2008) 162 CA4th 809, 821-822.

The "business judgment rule" is the standard the California courts apply in deciding whether a director, acting without a financial interest in the decision, satisfied the requirements of careful conduct imposed by the California Corporations Code. See Gaillard v. Natomas Co., (1989) 208 CA3d 1250, 1264. The rule remains a creature of common law. Some California courts define it as a standard of reasonable conduct. See Burt v. Irvine Co., (1965) 237 CA2d 828, while others speak of actions taken in good faith. See Marble v. Latchford Glass Co., (1962) 205 CA2d 171. While, still others examine whether the director "rationally believes that the business judgment is in the best interests of the corporation." See Lee v. Interinsurance Exch., (1996) 50 CA4th 694.

The business judgment rule is codified in Section 309 of the California Corporations Code, which provides that a director must act "in good faith, in a manner such director believes to be in the best interests of the corporation and its shareholders and with such care, including reasonable inquiry, as an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would use under similar circumstances." Cal. Corp. Code § 309(a); see also Lee v. Interinsurance Exch., (1996) 50 CA4th 694, 714. Section 309 shields from liability directors who follow its provisions: "A person who performs the duties of a director in accordance with subdivisions (a) and (b) shall have no liability based upon any alleged failure to discharge the person's obligations as a director." Cal. Corp. Code § 309 (c).

II

THE ACTIONS OF THE ICANN BOARD OF DIRECTORS ARE ENTITLED TO SUBSTANTIAL DEFERENCE FROM THE INDEPENDENT REVIEW PANEL

ICANN's By-Laws, specifically Article I, § 2, sets forth 11 core values and concludes as follows:

"These core values are deliberately expressed in very general terms, so that they may provide useful and relevant guidance in the broadest possible range of circumstances. Because they are not narrowly prescriptive, the specific way in which they apply, individually and collectively, to each new

situation will necessarily depend on many factors that cannot be fully anticipated or enumerated; and because they are statements of principle rather than practice, situations will inevitably arise in which perfect fidelity to all eleven core values simultaneously is not possible. Any ICANN body making a recommendation or decision shall exercise its judgment to determine which core values are most relevant and how they apply to the specific circumstances of the case at hand, and to determine, if necessary, an appropriate and defensible balance among competing values.”

The By-Laws make it clear that the core values must not be construed in a “narrowly prescriptive” manner. To the contrary, Article I, § 2, provides that the ICANN Board is vested with board discretion in implementing its responsibility such as is mentioned in the business judgment rule.

III

PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW DO NOT APPLY

Article 4 of the ICANN Articles of Incorporation does not preempt the California Corporations Code as a “choice-of-law provision” importing international law into the independent review process. Rather, the substantive provisions of the By-Laws and Articles of Incorporation, as construed in light of the law of California, where ICANN is incorporated as a non-profit entity, should govern the claims before the Independent Review Panel (hereinafter “IRP”).

Professor Caron opined that principles of international law do not apply because, as a private entity, ICANN is not subject to that body of law governing sovereigns. To adopt a more expansive view is tantamount to judicial legislation or mischief.

IV

THE ICANN BOARD OF DIRECTORS DID NOT ACT INCONSISTENTLY WITH ICANN’S ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION AND BY-LAWS IN CONSIDERING AND ULTIMATELY DENYING ICM REGISTRY, LLC’S APPLICATION FOR A SPONSORED TOP LEVEL DOMAIN NAME

On March 30, 2007, the ICANN Board of Directors approved a resolution rejecting the proposed registry agreement and denying the application submitted by ICM Registry, LLC for a sponsored top level domain name. The findings of the Board was that the application was deficient in that the applicant, ICM Registry, LLC, (hereinafter “ICM”), failed to satisfy the

Request For Proposal (“hereinafter “RFP”) posted June 24, 2003, in the following manner:

- “1. ICM’s definition of its sponsored TLD community was not capable of precise or clear definition;
2. ICM’s policies were not primarily in the interests of the sponsored TLD community;
3. ICM’s proposed community did not have needs and interests which are differentiated from those of the general global Internet community;
4. ICM could not demonstrate that it had the requisite community support; and,
5. ICM was not adding new and valuable space to the Internet name space.”

On December 15, 2003, ICANN posted a final RFP for a new round of sponsored Top Level Domain Names (hereinafter “STLD”). On March 16, 2004, ICM submitted its application for the .XXX STLD name. From the inception, ICM knew that its .XXX application would be controversial. From the time that ICM submitted its applications until the application was finally denied on March 30, 2007, ICM never was able to clearly define what the interests of the .XXX community would be or that ICM had adequate support from the community it sought to represent.

ICM has claimed during these proceedings that the RFP posted by ICANN established a non-overlapping two-step procedure for approving new STLDs, under which applications would first be tested for baseline criteria, and only after the applications were finally and irrevocably approved by the ICANN Board could the applications proceed to technical and commercial contract negotiations with ICANN staff. ICM forcefully argues that on June 1, 2005, the ICANN Board irrevocably approved the ICM .XXX STLD application so as to be granted vested rights to enter into registry agreement negotiations dealing with economic issues only. The evidence introduced at the independent review procedure refutes this contention. Nothing contained in the ICANN RFP permits this interpretation.

Before the ICANN Board could approve a STLD application, applicants had to satisfy the baseline selection criteria set forth in the RFP, including the technical, business, financial and sponsorship criteria, and also negotiate an acceptable registry contract with ICANN staff. A review of the relevant documents and testimony admitted into evidence established that the two phases could overlap in time.

The fact that most ICANN Board members expressed significant concerns about ICM’s sponsorship shortcomings after the June 1, 2005,

resolutions negates any notion that the June 1, 2005, resolutions (which do not say that the Board is approving anything and, to the contrary, state clearly that the ICANN Board is not doing so) conclusively determined the sponsorship issue.

The sponsorship issues and shortcomings in ICM's application were also raised by ICANN Board members who joined the ICANN Board after the June 1, 2005, resolutions. Between the June 2005 and February 2007 ICANN Board meetings, there were a total of six new voting Board members (out of a total of fifteen) considering ICM's application.

Both Dr. Cerf and Dr. Pisanty testified during the evidentiary hearing that the ICANN Board's vote on June 1, 2005, made clear that the Board's vote was intended only to permit ICM to proceed with contract negotiations. Under no circumstances was ICANN bound by the vote to award the .XXX STLD to ICM because the resolution that the ICANN Board adopted was not a finding that ICM had satisfied the sponsorship criteria set forth in the Request for Proposal.

By August 9, 2005, ICM's first draft of the proposed .XXX STLD registry agreement was posted on ICANN's website and submitted to the ICANN Board for approval. ICANN's next Board meeting was scheduled for August 16, 2005, at which time the ICANN Board had planned on discussing the proposed agreement.

Within days of ICANN posting the proposed registry agreement, the Government Advisory Committee (hereinafter "GAC") Chairman wrote Dr. Cerf a letter expressing the GAC's diverse and wide ranging" concerns with the .XXX STLD and requesting that the ICANN Board provide additional time for governments to express their public policy concerns before the ICANN Board reached a final decision on the proposed registry agreement.

The GAC's input was significant and proper because the ICANN By-Laws require the ICANN Board to take into account advice from the GAC on public policy matters, both in formulation and adoption of policies. ICANN By-Laws Article XI, § 2.1 (j), provides: "The advice of the Governmental Advisory Committee on public policy matters shall be duly taken into account, both in the formulation and adoption of policies." Where the ICANN Board seeks to take actions that are inconsistent with the GAC's advice, the Board must tell the GAC why. Thus, it was perfectly acceptable, appropriate and fully consistent with the ICANN Articles of Incorporation and By-Laws for the ICANN Board to consider and to address the GAC's concerns.

Further, throughout 2005 and up to the ICANN Board's denial of the ICM .XXX STLD on March 30, 2007, a number of additional continuing concerns and issues appeared beyond those originally voiced by the evaluation panel at the beginning of the review process. Despite the best efforts of many and

numerous opportunities, ICM could not satisfy these additional concerns and, most importantly, could not cure the continuing sponsorship defects.

In all respects, ICANN operated in a fair, transparent and reasoned manner in accordance with its Articles of Incorporation and By-Laws.

V

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, I would give substantial deference to the actions of the ICANN Board of Directors taken on March 30, 2007, in approving a resolution rejecting the proposed registry agreement and denying the application submitted by ICM Registry, LLC for a sponsored top level domain name. I specifically reject any notion that there was any sinister motive by any ICANN Director, governmental entity or religious organization to undermine ICM Registry, LLC's application. In my opinion, the application was rejected on the merits in an open and transparent forum. On the basis of that, ICM Registry, LLC never satisfied the sponsorship requirements and criteria for a top level domain name.

The rejection of the business judgment rule will open the floodgates to increased collateral attacks on the decisions of the ICANN Board of Directors and undermine its authority to provide a reliable point of reference to exercise plenary control over the Internet Domain Name System. In addition, it will leave the ICANN Board in a very vulnerable position for politicization of its activities.

The business judgment rule establishes a presumption that the directors' and officers' decisions are based on sound business judgment, and it prohibits courts from interfering in business decisions made by the management in good faith and in the absence of a conflict of interest. *Katz v. Chevron Corp.*, 22 Cal.App.4th 1352. In most cases, "the presumption created by the business judgment rule can be rebutted only by affirmative allegations of facts which, if proven, would establish fraud, bad faith, overreaching or an unreasonable failure to investigate material facts." The record in this case does not support such findings. In addition, interference with the discretion of the directors is not warranted in doubtful cases such as is present here. *Lee v. Interinsurance Exch.*, 50 Cal.App.4th 694.

In *Marble v. Latchford Glass Co.*, 205 Cal.App.2nd 171, the court stated that it would "not substitute its judgment for the business judgment of the board of directors made in good faith." Similarly, in *Eldridge v. Tymshare, Inc.*, 186 Cal.App.3rd 767, the court stated that the business judgment rule "sets up a presumption that directors' decisions are based on sound business judgment. This presumption can be rebutted only by a factual showing of fraud, bad faith or gross overreaching." ICM Registry, LLC has not met the standard articulated by established law.

In the present case, regardless of how ICM Registry, LLC stylizes its allegations, the business judgment rule poses a substantial hurdle for ICM's effort which I submit was never met by the evidence presented. The evidence presented at the hearing held in this matter disclosed that at every step the decisions made by the ICANN Board were made in good faith, and for the benefit of the continued operation of ICANN in its role as exercising plenary control over one of the world's most important technological resources: the Internet Domain Name System.

Simply stated, as long as ICANN is incorporated and domiciled within the State of California, U.S.A., it is the undersigned's opinion that the standard of review to be used by the Independent Review Panel in judging the conduct of the ICANN board, is the abuse of discretion standard, based upon the business judgment rule, and not a de novo review of the evidence.

JUDGE DICKRAN TEVRIZIAN (Retired)

Dickran Tevrian
February 18, 2010

APPENDIX F

Translations Français Español

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▼ Registries

▼ ccTLDs

▼ Internationalized
Domain
Names

▼ Universal
Acceptance
Initiative

BYLAWS FOR INTERNET CORPORATION FOR ASSIGNED NAMES AND NUMBERS | As amended 30 September 2009

A California Nonprofit Public-Benefit Corporation

As amended 30 September 2009

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ARTICLE I: MISSION AND CORE VALUES

Section 1. MISSION

The mission of The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (“[ICANN](#)”) is to coordinate, at the overall level, the global Internet's systems of unique identifiers, and in particular to ensure the stable and secure operation of the Internet's unique identifier systems. In particular, [ICANN](#):

1. Coordinates the allocation and assignment of the three sets of unique identifiers for the Internet, which are
 - a. Domain names (forming a system referred to as “[DNS](#)”);
 - b. Internet protocol (“[IP](#)”) addresses and autonomous system (“[AS](#)”) numbers; and
 - c. [Protocol](#) port and parameter numbers.

2. Coordinates the operation and evolution of the DNS root name server system.

3. Coordinates policy development reasonably and appropriately related to these technical functions.

Section 2. CORE VALUES

In performing its mission, the following core values should guide the decisions and actions of ICANN:

1. Preserving and enhancing the operational stability, reliability, security, and global interoperability of the Internet.

2. Respecting the creativity, innovation, and flow of information made possible by the Internet by limiting ICANN's activities to those matters within ICANN's mission requiring or significantly benefiting from global coordination.

3. To the extent feasible and appropriate, delegating coordination functions to or recognizing the policy role of other responsible entities that reflect the interests of affected parties.

4. Seeking and supporting broad, informed participation reflecting the functional, geographic, and cultural diversity of the Internet at all levels of policy development and decision-making.

5. Where feasible and appropriate, depending on market mechanisms to promote and sustain a competitive environment.

6. Introducing and promoting competition in the registration of domain names where practicable and beneficial in the public interest.

7. Employing open and transparent policy development mechanisms that (i) promote well-

informed decisions based on expert advice, and (ii) ensure that those entities most affected can assist in the policy development process.

8. Making decisions by applying documented policies neutrally and objectively, with integrity and fairness.

9. Acting with a speed that is responsive to the needs of the Internet while, as part of the decision-making process, obtaining informed input from those entities most affected.

10. Remaining accountable to the Internet community through mechanisms that enhance ICANN's effectiveness.

11. While remaining rooted in the private sector, recognizing that governments and public authorities are responsible for public policy and duly taking into account governments' or public authorities' recommendations.

These core values are deliberately expressed in very general terms, so that they may provide useful and relevant guidance in the broadest possible range of circumstances. Because they are not narrowly prescriptive, the specific way in which they apply, individually and collectively, to each new situation will necessarily depend on many factors that cannot be fully anticipated or enumerated; and because they are statements of principle rather than practice, situations will inevitably arise in which perfect fidelity to all eleven core values simultaneously is not possible. Any ICANN body making a recommendation or decision shall exercise its judgment to determine which core values are most relevant and how they apply to the specific circumstances of the case at hand, and to determine, if necessary, an appropriate and defensible balance among competing values.

ARTICLE II: POWERS

Section 1. GENERAL POWERS

Except as otherwise provided in the Articles of Incorporation or these Bylaws, the powers of ICANN shall be exercised by, and its property controlled and its business and affairs conducted by or under the direction of, the Board. With respect to any matters that would fall within the provisions of [Article III, Section 6](#), the Board may act only by a majority vote of all members of the Board. In all other matters, except as otherwise provided in these Bylaws or by law, the Board may act by majority vote of those present at any annual, regular, or special meeting of the Board. Any references in these Bylaws to a vote of the Board shall mean the vote of only those members present at the meeting where a quorum is present unless otherwise specifically provided in these Bylaws by reference to “all of the members of the Board.”

Section 2. RESTRICTIONS

ICANN shall not act as a Domain Name System Registry or Registrar or Internet Protocol Address Registry in competition with entities affected by the policies of ICANN. Nothing in this Section is intended to prevent ICANN from taking whatever steps are necessary to protect the operational stability of the Internet in the event of financial failure of a Registry or Registrar or other emergency.

Section 3. NON-DISCRIMINATORY TREATMENT

ICANN shall not apply its standards, policies, procedures, or practices inequitably or single out any particular party for disparate treatment unless justified by substantial and reasonable cause, such as the promotion of effective competition.

ARTICLE III: TRANSPARENCY

Section 1. PURPOSE

ICANN and its constituent bodies shall operate to the maximum extent feasible in an open and transparent manner and consistent with procedures designed to ensure fairness.

Section 2. WEBSITE

ICANN shall maintain a publicly-accessible Internet World Wide Web site (the "Website"), which may include, among other things, (i) a calendar of scheduled meetings of the Board, Supporting Organizations, and Advisory Committees; (ii) a docket of all pending policy development matters, including their schedule and current status; (iii) specific meeting notices and agendas as described below; (iv) information on ICANN's budget, annual audit, financial contributors and the amount of their contributions, and related matters; (v) information about the availability of accountability mechanisms, including reconsideration, independent review, and Ombudsman activities, as well as information about the outcome of specific requests and complaints invoking these mechanisms; (vi) announcements about ICANN activities of interest to significant segments of the ICANN community; (vii) comments received from the community on policies being developed and other matters; (viii) information about ICANN's physical meetings and public forums; and (ix) other information of interest to the ICANN community.

Section 3. MANAGER OF PUBLIC PARTICIPATION

There shall be a staff position designated as Manager of Public Participation, or such other title as shall be determined by the President, that shall be responsible, under the direction of the President, for coordinating the various aspects of public participation in ICANN, including the Website and various other means of communicating with and receiving input from the general community of Internet users.

Section 4. MEETING NOTICES AND AGENDAS

At least seven days in advance of each Board meeting (or if not practicable, as far in advance as is practicable), a notice of such meeting and, to the extent known, an agenda for the meeting shall be posted.

Section 5. MINUTES AND PRELIMINARY REPORTS

1. All minutes of meetings of the Board and Supporting Organizations (and any councils thereof) shall be approved promptly by the originating body and

provided to the ICANN Secretary for posting on the Website.

2. No later than five (5) business days after each meeting (as calculated by local time at the location of ICANN's principal office), any actions taken by the Board shall be made publicly available in a preliminary report on the Website; provided, however, that any actions relating to personnel or employment matters, legal matters (to the extent the Board determines it is necessary or appropriate to protect the interests of ICANN), matters that ICANN is prohibited by law or contract from disclosing publicly, and other matters that the Board determines, by a three-quarters (3/4) vote of Directors present at the meeting and voting, are not appropriate for public distribution, shall not be included in the preliminary report made publicly available. For any matters that the Board determines not to disclose, the Board shall describe in general terms in the relevant preliminary report the reason for such nondisclosure.

3. No later than the day after the date on which they are formally approved by the Board (or, if such day is not a business day, as calculated by local time at the location of ICANN's principal office, then the next immediately following business day), the minutes shall be made publicly available on the Website; provided, however, that any minutes relating to personnel or employment matters, legal matters (to the extent the Board determines it is necessary or appropriate to protect the interests of ICANN), matters that ICANN is prohibited by law or contract from disclosing publicly, and other matters that the Board determines, by a three-quarters (3/4) vote of Directors present at the meeting and voting, are not appropriate for public distribution, shall not be included in the minutes made publicly available. For any matters that the Board determines not to disclose, the Board shall describe in

general terms in the relevant minutes the reason for such nondisclosure.

Section 6. NOTICE AND COMMENT ON POLICY ACTIONS

1. With respect to any policies that are being considered by the Board for adoption that substantially affect the operation of the Internet or third parties, including the imposition of any fees or charges, ICANN shall:

a. provide public notice on the Website explaining what policies are being considered for adoption and why, at least twenty-one days (and if practical, earlier) prior to any action by the Board;

b. provide a reasonable opportunity for parties to comment on the adoption of the proposed policies, to see the comments of others, and to reply to those comments, prior to any action by the Board; and

c. in those cases where the policy action affects public policy concerns, to request the opinion of the Governmental Advisory Committee and take duly into account any advice timely presented by the Governmental Advisory Committee on its own initiative or at the Board's request.

2. Where both practically feasible and consistent with the relevant policy development process, an in-person public forum shall also be held for discussion of any proposed policies as described in [Section 6\(1\)\(b\) of this Article](#), prior to any final Board action.

3. After taking action on any policy subject to this Section, the Board shall publish in the meeting minutes the reasons for any action taken, the vote of each Director voting on the action, and the separate

statement of any Director desiring publication of such a statement.

Section 7. TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENTS

As appropriate and to the extent provided in the ICANN budget, ICANN shall facilitate the translation of final published documents into various appropriate languages.

ARTICLE IV: ACCOUNTABILITY AND REVIEW

Section 1. PURPOSE

In carrying out its mission as set out in these Bylaws, ICANN should be accountable to the community for operating in a manner that is consistent with these Bylaws, and with due regard for the core values set forth in [Article I of these Bylaws](#). The provisions of this Article, creating processes for reconsideration and independent review of ICANN actions and periodic review of ICANN's structure and procedures, are intended to reinforce the various accountability mechanisms otherwise set forth in these Bylaws, including the transparency provisions of [Article III](#) and the Board and other selection mechanisms set forth throughout these Bylaws.

Section 2. RECONSIDERATION

1. ICANN shall have in place a process by which any person or entity materially affected by an action of ICANN may request review or reconsideration of that action by the Board.
2. Any person or entity may submit a request for reconsideration or review of an ICANN action or inaction ("Reconsideration Request") to the extent that he, she, or it have been adversely affected by:
 - a. one or more staff actions or inactions that contradict established ICANN policy (ies); or

b. one or more actions or inactions of the ICANN Board that have been taken or refused to be taken without consideration of material information, except where the party submitting the request could have submitted, but did not submit, the information for the Board's consideration at the time of action or refusal to act.

3. The Board has designated the Board Governance Committee to review and consider any such Reconsideration Requests. The Board Governance Committee shall have the authority to:

a. evaluate requests for review or reconsideration;

b. determine whether a stay of the contested action pending resolution of the request is appropriate;

c. conduct whatever factual investigation is deemed appropriate;

d. request additional written submissions from the affected party, or from other parties; and

e. make a recommendation to the Board of Directors on the merits of the request.

4. ICANN shall absorb the normal administrative costs of the reconsideration process. It reserves the right to recover from a party requesting review or reconsideration any costs which are deemed to be extraordinary in nature. When such extraordinary costs can be foreseen, that fact and the reasons why such costs are necessary and appropriate to evaluating the Reconsideration Request shall be communicated to the party seeking reconsideration, who shall then have

the option of withdrawing the request or agreeing to bear such costs.

5. All Reconsideration Requests must be submitted to an e-mail address designated by the Board Governance Committee within thirty days after:

a. for requests challenging Board actions, the date on which information about the challenged Board action is first published in a preliminary report or minutes of the Board's meetings; or

b. for requests challenging staff actions, the date on which the party submitting the request became aware of, or reasonably should have become aware of, the challenged staff action; or

c. for requests challenging either Board or staff inaction, the date on which the affected person reasonably concluded, or reasonably should have concluded, that action would not be taken in a timely manner.

6. All Reconsideration Requests must include the information required by the Board Governance Committee, which shall include at least the following information:

a. name, address, and contact information for the requesting party, including postal and e-mail addresses;

b. the specific action or inaction of ICANN for which review or reconsideration is sought;

c. the date of the action or inaction;

d. the manner by which the requesting party will be affected by the action or inaction;

e. the extent to which, in the opinion of the party submitting the Request for Reconsideration, the action or inaction complained of adversely affects others;

f. whether a temporary stay of any action complained of is requested, and if so, the harms that will result if the action is not stayed;

g. in the case of staff action or inaction, a detailed explanation of the facts as presented to the staff and the reasons why the staff's action or inaction was inconsistent with established ICANN policy (ies);

h. in the case of Board action or inaction, a detailed explanation of the material information not considered by the Board and, if the information was not presented to the Board, the reasons the party submitting the request did not submit it to the Board before it acted or failed to act;

i. what specific steps the requesting party asks ICANN to take-i.e., whether and how the action should be reversed, cancelled, or modified, or what specific action should be taken;

j. the grounds on which the requested action should be taken; and

k. any documents the requesting party wishes to submit in support of its request.

7. All Reconsideration Requests shall be posted on the Website..

8. The Board Governance Committee shall have authority to consider Reconsideration Requests from different parties in the same proceeding so long as (i) the requests involve the same general action or inaction and (ii) the parties submitting Reconsideration Requests are similarly affected by such action or inaction.

9. The Board Governance Committee shall review Reconsideration Requests promptly upon receipt and announce, within thirty days, its intention to either decline to consider or proceed to consider a Reconsideration Request after receipt of the Request. The announcement shall be posted on the Website.

10. The Board Governance Committee announcement of a decision not to hear a Reconsideration Request must contain an explanation of the reasons for its decision.

11. The Board Governance Committee may request additional information or clarifications from the party submitting the Request for Reconsideration.

12. The Board Governance Committee may ask the ICANN staff for its views on the matter, which comments shall be made publicly available on the Website.

13. If the Board Governance Committee requires additional information, it may elect to conduct a meeting with the party seeking Reconsideration by telephone, e-mail or, if acceptable to the party requesting reconsideration, in person. To the extent any information gathered in such a meeting is relevant to any recommendation by the Board Governance Committee, it shall so state in its recommendation.

14. The Board Governance Committee may also request information relevant to the request from third parties. To the extent any information gathered is relevant to any recommendation by the Board Governance Committee, it shall so state in its recommendation.

15. The Board Governance Committee shall act on a Reconsideration Request on the basis of the public written record, including information submitted by the party seeking reconsideration or review, by the ICANN staff, and by any third party.

16. To protect against abuse of the reconsideration process, a request for reconsideration may be dismissed by the Board Governance Committee where it is repetitive, frivolous, non-substantive, or otherwise abusive, or where the affected party had notice and opportunity to, but did not, participate in the public comment period relating to the contested action, if applicable. Likewise, the Board Governance Committee may dismiss a request when the requesting party does not show that it will be affected by ICANN's action.

17. The Board Governance Committee shall make a final recommendation to the Board with respect to a Reconsideration Request within ninety days following its receipt of the request, unless impractical, in which case it shall report to the Board the circumstances that prevented it from making a final recommendation and its best estimate of the time required to produce such a final recommendation. The final recommendation shall be posted on the Website.

18. The Board shall not be bound to follow the recommendations of the Board Governance Committee. The final decision of the Board shall be made public as part of the preliminary report and minutes of the Board meeting at which action is taken.

19. The Board Governance Committee shall submit a report to the Board on an annual basis containing at least the following information for the preceding calendar year:

a. the number and general nature of Reconsideration Requests received;

b. the number of Reconsideration Requests on which the Board Governance Committee has taken action;

c. the number of Reconsideration Requests that remained pending at the end of the calendar year and the average length of time for which such Reconsideration Requests have been pending;

d. a description of any Reconsideration Requests that were pending at the end of the calendar year for more than ninety (90) days and the reasons that the Board Governance Committee has not taken action on them;

e. the number and nature of Reconsideration Requests that the Board Governance Committee declined to consider on the basis that they did not meet the criteria established in this policy;

f. for Reconsideration Requests that were denied, an explanation of any other mechanisms available to ensure that ICANN is accountable to persons materially affected by its decisions; and

g. whether or not, in the Board Governance Committee's view, the criteria for which reconsideration may be requested should be revised, or another process should be

adopted or modified, to ensure that all persons materially affected by ICANN decisions have meaningful access to a review process that ensures fairness while limiting frivolous claims.

20. Each annual report shall also aggregate the information on the topics listed in [paragraph 19\(a\)-\(e\) of this Section](#) for the period beginning 1 January 2003.

Section 3. INDEPENDENT REVIEW OF BOARD ACTIONS

1. In addition to the reconsideration process described in [Section 2 of this Article](#), ICANN shall have in place a separate process for independent third-party review of Board actions alleged by an affected party to be inconsistent with the Articles of Incorporation or Bylaws.

2. Any person materially affected by a decision or action by the Board that he or she asserts is inconsistent with the Articles of Incorporation or Bylaws may submit a request for independent review of that decision or action.

3. Requests for such independent review shall be referred to an Independent Review Panel (“IRP”), which shall be charged with comparing contested actions of the Board to the Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws, and with declaring whether the Board has acted consistently with the provisions of those Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws.

4. The IRP shall be operated by an international arbitration provider appointed from time to time by ICANN (“the IRP Provider”) using arbitrators under contract with or nominated by that provider.

5. Subject to the approval of the Board, the IRP Provider shall establish operating rules and

procedures, which shall implement and be consistent with this [Section 3](#).

6. Either party may elect that the request for independent review be considered by a three-member panel; in the absence of any such election, the issue shall be considered by a one-member panel.

7. The IRP Provider shall determine a procedure for assigning members to individual panels; provided that if [ICANN](#) so directs, the IRP Provider shall establish a standing panel to hear such claims.

8. The IRP shall have the authority to:

a. request additional written submissions from the party seeking review, the Board, the Supporting Organizations, or from other parties;

b. declare whether an action or inaction of the Board was inconsistent with the Articles of Incorporation or Bylaws; and

c. recommend that the Board stay any action or decision, or that the Board take any interim action, until such time as the Board reviews and acts upon the opinion of the IRP.

9. Individuals holding an official position or office within the [ICANN](#) structure are not eligible to serve on the IRP.

10. In order to keep the costs and burdens of independent review as low as possible, the IRP should conduct its proceedings by e-mail and otherwise via the Internet to the maximum extent feasible. Where necessary, the IRP may hold meetings by telephone.

11. The IRP shall adhere to conflicts-of-interest policy stated in the IRP Provider's operating rules and procedures, as approved by the Board.

12. Declarations of the IRP shall be in writing. The IRP shall make its declaration based solely on the documentation, supporting materials, and arguments submitted by the parties, and in its declaration shall specifically designate the prevailing party. The party not prevailing shall ordinarily be responsible for bearing all costs of the IRP Provider, but in an extraordinary case the IRP may in its declaration allocate up to half of the costs of the IRP Provider to the prevailing party based upon the circumstances, including a consideration of the reasonableness of the parties' positions and their contribution to the public interest. Each party to the IRP proceedings shall bear its own expenses.

13. The IRP operating procedures, and all petitions, claims, and declarations, shall be posted on the Website when they become available.

14. The IRP may, in its discretion, grant a party's request to keep certain information confidential, such as trade secrets.

15. Where feasible, the Board shall consider the IRP declaration at the Board's next meeting.

Section 4. PERIODIC REVIEW OF ICANN STRUCTURE AND OPERATIONS

1. The Board shall cause a periodic review of the performance and operation of each Supporting Organization, each Supporting Organization Council, each Advisory Committee (other than the Governmental Advisory Committee), and the Nominating Committee by an entity or entities independent of the organization under review. The goal of the review, to be undertaken pursuant to such

criteria and standards as the Board shall direct, shall be to determine (i) whether that organization has a continuing purpose in the ICANN structure, and (ii) if so, whether any change in structure or operations is desirable to improve its effectiveness.

These periodic reviews shall be conducted no less frequently than every five years, based on feasibility as determined by the Board. Each five-year cycle will be computed from the moment of the reception by the Board of the final report of the relevant review Working Group.

The results of such reviews shall be posted on the Website for public review and comment, and shall be considered by the Board no later than the second scheduled meeting of the Board after such results have been posted for 30 days. The consideration by the Board includes the ability to revise the structure or operation of the parts of ICANN being reviewed by a two-thirds vote of all members of the Board.

2. The Governmental Advisory Committee shall provide its own review mechanisms.

ARTICLE V: OMBUDSMAN

Section 1. OFFICE OF OMBUDSMAN

1. There shall be an Office of Ombudsman, to be managed by an Ombudsman and to include such staff support as the Board determines is appropriate and feasible. The Ombudsman shall be a full-time position, with salary and benefits appropriate to the function, as determined by the Board.

2. The Ombudsman shall be appointed by the Board for an initial term of two years, subject to renewal by the Board.

3. The Ombudsman shall be subject to dismissal by the Board only upon a three-fourths (3/4) vote of the entire Board.

4. The annual budget for the Office of Ombudsman shall be established by the Board as part of the annual ICANN budget process. The Ombudsman shall submit a proposed budget to the President, and the President shall include that budget submission in its entirety and without change in the general ICANN budget recommended by the ICANN President to the Board. Nothing in this Article shall prevent the President from offering separate views on the substance, size, or other features of the Ombudsman's proposed budget to the Board.

Section 2. CHARTER

The charter of the Ombudsman shall be to act as a neutral dispute resolution practitioner for those matters for which the provisions of the Reconsideration Policy set forth in [Section 2 of Article IV](#) or the Independent Review Policy set forth in [Section 3 of Article IV](#) have not been invoked. The principal function of the Ombudsman shall be to provide an independent internal evaluation of complaints by members of the ICANN community who believe that the ICANN staff, Board or an ICANN constituent body has treated them unfairly. The Ombudsman shall serve as an objective advocate for fairness, and shall seek to evaluate and where possible resolve complaints about unfair or inappropriate treatment by ICANN staff, the Board, or ICANN constituent bodies, clarifying the issues and using conflict resolution tools such as negotiation, facilitation, and “shuttle diplomacy” to achieve these results.

Section 3. OPERATIONS

The Office of Ombudsman shall:

1. facilitate the fair, impartial, and timely resolution of problems and complaints that affected members of the ICANN community (excluding employees and

vendors/suppliers of ICANN) may have with specific actions or failures to act by the Board or ICANN staff which have not otherwise become the subject of either the Reconsideration or Independent Review Policies;

2. exercise discretion to accept or decline to act on a complaint or question, including by the development of procedures to dispose of complaints that are insufficiently concrete, substantive, or related to ICANN's interactions with the community so as to be inappropriate subject matters for the Ombudsman to act on. In addition, and without limiting the foregoing, the Ombudsman shall have no authority to act in any way with respect to internal administrative matters, personnel matters, issues relating to membership on the Board, or issues related to vendor/supplier relations;

3. have the right to have access to (but not to publish if otherwise confidential) all necessary information and records from ICANN staff and constituent bodies to enable an informed evaluation of the complaint and to assist in dispute resolution where feasible (subject only to such confidentiality obligations as are imposed by the complainant or any generally applicable confidentiality policies adopted by ICANN);

4. heighten awareness of the Ombudsman program and functions through routine interaction with the ICANN community and online availability;

5. maintain neutrality and independence, and have no bias or personal stake in an outcome; and

6. comply with all ICANN conflicts-of-interest and confidentiality policies.

Section 4. INTERACTION WITH ICANN AND OUTSIDE ENTITIES

1. No ICANN employee, Board member, or other participant in Supporting Organizations or Advisory Committees shall prevent or impede the Ombudsman's contact with the ICANN community (including employees of ICANN). ICANN employees and Board members shall direct members of the ICANN community who voice problems, concerns, or complaints about ICANN to the Ombudsman, who shall advise complainants about the various options available for review of such problems, concerns, or complaints.
2. ICANN staff and other ICANN participants shall observe and respect determinations made by the Office of Ombudsman concerning confidentiality of any complaints received by that Office.
3. Contact with the Ombudsman shall not constitute notice to ICANN of any particular action or cause of action.
4. The Ombudsman shall be specifically authorized to make such reports to the Board as he or she deems appropriate with respect to any particular matter and its resolution or the inability to resolve it. Absent a determination by the Ombudsman, in his or her sole discretion, that it would be inappropriate, such reports shall be posted on the Website.
5. The Ombudsman shall not take any actions not authorized in these Bylaws, and in particular shall not institute, join, or support in any way any legal actions challenging ICANN structure, procedures, processes, or any conduct by the ICANN Board, staff, or constituent bodies.

Section 5. ANNUAL REPORT

The Office of Ombudsman shall publish on an annual basis a consolidated analysis of the year's complaints and resolutions, appropriately dealing with confidentiality obligations and concerns.

Such annual report should include a description of any trends or common elements of complaints received during the period in question, as well as recommendations for steps that could be taken to minimize future complaints. The annual report shall be posted on the Website.

ARTICLE VI: BOARD OF DIRECTORS

Section 1. COMPOSITION OF THE BOARD

The ICANN Board of Directors (“Board”) shall consist of fifteen voting members (“Directors”). In addition, six non-voting liaisons (“Liaisons”) shall be designated for the purposes set forth in [Section 9 of this Article](#). Only Directors shall be included in determining the existence of quorums, and in establishing the validity of votes taken by the ICANN Board.

Section 2. DIRECTORS AND THEIR SELECTION; ELECTION OF CHAIRMAN AND VICE-CHAIRMAN

1. The Directors shall consist of:
 - a. Eight voting members selected by the Nominating Committee established by [Article VII of these Bylaws](#). These seats on the Board of Directors are referred to in these Bylaws as Seats 1 through 8.
 - b. Two voting members selected by the Address Supporting Organization according to the provisions of [Article VIII of these Bylaws](#). These seats on the Board of Directors are referred to in these Bylaws as Seat 9 and Seat 10.
 - c. Two voting members selected by the Country-Code Names Supporting Organization according to the provisions of [Article IX of these Bylaws](#). These seats on the Board of Directors are referred to in these Bylaws as Seat 11 and Seat 12.

d. Two voting members selected by the Generic Names Supporting Organization according to the provisions of [Article X of these Bylaws](#). These seats on the Board of Directors are referred to in these Bylaws as Seat 13 and Seat 14.

e. The President ex officio, who shall be a voting member.

2. In carrying out its responsibilities to fill Seats 1 through 8, the Nominating Committee shall seek to ensure that the ICANN Board is composed of members who in the aggregate display diversity in geography, culture, skills, experience, and perspective, by applying the criteria set forth in [Section 3 of this Article](#). At no time when it makes its selection shall the Nominating Committee select a Director to fill any vacancy or expired term whose selection would cause the total number of Directors (not including the President) from countries in any one Geographic Region (as defined in [Section 5 of this Article](#)) to exceed five; and the Nominating Committee shall ensure when it makes its selections that the Board includes at least one Director who is from a country in each ICANN Geographic Region (“Diversity Calculation”).

For purposes of this sub-section 2 of Article VI, Section 2 of the ICANN Bylaws, if any candidate for director maintains citizenship of more than one country, or has been domiciled for more than five years in a country of which the candidate does not maintain citizenship (“Domicile”), that candidate may be deemed to be from either country and must select in his/her Statement of Interest the country of citizenship or Domicile that he/she wants the Nominating Committee to use for Diversity Calculation purposes. For purposes of this sub- section 2 of Article VI, Section 2 of the ICANN Bylaws, a person can only have one “Domicile,” which

shall be determined by where the candidate has a permanent residence and place of habitation.

3. In carrying out their responsibilities to fill Seats 9 through 14, the Supporting Organizations shall seek to ensure that the ICANN Board is composed of members that in the aggregate display diversity in geography, culture, skills, experience, and perspective, by applying the criteria set forth in [Section 3 of this Article](#). At any given time, no two Directors selected by a Supporting Organization shall be citizens from the same country or of countries located in the same Geographic Region.

For purposes of this sub-section 3 of Article VI, Section 2 of the ICANN Bylaws, if any candidate for director maintains citizenship of more than one country, or has been domiciled for more than five years in a country of which the candidate does not maintain citizenship (“Domicile”), that candidate may be deemed to be from either country and must select in his/her Statement of Interest the country of citizenship or Domicile that he/she wants the Supporting Organization to use for selection purposes. For purposes of this sub-section 3 of Article VI, Section 2 of the ICANN Bylaws, a person can only have one “Domicile,” which shall be determined by where the candidate has a permanent residence and place of habitation.

4. The Board shall annually elect a Chairman and a Vice-Chairman from among the Directors, not including the President.

Section 3. CRITERIA FOR SELECTION OF DIRECTORS

ICANN Directors shall be:

1. Accomplished persons of integrity, objectivity, and intelligence, with reputations for sound judgment and open minds, and a demonstrated capacity for thoughtful group decision-making;

2. Persons with an understanding of ICANN's mission and the potential impact of ICANN decisions on the global Internet community, and committed to the success of ICANN;
3. Persons who will produce the broadest cultural and geographic diversity on the Board consistent with meeting the other criteria set forth in this Section;
4. Persons who, in the aggregate, have personal familiarity with the operation of gTLD registries and registrars; with ccTLD registries; with IP address registries; with Internet technical standards and protocols; with policy-development procedures, legal traditions, and the public interest; and with the broad range of business, individual, academic, and non-commercial users of the Internet;
5. Persons who are willing to serve as volunteers, without compensation other than the reimbursement of certain expenses; and
6. Persons who are able to work and communicate in written and spoken English.

Section 4. ADDITIONAL QUALIFICATIONS

1. Notwithstanding anything herein to the contrary, no official of a national government or a multinational entity established by treaty or other agreement between national governments may serve as a Director. As used herein, the term "official" means a person (i) who holds an elective governmental office or (ii) who is employed by such government or multinational entity and whose primary function with such government or entity is to develop or influence governmental or public policies.
2. No person who serves in any capacity (including as a liaison) on any Supporting Organization Council shall simultaneously serve as a Director or liaison to the

Board. If such a person accepts a nomination to be considered for selection by the Supporting Organization Council to be a Director, the person shall not, following such nomination, participate in any discussion of, or vote by, the Supporting Organization Council relating to the selection of Directors by the Council, until the Council has selected the full complement of Directors it is responsible for selecting. In the event that a person serving in any capacity on a Supporting Organization Council accepts a nomination to be considered for selection as a Director, the constituency group or other group or entity that selected the person may select a replacement for purposes of the Council's selection process.

3. Persons serving in any capacity on the Nominating Committee shall be ineligible for selection to positions on the Board as provided by [Article VII, Section 8](#).

Section 5. INTERNATIONAL REPRESENTATION

In order to ensure broad international representation on the Board, the selection of Directors by the Nominating Committee and each Supporting Organization shall comply with all applicable diversity provisions of these Bylaws or of any Memorandum of Understanding referred to in these Bylaws concerning the Supporting Organization. One intent of these diversity provisions is to ensure that at all times each Geographic Region shall have at least one Director, and at all times no region shall have more than five Directors on the Board (not including the President). As used in these Bylaws, each of the following is considered to be a "Geographic Region": Europe; Asia/Australia/Pacific; Latin America/Caribbean islands; Africa; and North America. The specific countries included in each Geographic Region shall be determined by the Board, and this Section shall be reviewed by the Board from time to time (but at least every three years) to determine whether any change is appropriate, taking account of the evolution of the Internet.

Section 6. DIRECTORS' CONFLICTS OF INTEREST

The Board, through the Board Governance Committee, shall require a statement from each Director not less frequently than once a year setting forth all business and other affiliations that relate in any way to the business and other affiliations of ICANN. Each Director shall be responsible for disclosing to ICANN any matter that could reasonably be considered to make such Director an “interested director” within the meaning of Section 5233 of the California Nonprofit Public Benefit Corporation Law (“CNPBCL”). In addition, each Director shall disclose to ICANN any relationship or other factor that could reasonably be considered to cause the Director to be considered to be an “interested person” within the meaning of Section 5227 of the CNPBCL. The Board shall adopt policies specifically addressing Director, Officer, and Supporting Organization conflicts of interest. No Director shall vote on any matter in which he or she has a material and direct financial interest that would be affected by the outcome of the vote.

Section 7. DUTIES OF DIRECTORS

Directors shall serve as individuals who have the duty to act in what they reasonably believe are the best interests of ICANN and not as representatives of the entity that selected them, their employers, or any other organizations or constituencies.

Section 8. TERMS OF DIRECTORS

1. Subject to the provisions of the [Transition Article of these Bylaws](#), the regular term of office of Director Seats 1 through 14 shall begin as follows:
 - a. The regular terms of Seats 1 through 3 shall begin at the conclusion of ICANN's annual meeting in 2003 and each ICANN annual meeting every third year after 2003;
 - b. The regular terms of Seats 4 through 6 shall begin at the conclusion of ICANN's annual meeting in 2004 and each ICANN annual meeting every third year after 2004;

c. The regular terms of Seats 7 and 8 shall begin at the conclusion of ICANN's annual meeting in 2005 and each ICANN annual meeting every third year after 2005;

d. The regular terms of Seats 9 and 12 shall begin on the day six months after the conclusion of ICANN's annual meeting in 2002 and each ICANN annual meeting every third year after 2002;

e. The regular terms of Seats 10 and 13 shall begin on the day six months after the conclusion of ICANN's annual meeting in 2003 and each ICANN annual meeting every third year after 2003; and

f. The regular terms of Seats 11 and 14 shall begin on the day six months after the conclusion of ICANN's annual meeting in 2004 and each ICANN annual meeting every third year after 2004.

2. Each Director holding any of Seats 1 through 14, including a Director selected to fill a vacancy, shall hold office for a term that lasts until the next term for that Seat commences and until a successor has been selected and qualified or until that Director resigns or is removed in accordance with these Bylaws.

3. At least one month before the commencement of each annual meeting, the Nominating Committee shall give the Secretary of ICANN written notice of its selection of Directors for seats with terms beginning at the conclusion of the annual meeting.

4. No later than five months after the conclusion of each annual meeting, any Supporting Organization entitled to select a Director for a Seat with a term beginning on the day six months after the conclusion

of the annual meeting shall give the Secretary of ICANN written notice of its selection.

5. Subject to the provisions of the Transition Article of these Bylaws, no Director may serve more than three consecutive terms. For these purposes, a person selected to fill a vacancy in a term shall not be deemed to have served that term.

6. The term as Director of the person holding the office of President shall be for as long as, and only for as long as, such person holds the office of President.

Section 9. NON-VOTING LIAISONS

1. The non-voting liaisons shall include:

- a. One appointed by the [Governmental Advisory Committee](#);
- b. One appointed by the Root Server System Advisory Committee established by [Article XI of these Bylaws](#);
- c. One appointed by the Security and Stability Advisory Committee established by [Article XI of these Bylaws](#);
- d. One appointed by the Technical Liaison Group established by [Article XI-A of these Bylaws](#);
- e. One appointed by the At-Large Advisory Committee established by [Article XI of these Bylaws](#); and
- f. One appointed by the Internet Engineering Task Force.

2. Subject to the provisions of the [Transition Article of these Bylaws](#), the non-voting liaisons shall serve terms

that begin at the conclusion of each annual meeting. At least one month before the commencement of each annual meeting, each body entitled to appoint a non-voting liaison shall give the Secretary of ICANN written notice of its appointment.

3. Non-voting liaisons shall serve as volunteers, without compensation other than the reimbursement of certain expenses.

4. Each non-voting liaison may be reappointed, and shall remain in that position until a successor has been appointed or until the liaison resigns or is removed in accordance with these Bylaws.

5. The non-voting liaisons shall be entitled to attend Board meetings, participate in Board discussions and deliberations, and have access (under conditions established by the Board) to materials provided to Directors for use in Board discussions, deliberations and meetings, but shall otherwise not have any of the rights and privileges of Directors. Non-voting liaisons shall be entitled (under conditions established by the Board) to use any materials provided to them pursuant to this Section for the purpose of consulting with their respective committee or organization.

Section 10. RESIGNATION OF A DIRECTOR OR NON-VOTING LIAISON

Subject to Section 5226 of the CNPBCL, any Director or non-voting liaison may resign at any time, either by oral tender of resignation at any meeting of the Board (followed by prompt written notice to the Secretary of ICANN) or by giving written notice thereof to the President or the Secretary of ICANN. Such resignation shall take effect at the time specified, and, unless otherwise specified, the acceptance of such resignation shall not be necessary to make it effective. The successor shall be selected pursuant to [Section 12 of this Article](#).

Section 11. REMOVAL OF A DIRECTOR OR NON-VOTING LIAISON

1. Any Director may be removed, following notice to that Director and, if selected by a Supporting Organization, to that Supporting Organization, by a three-fourths (3/4) majority vote of all Directors; provided, however, that the Director who is the subject of the removal action shall not be entitled to vote on such an action or be counted as a voting member of the Board when calculating the required three-fourths (3/4) vote; and provided further, that each vote to remove a Director shall be a separate vote on the sole question of the removal of that particular Director.

2. With the exception of the non-voting liaison appointed by the Governmental Advisory Committee, any non-voting liaison may be removed, following notice to that liaison and to the organization by which that liaison was selected, by a three-fourths (3/4) majority vote of all Directors if the selecting organization fails to promptly remove that liaison following such notice. The Board may request the Governmental Advisory Committee to consider the replacement of the non-voting liaison appointed by that Committee if the Board, by a three-fourths (3/4) majority vote of all Directors, determines that such an action is appropriate.

Section 12. VACANCIES

1. A vacancy or vacancies in the Board of Directors shall be deemed to exist in the case of the death, resignation, or removal of any Director; if the authorized number of Directors is increased; or if a Director has been declared of unsound mind by a final order of court or convicted of a felony or incarcerated for more than 90 days as a result of a criminal conviction or has been found by final order or judgment of any court to have breached a duty under Sections 5230 et seq. of the CNPBCL. Any vacancy

occurring on the Board of Directors shall be filled by the Nominating Committee, unless (a) that Director was selected by a Supporting Organization, in which case that vacancy shall be filled by that Supporting Organization, or (b) that Director was the President, in which case the vacancy shall be filled in accordance with the provisions of [Article XIII of these Bylaws](#). The selecting body shall give written notice to the Secretary of ICANN of their appointments to fill vacancies. A Director selected to fill a vacancy on the Board shall serve for the unexpired term of his or her predecessor in office and until a successor has been selected and qualified. No reduction of the authorized number of Directors shall have the effect of removing a Director prior to the expiration of the Director's term of office.

2. The organizations selecting the non-voting liaisons identified in [Section 9 of this Article](#) are responsible for determining the existence of, and filling, any vacancies in those positions. They shall give the Secretary of ICANN written notice of their appointments to fill vacancies.

Section 13. ANNUAL MEETINGS

Annual meetings of ICANN shall be held for the purpose of electing Officers and for the transaction of such other business as may come before the meeting. Each annual meeting for ICANN shall be held at the principal office of ICANN, or any other appropriate place of the Board's time and choosing, provided such annual meeting is held within 14 months of the immediately preceding annual meeting. If the Board determines that it is practical, the annual meeting should be distributed in real-time and archived video and audio formats on the Internet.

Section 14. REGULAR MEETINGS

Regular meetings of the Board shall be held on dates to be determined by the Board. In the absence of other designation, regular meetings shall be held at the principal office of ICANN.

Section 15. SPECIAL MEETINGS

Special meetings of the Board may be called by or at the request of one-quarter (1/4) of the members of the Board or by the Chairman of the Board or the President. A call for a special meeting shall be made by the Secretary of ICANN. In the absence of designation, special meetings shall be held at the principal office of ICANN.

Section 16. NOTICE OF MEETINGS

Notice of time and place of all meetings shall be delivered personally or by telephone or by electronic mail to each Director and non-voting liaison, or sent by first-class mail (air mail for addresses outside the United States) or facsimile, charges prepaid, addressed to each Director and non-voting liaison at the Director's or non-voting liaison's address as it is shown on the records of ICANN. In case the notice is mailed, it shall be deposited in the United States mail at least fourteen (14) days before the time of the holding of the meeting. In case the notice is delivered personally or by telephone or facsimile or electronic mail it shall be delivered personally or by telephone or facsimile or electronic mail at least forty-eight (48) hours before the time of the holding of the meeting. Notwithstanding anything in this Section to the contrary, notice of a meeting need not be given to any Director who signed a waiver of notice or a written consent to holding the meeting or an approval of the minutes thereof, whether before or after the meeting, or who attends the meeting without protesting, prior thereto or at its commencement, the lack of notice to such Director. All such waivers, consents and approvals shall be filed with the corporate records or made a part of the minutes of the meetings.

Section 17. QUORUM

At all annual, regular, and special meetings of the Board, a majority of the total number of Directors then in office shall constitute a quorum for the transaction of business, and the act of a majority of the Directors present at any meeting at which there is a quorum shall be the act of the Board, unless otherwise provided herein or by law. If a quorum shall not be present at any meeting

of the Board, the Directors present thereat may adjourn the meeting from time to time to another place, time, or date. If the meeting is adjourned for more than twenty-four (24) hours, notice shall be given to those Directors not at the meeting at the time of the adjournment.

Section 18. ACTION BY TELEPHONE MEETING OR BY OTHER COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT

Members of the Board or any Committee of the Board may participate in a meeting of the Board or Committee of the Board through use of (i) conference telephone or similar communications equipment, provided that all Directors participating in such a meeting can speak to and hear one another or (ii) electronic video screen communication or other communication equipment; provided that (a) all Directors participating in such a meeting can speak to and hear one another, (b) all Directors are provided the means of fully participating in all matters before the Board or Committee of the Board, and (c) ICANN adopts and implements means of verifying that (x) a person participating in such a meeting is a Director or other person entitled to participate in the meeting and (y) all actions of, or votes by, the Board or Committee of the Board are taken or cast only by the members of the Board or Committee and not persons who are not members.

Participation in a meeting pursuant to this Section constitutes presence in person at such meeting. ICANN shall make available at the place of any meeting of the Board the telecommunications equipment necessary to permit members of the Board to participate by telephone.

Section 19. ACTION WITHOUT MEETING

Any action required or permitted to be taken by the Board or a Committee of the Board may be taken without a meeting if all of the Directors entitled to vote thereat shall individually or collectively consent in writing to such action. Such written consent shall have the same force and effect as the unanimous vote of such Directors. Such written consent or consents shall be filed with the minutes of the proceedings of the Board.

Section 20. ELECTRONIC MAIL

If permitted under applicable law, communication by electronic mail shall be considered equivalent to any communication otherwise required to be in writing. ICANN shall take such steps as it deems appropriate under the circumstances to assure itself that communications by electronic mail are authentic.

Section 21. RIGHTS OF INSPECTION

Every Director shall have the right at any reasonable time to inspect and copy all books, records and documents of every kind, and to inspect the physical properties of ICANN. ICANN shall establish reasonable procedures to protect against the inappropriate disclosure of confidential information.

Section 22. COMPENSATION

The Directors shall receive no compensation for their services as Directors. The Board may, however, authorize the reimbursement of actual and necessary reasonable expenses incurred by Directors and non-voting liaisons performing their duties as Directors or non-voting liaisons.

Section 23. PRESUMPTION OF ASSENT

A Director present at a Board meeting at which action on any corporate matter is taken shall be presumed to have assented to the action taken unless his or her dissent or abstention is entered in the minutes of the meeting, or unless such Director files a written dissent or abstention to such action with the person acting as the secretary of the meeting before the adjournment thereof, or forwards such dissent or abstention by registered mail to the Secretary of ICANN immediately after the adjournment of the meeting. Such right to dissent or abstain shall not apply to a Director who voted in favor of such action.

ARTICLE VII: NOMINATING COMMITTEE

Section 1. DESCRIPTION

There shall be a Nominating Committee of ICANN, responsible for the selection of all ICANN Directors except the President and

those Directors selected by [ICANN's Supporting Organizations](#), and for such other selections as are set forth in these Bylaws.

Section 2. COMPOSITION

The Nominating Committee shall be composed of the following persons:

1. A non-voting Chair, appointed by the [ICANN Board](#);
2. The immediately previous Nominating Committee Chair, as a non-voting advisor;
3. A non-voting liaison appointed by the [ICANN Root Server System Advisory Committee](#) established by [Article XI of these Bylaws](#);
4. A non-voting liaison appointed by the [ICANN Security and Stability Advisory Committee](#) established by [Article XI of these Bylaws](#);
5. A non-voting liaison appointed by the [Governmental Advisory Committee](#);
6. Subject to the provisions of the Transition Article of these Bylaws, five voting delegates selected by the At-Large Advisory Committee established by [Article XI of these Bylaws](#);
7. Voting delegates to the Nominating Committee shall be selected from the Generic Names Supporting Organization, established by [Article X of these Bylaws](#), as follows:
 - a. One delegate from the Registries Stakeholder Group;
 - b. One delegate from the Registrars Stakeholder Group;
 - c. Two delegates from the Business Constituency, one representing small

business users and one representing large business users;

d. One delegate from the Internet Service Providers Constituency;

e. One delegate from the Intellectual Property Constituency; and

f. One delegate from consumer and civil society groups, selected by the Non-Commercial Users Constituency.

8. One voting delegate each selected by the following entities:

a. The Council of the Country Code Names Supporting Organization established by [Article IX of these Bylaws](#);

b. The Council of the Address Supporting Organization established by [Article VIII of these Bylaws](#);

c. An entity designated by the Board to represent academic and similar organizations;

d. The Internet Engineering Task Force; and

e. The ICANN Technical Liaison Group established by [Article XI-A of these Bylaws](#);

9. A non-voting Associate Chair, who may be appointed by the Chair, at his or her sole discretion, to serve during all or part of the term of the Chair. The Associate Chair may not be a person who is otherwise a member of the same Nominating Committee. The Associate Chair shall assist the Chair in carrying out

the duties of the Chair, but shall not serve, temporarily or otherwise, in the place of the Chair.

Section 3. TERMS

Subject to the provisions of the [Transition Article of these Bylaws](#):

1. Each voting delegate shall serve a one-year term. A delegate may serve at most two successive one-year terms, after which at least two years must elapse before the individual is eligible to serve another term.

2. The regular term of each voting delegate shall begin at the conclusion of an ICANN annual meeting and shall end at the conclusion of the immediately following ICANN annual meeting.

3. Non-voting liaisons shall serve during the term designated by the entity that appoints them. The Chair, the immediately previous Chair serving as an advisor, and any Associate Chair shall serve as such until the conclusion of the next ICANN annual meeting.

4. Vacancies in the positions of delegate, non-voting liaison, or Chair shall be filled by the entity entitled to select the delegate, non-voting liaison, or Chair involved. A vacancy in the position of non-voting advisor (immediately previous Chair) may be filled by the Board from among persons with prior service on the Board or a Nominating Committee. A vacancy in the position of Associate Chair may be filled by the Chair in accordance with the criteria established by Section 2(9) of this Article.

5. The existence of any vacancies shall not affect the obligation of the Nominating Committee to carry out the responsibilities assigned to it in these Bylaws.

Section 4. CRITERIA FOR SELECTION OF NOMINATING COMMITTEE DELEGATES

Delegates to the ICANN Nominating Committee shall be:

1. Accomplished persons of integrity, objectivity, and intelligence, with reputations for sound judgment and open minds, and with experience and competence with collegial large group decision-making;
2. Persons with wide contacts, broad experience in the Internet community, and a commitment to the success of ICANN;
3. Persons whom the selecting body is confident will consult widely and accept input in carrying out their responsibilities;
4. Persons who are neutral and objective, without any fixed personal commitments to particular individuals, organizations, or commercial objectives in carrying out their Nominating Committee responsibilities;
5. Persons with an understanding of ICANN's mission and the potential impact of ICANN's activities on the broader Internet community who are willing to serve as volunteers, without compensation other than the reimbursement of certain expenses; and
6. Persons who are able to work and communicate in written and spoken English.

Section 5. DIVERSITY

In carrying out its responsibilities to select members of the ICANN Board (and selections to any other ICANN bodies as the Nominating Committee is responsible for under these Bylaws), the Nominating Committee shall take into account the continuing membership of the ICANN Board (and such other bodies), and seek to ensure that the persons selected to fill vacancies on the ICANN Board (and each such other body) shall, to the extent feasible and consistent with the other criteria required to be applied by [Section 4 of this Article](#), make selections guided by Core Value 4 in [Article I, Section 2](#) .

Section 6. ADMINISTRATIVE AND OPERATIONAL SUPPORT

ICANN shall provide administrative and operational support necessary for the Nominating Committee to carry out its responsibilities.

Section 7. PROCEDURES

The Nominating Committee shall adopt such operating procedures as it deems necessary, which shall be published on the Website.

Section 8. INELIGIBILITY FOR SELECTION BY NOMINATING COMMITTEE

No person who serves on the Nominating Committee in any capacity shall be eligible for selection by any means to any position on the Board or any other ICANN body having one or more membership positions that the Nominating Committee is responsible for filling, until the conclusion of an ICANN annual meeting that coincides with, or is after, the conclusion of that person's service on the Nominating Committee.

Section 9. INELIGIBILITY FOR SERVICE ON NOMINATING COMMITTEE

No person who is an employee of or paid consultant to ICANN (including the Ombudsman) shall simultaneously serve in any of the Nominating Committee positions described in [Section 2 of this Article](#).

ARTICLE VIII: ADDRESS SUPPORTING ORGANIZATION

Section 1. DESCRIPTION

1. The Address Supporting Organization (ASO) shall advise the Board with respect to policy issues relating to the operation, assignment, and management of Internet addresses.

2. The ASO shall be the entity established by the Memorandum of Understanding entered on 21 October 2004 between ICANN and the Number Resource Organization (NRO), an organization of the existing regional Internet registries (RIRs).

Section 2. ADDRESS COUNCIL

1. The ASO shall have an Address Council, consisting of the members of the NRO Number Council.

2. The Address Council shall select Directors to those seats on the Board designated to be filled by the ASO.

ARTICLE IX: COUNTRY-CODE NAMES SUPPORTING ORGANIZATION

Section 1. DESCRIPTION

There shall be a policy-development body known as the Country-Code Names Supporting Organization (ccNSO), which shall be responsible for:

1. developing and recommending to the Board global policies relating to country-code top-level domains;
2. Nurturing consensus across the ccNSO's community, including the name-related activities of ccTLDs; and
3. Coordinating with other ICANN Supporting Organizations, committees, and constituencies under ICANN.

Policies that apply to ccNSO members by virtue of their membership are only those policies developed according to section 4.10 and 4.11 of this Article. However, the ccNSO may also engage in other activities authorized by its members. Adherence to the results of these activities will be voluntary and such activities may include: seeking to develop voluntary best practices for ccTLD managers, assisting in skills building within

the global community of ccTLD managers, and enhancing operational and technical cooperation among ccTLD managers.

Section 2. ORGANIZATION

The ccNSO shall consist of (i) ccTLD managers that have agreed in writing to be members of the ccNSO (see [Section 4\(2\) of this Article](#)) and (ii) a ccNSO Council responsible for managing the policy-development process of the ccNSO.

Section 3. ccNSO COUNCIL

1. The ccNSO Council shall consist of (a) three ccNSO Council members selected by the ccNSO members within each of [ICANN's Geographic Regions](#) in the manner described in [Section 4\(7\) through \(9\) of this Article](#); (b) three ccNSO Council members selected by the ICANN Nominating Committee; (c) liaisons as described in [paragraph 2 of this Section](#); and (iv) observers as described in [paragraph 3 of this Section](#).

2. There shall also be one liaison to the ccNSO Council from each of the following organizations, to the extent they choose to appoint such a liaison: (a) the Governmental Advisory Committee; (b) the At-Large Advisory Committee; and (c) each of the Regional Organizations described in [Section 5 of this Article](#). These liaisons shall not be members of or entitled to vote on the ccNSO Council, but otherwise shall be entitled to participate on equal footing with members of the ccNSO Council. Appointments of liaisons shall be made by providing written notice to the ICANN Secretary, with a notification copy to the ccNSO Council Chair, and shall be for the term designated by the appointing organization as stated in the written notice. The appointing organization may recall from office or replace its liaison at any time by providing written notice of the recall or replacement to the ICANN Secretary, with a notification copy to the ccNSO Council Chair.

3. The ccNSO Council may agree with the Council of any other ICANN Supporting Organization to exchange observers. Such observers shall not be members of or entitled to vote on the ccNSO Council, but otherwise shall be entitled to participate on equal footing with members of the ccNSO Council. The appointing Council may designate its observer (or revoke or change the designation of its observer) on the ccNSO Council at any time by providing written notice to the ICANN Secretary, with a notification copy to the ccNSO Council Chair.

4. Subject to the provisions of the [Transition Article of these Bylaws](#): (a) the regular term of each ccNSO Council member shall begin at the conclusion of an ICANN annual meeting and shall end at the conclusion of the third ICANN annual meeting thereafter; (b) the regular terms of the three ccNSO Council members selected by the ccNSO members within each ICANN Geographic Region shall be staggered so that one member's term begins in a year divisible by three, a second member's term begins in the first year following a year divisible by three, and the third member's term begins in the second year following a year divisible by three; and (c) the regular terms of the three ccNSO Council members selected by the Nominating Committee shall be staggered in the same manner. Each ccNSO Council member shall hold office during his or her regular term and until a successor has been selected and qualified or until that member resigns or is removed in accordance with these Bylaws.

5. A ccNSO Council member may resign at any time by giving written notice to the ICANN Secretary, with a notification copy to the ccNSO Council Chair.

6. ccNSO Council members may be removed for not attending three consecutive meetings of the ccNSO Council without sufficient cause or for grossly inappropriate behavior, both as determined by at least

a 66% vote of all of the members of the ccNSO Council.

7. A vacancy on the ccNSO Council shall be deemed to exist in the case of the death, resignation, or removal of any ccNSO Council member. Vacancies in the positions of the three members selected by the Nominating Committee shall be filled for the unexpired term involved by the Nominating Committee giving the ICANN Secretary written notice of its selection, with a notification copy to the ccNSO Council Chair. Vacancies in the positions of the ccNSO Council members selected by ccNSO members shall be filled for the unexpired term by the procedure described in [Section 4\(7\) through \(9\) of this Article](#).

8. The role of the ccNSO Council is to administer and coordinate the affairs of the ccNSO (including coordinating meetings, including an annual meeting, of ccNSO members as described in [Section 4\(6\) of this Article](#)) and to manage the development of policy recommendations in accordance with Section 6 of this Article. The ccNSO Council shall also undertake such other roles as the members of the ccNSO shall decide from time to time.

9. The ccNSO Council shall make selections to fill Seats 11 and 12 on the Board by written ballot or by action at a meeting; any such selection must have affirmative votes of a majority of all the members of the ccNSO Council then in office. Notification of the ccNSO Council's selections shall be given by the ccNSO Council Chair in writing to the ICANN Secretary, consistent with Article VI, [Sections 8\(4\) and 12\(1\)](#).

10. The ccNSO Council shall select from among its members the ccNSO Council Chair and such Vice Chair(s) as it deems appropriate. Selections of the ccNSO Council Chair and Vice Chair(s) shall be by written ballot or by action at a meeting; any such

selection must have affirmative votes of a majority of all the members of the ccNSO Council then in office. The term of office of the ccNSO Council Chair and any Vice Chair(s) shall be as specified by the ccNSO Council at or before the time the selection is made. The ccNSO Council Chair or any Vice Chair(s) may be recalled from office by the same procedure as used for selection.

11. The ccNSO Council, subject to direction by the ccNSO members, shall adopt such rules and procedures for the ccNSO as it deems necessary, provided they are consistent with these Bylaws. Rules for ccNSO membership and operating procedures adopted by the ccNSO Council shall be published on the Website.

12. Except as provided by [paragraphs 9 and 10 of this Section](#), the ccNSO Council shall act at meetings. The ccNSO Council shall meet regularly on a schedule it determines, but not fewer than four times each calendar year. At the discretion of the ccNSO Council, meetings may be held in person or by other means, provided that all ccNSO Council members are permitted to participate by at least one means described in [paragraph 14 of this Section](#). Except where determined by a majority vote of the members of the ccNSO Council present that a closed session is appropriate, physical meetings shall be open to attendance by all interested persons. To the extent practicable, ccNSO Council meetings should be held in conjunction with meetings of the Board, or of one or more of ICANN's other Supporting Organizations.

13. Notice of time and place (and information about means of participation other than personal attendance) of all meetings of the ccNSO Council shall be provided to each ccNSO Council member, liaison, and observer by e-mail, telephone, facsimile, or a paper notice delivered personally or by postal mail. In case the notice is sent by postal mail, it shall be sent at least 21

days before the day of the meeting. In case the notice is delivered personally or by telephone, facsimile, or e-mail it shall be provided at least seven days before the day of the meeting. At least seven days in advance of each ccNSO Council meeting (or if not practicable, as far in advance as is practicable), a notice of such meeting and, to the extent known, an agenda for the meeting shall be posted.

14. Members of the ccNSO Council may participate in a meeting of the ccNSO Council through personal attendance or use of electronic communication (such as telephone or video conference), provided that (a) all ccNSO Council members participating in the meeting can speak to and hear one another, (b) all ccNSO Council members participating in the meeting are provided the means of fully participating in all matters before the ccNSO Council, and (c) there is a reasonable means of verifying the identity of ccNSO Council members participating in the meeting and their votes. A majority of the ccNSO Council members (i.e. those entitled to vote) then in office shall constitute a quorum for the transaction of business, and actions by a majority vote of the ccNSO Council members present at any meeting at which there is a quorum shall be actions of the ccNSO Council, unless otherwise provided in these Bylaws. The ccNSO Council shall transmit minutes of its meetings to the ICANN Secretary, who shall cause those minutes to be posted to the Website as soon as practicable following the meeting, and no later than 21 days following the meeting.

Section 4. MEMBERSHIP

1. The ccNSO shall have a membership consisting of ccTLD managers. Any ccTLD manager that meets the membership qualifications stated in [paragraph 2 of this Section](#) shall be entitled to be members of the ccNSO. For purposes of this Article, a ccTLD manager is the organization or entity responsible for managing an ISO

3166 country-code top-level domain and referred to in the IANA database under the current heading of “Sponsoring Organization”, or under any later variant, for that country-code top-level domain.

2. Any ccTLD manager may become a ccNSO member by submitting an application to a person designated by the ccNSO Council to receive applications. Subject to the provisions of the Transition Article of these Bylaws, the application shall be in writing in a form designated by the ccNSO Council. The application shall include the ccTLD manager's recognition of the role of the ccNSO within the ICANN structure as well as the ccTLD manager's agreement, for the duration of its membership in the ccNSO, (a) to adhere to rules of the ccNSO, including membership rules, (b) to abide by policies developed and recommended by the ccNSO and adopted by the Board in the manner described by paragraphs 10 and 11 of this Section, and (c) to pay ccNSO membership fees established by the ccNSO Council under [Section 7\(3\) of this Article](#). A ccNSO member may resign from membership at any time by giving written notice to a person designated by the ccNSO Council to receive notices of resignation. Upon resignation the ccTLD manager ceases to agree to (a) adhere to rules of the ccNSO, including membership rules, (b) to abide by policies developed and recommended by the ccNSO and adopted by the Board in the manner described by paragraphs 10 and 11 of this Section, and (c) to pay ccNSO membership fees established by the ccNSO Council under [Section 7\(3\) of this Article](#). In the absence of designation by the ccNSO Council of a person to receive applications and notices of resignation, they shall be sent to the ICANN Secretary, who shall notify the ccNSO Council of receipt of any such applications and notices.

3. Neither membership in the ccNSO nor membership in any Regional Organization described in [Section 5 of](#)

[this Article](#) shall be a condition for access to or registration in the IANA database. Any individual relationship a ccTLD manager has with ICANN or the ccTLD manager's receipt of IANA services is not in any way contingent upon membership in the ccNSO.

4. The Geographic Regions of ccTLDs shall be as described in [Article VI, Section 5 of these Bylaws](#). For purposes of this Article, managers of ccTLDs within a Geographic Region that are members of the ccNSO are referred to as ccNSO members "within" the Geographic Region, regardless of the physical location of the ccTLD manager. In cases where the Geographic Region of a ccNSO member is unclear, the ccTLD member should self-select according to procedures adopted by the ccNSO Council.

5. Each ccTLD manager may designate in writing a person, organization, or entity to represent the ccTLD manager. In the absence of such a designation, the ccTLD manager shall be represented by the person, organization, or entity listed as the administrative contact in the IANA database.

6. There shall be an annual meeting of ccNSO members, which shall be coordinated by the ccNSO Council. Annual meetings should be open for all to attend, and a reasonable opportunity shall be provided for ccTLD managers that are not members of the ccNSO as well as other non-members of the ccNSO to address the meeting. To the extent practicable, annual meetings of the ccNSO members shall be held in person and should be held in conjunction with meetings of the Board, or of one or more of ICANN's other Supporting Organizations.

7. The ccNSO Council members selected by the ccNSO members from each Geographic Region (see [Section 3\(1\)\(a\) of this Article](#)) shall be selected through nomination, and if necessary election, by the ccNSO members within that Geographic Region. At least 90

days before the end of the regular term of any ccNSO-member-selected member of the ccNSO Council, or upon the occurrence of a vacancy in the seat of such a ccNSO Council member, the ccNSO Council shall establish a nomination and election schedule, which shall be sent to all ccNSO members within the Geographic Region and posted on the Website.

8. Any ccNSO member may nominate an individual to serve as a ccNSO Council member representing the ccNSO member's Geographic Region. Nominations must be seconded by another ccNSO member from the same Geographic Region. By accepting their nomination, individuals nominated to the ccNSO Council agree to support the policies committed to by ccNSO members.

9. If at the close of nominations there are no more candidates nominated (with seconds and acceptances) in a particular Geographic Region than there are seats on the ccNSO Council available for that Geographic Region, then the nominated candidates shall be selected to serve on the ccNSO Council. Otherwise, an election by written ballot (which may be by e-mail) shall be held to select the ccNSO Council members from among those nominated (with seconds and acceptances), with ccNSO members from the Geographic Region being entitled to vote in the election through their designated representatives. In such an election, a majority of all ccNSO members in the Geographic Region entitled to vote shall constitute a quorum, and the selected candidate must receive the votes of a majority of those cast by ccNSO members within the Geographic Region. The ccNSO Council Chair shall provide the ICANN Secretary prompt written notice of the selection of ccNSO Council members under this paragraph.

10. Subject to clause 4(11), ICANN policies shall apply to ccNSO members by virtue of their membership to

the extent, and only to the extent, that the policies (a) only address issues that are within scope of the ccNSO according to Article IX, Section 6 and Annex C; (b) have been developed through the ccPDP as described in [Section 6 of this Article](#), and (c) have been recommended as such by the ccNSO to the Board, and (d) are adopted by the Board as policies, provided that such policies do not conflict with the law applicable to the ccTLD manager which shall, at all times, remain paramount. In addition, such policies shall apply to ICANN in its activities concerning ccTLDs.

11. A ccNSO member shall not be bound if it provides a declaration to the ccNSO Council stating that (a) implementation of the policy would require the member to breach custom, religion, or public policy (not embodied in the applicable law described in [paragraph 10 of this Section](#)), and (b) failure to implement the policy would not impair DNS operations or interoperability, giving detailed reasons supporting its statements. After investigation, the ccNSO Council will provide a response to the ccNSO member's declaration. If there is a ccNSO Council consensus disagreeing with the declaration, which may be demonstrated by a vote of 14 or more members of the ccNSO Council, the response shall state the ccNSO Council's disagreement with the declaration and the reasons for disagreement. Otherwise, the response shall state the ccNSO Council's agreement with the declaration. If the ccNSO Council disagrees, the ccNSO Council shall review the situation after a six-month period. At the end of that period, the ccNSO Council shall make findings as to (a) whether the ccNSO members' implementation of the policy would require the member to breach custom, religion, or public policy (not embodied in the applicable law described in [paragraph 10 of this Section](#)) and (b) whether failure to implement the policy would impair DNS operations or interoperability. In making any

findings disagreeing with the declaration, the ccNSO Council shall proceed by consensus, which may be demonstrated by a vote of 14 or more members of the ccNSO Council.

Section 5. REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

The ccNSO Council may designate a Regional Organization for each ICANN Geographic Region, provided that the Regional Organization is open to full membership by all ccNSO members within the Geographic Region. Decisions to designate or de-designate a Regional Organization shall require a 66% vote of all of the members of the ccNSO Council and shall be subject to review according to procedures established by the Board.

Section 6. ccNSO POLICY-DEVELOPMENT PROCESS AND SCOPE

1. The scope of the ccNSO's policy-development role shall be as stated in [Annex C to these Bylaws](#); any modifications to the scope shall be recommended to the Board by the ccNSO by use of the procedures of the ccPDP, and shall be subject to approval by the Board.

2. In developing global policies within the scope of the ccNSO and recommending them to the Board, the ccNSO shall follow the ccNSO Policy-Development Process (ccPDP). The ccPDP shall be as stated in [Annex B to these Bylaws](#); modifications shall be recommended to the Board by the ccNSO by use of the procedures of the ccPDP, and shall be subject to approval by the Board.

Section 7. STAFF SUPPORT AND FUNDING

1. Upon request of the ccNSO Council, a member of the ICANN staff may be assigned to support the ccNSO and shall be designated as the ccNSO Staff Manager. Alternatively, the ccNSO Council may designate, at ccNSO expense, another person to serve

as ccNSO Staff Manager. The work of the ccNSO Staff Manager on substantive matters shall be assigned by the Chair of the ccNSO Council, and may include the duties of ccPDP Issue Manager.

2. Upon request of the ccNSO Council, ICANN shall provide administrative and operational support necessary for the ccNSO to carry out its responsibilities. Such support shall not include an obligation for ICANN to fund travel expenses incurred by ccNSO participants for travel to any meeting of the ccNSO or for any other purpose. The ccNSO Council may make provision, at ccNSO expense, for administrative and operational support in addition or as an alternative to support provided by ICANN.

3. The ccNSO Council shall establish fees to be paid by ccNSO members to defray ccNSO expenses as described in [paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Section](#), as approved by the ccNSO members.

4. Written notices given to the ICANN Secretary under this Article shall be permanently retained, and shall be made available for review by the ccNSO Council on request. The ICANN Secretary shall also maintain the roll of members of the ccNSO, which shall include the name of each ccTLD manager's designated representative, and which shall be posted on the Website.

ARTICLE X: GENERIC NAMES SUPPORTING ORGANIZATION

Section 1. DESCRIPTION

There shall be a policy-development body known as the Generic Names Supporting Organization (GNSO), which shall be responsible for developing and recommending to the ICANN Board substantive policies relating to generic top-level domains.

Section 2. ORGANIZATION

The GNSO shall consist of:

- (i) A number of Constituencies, where applicable, organized within the Stakeholder Groups as described in [Section 5 of this Article](#);
- (ii) Four Stakeholder Groups organized within Houses as described in [Section 5 of this Article](#);
- (iii) Two Houses within the GNSO Council as described in [Section 3\(8\) of this Article](#); and
- (iv) a GNSO Council responsible for managing the policy development process of the GNSO, as described in [Section 3 of this Article](#).

Except as otherwise defined in these Bylaws, the four Stakeholder Groups and the Constituencies will be responsible for defining their own charters with the approval of their members and of the ICANN Board of Directors.

Section 3. GNSO COUNCIL

1. Subject to the provisions of [Transition Article XX](#), [Section 5 of these Bylaws](#) and as described in [Section 5 of Article X](#), the GNSO Council shall consist of:
 - a. three representatives selected from the Registries Stakeholder Group;
 - b. three representatives selected from the Registrars Stakeholder Group;
 - c. six representatives selected from the Commercial Stakeholder Group;
 - d. six representatives selected from the Non-Commercial Stakeholder Group; and
 - e. three representatives selected by the ICANN Nominating Committee, one of which shall be non-voting, but otherwise

entitled to participate on equal footing with other members of the GNSO Council including, e.g. the making and seconding of motions and of serving as Chair if elected. One Nominating Committee Appointee voting representative shall be assigned to each House (as described in [Section 3\(8\) of this Article](#)) by the Nominating Committee.

No individual representative may hold more than one seat on the GNSO Council at the same time.

Stakeholder Groups should, in their charters, ensure their representation on the GNSO Council is as diverse as possible and practicable, including considerations of geography, GNSO Constituency, sector, ability and gender.

There may also be liaisons to the GNSO Council from other ICANN Supporting Organizations and/or Advisory Committees, from time to time. The appointing organization shall designate, revoke, or change its liaison on the GNSO Council by providing written notice to the Chair of the GNSO Council and to the ICANN Secretary. Liaisons shall not be members of or entitled to vote, to make or second motions, or to serve as an officer on the GNSO Council, but otherwise liaisons shall be entitled to participate on equal footing with members of the GNSO Council.

2. Subject to the provisions of the [Transition Article XX, and Section 5 of these Bylaws](#), the regular term of each GNSO Council member shall begin at the conclusion of an ICANN annual meeting and shall end at the conclusion of the second ICANN annual meeting thereafter. The regular term of two representatives selected from Stakeholder Groups with three Council seats shall begin in even-numbered years and the regular term of the other representative selected from that Stakeholder Group shall begin in odd-numbered

years. The regular term of three representatives selected from Stakeholder Groups with six Council seats shall begin in even-numbered years and the regular term of the other three representatives selected from that Stakeholder Group shall begin in odd-numbered years. The regular term of one of the three members selected by the Nominating Committee shall begin in even-numbered years and the regular term of the other two of the three members selected by the Nominating Committee shall begin in odd-numbered years. Each GNSO Council member shall hold office during his or her regular term and until a successor has been selected and qualified or until that member resigns or is removed in accordance with these Bylaws.

Except in a “special circumstance,” such as, but not limited to, meeting geographic or other diversity requirements defined in the Stakeholder Group charters, where no alternative representative is available to serve, no Council member may be selected to serve more than two consecutive terms, in such a special circumstance a Council member may serve one additional term. For these purposes, a person selected to fill a vacancy in a term shall not be deemed to have served that term. A former Council member who has served two consecutive terms must remain out of office for one full term prior to serving any subsequent term as Council member. A “special circumstance” is defined in the GNSO Operating Procedures.

3. A vacancy on the GNSO Council shall be deemed to exist in the case of the death, resignation, or removal of any member. Vacancies shall be filled for the unexpired term by the appropriate Nominating Committee or Stakeholder Group that selected the member holding the position before the vacancy occurred by giving the GNSO Secretariat written notice of its selection. Procedures for handling Stakeholder

Group-appointed GNSO Council member vacancies, resignations, and removals are prescribed in the applicable Stakeholder Group Charter.

A GNSO Council member selected by the Nominating Committee may be removed for cause: i) stated by a three-fourths (3/4) vote of all members of the applicable House to which the Nominating Committee appointee is assigned; or ii) stated by a three-fourths (3/4) vote of all members of each House in the case of the non-voting Nominating Committee appointee (see [Section 3\(8\) of this Article](#)). Such removal shall be subject to reversal by the ICANN Board on appeal by the affected GNSO Council member.

4. The GNSO Council is responsible for managing the policy development process of the GNSO. It shall adopt such procedures (the “GNSO Operating Procedures”) as it sees fit to carry out that responsibility, provided that such procedures are approved by a majority vote of each House. The GNSO Operating Procedures shall be effective upon the expiration of a twenty-one (21) day public comment period, and shall be subject to Board oversight and review. Until any modifications are recommended by the GNSO Council, the applicable procedures shall be as set forth in [Section 6 of this Article](#).

5. No more than one officer, director or employee of any particular corporation or other organization (including its subsidiaries and affiliates) shall serve on the GNSO Council at any given time.

6. The GNSO shall make selections to fill Seats 13 and 14 on the ICANN Board by written ballot or by action at a meeting. Each of the two voting Houses of the GNSO, as described in [Section 3\(8\) of this Article](#), shall make a selection to fill one of two ICANN Board seats, as outlined below; any such selection must have affirmative votes comprising sixty percent (60%) of all the respective voting House members:

a. the Contracted Party House shall select a representative to fill Seat 13; and

b. the Non-Contracted Party House shall select a representative to fill Seat 14

Election procedures are defined in the GNSO Operating Procedures.

Notification of the Board seat selections shall be given by the GNSO Chair in writing to the ICANN Secretary, consistent with Article VI, Sections [8\(4\)](#) and [12\(1\)](#).

7. The GNSO Council shall select the GNSO Chair for a term the GNSO Council specifies, but not longer than one year. Each House (as described in [Section 3.8 of this Article](#)) shall select a Vice-Chair, who will be a Vice-Chair of the whole of the GNSO Council, for a term the GNSO Council specifies, but not longer than one year. The procedures for selecting the Chair and any other officers are contained in the GNSO Operating Procedures. In the event that the GNSO Council has not elected a GNSO Chair by the end of the previous Chair's term, the Vice-Chairs will serve as Interim GNSO Co-Chairs until a successful election can be held.

8. Except as otherwise required in these Bylaws, for voting purposes, the GNSO Council (see [Section 3\(1\) of this Article](#)) shall be organized into a bicameral House structure as described below:

a. the Contracted Parties House includes the Registries Stakeholder Group (three members), the Registrars Stakeholder Group (three members), and one voting member appointed by the ICANN Nominating Committee for a total of seven voting members; and

b. the Non Contracted Parties House includes the Commercial Stakeholder Group (six members), the Non-Commercial Stakeholder Group (six members), and one voting member appointed by the ICANN Nominating Committee to that House for a total of thirteen voting members.

Except as otherwise specified in these Bylaws, each member of a voting House is entitled to cast one vote in each separate matter before the GNSO Council.

9. Except as otherwise specified in these Bylaws, [Annex A](#) hereto, or the GNSO Operating Procedures, the default threshold to pass a GNSO Council motion or other voting action requires a simple majority vote of each House. The voting thresholds described below shall apply to the following GNSO actions:

a. Create an Issues Report: requires an affirmative vote of more than 25% vote of each House or majority of one House;

b. Initiate a Policy Development Process (“PDP”) Within Scope (as described in [Annex A](#)): requires an affirmative vote of more than 33% of each House or more than 66% of one House;

c. Initiate a PDP Not Within Scope: requires an affirmative vote of more than 75% of one House and a majority of the other House (“GNSO Supermajority”);

d. Approve a PDP Recommendation Without a GNSO Supermajority: requires an affirmative vote of a majority of each House and further requires that one GNSO Council member representative of at least 3 of the 4 Stakeholder Groups supports the Recommendation;

e. Approve a PDP Recommendation With a GNSO Supermajority: requires an affirmative vote of a GNSO Supermajority; and

f. Approve a PDP Recommendation Imposing New Obligations on Certain Contracting Parties: where an ICANN contract provision specifies that “a two-thirds vote of the council” demonstrates the presence of a consensus, the GNSO Supermajority vote threshold will have to be met or exceeded with respect to any contracting party affected by such contract provision.

Section 4. STAFF SUPPORT AND FUNDING

1. A member of the ICANN staff shall be assigned to support the GNSO, whose work on substantive matters shall be assigned by the Chair of the GNSO Council, and shall be designated as the GNSO Staff Manager (Staff Manager).

2. ICANN shall provide administrative and operational support necessary for the GNSO to carry out its responsibilities. Such support shall not include an obligation for ICANN to fund travel expenses incurred by GNSO participants for travel to any meeting of the GNSO or for any other purpose. ICANN may, at its discretion, fund travel expenses for GNSO participants under any travel support procedures or guidelines that it may adopt from time to time.

Section 5. STAKEHOLDER GROUPS

1. The following Stakeholder Groups are hereby recognized as representative of a specific group of one or more Constituencies or interest groups and subject to the provisions of the [Transition Article XX, Section 5 of these Bylaws](#):

- a. Registries Stakeholder Group representing all gTLD registries under contract to ICANN;
- b. Registrars Stakeholder Group representing all registrars accredited by and under contract to ICANN;
- c. Commercial Stakeholder Group representing the full range of large and small commercial entities of the Internet; and
- d. Non-Commercial Stakeholder Group representing the full range of non-commercial entities of the Internet.

2. Each Stakeholder Group is assigned a specific number of Council seats in accordance with [Section 3 \(1\) of this Article](#).

3. Each Stakeholder Group identified in [paragraph 1 of this Section](#) and each of its associated Constituencies, where applicable, shall maintain recognition with the ICANN Board. Recognition is granted by the Board based upon the extent to which, in fact, the entity represents the global interests of the stakeholder communities it purports to represent and operates to the maximum extent feasible in an open and transparent manner consistent with procedures designed to ensure fairness. Stakeholder Group and Constituency Charters may be reviewed periodically as prescribed by the Board.

4. Any group of individuals or entities may petition the Board for recognition as a new or separate Constituency in the Non-Contracted Parties House. Any such petition shall contain:

- a. A detailed explanation of why the addition of such a Constituency will improve

the ability of the GNSO to carry out its policy-development responsibilities;

b. A detailed explanation of why the proposed new Constituency adequately represents, on a global basis, the stakeholders it seeks to represent;

c. A recommendation for organizational placement within a particular Stakeholder Group; and

d. A proposed charter that adheres to the principles and procedures contained in these Bylaws.

Any petition for the recognition of a new Constituency and the associated charter shall be posted for public comment.

5. The Board may create new Constituencies as described in [Section 5\(3\)](#) in response to such a petition, or on its own motion, if the Board determines that such action would serve the purposes of ICANN. In the event the Board is considering acting on its own motion it shall post a detailed explanation of why such action is necessary or desirable, set a reasonable time for public comment, and not make a final decision on whether to create such new Constituency until after reviewing all comments received. Whenever the Board posts a petition or recommendation for a new Constituency for public comment, the Board shall notify the GNSO Council and the appropriate Stakeholder Group affected and shall consider any response to that notification prior to taking action.

Section 6. POLICY DEVELOPMENT PROCESS

The policy-development procedures to be followed by the GNSO shall be as stated in [Annex A](#) to these Bylaws. These procedures

may be supplemented or revised in the manner stated in [Section 3\(4\) of this Article](#).

ARTICLE XI: ADVISORY COMMITTEES

Section 1. GENERAL

The Board may create one or more Advisory Committees in addition to those set forth in this Article. Advisory Committee membership may consist of Directors only, Directors and non-directors, or non-directors only, and may also include non-voting or alternate members. Advisory Committees shall have no legal authority to act for ICANN, but shall report their findings and recommendations to the Board.

Section 2. SPECIFIC ADVISORY COMMITTEES

There shall be at least the following Advisory Committees:

1. Governmental Advisory Committee

a. The Governmental Advisory Committee should consider and provide advice on the activities of ICANN as they relate to concerns of governments, particularly matters where there may be an interaction between ICANN's policies and various laws and international agreements or where they may affect public policy issues.

b. Membership in the Governmental Advisory Committee shall be open to all national governments. Membership shall also be open to Distinct Economies as recognized in international fora, and multinational governmental organizations and treaty organizations, on the invitation of the Governmental Advisory Committee through its Chair.

c. The Governmental Advisory Committee may adopt its own charter and internal operating principles or procedures to guide its operations, to be published on the Website.

d. The chair of the Governmental Advisory Committee shall be elected by the members of the Governmental Advisory Committee pursuant to procedures adopted by such members.

e. Each member of the Governmental Advisory Committee shall appoint one accredited representative to the Committee. The accredited representative of a member must hold a formal official position with the member's public administration. The term "official" includes a holder of an elected governmental office, or a person who is employed by such government, public authority, or multinational governmental or treaty organization and whose primary function with such government, public authority, or organization is to develop or influence governmental or public policies.

f. The Governmental Advisory Committee shall annually appoint one non-voting liaison to the ICANN Board of Directors, without limitation on reappointment, and shall annually appoint one non-voting liaison to the ICANN Nominating Committee.

g. The Governmental Advisory Committee may designate a non-voting liaison to each of the Supporting Organization Councils and Advisory Committees, to the extent the Governmental Advisory Committee deems it appropriate and useful to do so.

h. The Board shall notify the Chair of the Governmental Advisory Committee in a timely manner of any proposal raising public policy issues on which it or any of ICANN's supporting organizations or advisory committees seeks public comment, and shall take duly into account any timely response to that notification prior to taking action.

i. The Governmental Advisory Committee may put issues to the Board directly, either by way of comment or prior advice, or by way of specifically recommending action or new policy development or revision to existing policies.

j. The advice of the Governmental Advisory Committee on public policy matters shall be duly taken into account, both in the formulation and adoption of policies. In the event that the ICANN Board determines to take an action that is not consistent with the Governmental Advisory Committee advice, it shall so inform the Committee and state the reasons why it decided not to follow that advice. The Governmental Advisory Committee and the ICANN Board will then try, in good faith and in a timely and efficient manner, to find a mutually acceptable solution.

k. If no such solution can be found, the ICANN Board will state in its final decision the reasons why the Governmental Advisory Committee advice was not followed, and such statement will be without prejudice to the rights or obligations of Governmental Advisory Committee members with regard to public policy issues falling within their responsibilities.

2. Security and Stability Advisory Committee

a. The role of the Security and Stability Advisory Committee (“SAC”) is to advise the ICANN community and Board on matters relating to the security and integrity of the Internet's naming and address allocation systems. It shall have the following responsibilities:

1. To develop a security framework for Internet naming and address allocation services that defines the key focus areas, and identifies where the responsibilities for each area lie. The committee shall focus on the operational considerations of critical naming infrastructure.
2. To communicate on security matters with the Internet technical community and the operators and managers of critical DNS infrastructure services, to include the root name server operator community, the top-level domain registries and registrars, the operators of the reverse delegation trees such as in-addr.arpa and ip6.arpa, and others as events and developments dictate. The Committee shall gather and articulate requirements to offer to those engaged in technical revision of the protocols related to DNS and address allocation and those engaged in operations planning.

3. To engage in ongoing threat assessment and risk analysis of the Internet naming and address allocation services to assess where the principal threats to stability and security lie, and to advise the ICANN community accordingly. The Committee shall recommend any necessary audit activity to assess the current status of DNS and address allocation security in relation to identified risks and threats.

4. To communicate with those who have direct responsibility for Internet naming and address allocation security matters (IETF, RSSAC, RIRs, name registries, etc.), to ensure that its advice on security risks, issues, and priorities is properly synchronized with existing standardization, deployment, operational, and coordination activities. The Committee shall monitor these activities and inform the ICANN community and Board on their progress, as appropriate.

5. To report periodically to the Board on its activities.

6. To make policy recommendations to the ICANN community and Board.

b. The SAC's chair and members shall be appointed by the Board.

c. The SAC shall annually appoint a non-voting liaison to the ICANN Board according to [Section 9 of Article VI](#).

3. Root Server System Advisory Committee

a. The role of the Root Server System Advisory Committee (“RSSAC”) shall be to advise the Board about the operation of the root name servers of the domain name system. The RSSAC shall consider and provide advice on the operational requirements of root name servers, including host hardware capacities, operating systems and name server software versions, network connectivity and physical environment. The RSSAC shall examine and advise on the security aspects of the root name server system. Further, the RSSAC shall review the number, location, and distribution of root name servers considering the total system performance, robustness, and reliability.

b. Membership in the RSSAC shall consist of (i) each operator of an authoritative root name server (as listed at <ftp://ftp.internic.net/domain/named.root>), and (ii) such other persons as are appointed by the ICANN Board.

c. The initial chairman of the DNS Root Server System Advisory Committee shall be appointed by the Board; subsequent chairs shall be elected by the members of the DNS Root Server System Advisory Committee pursuant to procedures adopted by the members.

d. The Root Server System Advisory Committee shall annually appoint one non-

voting liaison to the ICANN Board of Directors, without limitation on re-appointment, and shall annually appoint one non-voting liaison to the ICANN Nominating Committee.

4. At-Large Advisory Committee

a. The role of the At-Large Advisory Committee (“ALAC”) shall be to consider and provide advice on the activities of ICANN, insofar as they relate to the interests of individual Internet users.

b. The ALAC shall consist of (i) two members selected by each of the Regional At-Large Organizations (“RALOs”) established according to paragraph [4\(g\) of this Section](#), and (ii) five members selected by the Nominating Committee. The five members selected by the Nominating Committee shall include one citizen of a country within each of the five Geographic Regions established according to [Section 5 of Article VI](#).

c. Subject to the provisions of the [Transition Article of these Bylaws](#), the regular terms of members of the ALAC shall be as follows:

1. The term of one member selected by each RALO shall begin at the conclusion of an ICANN annual meeting in an even-numbered year.

2. The term of the other member selected by each RALO shall begin at the conclusion of an ICANN annual meeting in an odd-numbered year.

3. The terms of three of the members selected by the Nominating Committee shall begin at the conclusion of an annual meeting in an odd-numbered year and the terms of the other two members selected by the Nominating Committee shall begin at the conclusion of an annual meeting in an even-numbered year.

4. The regular term of each member shall end at the conclusion of the second ICANN annual meeting after the term began.

d. The Chair of the ALAC shall be elected by the members of the ALAC pursuant to procedures adopted by the Committee.

e. The ALAC shall annually appoint one non-voting liaison to the ICANN Board of Directors, without limitation on re-appointment, and shall, after consultation with each RALO, annually appoint five voting delegates (no two of whom shall be citizens of countries in the same Geographic Region, as defined according to [Section 5 of Article VI](#)) to the Nominating Committee.

f. Subject to the provisions of the [Transition Article of these Bylaws](#), the At-Large Advisory Committee may designate non-voting liaisons to each of the ccNSO Council and the GNSO Council.

g. There shall be one RALO for each Geographic Region established according

to [Section 5 of Article VI](#). Each RALO shall serve as the main forum and coordination point for public input to ICANN in its Geographic Region and shall be a non-profit organization certified by ICANN according to criteria and standards established by the Board based on recommendations of the At-Large Advisory Committee. An organization shall become the recognized RALO for its Geographic Region upon entering a Memorandum of Understanding with ICANN addressing the respective roles and responsibilities of ICANN and the RALO regarding the process for selecting ALAC members and requirements of openness, participatory opportunities, transparency, accountability, and diversity in the RALO's structure and procedures, as well as criteria and standards for the RALO's constituent At-Large Structures.

h. Each RALO shall be comprised of self-supporting At-Large Structures within its Geographic Region that have been certified to meet the requirements of the RALO's Memorandum of Understanding with ICANN according to [paragraph 4\(i\) of this Section](#). If so provided by its Memorandum of Understanding with ICANN, a RALO may also include individual Internet users who are citizens or residents of countries within the RALO's Geographic Region.

i. Membership in the At-Large Community

1. The criteria and standards for the certification of At-Large Structures within each Geographic Region shall be established by the Board based on recommendations from the ALAC

and shall be stated in the Memorandum of Understanding between ICANN and the RALO for each Geographic Region.

2. The criteria and standards for the certification of At-Large Structures shall be established in such a way that participation by individual Internet users who are citizens or residents of countries within the Geographic Region (as defined in [Section 5 of Article VI](#)) of the RALO will predominate in the operation of each At-Large Structure within the RALO, while not necessarily excluding additional participation, compatible with the interests of the individual Internet users within the region, by others.
3. Each RALO's Memorandum of Understanding shall also include provisions designed to allow, to the greatest extent possible, every individual Internet user who is a citizen of a country within the RALO's Geographic Region to participate in at least one of the RALO's At-Large Structures.
4. To the extent compatible with these objectives, the criteria and standards should also afford to each RALO the type of structure that best fits the customs and character of its Geographic Region.
5. Once the criteria and standards have been established as provided in this Clause i, the ALAC, with the advice and participation of the

RALO where the applicant is based, shall be responsible for certifying organizations as meeting the criteria and standards for At-Large Structure accreditation.

6. Decisions to certify or decertify an At-Large Structure shall be made as decided by the ALAC in its Rules of Procedure, save always that any changes made to the Rules of Procedure in respect of ALS applications shall be subject to review by the RALOs and by the ICANN Board.
7. Decisions as to whether to accredit, not to accredit, or disaccredit an At-Large Structure shall be subject to review according to procedures established by the Board.
8. On an ongoing basis, the ALAC may also give advice as to whether a prospective At-Large Structure meets the applicable criteria and standards.

j. The ALAC is also responsible, working in conjunction with the RALOs, for coordinating the following activities:

1. Keeping the community of individual Internet users informed about the significant news from ICANN;
2. Distributing (through posting or otherwise) an updated agenda, news about ICANN, and information about items in

the ICANN policy-development process;

3. Promoting outreach activities in the community of individual Internet users;

4. Developing and maintaining on-going information and education programs, regarding ICANN and its work;

5. Establishing an outreach strategy about ICANN issues in each RALO's Region;

6. Making public, and analyzing, ICANN's proposed policies and its decisions and their (potential) regional impact and (potential) effect on individuals in the region;

7. Offering Internet-based mechanisms that enable discussions among members of At-Large structures; and

8. Establishing mechanisms and processes that enable two-way communication between members of At-Large Structures and those involved in ICANN decision-making, so interested individuals can share their views on pending ICANN issues.

Section 3. PROCEDURES

Each Advisory Committee shall determine its own rules of procedure and quorum requirements.

Section 4. TERM OF OFFICE

The chair and each member of a committee shall serve until his or her successor is appointed, or until such committee is sooner terminated, or until he or she is removed, resigns, or otherwise ceases to qualify as a member of the committee.

Section 5. VACANCIES

Vacancies on any committee shall be filled in the same manner as provided in the case of original appointments.

Section 6. COMPENSATION

Committee members shall receive no compensation for their services as a member of a committee. The Board may, however, authorize the reimbursement of actual and necessary expenses incurred by committee members, including Directors, performing their duties as committee members.

ARTICLE XI-A: OTHER ADVISORY MECHANISMS

Section 1. EXTERNAL EXPERT ADVICE

1. Purpose. The purpose of seeking external expert advice is to allow the policy-development process within ICANN to take advantage of existing expertise that resides in the public or private sector but outside of ICANN. In those cases where there are relevant public bodies with expertise, or where access to private expertise could be helpful, the Board and constituent bodies should be encouraged to seek advice from such expert bodies or individuals.

2. Types of Expert Advisory Panels.

a. On its own initiative or at the suggestion of any ICANN body, the Board may appoint, or authorize the President to appoint, Expert Advisory Panels consisting of public or private sector individuals or

entities. If the advice sought from such Panels concerns issues of public policy, the provisions of [Section 1\(3\)\(b\) of this Article](#) shall apply.

b. In addition, in accordance with [Section 1 \(3\) of this Article](#), the Board may refer issues of public policy pertinent to matters within ICANN's mission to a multinational governmental or treaty organization.

3. Process for Seeking Advice-Public Policy Matters.

a. The Governmental Advisory Committee may at any time recommend that the Board seek advice concerning one or more issues of public policy from an external source, as set out above.

b. In the event that the Board determines, upon such a recommendation or otherwise, that external advice should be sought concerning one or more issues of public policy, the Board shall, as appropriate, consult with the Governmental Advisory Committee regarding the appropriate source from which to seek the advice and the arrangements, including definition of scope and process, for requesting and obtaining that advice.

c. The Board shall, as appropriate, transmit any request for advice from a multinational governmental or treaty organization, including specific terms of reference, to the Governmental Advisory Committee, with the suggestion that the request be transmitted by the Governmental Advisory Committee to the multinational governmental or treaty organization.

4. Process for Seeking and Advice-Other Matters. Any reference of issues not concerning public policy to an Expert Advisory Panel by the Board or President in accordance with [Section 1\(2\)\(a\) of this Article](#) shall be made pursuant to terms of reference describing the issues on which input and advice is sought and the procedures and schedule to be followed.

5. Receipt of Expert Advice and its Effect. External advice pursuant to this Section shall be provided in written form. Such advice is advisory and not binding, and is intended to augment the information available to the Board or other ICANN body in carrying out its responsibilities.

6. Opportunity to Comment. The Governmental Advisory Committee, in addition to the Supporting Organizations and other Advisory Committees, shall have an opportunity to comment upon any external advice received prior to any decision by the Board.

Section 2. TECHNICAL LIAISON GROUP

1. Purpose. The quality of ICANN's work depends on access to complete and authoritative information concerning the technical standards that underlie ICANN's activities. ICANN's relationship to the organizations that produce these standards is therefore particularly important. The Technical Liaison Group (TLG) shall connect the Board with appropriate sources of technical advice on specific matters pertinent to ICANN's activities.

2. TLG Organizations. The TLG shall consist of four organizations: the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI), the International Telecommunications Union's Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T), the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C), and the Internet Architecture Board (IAB).

3. Role. The role of the TLG organizations shall be to channel technical information and guidance to the Board and to other ICANN entities. This role has both a responsive component and an active “watchdog” component, which involve the following responsibilities:

a. In response to a request for information, to connect the Board or other ICANN body with appropriate sources of technical expertise. This component of the TLG role covers circumstances in which ICANN seeks an authoritative answer to a specific technical question. Where information is requested regarding a particular technical standard for which a TLG organization is responsible, that request shall be directed to that TLG organization.

b. As an ongoing “watchdog” activity, to advise the Board of the relevance and progress of technical developments in the areas covered by each organization's scope that could affect Board decisions or other ICANN actions, and to draw attention to global technical standards issues that affect policy development within the scope of ICANN's mission. This component of the TLG role covers circumstances in which ICANN is unaware of a new development, and would therefore otherwise not realize that a question should be asked.

4. TLG Procedures. The TLG shall not have officers or hold meetings, nor shall it provide policy advice to the Board as a committee (although TLG organizations may individually be asked by the Board to do so as the need arises in areas relevant to their individual charters). Neither shall the TLG debate or otherwise coordinate technical issues across the TLG organizations; establish or attempt to establish unified

positions; or create or attempt to create additional layers or structures within the TLG for the development of technical standards or for any other purpose.

5. Technical Work of the IANA. The TLG shall have no involvement with the IANA's work for the Internet Engineering Task Force, Internet Research Task Force, or the Internet Architecture Board, as described in the Memorandum of Understanding Concerning the Technical Work of the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority ratified by the Board on 10 March 2000.

6. Individual Technical Experts. Each TLG organization shall designate two individual technical experts who are familiar with the technical standards issues that are relevant to ICANN's activities. These 8 experts shall be available as necessary to determine, through an exchange of e-mail messages, where to direct a technical question from ICANN when ICANN does not ask a specific TLG organization directly.

7. Board Liaison and Nominating Committee Delegate. Annually, in rotation, one TLG organization shall appoint one non-voting liaison to the Board according to [Article VI, Section 9\(1\)\(d\)](#). Annually, in rotation, one TLG organization shall select one voting delegate to the ICANN Nominating Committee according to [Article VII, Section 2\(8\)\(j\)](#). The rotation order for the appointment of the non-voting liaison to the Board shall be ETSI, ITU-T, and W3C. The rotation order for the selection of the Nominating Committee delegate shall be W3C, ETSI, and ITU-T. (IAB does not participate in these rotations because the IETF otherwise appoints a non-voting liaison to the Board and selects a delegate to the ICANN Nominating Committee.)

ARTICLE XII: BOARD AND TEMPORARY COMMITTEES

Section 1. BOARD COMMITTEES

The Board may establish one or more committees of the Board, which shall continue to exist until otherwise determined by the Board. Only Directors may be appointed to a Committee of the Board. If a person appointed to a Committee of the Board ceases to be a Director, such person shall also cease to be a member of any Committee of the Board. Each Committee of the Board shall consist of two or more Directors. The Board may designate one or more Directors as alternate members of any such committee, who may replace any absent member at any meeting of the committee. Committee members may be removed from a committee at any time by a two-thirds (2/3) majority vote of all members of the Board; provided, however, that any Director or Directors which are the subject of the removal action shall not be entitled to vote on such an action or be counted as a member of the Board when calculating the required two-thirds (2/3) vote; and, provided further, however, that in no event shall a Director be removed from a committee unless such removal is approved by not less than a majority of all members of the Board.

Section 2. POWERS OF BOARD COMMITTEES

1. The Board may delegate to Committees of the Board all legal authority of the Board except with respect to:
 - a. The filling of vacancies on the Board or on any committee;
 - b. The amendment or repeal of Bylaws or the Articles of Incorporation or the adoption of new Bylaws or Articles of Incorporation;
 - c. The amendment or repeal of any resolution of the Board which by its express terms is not so amendable or repealable;
 - d. The appointment of committees of the Board or the members thereof;

e. The approval of any self-dealing transaction, as such transactions are defined in Section 5233(a) of the CNPBCL;

f. The approval of the annual budget required by [Article XVI](#); or

g. The compensation of any officer described in [Article XIII](#).

2. The Board shall have the power to prescribe the manner in which proceedings of any Committee of the Board shall be conducted. In the absence of any such prescription, such committee shall have the power to prescribe the manner in which its proceedings shall be conducted. Unless these Bylaws, the Board or such committee shall otherwise provide, the regular and special meetings shall be governed by the provisions of [Article VI](#) applicable to meetings and actions of the Board. Each committee shall keep regular minutes of its proceedings and shall report the same to the Board from time to time, as the Board may require.

Section 3. TEMPORARY COMMITTEES

The Board may establish such temporary committees as it sees fit, with membership, duties, and responsibilities as set forth in the resolutions or charters adopted by the Board in establishing such committees.

ARTICLE XIII: OFFICERS

Section 1. OFFICERS

The officers of ICANN shall be a President (who shall serve as Chief Executive Officer), a Secretary, and a Chief Financial Officer. ICANN may also have, at the discretion of the Board, any additional officers that it deems appropriate. Any person, other than the President, may hold more than one office, except that no member of the Board (other than the President) shall simultaneously serve as an officer of ICANN.

Section 2. ELECTION OF OFFICERS

The officers of ICANN shall be elected annually by the Board, pursuant to the recommendation of the President or, in the case of the President, of the Chairman of the ICANN Board. Each such officer shall hold his or her office until he or she resigns, is removed, is otherwise disqualified to serve, or his or her successor is elected.

Section 3. REMOVAL OF OFFICERS

Any Officer may be removed, either with or without cause, by a two-thirds (2/3) majority vote of all the members of the Board. Should any vacancy occur in any office as a result of death, resignation, removal, disqualification, or any other cause, the Board may delegate the powers and duties of such office to any Officer or to any Director until such time as a successor for the office has been elected.

Section 4. PRESIDENT

The President shall be the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of ICANN in charge of all of its activities and business. All other officers and staff shall report to the President or his or her delegate, unless stated otherwise in these Bylaws. The President shall serve as an ex officio member of the Board, and shall have all the same rights and privileges of any Board member. The President shall be empowered to call special meetings of the Board as set forth herein, and shall discharge all other duties as may be required by these Bylaws and from time to time may be assigned by the Board.

Section 5. SECRETARY

The Secretary shall keep or cause to be kept the minutes of the Board in one or more books provided for that purpose, shall see that all notices are duly given in accordance with the provisions of these Bylaws or as required by law, and in general shall perform all duties as from time to time may be prescribed by the President or the Board.

Section 6. CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER

The Chief Financial Officer (“CFO”) shall be the chief financial officer of ICANN. If required by the Board, the CFO shall give a bond for the faithful discharge of his or her duties in such form and with such surety or sureties as the Board shall determine. The CFO shall have charge and custody of all the funds of ICANN and shall keep or cause to be kept, in books belonging to ICANN, full and accurate amounts of all receipts and disbursements, and shall deposit all money and other valuable effects in the name of ICANN in such depositories as may be designated for that purpose by the Board. The CFO shall disburse the funds of ICANN as may be ordered by the Board or the President and, whenever requested by them, shall deliver to the Board and the President an account of all his or her transactions as CFO and of the financial condition of ICANN. The CFO shall be responsible for ICANN's financial planning and forecasting and shall assist the President in the preparation of ICANN's annual budget. The CFO shall coordinate and oversee ICANN's funding, including any audits or other reviews of ICANN or its Supporting Organizations. The CFO shall be responsible for all other matters relating to the financial operation of ICANN.

Section 7. ADDITIONAL OFFICERS

In addition to the officers described above, any additional or assistant officers who are elected or appointed by the Board shall perform such duties as may be assigned to them by the President or the Board.

Section 8. COMPENSATION AND EXPENSES

The compensation of any Officer of ICANN shall be approved by the Board. Expenses incurred in connection with performance of their officer duties may be reimbursed to Officers upon approval of the President (in the case of Officers other than the President), by another Officer designated by the Board (in the case of the President), or the Board.

Section 9. CONFLICTS OF INTEREST

The Board, through the Board Governance Committee, shall establish a policy requiring a statement from each Officer not less frequently than once a year setting forth all business and other affiliations that relate in any way to the business and other affiliations of ICANN.

ARTICLE XIV: INDEMNIFICATION OF DIRECTORS, OFFICERS, EMPLOYEES, AND OTHER AGENTS

ICANN shall, to maximum extent permitted by the CNPBC, indemnify each of its agents against expenses, judgments, fines, settlements, and other amounts actually and reasonably incurred in connection with any proceeding arising by reason of the fact that any such person is or was an agent of ICANN, provided that the indemnified person's acts were done in good faith and in a manner that the indemnified person reasonably believed to be in ICANN's best interests and not criminal. For purposes of this Article, an "agent" of ICANN includes any person who is or was a Director, Officer, employee, or any other agent of ICANN (including a member of any Supporting Organization, any Advisory Committee, the Nominating Committee, any other ICANN committee, or the Technical Liaison Group) acting within the scope of his or her responsibility; or is or was serving at the request of ICANN as a Director, Officer, employee, or agent of another corporation, partnership, joint venture, trust, or other enterprise. The Board may adopt a resolution authorizing the purchase and maintenance of insurance on behalf of any agent of ICANN against any liability asserted against or incurred by the agent in such capacity or arising out of the agent's status as such, whether or not ICANN would have the power to indemnify the agent against that liability under the provisions of this Article.

ARTICLE XV: GENERAL PROVISIONS

Section 1. CONTRACTS

The Board may authorize any Officer or Officers, agent or agents, to enter into any contract or execute or deliver any instrument in the name of and on behalf of ICANN, and such authority may be general or confined to specific instances. In the absence of a contrary Board authorization, contracts and instruments may only

be executed by the following Officers: President, any Vice President, or the CFO. Unless authorized or ratified by the Board, no other Officer, agent, or employee shall have any power or authority to bind ICANN or to render it liable for any debts or obligations.

Section 2. DEPOSITS

All funds of ICANN not otherwise employed shall be deposited from time to time to the credit of ICANN in such banks, trust companies, or other depositories as the Board, or the President under its delegation, may select.

Section 3. CHECKS

All checks, drafts, or other orders for the payment of money, notes, or other evidences of indebtedness issued in the name of ICANN shall be signed by such Officer or Officers, agent or agents, of ICANN and in such a manner as shall from time to time be determined by resolution of the Board.

Section 4. LOANS

No loans shall be made by or to ICANN and no evidences of indebtedness shall be issued in its name unless authorized by a resolution of the Board. Such authority may be general or confined to specific instances; provided, however, that no loans shall be made by ICANN to its Directors or Officers.

ARTICLE XVI: FISCAL MATTERS

Section 1. ACCOUNTING

The fiscal year end of ICANN shall be determined by the Board.

Section 2. AUDIT

At the end of the fiscal year, the books of ICANN shall be closed and audited by certified public accountants. The appointment of the fiscal auditors shall be the responsibility of the Board.

Section 3. ANNUAL REPORT AND ANNUAL STATEMENT

The Board shall publish, at least annually, a report describing its activities, including an audited financial statement and a description of any payments made by ICANN to Directors (including reimbursements of expenses). ICANN shall cause the annual report and the annual statement of certain transactions as required by the CNPBCL to be prepared and sent to each member of the Board and to such other persons as the Board may designate, no later than one hundred twenty (120) days after the close of ICANN's fiscal year.

Section 4. ANNUAL BUDGET

At least forty-five (45) days prior to the commencement of each fiscal year, the President shall prepare and submit to the Board, a proposed annual budget of ICANN for the next fiscal year, which shall be posted on the Website. The proposed budget shall identify anticipated revenue sources and levels and shall, to the extent practical, identify anticipated material expense items by line item. The Board shall adopt an annual budget and shall publish the adopted Budget on the Website.

Section 5. FEES AND CHARGES

The Board may set fees and charges for the services and benefits provided by ICANN, with the goal of fully recovering the reasonable costs of the operation of ICANN and establishing reasonable reserves for future expenses and contingencies reasonably related to the legitimate activities of ICANN. Such fees and charges shall be fair and equitable, shall be published for public comment prior to adoption, and once adopted shall be published on the Website in a sufficiently detailed manner so as to be readily accessible.

ARTICLE XVII: MEMBERS

ICANN shall not have members, as defined in the California Nonprofit Public Benefit Corporation Law (“CNPBCL”), notwithstanding the use of the term “Member” in these Bylaws, in any ICANN document, or in any action of the ICANN Board or staff.

ARTICLE XVIII: OFFICES AND SEAL

Section 1. OFFICES

The principal office for the transaction of the business of ICANN shall be in the County of Los Angeles, State of California, United States of America. ICANN may also have an additional office or offices within or outside the United States of America as it may from time to time establish.

Section 2. SEAL

The Board may adopt a corporate seal and use the same by causing it or a facsimile thereof to be impressed or affixed or reproduced or otherwise.

ARTICLE XIX: AMENDMENTS

Except as otherwise provided in the Articles of Incorporation or these Bylaws, the Articles of Incorporation or Bylaws of ICANN may be altered, amended, or repealed and new Articles of Incorporation or Bylaws adopted only upon action by a two-thirds (2/3) vote of all members of the Board.

ARTICLE XX: TRANSITION ARTICLE

Section 1. PURPOSE

This Transition Article sets forth the provisions for the transition from the processes and structures defined by the ICANN Bylaws, as amended and restated on 29 October 1999 and amended through 12 February 2002 (the “[Old Bylaws](#)”), to the processes and structures defined by the Bylaws of which this Article is a part (the “[New Bylaws](#)”). [Explanatory Note (dated 10 December 2009): For Section 5(3) of this Article, reference to the Old Bylaws refers to the Bylaws as amended and restated through to 20 March 2009.]

Section 2. BOARD OF DIRECTORS

1. For the period beginning on the adoption of this Transition Article and ending on the Effective Date and Time of the New Board, as defined in [paragraph 5 of this Section 2](#), the Board of Directors of the Corporation (“Transition Board”) shall consist of the members of the Board who would have been Directors under the Old Bylaws immediately after the conclusion of the annual meeting in 2002, except that those At-Large members of the Board under the Old Bylaws who elect to do so by notifying the Secretary of the Board on 15 December 2002 or in writing or by e-mail no later than 23 December 2002 shall also serve as members of the Transition Board. Notwithstanding the provisions of [Article VI, Section 12 of the New Bylaws](#), vacancies on the Transition Board shall not be filled. The Transition Board shall not have liaisons as provided by [Article VI, Section 9 of the New Bylaws](#). The Board Committees existing on the date of adoption of this Transition Article shall continue in existence, subject to any change in Board Committees or their membership that the Transition Board may adopt by resolution.

2. The Transition Board shall elect a Chair and Vice-Chair to serve until the Effective Date and Time of the New Board.

3. The “New Board” is that Board described in [Article VI, Section 2\(1\) of the New Bylaws](#).

4. Promptly after the adoption of this Transition Article, a Nominating Committee shall be formed including, to the extent feasible, the delegates and liaisons described in [Article VII, Section 2 of the New Bylaws](#), with terms to end at the conclusion of the ICANN annual meeting in 2003. The Nominating Committee shall proceed without delay to select Directors to fill Seats 1 through 8 on the New Board, with terms to conclude upon the commencement of the first regular terms specified for those Seats in [Article VI, Section 8](#)

(1)(a)-(c) of the [New Bylaws](#), and shall give the [ICANN Secretary](#) written notice of that selection.

5. The Effective Date and Time of the New Board shall be a time, as designated by the Transition Board, during the first regular meeting of [ICANN](#) in 2003 that begins not less than seven calendar days after the [ICANN Secretary](#) has received written notice of the selection of Directors to fill at least ten of Seats 1 through 14 on the New Board. As of the Effective Date and Time of the New Board, it shall assume from the Transition Board all the rights, duties, and obligations of the [ICANN Board of Directors](#). Subject to Section 4 of this Article, the Directors ([Article VI, Section 2\(1\)\(a\)-\(d\)](#)) and non-voting liaisons ([Article VI, Section 9](#)) as to which the [ICANN Secretary](#) has received notice of selection shall, along with the President ([Article VI, Section 2\(1\)\(e\)](#)), be seated upon the Effective Date and Time of the New Board, and thereafter any additional Directors and non-voting liaisons shall be seated upon the [ICANN Secretary's](#) receipt of notice of their selection.

6. The New Board shall elect a Chairman and Vice-Chairman as its first order of business. The terms of those Board offices shall expire at the end of the annual meeting in 2003.

7. Committees of the Board in existence as of the Effective Date and Time of the New Board shall continue in existence according to their existing charters, but the terms of all members of those committees shall conclude at the Effective Date and Time of the New Board. Temporary committees in existence as of the Effective Date and Time of the New Board shall continue in existence with their existing charters and membership, subject to any change the New Board may adopt by resolution.

8. In applying the term-limitation provision of [Section 8 \(5\) of Article VI](#), a Director's service on the Board

before the Effective Date and Time of the New Board shall count as one term.

Section 3. ADDRESS SUPPORTING ORGANIZATION

The Address Supporting Organization shall continue in operation according to the provisions of the [Memorandum of Understanding originally entered on 18 October 1999](#) between ICANN and a group of regional Internet registries (RIRs), and [amended in October 2000](#), until a replacement Memorandum of Understanding becomes effective. Promptly after the adoption of this Transition Article, the Address Supporting Organization shall make selections, and give the ICANN Secretary written notice of those selections, of:

1. Directors to fill Seats 9 and 10 on the New Board, with terms to conclude upon the commencement of the first regular terms specified for each of those Seats in [Article VI, Section 8\(1\)\(d\) and \(e\) of the New Bylaws](#); and
2. the delegate to the Nominating Committee selected by the Council of the Address Supporting Organization, as called for in [Article VII, Section 2\(8\)\(f\) of the New Bylaws](#).

With respect to the ICANN Directors that it is entitled to select, and taking into account the need for rapid selection to ensure that the New Board becomes effective as soon as possible, the Address Supporting Organization may select those Directors from among the persons it previously selected as ICANN Directors pursuant to the Old Bylaws. To the extent the Address Supporting Organization does not provide the ICANN Secretary written notice, on or before 31 March 2003, of its selections for Seat 9 and Seat 10, the Address Supporting Organization shall be deemed to have selected for Seat 9 the person it selected as an ICANN Director pursuant to the Old Bylaws for a term beginning in 2001 and for Seat 10 the person it selected as an ICANN Director pursuant to the Old Bylaws for a term beginning in 2002.

Section 4. COUNTRY-CODE NAMES SUPPORTING ORGANIZATION

1. Upon the enrollment of thirty ccTLD managers (with at least four within each Geographic Region) as members of the ccNSO, written notice shall be posted on the Website. As soon as feasible after that notice, the members of the initial ccNSO Council to be selected by the ccNSO members shall be selected according to the procedures stated in [Article IX, Section 4\(8\) and \(9\)](#). Upon the completion of that selection process, a written notice that the ccNSO Council has been constituted shall be posted on the Website. Three ccNSO Council members shall be selected by the ccNSO members within each Geographic Region, with one member to serve a term that ends upon the conclusion of the first ICANN annual meeting after the ccNSO Council is constituted, a second member to serve a term that ends upon the conclusion of the second ICANN annual meeting after the ccNSO Council is constituted, and the third member to serve a term that ends upon the conclusion of the third ICANN annual meeting after the ccNSO Council is constituted. (The definition of “ccTLD manager” stated in [Article IX, Section 4\(1\)](#) and the definitions stated in [Article IX, Section 4\(4\)](#) shall apply within this Section 4 of Article XX.)

2. After the adoption of [Article IX of these Bylaws](#), the Nominating Committee shall select the three members of the ccNSO Council described in [Article IX, Section 3 \(1\)\(b\)](#). In selecting three individuals to serve on the ccNSO Council, the Nominating Committee shall designate one to serve a term that ends upon the conclusion of the first ICANN annual meeting after the ccNSO Council is constituted, a second member to serve a term that ends upon the conclusion of the second ICANN annual meeting after the ccNSO Council is constituted, and the third member to serve a term that ends upon the conclusion of the third ICANN

annual meeting after the ccNSO Council is constituted. The three members of the ccNSO Council selected by the Nominating Committee shall not take their seats before the ccNSO Council is constituted.

3. Upon the ccNSO Council being constituted, the At-Large Advisory Committee and the Governmental Advisory Committee may designate one liaison each to the ccNSO Council, as provided by [Article IX, Section 3\(2\)\(a\) and \(b\)](#).

4. Upon the ccNSO Council being constituted, the Council may designate Regional Organizations as provided in [Article IX, Section 5](#). Upon its designation, a Regional Organization may appoint a liaison to the ccNSO Council.

5. Until the ccNSO Council is constituted, Seats 11 and 12 on the New Board shall remain vacant. Promptly after the ccNSO Council is constituted, the ccNSO shall, through the ccNSO Council, make selections of Directors to fill Seats 11 and 12 on the New Board, with terms to conclude upon the commencement of the next regular term specified for each of those Seats in [Article VI, Section 8\(1\)\(d\) and \(f\) of the New Bylaws](#), and shall give the ICANN Secretary written notice of its selections.

6. Until the ccNSO Council is constituted, the delegate to the Nominating Committee established by the New Bylaws designated to be selected by the ccNSO shall be appointed by the Transition Board or New Board, depending on which is in existence at the time any particular appointment is required, after due consultation with members of the ccTLD community. Upon the ccNSO Council being constituted, the delegate to the Nominating Committee appointed by the Transition Board or New Board according to this Section 4(9) then serving shall remain in office, except that the ccNSO Council may replace that delegate with one of its choosing within three months after the

conclusion of ICANN's annual meeting, or in the event of a vacancy. Subsequent appointments of the Nominating Committee delegate described in [Article VII, Section 2\(8\)\(c\)](#) shall be made by the ccNSO Council.

Section 5. GENERIC NAMES SUPPORTING ORGANIZATION

1. The Generic Names Supporting Organization (“GNSO”), upon the adoption of this Transition Article, shall continue its operations; however, it shall be restructured into four new Stakeholder Groups which shall represent, organizationally, the former Constituencies of the GNSO, subject to ICANN Board approval of each individual Stakeholder Group Charter:

a. The gTLD Registries Constituency shall be assigned to the Registries Stakeholder Group;

b. The Registrars Constituency shall be assigned to the Registrars Stakeholder Group;

c. The Business Constituency shall be assigned to the Commercial Stakeholder Group;

d. The Intellectual Property Constituency shall be assigned to the Commercial Stakeholder Group;

e. The Internet Services Providers Constituency shall be assigned to the Commercial Stakeholder Group; and

f. The Non-Commercial Users Constituency shall be assigned to the Non-Commercial Stakeholder Group.

2. Each GNSO Constituency described in paragraph 1 of this subsection shall continue operating substantially as before and no Constituency official, working group, or other activity shall be changed until further action of the Constituency, provided that each GNSO Constituency described in paragraph 1 (c-f) shall submit to the ICANN Secretary a new or revised Charter inclusive of its operating procedures, adopted according to the Constituency's processes and consistent with these Bylaws Amendments, no later than the ICANN meeting in October 2009, or another date as the Board may designate by resolution.

3. Prior to the commencement of the ICANN meeting in October 2009, or another date the Board may designate by resolution, the GNSO Council shall consist of its current Constituency structure and officers as described in [Article X, Section 3\(1\) of the Bylaws](#) (as amended and restated on 29 October 1999 and amended through 20 March 2009 (the "Old Bylaws")). Thereafter, the composition of the GNSO Council shall be as provided in these Bylaws, as they may be amended from time to time. All committees, task forces, working groups, drafting committees, and similar groups established by the GNSO Council and in existence immediately before the adoption of this Transition Article shall continue in existence with the same charters, membership, and activities, subject to any change by action of the GNSO Council or ICANN Board.

4. Beginning with the commencement of the ICANN Meeting in October 2009, or another date the Board may designate by resolution (the "Effective Date of the Transition"), the GNSO Council seats shall be assigned as follows:

- a. The three seats currently assigned to the Registry Constituency shall be reassigned as three seats of the Registries Stakeholder Group;

b. The three seats currently assigned to the Registrar Constituency shall be reassigned as three seats of the Registrars Stakeholder Group;

c. The three seats currently assigned to each of the Business Constituency, the Intellectual Property Constituency, and the Internet Services Provider Constituency (nine total) shall be decreased to be six seats of the Commercial Stakeholder Group;

d. The three seats currently assigned to the Non-Commercial Users Constituency shall be increased to be six seats of the Non-Commercial Stakeholder Group;

e. The three seats currently selected by the Nominating Committee shall be assigned by the Nominating Committee as follows: one voting member to the Contracted Party House, one voting member to the Non-Contracted Party House, and one non-voting member assigned to the GNSO Council at large.

Representatives on the GNSO Council shall be appointed or elected consistent with the provisions in each applicable Stakeholder Group Charter, approved by the Board, and sufficiently in advance of the October 2009 ICANN Meeting that will permit those representatives to act in their official capacities at the start of said meeting.

5. The GNSO Council, as part of its Restructure Implementation Plan, will document: (a) how vacancies, if any, will be handled during the transition period; (b) for each Stakeholder Group, how each assigned Council seat to take effect at the 2009 ICANN annual meeting will be filled, whether through a

continuation of an existing term or a new election or appointment; (c) how it plans to address staggered terms such that the new GNSO Council preserves as much continuity as reasonably possible; and (d) the effect of Bylaws term limits on each Council member.

6. As soon as practical after the commencement of the ICANN meeting in October 2009, or another date the Board may designate by resolution, the GNSO Council shall, in accordance with [Article X, Section 3\(7\)](#) and its GNSO Operating Procedures, elect officers and give the ICANN Secretary written notice of its selections.

Section 6. PROTOCOL SUPPORTING ORGANIZATION

The [Protocol Supporting Organization referred to in the Old Bylaws](#) is discontinued.

Section 7. ADVISORY COMMITTEES AND TECHNICAL LIAISON GROUP

1. Upon the adoption of the New Bylaws, the Governmental Advisory Committee shall continue in operation according to its existing operating principles and practices, until further action of the committee. The Governmental Advisory Committee may designate liaisons to serve with other ICANN bodies as contemplated by the New Bylaws by providing written notice to the ICANN Secretary. Promptly upon the adoption of this Transition Article, the Governmental Advisory Committee shall notify the ICANN Secretary of the person selected as its delegate to the Nominating Committee, as set forth in [Article VII, Section 2 of the New Bylaws](#).

2. The organizations designated as members of the Technical Liaison Group under [Article XI-A, Section 2 \(2\) of the New Bylaws](#) shall each designate the two individual technical experts described in [Article XI-A, Section 2\(6\) of the New Bylaws](#), by providing written notice to the ICANN Secretary. As soon as feasible,

the delegate from the Technical Liaison Group to the Nominating Committee shall be selected according to [Article XI-A, Section 2\(7\) of the New Bylaws](#).

3. Upon the adoption of the New Bylaws, the [Security and Stability Advisory Committee](#) shall continue in operation according to its existing operating principles and practices, until further action of the committee. Promptly upon the adoption of this Transition Article, the Security and Stability Advisory Committee shall notify the ICANN Secretary of the person selected as its delegate to the Nominating Committee, as set forth in [Article VII, Section 2\(4\) of the New Bylaws](#).

4. Upon the adoption of the New Bylaws, the [Root Server System Advisory Committee](#) shall continue in operation according to its existing operating principles and practices, until further action of the committee. Promptly upon the adoption of this Transition Article, the Root Server Advisory Committee shall notify the ICANN Secretary of the person selected as its delegate to the Nominating Committee, as set forth in [Article VII, Section 2\(3\) of the New Bylaws](#).

5. At-Large Advisory Committee

a. There shall exist an Interim At-Large Advisory Committee until such time as ICANN recognizes, through the entry of a Memorandum of Understanding, all of the Regional At-Large Organizations (RALOs) identified in [Article XI, Section 2\(4\) of the New Bylaws](#). The Interim At-Large Advisory Committee shall be composed of (i) ten individuals (two from each ICANN region) selected by the ICANN Board following nominations by the At-Large Organizing Committee and (ii) five additional individuals (one from each ICANN region) selected by the initial Nominating Committee as soon as feasible in

accordance with the principles established in [Article VII, Section 5 of the New Bylaws](#). The initial Nominating Committee shall designate two of these individuals to serve terms until the conclusion of the ICANN annual meeting in 2004 and three of these individuals to serve terms until the conclusion of the ICANN annual meeting in 2005.

b. Upon the entry of each RALO into such a Memorandum of Understanding, that entity shall be entitled to select two persons who are citizens and residents of that Region to be members of the At-Large Advisory Committee established by [Article XI, Section 2\(4\) of the New Bylaws](#). Upon the entity's written notification to the ICANN Secretary of such selections, those persons shall immediately assume the seats held until that notification by the Interim At-Large Advisory Committee members previously selected by the Board from the RALO's region.

c. Upon the seating of persons selected by all five RALOs, the Interim At-Large Advisory Committee shall become the At-Large Advisory Committee, as established by [Article XI, Section 2\(4\) of the New Bylaws](#). The five individuals selected to the Interim At-Large Advisory Committee by the Nominating Committee shall become members of the At-Large Advisory Committee for the remainder of the terms for which they were selected.

d. Promptly upon its creation, the Interim At-Large Advisory Committee shall notify the ICANN Secretary of the persons selected as its delegates to the Nominating

Committee, as set forth in [Article VII, Section 2\(6\) of the New Bylaws](#).

Section 8. OFFICERS

ICANN officers (as defined in [Article XIII of the New Bylaws](#)) shall be elected by the then-existing Board of ICANN at the annual meeting in 2002 to serve until the annual meeting in 2003.

Section 9. GROUPS APPOINTED BY THE PRESIDENT

Notwithstanding the adoption or effectiveness of the New Bylaws, task forces and other groups appointed by the ICANN President shall continue unchanged in membership, scope, and operation until changes are made by the President.

Section 10. CONTRACTS WITH ICANN

Notwithstanding the adoption or effectiveness of the New Bylaws, all agreements, including employment and consulting agreements, entered by ICANN shall continue in effect according to their terms.

Annex A: GNSO Policy-Development Process

The following process shall govern the GNSO policy development process (“PDP”) until such time as modifications are recommended to and approved by the ICANN Board of Directors (“Board”). [Note: this Annex includes amendments that were needed on an interim basis to allow the GNSO to operate while community and Board discussions continue on revised policy development and operating procedures].

1. Raising an Issue

An issue may be raised for consideration as part of the PDP by any of the following:

- a. *Board Initiation*. The Board may initiate the PDP by instructing the GNSO Council (“Council”) to begin the process outlined in this Annex.

b. *Council Initiation.* The GNSO Council may initiate the PDP by a vote of at least twenty-five percent (25%) of the members of the Council of each House or a majority of one House.

c. *Advisory Committee Initiation.* An Advisory Committee may raise an issue for policy development by action of such committee to commence the PDP, and transmission of that request to the GNSO Council.

2. Creation of the Issue Report

Within fifteen (15) calendar days after receiving either (i) an instruction from the Board; (ii) a properly supported motion from a Council member; or (iii) a properly supported motion from an Advisory Committee, the Staff Manager will create a report (an "Issue Report"). Each Issue Report shall contain at least the following:

- a. The proposed issue raised for consideration;
- b. The identity of the party submitting the issue;
- c. How that party is affected by the issue;
- d. Support for the issue to initiate the PDP;
- e. A recommendation from the Staff Manager as to whether the Council should initiate the PDP for this issue (the "Staff Recommendation"). Each Staff Recommendation shall include the opinion of the ICANN General Counsel regarding whether the issue proposed to initiate the PDP is properly within the scope of the ICANN policy process and within the scope of the GNSO. In determining whether the issue is properly within the scope of the ICANN policy process, the General Counsel shall examine whether such issue:

1. is within the scope of ICANN's mission statement;

2. is broadly applicable to multiple situations or organizations;
3. is likely to have lasting value or applicability, albeit with the need for occasional updates;
4. will establish a guide or framework for future decision-making; or
5. implicates or affects an existing ICANN policy.

f. On or before the fifteen (15) day deadline, the Staff Manager shall distribute the Issue Report to the full Council for a vote on whether to initiate the PDP, as discussed below.

3. Initiation of PDP

The Council shall initiate the PDP as follows:

a. *Issue Raised by the Board.* If the Board directs the Council to initiate the PDP, then the Council shall meet and do so within fifteen (15) calendar days after receipt of the Issue Report, with no intermediate vote of the Council.

b. *Issue Raised by Other than by the Board.* If a policy issue is presented to the Council for consideration via an Issue Report, then the Council shall meet within fifteen (15) calendar days after receipt of such Report to vote on whether to initiate the PDP. Such meeting may be convened in any manner deemed appropriate by the Council, including in person, via conference call or via electronic mail.

c. *Vote of the Council.* A vote of more than 33% of the Council members of each House or more than 66% vote of one House in favor of initiating the PDP within scope will suffice to initiate the PDP; unless the Staff

Recommendation stated that the issue is not properly within the scope of the ICANN policy process or the GNSO, in which case a GNSO Supermajority Vote as set forth in [Article X, Section 3, paragraph 9\(c\)](#) in favor of initiating the PDP will be required to initiate the PDP.

4. Commencement of the PDP

At the meeting of the Council initiating the PDP, the Council shall decide, by a majority vote of members of each House, whether to appoint a task force to address the issue. If the Council votes:

- a. In favor of convening a task force, it shall do so in accordance with the provisions of [Item 7 below](#).
- b. Against convening a task force, then it will collect information on the policy issue in accordance with the provisions of [Item 8 below](#).

5. Composition and Selection of Task Forces

- a. Upon voting to appoint a task force, the Council shall invite each of the Constituencies and/or Stakeholder Groups of the GNSO to appoint one individual to participate in the task force. Additionally, the Council may appoint up to three outside advisors to sit on the task force. (Each task force member is referred to in this Annex as a "Representative" and collectively, the "Representatives"). The Council may increase the number of Representatives per Constituency or Stakeholder Group that may sit on a task force in its discretion in circumstances that it deems necessary or appropriate.
- b. Any Constituency or Stakeholder Group wishing to appoint a Representative to the task force must submit the name of the Constituency or Stakeholder Group designee to the Staff Manager within ten (10) calendar days after such request in order to be included on the task force. Such designee need not be a member of the Council, but must be an individual who has an

interest, and ideally knowledge and expertise, in the area to be developed, coupled with the ability to devote a substantial amount of time to task force activities.

c. The Council may also pursue other options that it deems appropriate to assist in the PDP, including appointing a particular individual or organization to gather information on the issue or scheduling meetings for deliberation or briefing. All such information shall be submitted to the Staff Manager within thirty-five (35) calendar days after initiation of the PDP.

6. Public Notification of Initiation of the PDP

After initiation of the PDP, ICANN shall post a notification of such action to the Website. A public comment period shall be commenced for the issue for a period of twenty (20) calendar days after initiation of the PDP. The Staff Manager, or some other designated representative of ICANN shall review the public comments and incorporate them into a report (the "Public Comment Report") to be included in either the Preliminary Task Force Report or the Initial Report, as applicable.

7. Task Forces

a. *Role of Task Force.* If a task force is created, its role will generally be to (i) gather information detailing the positions of the Stakeholder Groups and the formal constituencies and provisional constituencies, if any, within the GNSO; and (ii) otherwise obtain relevant information that will enable the Task Force Report to be as complete and informative as possible.

The task force shall not have any formal decision-making authority. Rather, the role of the task force shall be to gather information that will document the positions of various parties or groups as specifically and comprehensively as possible, thereby enabling the Council to have a meaningful and informed deliberation on the issue.

b. *Task Force Charter or Terms of Reference.* The Council, with the assistance of the Staff Manager, shall develop a charter or terms of reference for the task force (the "Charter") within ten (10) calendar days after initiation of the PDP. Such Charter will include:

1. the issue to be addressed by the task force, as such issue was articulated for the vote before the Council that commenced the PDP;
2. the specific timeline that the task force must adhere to, as set forth below, unless the Board determines that there is a compelling reason to extend the timeline; and
3. any specific instructions from the Council for the task force, including whether or not the task force should solicit the advice of outside advisors on the issue.

The task force shall prepare its report and otherwise conduct its activities in accordance with the Charter. Any request to deviate from the Charter must be formally presented to the Council and may only be undertaken by the task force upon a vote of a majority of each house of the Council members.

c. *Appointment of Task Force Chair.* The Staff Manager shall convene the first meeting of the task force within five (5) calendar days after receipt of the Charter. At the initial meeting, the task force members will, among other things, vote to appoint a task force chair. The chair shall be responsible for organizing the activities of the task force, including compiling the Task Force Report. The chair of a task force need not be a member of the Council.

d. *Collection of Information*

1. *Constituency and Stakeholder Group Statements*. The Representatives of the Stakeholder Groups will each be responsible for soliciting the position of their Stakeholder Groups or any of their constituencies, at a minimum, and other comments as each Representative deems appropriate, regarding the issue under consideration. This position and other comments, as applicable, should be submitted in a formal statement to the task force chair (each, a "Constituency/Stakeholder Group Statement") within thirty-five (35) calendar days after initiation of the PDP. Every Constituency/Stakeholder Group Statement shall include at least the following:

(i) If a Supermajority Vote was reached, a clear statement of the constituency's or Stakeholder Group's position on the issue;

(ii) If a Supermajority Vote was not reached, a clear statement of all positions espoused by constituency or Stakeholder Group members;

(iii) A clear statement of how the constituency or Stakeholder Group arrived at its position(s). Specifically, the statement should detail specific constituency or Stakeholder Group meetings, teleconferences, or other means of deliberating an issue, and a list of all members who

participated or otherwise submitted their views;

(iv) An analysis of how the issue would affect the constituency or Stakeholder Group, including any financial impact on the constituency or Stakeholder Group; and

(v) An analysis of the period of time that would likely be necessary to implement the policy.

2. *Outside Advisors.* The task force, should it deem it appropriate or helpful, may solicit the opinions of outside advisors, experts, or other members of the public, in addition to those of constituency or Stakeholder Group members. Such opinions should be set forth in a report prepared by such outside advisors, and (i) clearly labeled as coming from outside advisors; (ii) accompanied by a detailed statement of the advisors' (A) qualifications and relevant experience; and (B) potential conflicts of interest. These reports should be submitted in a formal statement to the task force chair within thirty-five (35) calendar days after initiation of the PDP.

e. *Task Force Report.* The chair of the task force, working with the Staff Manager, shall compile the Constituency/Stakeholder Group Statements, Public Comment Report, and other information or reports, as applicable, into a single document ("Preliminary Task Force Report") and distribute the Preliminary Task Force Report to the full task force within forty (40) calendar days after initiation of the PDP. The task force shall have a final task force meeting within five

(5) days after the date of distribution of the Preliminary Task Force Report to deliberate the issues and try and reach a Supermajority Vote. Within five (5) calendar days after the final task force meeting, the chair of the task force and the Staff Manager shall create the final task force report (the "Task Force Report") and post it on the Comment Site. Each Task Force Report must include:

1. A clear statement of any Supermajority Vote position of the task force on the issue;
2. If a Supermajority Vote was not reached, a clear statement of all positions espoused by task force members submitted within the twenty-day timeline for submission of constituency or Stakeholder Group reports. Each statement should clearly indicate (i) the reasons underlying the position and (ii) the constituency(ies) or Stakeholder Group (s) that held the position;
3. An analysis of how the issue would affect each constituency or Stakeholder Group of the task force, including any financial impact on the constituency or Stakeholder Group;
4. An analysis of the period of time that would likely be necessary to implement the policy; and
5. The advice of any outside advisors appointed to the task force by the Council, accompanied by a detailed statement of the advisors' (i) qualifications and relevant experience; and (ii) potential conflicts of interest.

8. Procedure if No Task Force is Formed

a. If the Council decides not to convene a task force, the Council will request that, within ten (10) calendar days thereafter, each constituency or Stakeholder Group appoint a representative to solicit the constituency's or Stakeholder Group's views on the issue. Each such representative shall be asked to submit a Constituency/Stakeholder Group Statement to the Staff Manager within thirty-five (35) calendar days after initiation of the PDP.

b. The Council may also pursue other options that it deems appropriate to assist in the PDP, including appointing a particular individual or organization to gather information on the issue or scheduling meetings for deliberation or briefing. All such information shall be submitted to the Staff Manager within thirty-five (35) calendar days after initiation of the PDP.

c. The Staff Manager will take all Constituency/Stakeholder Group Statements, Public Comment Statements, and other information and compile (and post on the Comment Site) an Initial Report within fifty (50) calendar days after initiation of the PDP. Thereafter, the PDP shall follow the provisions of Item 9 below in creating a Final Report.

9. Public Comments to the Task Force Report or Initial Report

a. The public comment period will last for twenty (20) calendar days after posting of the Task Force Report or Initial Report. Any individual or organization may submit comments during the public comment period, including any Constituency or Stakeholder Group that did not participate in the task force. All comments shall be accompanied by the name of the author of the comments, the author's relevant experience, and the author's interest in the issue.

b. At the end of the twenty (20) day period, the Staff Manager will be responsible for reviewing the comments received and adding those deemed

appropriate for inclusion in the Staff Manager's reasonable discretion to the Task Force Report or Initial Report (collectively, the "Final Report"). The Staff Manager shall not be obligated to include all comments made during the comment period, including each comment made by any one individual or organization.

c. The Staff Manager shall prepare the Final Report and submit it to the Council chair within ten (10) calendar days after the end of the public comment period.

10. Council Deliberation

a. Upon receipt of a Final Report, whether as the result of a task force or otherwise, the Council chair will (i) distribute the Final Report to all Council members; and (ii) call for a Council meeting within ten (10) calendar days thereafter. The Council may commence its deliberation on the issue prior to the formal meeting, including via in-person meetings, conference calls, e-mail discussions or any other means the Council may choose. The deliberation process shall culminate in a formal Council meeting either in person or via teleconference, wherein the Council will work towards achieving a Successful GNSO Vote to present to the Board.

b. The Council may, if it so chooses, solicit the opinions of outside advisors at its final meeting. The opinions of these advisors, if relied upon by the Council, shall be (i) embodied in the Council's report to the Board, (ii) specifically identified as coming from an outside advisor; and (iii) be accompanied by a detailed statement of the advisor's (x) qualifications and relevant experience; and (y) potential conflicts of interest.

11. Council Report to the Board

The Staff Manager will be present at the final meeting of the Council, and will have five (5) calendar days after the meeting to incorporate the views of the Council into a report to be submitted to the Board (the "Board Report"). The Board Report must contain at least the following:

- a. A clear statement of any Successful GNSO Vote recommendation of the Council;
- b. If a Successful GNSO Vote was not reached, a clear statement of all positions held by Council members. Each statement should clearly indicate (i) the reasons underlying each position and (ii) the constituency(ies) or Stakeholder Group(s) that held the position;
- c. An analysis of how the issue would affect each constituency or Stakeholder Group, including any financial impact on the constituency or Stakeholder Group;
- d. An analysis of the period of time that would likely be necessary to implement the policy;
- e. The advice of any outside advisors relied upon, which should be accompanied by a detailed statement of the advisor's (i) qualifications and relevant experience; and (ii) potential conflicts of interest;
- f. The Final Report submitted to the Council; and
- g. A copy of the minutes of the Council deliberation on the policy issue, including the all opinions expressed during such deliberation, accompanied by a description of who expressed such opinions.

12. Agreement of the Council

A. Successful GNSO Vote of the Council members will be deemed to reflect the view of the Council, and may be conveyed to the Board as the Council's recommendation. In the event a GNSO Supermajority Vote is not achieved, approval of the

recommendations contained in the Final Report requires a majority of both houses and further requires that one representative of at least 3 of the 4 Stakeholder Groups supports the recommendations. Abstentions shall not be permitted; thus all Council members must cast a vote unless they identify a financial interest in the outcome of the policy issue. Notwithstanding the foregoing, as set forth above, all viewpoints expressed by Council members during the PDP must be included in the Board Report.

13. Board Vote

- a. The Board will meet to discuss the GNSO Council recommendation as soon as feasible after receipt of the Board Report from the Staff Manager.
- b. In the event that the Council reached a GNSO Supermajority Vote, the Board shall adopt the policy according to the GNSO Supermajority Vote recommendation unless by a vote of more than sixty-six (66%) percent of the Board determines that such policy is not in the best interests of the ICANN community or ICANN.
- c. In the event that the Board determines not to act in accordance with the GNSO Supermajority Vote recommendation, the Board shall (i) articulate the reasons for its determination in a report to the Council (the "Board Statement"); and (ii) submit the Board Statement to the Council.
- d. The Council shall review the Board Statement for discussion with the Board within twenty (20) calendar days after the Council's receipt of the Board Statement. The Board shall determine the method (e.g., by teleconference, e-mail, or otherwise) by which the Council and Board will discuss the Board Statement.
- e. At the conclusion of the Council and Board discussions, the Council shall meet to affirm or modify its recommendation, and communicate that conclusion

(the "Supplemental Recommendation") to the Board, including an explanation for its current recommendation. In the event that the Council is able to reach a GNSO Supermajority Vote on the Supplemental Recommendation, the Board shall adopt the recommendation unless more than sixty-six (66%) percent of the Board determines that such policy is not in the interests of the ICANN community or ICANN.

f. In any case in which the Council is not able to reach GNSO Supermajority vote, a majority vote of the Board will be sufficient to act.

g. When a final decision on a GNSO Council Recommendation or Supplemental Recommendation is timely, the Board shall take a preliminary vote and, where practicable, will publish a tentative decision that allows for a ten (10) day period of public comment prior to a final decision by the Board.

14. Implementation of the Policy

Upon a final decision of the Board, the Board shall, as appropriate, give authorization or direction to the ICANN staff to take all necessary steps to implement the policy.

15. Maintenance of Records

Throughout the PDP, from policy suggestion to a final decision by the Board, ICANN will maintain on the Website, a status web page detailing the progress of each PDP issue, which will describe:

- a. The initial suggestion for a policy;
- b. A list of all suggestions that do not result in the creation of an Issue Report;
- c. The timeline to be followed for each policy;
- d. All discussions among the Council regarding the policy;

e. All reports from task forces, the Staff Manager, the Council and the Board; and

f. All public comments submitted.

16. Additional Definitions

"Comment Site" and "Website" refer to one or more web sites designated by ICANN on which notifications and comments regarding the PDP will be posted.

"Supermajority Vote" means a vote of more than sixty-six (66) percent of the members present at a meeting of the applicable body, with the exception of the GNSO Council.

"Staff Manager" means an ICANN staff person(s) who manages the PDP.

"GNSO Supermajority Vote" shall have the meaning set forth in the [Bylaws](#).

A "Successful GNSO Vote" is an affirmative vote of the GNSO Council that meets the relevant voting thresholds set forth in [Article X, Section 3\(9\)](#) including, without limitation, a GNSO Supermajority Vote.

Annex B: ccNSO Policy-Development Process (ccPDP)

The following process shall govern the ccNSO policy-development process ("PDP").

1. Request for an Issue Report

An Issue Report may be requested by any of the following:

a. *Council*. The ccNSO Council (in this Annex B, the "Council") may call for the creation of an Issue Report by an affirmative vote of at least seven of the members of the Council present at any meeting or voting by e-mail.

b. *Board*. The ICANN Board may call for the creation of an Issue Report by requesting the Council to begin the policy-development process.

c. *Regional Organization*. One or more of the Regional Organizations representing ccTLDs in the ICANN recognized Regions may call for creation of an Issue Report by requesting the Council to begin the policy-development process.

d. *ICANN Supporting Organization or Advisory Committee*. An ICANN Supporting Organization or an ICANN Advisory Committee may call for creation of an Issue Report by requesting the Council to begin the policy-development process.

e. *Members of the ccNSO*. The members of the ccNSO may call for the creation of an Issue Report by an affirmative vote of at least ten members of the ccNSO present at any meeting or voting by e-mail.

Any request for an Issue Report must be in writing and must set out the issue upon which an Issue Report is requested in sufficient detail to enable the Issue Report to be prepared. It shall be open to the Council to request further information or undertake further research or investigation for the purpose of determining whether or not the requested Issue Report should be created.

2. Creation of the Issue Report and Initiation Threshold

Within seven days after an affirmative vote as outlined in Item 1(a) above or the receipt of a request as outlined in Items 1 (b), (c), or (d) above the Council shall appoint an Issue Manager. The Issue Manager may be a staff member of ICANN (in which case the costs of the Issue Manager shall be borne by ICANN) or such other person or persons selected by the Council (in which case the ccNSO shall be responsible for the costs of the Issue Manager).

Within fifteen (15) calendar days after appointment (or such other time as the Council shall, in consultation with the Issue Manager,

deem to be appropriate), the Issue Manager shall create an Issue Report. Each Issue Report shall contain at least the following:

- a. The proposed issue raised for consideration;
- b. The identity of the party submitting the issue;
- c. How that party is affected by the issue;
- d. Support for the issue to initiate the PDP;
- e. A recommendation from the Issue Manager as to whether the Council should move to initiate the PDP for this issue (the “Manager Recommendation”). Each Manager Recommendation shall include, and be supported by, an opinion of the ICANN General Counsel regarding whether the issue is properly within the scope of the ICANN policy process and within the scope of the ccNSO. In coming to his or her opinion, the General Counsel shall examine whether:

- 1) The issue is within the scope of ICANN's mission statement;
- 2) Analysis of the relevant factors according to [Article IX, Section 6\(2\)](#) and [Annex C](#) affirmatively demonstrates that the issue is within the scope of the ccNSO;

In the event that the General Counsel reaches an opinion in the affirmative with respect to points 1 and 2 above then the General Counsel shall also consider whether the issue:

- 3) Implicates or affects an existing ICANN policy;
- 4) Is likely to have lasting value or applicability, albeit with the need for occasional updates, and to establish a

guide or framework for future decision-making.

In all events, consideration of revisions to the ccPDP (this [Annex B](#)) or to the scope of the [ccNSO \(Annex C\)](#) shall be within the scope of [ICANN](#) and the [ccNSO](#).

In the event that General Counsel is of the opinion the issue is not properly within the scope of the [ccNSO Scope](#), the Issue Manager shall inform the Council of this opinion. If after an analysis of the relevant factors according to Article IX, Section 6 and Annex C a majority of 10 or more Council members is of the opinion the issue is within scope the Chair of the [ccNSO](#) shall inform the Issue Manager accordingly. General Counsel and the [ccNSO Council](#) shall engage in a dialogue according to agreed rules and procedures to resolve the matter. In the event no agreement is reached between General Counsel and the Council as to whether the issue is within or outside Scope of the [ccNSO](#) then by a vote of 15 or more members the Council may decide the issue is within scope. The Chair of the [ccNSO](#) shall inform General Counsel and the Issue Manager accordingly. The Issue Manager shall then proceed with a recommendation whether or not the Council should move to initiate the [PDP](#) including both the opinion and analysis of General Counsel and Council in the Issues Report.

f. In the event that the Manager Recommendation is in favor of initiating the [PDP](#), a proposed time line for conducting each of the stages of [PDP](#) outlined herein ([PDP Time Line](#)).

g. If possible, the issue report shall indicate whether the resulting output is likely to result in a policy to be approved by the [ICANN Board](#). In some circumstances, it will not be possible to do this until substantive discussions on the issue have taken place. In these cases, the issue report should indicate this

uncertainty. Upon completion of the Issue Report, the Issue Manager shall distribute it to the full Council for a vote on whether to initiate the PDP.

3. Initiation of PDP

The Council shall decide whether to initiate the PDP as follows:

a. Within 21 days after receipt of an Issue Report from the Issue Manager, the Council shall vote on whether to initiate the PDP. Such vote should be taken at a meeting held in any manner deemed appropriate by the Council, including in person or by conference call, but if a meeting is not feasible the vote may occur by e-mail.

b. A vote of ten or more Council members in favor of initiating the PDP shall be required to initiate the PDP provided that the Issue Report states that the issue is properly within the scope of the ICANN mission statement and the ccNSO Scope.

4. Decision Whether to Appoint Task Force; Establishment of Time Line

At the meeting of the Council where the PDP has been initiated (or, where the Council employs a vote by e-mail, in that vote) pursuant to Item 3 above, the Council shall decide, by a majority vote of members present at the meeting (or voting by e-mail), whether or not to appoint a task force to address the issue. If the Council votes:

a. In favor of convening a task force, it shall do so in accordance with Item 7 below.

b. Against convening a task force, then it shall collect information on the policy issue in accordance with Item 8 below.

The Council shall also, by a majority vote of members present at the meeting or voting by e-mail, approve or amend and approve the PDP Time Lineset out in the Issue Report.

5. Composition and Selection of Task Forces

a. Upon voting to appoint a task force, the Council shall invite each of the Regional Organizations (see [Article IX, Section 6](#)) to appoint two individuals to participate in the task force (the “Representatives”). Additionally, the Council may appoint up to three advisors (the “Advisors”) from outside the ccNSO and, following formal request for GAC participation in the Task Force, accept up to two Representatives from the Governmental Advisory Committee to sit on the task force. The Council may increase the number of Representatives that may sit on a task force in its discretion in circumstances that it deems necessary or appropriate.

b. Any Regional Organization wishing to appoint Representatives to the task force must provide the names of the Representatives to the Issue Manager within ten (10) calendar days after such request so that they are included on the task force. Such Representatives need not be members of the Council, but each must be an individual who has an interest, and ideally knowledge and expertise, in the subject matter, coupled with the ability to devote a substantial amount of time to the task force's activities.

c. The Council may also pursue other actions that it deems appropriate to assist in the PDP, including appointing a particular individual or organization to gather information on the issue or scheduling meetings for deliberation or briefing. All such information shall be submitted to the Issue Manager in accordance with the PDP Time Line.

6. Public Notification of Initiation of the PDP and Comment Period

After initiation of the PDP, ICANN shall post a notification of such action to the Website and to the other ICANN Supporting Organizations and Advisory Committees. A comment period (in accordance with the PDP Time Line, and ordinarily at least 21 days long) shall be commenced for the issue. Comments shall be accepted from ccTLD managers, other Supporting Organizations, Advisory Committees, and from the public. The Issue Manager, or some other designated Council representative shall review the comments and incorporate them into a report (the “Comment Report”) to be included in either the Preliminary Task Force Report or the Initial Report, as applicable.

7. Task Forces

a. *Role of Task Force.* If a task force is created, its role shall be responsible for (i) gathering information documenting the positions of the ccNSO members within the Geographic Regions and other parties and groups; and (ii) otherwise obtaining relevant information that shall enable the Task Force Report to be as complete and informative as possible to facilitate the Council's meaningful and informed deliberation.

The task force shall not have any formal decision-making authority. Rather, the role of the task force shall be to gather information that shall document the positions of various parties or groups as specifically and comprehensively as possible, thereby enabling the Council to have a meaningful and informed deliberation on the issue.

b. *Task Force Charter or Terms of Reference.* The Council, with the assistance of the Issue Manager, shall develop a charter or terms of reference for the task force (the “Charter”) within the time designated in the PDP Time Line. Such Charter shall include:

1. The issue to be addressed by the task force, as such issue was articulated for the vote before the Council that initiated the PDP;

2. The specific time line that the task force must adhere to, as set forth below, unless the Council determines that there is a compelling reason to extend the timeline; and

3. Any specific instructions from the Council for the task force, including whether or not the task force should solicit the advice of outside advisors on the issue.

The task force shall prepare its report and otherwise conduct its activities in accordance with the Charter. Any request to deviate from the Charter must be formally presented to the Council and may only be undertaken by the task force upon a vote of a majority of the Council members present at a meeting or voting by e-mail. The quorum requirements of [Article IX, Section 3\(14\)](#) shall apply to Council actions under this Item 7(b).

c. Appointment of Task Force Chair. The Issue Manager shall convene the first meeting of the task force within the time designated in the PDP Time Line. At the initial meeting, the task force members shall, among other things, vote to appoint a task force chair. The chair shall be responsible for organizing the activities of the task force, including compiling the Task Force Report. The chair of a task force need not be a member of the Council.

d. Collection of Information.

1. *Regional Organization Statements.* The Representatives shall each be responsible for soliciting the position of the Regional Organization for their Geographic Region, at a minimum, and may solicit other comments, as each Representative deems appropriate, including the comments of the ccNSO members in that region that are not

members of the Regional Organization, regarding the issue under consideration. The position of the Regional Organization and any other comments gathered by the Representatives should be submitted in a formal statement to the task force chair (each, a “Regional Statement”) within the time designated in the PDP Time Line. Every Regional Statement shall include at least the following:

(i) If a Supermajority Vote (as defined by the Regional Organization) was reached, a clear statement of the Regional Organization's position on the issue;

(ii) If a Supermajority Vote was not reached, a clear statement of all positions espoused by the members of the Regional Organization;

(iii) A clear statement of how the Regional Organization arrived at its position(s). Specifically, the statement should detail specific meetings, teleconferences, or other means of deliberating an issue, and a list of all members who participated or otherwise submitted their views;

(iv) A statement of the position on the issue of any ccNSO members that are not members of the Regional Organization;

(v) An analysis of how the issue would affect the Region,

including any financial impact on the Region; and

(vi) An analysis of the period of time that would likely be necessary to implement the policy.

2. *Outside Advisors.* The task force may, in its discretion, solicit the opinions of outside advisors, experts, or other members of the public. Such opinions should be set forth in a report prepared by such outside advisors, and (i) clearly labeled as coming from outside advisors; (ii) accompanied by a detailed statement of the advisors' (a) qualifications and relevant experience and (b) potential conflicts of interest. These reports should be submitted in a formal statement to the task force chair within the time designated in the PDP Time Line.

e. *Task Force Report.* The chair of the task force, working with the Issue Manager, shall compile the Regional Statements, the Comment Report, and other information or reports, as applicable, into a single document ("Preliminary Task Force Report") and distribute the Preliminary Task Force Report to the full task force within the time designated in the PDP Time Line. The task force shall have a final task force meeting to consider the issues and try and reach a Supermajority Vote. After the final task force meeting, the chair of the task force and the Issue Manager shall create the final task force report (the "Task Force Report") and post it on the Website and to the other ICANN Supporting Organizations and Advisory Committees. Each Task Force Report must include:

1. A clear statement of any Supermajority Vote (being 66% of the task force) position of the task force on the issue;

2. If a Supermajority Vote was not reached, a clear statement of all positions espoused by task force members submitted within the time line for submission of constituency reports. Each statement should clearly indicate (i) the reasons underlying the position and (ii) the Regional Organizations that held the position;

3. An analysis of how the issue would affect each Region, including any financial impact on the Region;

4. An analysis of the period of time that would likely be necessary to implement the policy; and

5. The advice of any outside advisors appointed to the task force by the Council, accompanied by a detailed statement of the advisors' (i) qualifications and relevant experience and (ii) potential conflicts of interest.

8. Procedure if No Task Force is Formed

a. If the Council decides not to convene a task force, each Regional Organization shall, within the time designated in the PDP Time Line, appoint a representative to solicit the Region's views on the issue. Each such representative shall be asked to submit a Regional Statement to the Issue Manager within the time designated in the PDP Time Line.

b. The Council may, in its discretion, take other steps to assist in the PDP, including, for example, appointing a particular individual or organization, to gather information on the issue or scheduling meetings for deliberation or briefing. All such information shall be submitted to the Issue Manager within the time designated in the PDP Time Line.

c. The Council shall formally request the Chair of the GAC to offer opinion or advice.

d. The Issue Manager shall take all Regional Statements, the Comment Report, and other information and compile (and post on the Website) an Initial Report within the time designated in the PDP Time Line. Thereafter, the Issue Manager shall, in accordance with Item 9 below, create a Final Report.

9. Comments to the Task Force Report or Initial Report

a. A comment period (in accordance with the PDP Time Line, and ordinarily at least 21 days long) shall be opened for comments on the Task Force Report or Initial Report. Comments shall be accepted from ccTLD managers, other Supporting Organizations, Advisory Committees, and from the public. All comments shall include the author's name, relevant experience, and interest in the issue.

b. At the end of the comment period, the Issue Manager shall review the comments received and may, in the Issue Manager's reasonable discretion, add appropriate comments to the Task Force Report or Initial Report, to prepare the "Final Report". The Issue Manager shall not be obligated to include all comments made during the comment period, nor shall the Issue Manager be obligated to include all comments submitted by any one individual or organization.

c. The Issue Manager shall prepare the Final Report and submit it to the Council chair within the time designated in the PDP Time Line.

10. Council Deliberation

a. Upon receipt of a Final Report, whether as the result of a task force or otherwise, the Council chair shall (i) distribute the Final Report to all Council members; (ii)

call for a Council meeting within the time designated in the PDP Time Line wherein the Council shall work towards achieving a recommendation to present to the Board; and (iii) formally send to the GAC Chair an invitation to the GAC to offer opinion or advice. Such meeting may be held in any manner deemed appropriate by the Council, including in person or by conference call. The Issue Manager shall be present at the meeting.

b. The Council may commence its deliberation on the issue prior to the formal meeting, including via in-person meetings, conference calls, e-mail discussions, or any other means the Council may choose.

c. The Council may, if it so chooses, solicit the opinions of outside advisors at its final meeting. The opinions of these advisors, if relied upon by the Council, shall be (i) embodied in the Council's report to the Board, (ii) specifically identified as coming from an outside advisor; and (iii) accompanied by a detailed statement of the advisor's (a) qualifications and relevant experience and (b) potential conflicts of interest.

11. Recommendation of the Council

In considering whether to make a recommendation on the issue (a "Council Recommendation"), the Council shall seek to act by consensus. If a minority opposes a consensus position, that minority shall prepare and circulate to the Council a statement explaining its reasons for opposition. If the Council's discussion of the statement does not result in consensus, then a recommendation supported by 14 or more of the Council members shall be deemed to reflect the view of the Council, and shall be conveyed to the Members as the Council's Recommendation. Notwithstanding the foregoing, as outlined below, all viewpoints expressed by Council members during the PDP must be included in the Members Report.

12. Council Report to the Members

In the event that a Council Recommendation is adopted pursuant to Item 11 then the Issue Manager shall, within seven days after the Council meeting, incorporate the Council's Recommendation together with any other viewpoints of the Council members into a Members Report to be approved by the Council and then to be submitted to the Members (the "Members Report"). The Members Report must contain at least the following:

- a. A clear statement of the Council's recommendation;
- b. The Final Report submitted to the Council; and
- c. A copy of the minutes of the Council's deliberation on the policy issue (see Item 10), including all the opinions expressed during such deliberation, accompanied by a description of who expressed such opinions.

13. Members Vote

Following the submission of the Members Report and within the time designated by the PDP Time Line, the ccNSO members shall be given an opportunity to vote on the Council Recommendation. The vote of members shall be electronic and members' votes shall be lodged over such a period of time as designated in the PDP Time Line (at least 21 days long).

In the event that at least 50% of the ccNSO members lodge votes within the voting period, the resulting vote will be employed without further process. In the event that fewer than 50% of the ccNSO members lodge votes in the first round of voting, the first round will not be employed and the results of a final, second round of voting, conducted after at least thirty days notice to the ccNSO members, will be employed if at least 50% of the ccNSO members lodge votes. In the event that more than 66% of the votes received at the end of the voting period shall be in favor of the Council Recommendation, then the recommendation shall be conveyed to the Board in accordance with Item 14 below as the ccNSO Recommendation.

14. Board Report

The Issue Manager shall within seven days after a ccNSO Recommendation being made in accordance with Item 13 incorporate the ccNSO Recommendation into a report to be approved by the Council and then to be submitted to the Board (the “Board Report”). The Board Report must contain at least the following:

- a. A clear statement of the ccNSO recommendation;
- b. The Final Report submitted to the Council; and
- c. the Members' Report.

15. Board Vote

- a. The Board shall meet to discuss the ccNSO Recommendation as soon as feasible after receipt of the Board Report from the Issue Manager, taking into account procedures for Board consideration.
- b. The Board shall adopt the ccNSO Recommendation unless by a vote of more than 66% the Board determines that such policy is not in the best interest of the ICANN community or of ICANN.

1. In the event that the Board determines not to act in accordance with the ccNSO Recommendation, the Board shall (i) state its reasons for its determination not to act in accordance with the ccNSO Recommendation in a report to the Council (the “Board Statement”); and (ii) submit the Board Statement to the Council.

2. The Council shall discuss the Board Statement with the Board within thirty days after the Board Statement is submitted to the Council. The Board shall determine the method (e.g., by teleconference, e-mail, or otherwise) by which the Council and Board shall discuss the Board Statement. The

discussions shall be held in good faith and in a timely and efficient manner, to find a mutually acceptable solution.

3. At the conclusion of the Council and Board discussions, the Council shall meet to affirm or modify its Council Recommendation. A recommendation supported by 14 or more of the Council members shall be deemed to reflect the view of the Council (the Council's "Supplemental Recommendation"). That Supplemental Recommendation shall be conveyed to the Members in a Supplemental Members Report, including an explanation for the Supplemental Recommendation. Members shall be given an opportunity to vote on the Supplemental Recommendation under the same conditions outlined in Item 13. In the event that more than 66% of the votes cast by ccNSO Members during the voting period are in favor of the Supplemental Recommendation then that recommendation shall be conveyed to Board as the ccNSO Supplemental Recommendation and the Board shall adopt the recommendation unless by a vote of more than 66% of the Board determines that acceptance of such policy would constitute a breach of the fiduciary duties of the Board to the Company.

4. In the event that the Board does not accept the ccNSO Supplemental Recommendation, it shall state its reasons for doing so in its final decision ("Supplemental Board Statement").

5. In the event the Board determines not to accept a ccNSO Supplemental Recommendation, then the Board shall not be entitled to set policy on the issue

addressed by the recommendation and the status quo shall be preserved until such time as the ccNSO shall, under the ccPDP, make a recommendation on the issue that is deemed acceptable by the Board.

16. Implementation of the Policy

Upon adoption by the Board of a ccNSO Recommendation or ccNSO Supplemental Recommendation, the Board shall, as appropriate, direct or authorize ICANN staff to implement the policy.

17. Maintenance of Records

With respect to each ccPDP for which an Issue Report is requested (see Item 1), ICANN shall maintain on the Website a status web page detailing the progress of each ccPDP, which shall provide a list of relevant dates for the ccPDP and shall also link to the following documents, to the extent they have been prepared pursuant to the ccPDP:

- a. Issue Report;
- b. PDP Time Line;
- c. Comment Report;
- d. Regional Statement(s);
- e. Preliminary Task Force Report;
- f. Task Force Report;
- g. Initial Report;
- h. Final Report;
- i. Members' Report;
- j. Board Report;
- k. Board Statement;

- I. Supplemental Members' Report; and
- m. Supplemental Board Statement.

In addition, ICANN shall post on the Website comments received in electronic written form specifically suggesting that a ccPDP be initiated.

Annex C: The Scope of the ccNSO

This annex describes the scope and the principles and method of analysis to be used in any further development of the scope of the ccNSO's policy-development role. As provided in [Article IX, Section 6\(2\)](#) of the Bylaws, that scope shall be defined according to the procedures of the ccPDP.

The scope of the ccNSO's authority and responsibilities must recognize the complex relation between ICANN and ccTLD managers/registries with regard to policy issues. This annex shall assist the ccNSO, the ccNSO Council, and the ICANN Board and staff in delineating relevant global policy issues.

Policy areas

The ccNSO's policy role should be based on an analysis of the following functional model of the DNS:

1. Data is registered/maintained to generate a zone file,
2. A zone file is in turn used in TLD name servers.

Within a TLD two functions have to be performed (these are addressed in greater detail below):

1. Entering data into a database (Data Entry Function) and
2. Maintaining and ensuring upkeep of name-servers for the TLD (Name Server Function).

These two core functions must be performed at the ccTLD registry level as well as at a higher level (IANA function and root servers) and at lower levels of the DNS hierarchy. This mechanism, as RFC 1591 points out, is recursive:

There are no requirements on sub domains of top-level domains beyond the requirements on higher-level domains themselves. That is, the requirements in this memo are applied recursively. In particular, all sub domains shall be allowed to operate their own domain name servers, providing in them whatever information the sub domain manager sees fit (as long as it is true and correct).

The Core Functions

1. Data Entry Function (DEF):

Looking at a more detailed level, the first function (entering and maintaining data in a database) should be fully defined by a naming policy. This naming policy must specify the rules and conditions:

(a) under which data will be collected and entered into a database or data changed (at the TLD level among others, data to reflect a transfer from registrant to registrant or changing registrar) in the database.

(b) for making certain data generally and publicly available (be it, for example, through Whois or nameservers).

2. The Name-Server Function (NSF)

The name-server function involves essential interoperability and stability issues at the heart of the domain name system. The importance of this function extends to nameservers at the ccTLD level, but also to the root servers (and root-server system) and nameservers at lower levels.

On its own merit and because of interoperability and stability considerations, properly functioning nameservers are of utmost

importance to the individual, as well as to the local and the global Internet communities.

With regard to the nameserver function, therefore, policies need to be defined and established. Most parties involved, including the majority of ccTLD registries, have accepted the need for common policies in this area by adhering to the relevant RFCs, among others RFC 1591.

Respective Roles with Regard to Policy, Responsibilities, and Accountabilities

It is in the interest of ICANN and ccTLD managers to ensure the stable and proper functioning of the domain name system. ICANN and the ccTLD registries each have a distinctive role to play in this regard that can be defined by the relevant policies. The scope of the ccNSO cannot be established without reaching a common understanding of the allocation of authority between ICANN and ccTLD registries.

Three roles can be distinguished as to which responsibility must be assigned on any given issue:

- Policy role: i.e. the ability and power to define a policy;
- Executive role: i.e. the ability and power to act upon and implement the policy; and
- Accountability role: i.e. the ability and power to hold the responsible entity accountable for exercising its power.

Firstly, responsibility presupposes a policy and this delineates the policy role. Depending on the issue that needs to be addressed those who are involved in defining and setting the policy need to be determined and defined. Secondly, this presupposes an executive role defining the power to implement and act within the boundaries of a policy. Finally, as a counter-balance to the executive role, the accountability role needs to be defined and determined.

The information below offers an aid to:

1. delineate and identify specific policy areas;
2. define and determine roles with regard to these specific policy areas.

This annex defines the scope of the ccNSO with regard to developing policies. The scope is limited to the policy role of the ccNSO policy-development process for functions and levels explicitly stated below. It is anticipated that the accuracy of the assignments of policy, executive, and accountability roles shown below will be considered during a scope-definition ccPDP process.

Name Server Function (as to ccTLDs)

Level 1: Root Name Servers

Policy role: IETF, RSSAC (ICANN)

Executive role: Root Server System Operators

Accountability role: RSSAC (ICANN), (US DoC-ICANN MoU)

Level 2: ccTLD Registry Name Servers in respect to interoperability

Policy role: ccNSO Policy Development Process (ICANN), for best practices a ccNSO process can be organized

Executive role: ccTLD Manager

Accountability role: part ICANN (IANA), part Local Internet Community, including local government

Level 3: User's Name Servers

Policy role: ccTLD Manager, IETF (RFC)

Executive role: Registrant

Accountability role: ccTLD Manager

Data Entry Function (as to ccTLDs)

Level 1: Root Level Registry

Policy role: ccNSO Policy Development Process (ICANN)

Executive role: ICANN (IANA)

Accountability role: ICANN community, ccTLD Managers, US DoC, (national authorities in some cases)

Level 2: ccTLD Registry

Policy role: Local Internet Community, including local government, and/or ccTLD Manager according to local structure

Executive role: ccTLD Manager

Accountability role: Local Internet Community, including national authorities in some cases

Level 3: Second and Lower Levels

Policy role: Registrant

Executive role: Registrant

Accountability role: Registrant, users of lower-level domain names



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APPENDIX G

**INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION
Independent Review Panel**

CASE # 50 2013 001083

DECLARATION ON THE IRP PROCEDURE

In the matter of an Independent Review Process (IRP) pursuant to the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Number's (ICANN's) Bylaws, the *International Dispute Resolution Procedures (ICDR Rules)* of the International Centre for Dispute Resolution (ICDR), and the *Supplementary Procedures for ICANN Independent Review Process*

Between: DotConnectAfrica Trust;
("Claimant" or "DCA Trust")

Represented by Mr. Arif H. Ali, Ms. Marguerite Walter and Ms. Erica Franzetti of Weil, Gotshal, Manges, LLP located at 1300 Eye Street, NW, Suite 900, Washington, DC 20005, U.S.A.

And

Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN);
("Respondent" or "ICANN")

Represented by Mr. Jeffrey A. LeVee of Jones Day, LLP located at 555 South Flower Street, Fiftieth Floor, Los Angeles, CA 90071, U.S.A.

Claimant and Respondent will together be referred to as "Parties".

IRP Panel:
Babak Barin, *Chair*
Prof. Catherine Kessedjian
Hon. Richard C. Neal (Ret.)

I. BACKGROUND

- 1) DCA Trust is a non-profit organization established under the laws of the Republic of Mauritius on 15 July 2010 with its registry operation – DCA Registry Services (Kenya) Limited – as its principal place of business in Nairobi, Kenya. DCA Trust was formed with the charitable purpose of, among other things, advancing information technology education in Africa and providing a continental Internet domain name to provide access to internet services for the people of Africa and for the public good.
- 2) In March 2012, DCA Trust applied to ICANN for the delegation of the .AFRICA top-level domain name in its 2012 General Top-Level Domains (“gTLD”) Internet Expansion Program (the “New gTLD Program”), an internet resource available for delegation under that program.
- 3) ICANN is a non-profit corporation established under the laws of the State of California, U.S.A., on 30 September 1998 and headquartered in Marina del Rey, California. According to its Articles of Incorporation, ICANN was established for the benefit of the Internet community as a whole and is tasked with carrying out its activities in conformity with relevant principles of international law, international conventions, and local law.
- 4) On 4 June 2013, the ICANN Board New gTLD Program Committee (“NGPC”) posted a notice that it had decided not to accept DCA Trust’s application.
- 5) On 19 June 2013, DCA Trust filed a request for reconsideration by the ICANN Board Governance Committee (“BGC”), which denied the request on 1 August 2013.
- 6) On 19 August 2013, DCA Trust informed ICANN of its intention to seek relief before an Independent Review Panel under ICANN’s Bylaws. Between August and October 2013, DCA Trust and ICANN participated in a Cooperative Engagement Process (“CEP”) to try and resolve the issues relating to DCA Trust’s application. Despite several meetings, no resolution was reached.
- 7) On 24 October 2013, DCA Trust filed a Notice of Independent Review Process with the ICDR in accordance with Article IV, Section 3, of ICANN’s Bylaws.

II. SUMMARY OF THE PARTIES’ POSITIONS ON THE MERITS

- 8) According to DCA Trust, the central dispute between it and ICANN in the Independent Review Process (“IRP”) invoked by DCA Trust in October 2013 and described in its Amended Notice of Independent Review Process submitted to ICANN on 10 January 2014 arises out of:

“(1) ICANN’s breaches of its Articles of Incorporation, Bylaws, international and local law, and other applicable rules in the administration of applications for the .AFRICA top-level domain name in its 2012 General Top-Level Domains (“gTLD”) Internet Expansion Program (the “New gTLD Program”); and (2) ICANN’s wrongful decision that DCA’s application for .AFRICA should not proceed [...]”¹

- 9) According to DCA Trust, “ICANN’s administration of the New gTLD Program and its decision on DCA’s application were unfair, discriminatory, and lacked appropriate due diligence and care, in breach of ICANN’s Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws.”² DCA Trust also advanced that “ICANN’s violations materially affected DCA’s right to have its application processed in accordance with the rules and procedures laid out by ICANN for the New gTLD Program.”³
- 10) In its 10 February 2014 [sic]⁴ Response to DCA Trust’s Amended Notice, ICANN submitted that in these proceedings, “DCA challenges the 4 June 2013 decision of the ICANN Board New gTLD Program Committee (“NGPC”), which has delegated authority from the ICANN Board to make decisions regarding the New gTLD. In that decision, the NGPC unanimously accepted advice from ICANN’s Governmental Advisory Committee (“GAC”) that DCA’s application for .AFRICA should not proceed. DCA argues that the NGPC should not have accepted the GAC’s advice. DCA also argues that ICANN’s subsequent decision to reject DCA’s Request for Reconsideration was improper.”⁵
- 11) ICANN argued that the challenged decisions of ICANN’s Board “were well within the Board’s discretion” and the Board “did exactly what it was supposed to do under its Bylaws, its Articles of Incorporation, and the Applicant Guidebook (“Guidebook”) that the Board adopted for implementing the New gTLD Program.”⁶
- 12) Specifically, ICANN also advanced that “ICANN properly investigated and rejected DCA’s assertion that two of ICANN’s Board members had conflicts of interest with regard to the .AFRICA applications, [...] numerous African countries issued “warnings” to ICANN regarding DCA’s application, a signal from those governments that they had serious concerns regarding DCA’s application; following the issuance of those warnings, the GAC issued “consensus advice” against DCA’s application; ICANN then accepted the GAC’s advice, which was entirely consistent with ICANN’s Bylaws and the

¹ Claimant’s Amended Notice of Independent Review Process, *para.* 2.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ ICANN’s Response to Claimant’s Amended Notice contains a typographical error; it is dated “February 10, 2013” rather than 2014.

⁵ ICANN’s Response to Claimant’s Amended Notice, *para.* 4. Underlining is from the original text.

⁶ *Ibid.*, *para.* 5.

Guidebook; [and] ICANN properly denied DCA's Request for Reconsideration."⁷

13) In short, ICANN argued that in these proceedings, "the evidence establishes that the process worked exactly as it was supposed to work."⁸

14) In the merits part of these proceedings, the Panel will decide the above and other related issues raised by the Parties in their submissions.

III. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND LEADING TO THIS DECISION

15) On 24 April 2013, 12 May, 27 May and 4 June 2014 respectively, the Panel issued a Procedural Order No. 1, a Decision on Interim Measures of Protection, a list of questions for the Parties to brief in their 20 May 2014 memorials on the procedural and substantive issues identified in Procedural Order No. 1 ("12 May List of Questions"), a Procedural Order No. 2 and a Decision on ICANN's Request for Partial Reconsideration of certain portions of its Decision on Interim Measures of Protection. The Decision on Interim Measures of Protection and the Decision on ICANN's Request for Partial Reconsideration of certain portions of the Decision on Interim Measures of Protection have no bearing on this Declaration. Consequently, they do not require any particular consideration by the Panel in this Declaration.

16) In Procedural Order No. 1 and the 12 May List of Questions, based on the Parties' submissions, the Panel identified a number of questions relating to the future conduct of these proceedings, including the method of hearing of the merits of DCA Trust's amended Notice of Independent Review Process that required further briefing by the Parties. In Procedural Order No. 1, the Panel identified some of these issues as follows:

B. Future conduct of the IRP proceedings, including the hearing of the merits of Claimant's Amended Notice of Independent Review Process, if required.

Issues:

- a) Interpretation of the provisions of ICANN's Bylaws, the *International Dispute Resolution Procedures* of the ICDR, and the *Supplementary Procedures for ICANN Independent Review Process* (together the "IRP Procedure"), including whether or not there should be *viva voce* testimony permitted.
- b) Document request and exchange.
- c) Additional filings, including any memoranda and hearing exhibits (if needed and appropriate).

⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸ ICANN's Response to Claimant's Amended Notice, *para.* 6. Underlining is from the original text.

- d) Consideration of method of hearing of the Parties, i.e., telephone, video or in-person and determination of a location for such a hearing, if necessary or appropriate, and consideration of any administrative issues relating to the hearing.

17) In that same Order, in light of: (a) the exceptional circumstances of this case; (b) the fact that some of the questions raised by the Parties implicated important issues of fairness, due process and equal treatment of the parties (“Outstanding Procedural Issues”); and (c) certain *primaie impressionis* or first impression issues that arose in relation to the IRP Procedure, the Panel requested the Parties to file two rounds of written memorials, including one that followed the 12 May List of Questions.

18) On 5 and 20 May 2014, the Parties filed their submissions with supporting material for consideration by the Panel.

IV. ISSUES TO BE DECIDED BY THE PANEL

19) Having read the Parties’ submissions and supporting material, and listened to their respective arguments by telephone, the Panel answers the following questions in this Declaration:

- 1) Does the Panel have the power to interpret and determine the IRP Procedure as it relates to the future conduct of these proceedings?
- 2) If so, what directions does the Panel give the Parties with respect to the Outstanding Procedural Issues?
- 3) Is the Panel's decision concerning the IRP Procedure and its future Declaration on the Merits in this proceeding binding?

Summary of the Panel’s findings

20) The Panel is of the view that it has the power to interpret and determine the IRP Procedure as it relates to the future conduct of these proceedings and consequently, it issues the procedural directions set out in paragraphs 58 to 61, 68 to 71 and 82 to 87 (below), which directions may be supplemented in a future procedural order. The Panel also concludes that this Declaration and its future Declaration on the Merits of this case are binding on the Parties.

V. ANALYSIS OF THE ISSUES AND REASONS FOR THE DECISION

1) Can the Panel interpret and determine the IRP Procedure as it relates to the future conduct of these proceedings?

Interpretation and Future Conduct of the IRP Proceedings

DCA Trusts' Submissions

21) In its 5 May 2014 Submission on Procedural Issues ("DCA Trust First Memorial"), DCA Trust submitted, *inter alia*, that:

"[Under] California law and applicable federal law, this IRP qualifies as an arbitration. It has all the characteristics that California courts look to in order to determine whether a proceeding is an arbitration: 1) a third-party decision-maker; 2) a decision-maker selected by the parties; 3) a mechanism for assuring the neutrality of the decision-maker; 4) an opportunity for both parties to be heard; and 5) a binding decision[...]. Thus, the mere fact that ICANN has labeled this proceeding an independent review process rather than an arbitration (and the adjudicator of the dispute is called a Panel rather than a Tribunal) does not change the fact that the IRP – insofar as its procedural framework and the legal effects of its outcome are concerned – is an arbitration."⁹

22) According to DCA Trust, the IRP Panel is a neutral body appointed by the parties and the ICDR to hear disputes involving ICANN. Therefore, it "qualifies as a third-party decision-maker for the purposes of defining the IRP as an arbitration."¹⁰ DCA Trust submits that, "ICANN's Bylaws contain its standing offer to arbitrate, through the IRP administered by the ICDR, disputes concerning Board actions alleged to be inconsistent with the Articles of Incorporation or the Bylaws."¹¹

23) DCA Trust submits that, it "accepted ICANN's standing offer to arbitrate by submitting its Notice of Independent Review [...] to the ICDR on 24 October 2013 [...] when the two party-appointed panelists were unable to agree on a chairperson, the ICDR made the appointment pursuant to Article 6 of the ICDR Rules, amended and effective 1 June 2009. The Parties thus chose to submit their dispute to the IRP Panel for resolution, as with any other arbitration."¹²

24) According to DCA Trust, "the Supplementary Procedures provide that the IRP is to be comprised of 'neutral' [individuals] and provide that the panel shall be comprised of members of a standing IRP Panel or as selected by the

⁹ DCA Trust First Memorial, *para.* 4 and 5.

¹⁰ *Ibid*, *para.* 8.

¹¹ *Ibid*, *para.* 9.

¹² *Ibid*.

parties under the ICDR Rules. The ICDR Rules [...] provide that panelists serving under the rules, ‘shall be impartial and independent’, and require them to disclose any circumstances giving rise to ‘justifiable doubts’ as to their impartiality and independence [...] The IRP therefore contains a mechanism for ensuring the neutrality of the decision-maker, just like any other arbitration.”¹³

25) DCA Trust further submitted that the “IRP affords both parties an opportunity to be heard, both in writing and orally” and the “governing instruments of the IRP – *i.e.*, the Bylaws, the ICDR Rules, and the Supplementary Procedures – confirm that the IRP is final and binding.” According to DCA Trust, the “IRP is the final accountability and review mechanism available to the parties materially affected by ICANN Board decisions. The IRP is also the only ICANN accountability mechanism conducted by an independent third-party decision-maker with the power to render a decision resolving the dispute and naming a prevailing party [...] The IRP represents a fundamentally different stage of review from those that precede it. Unlike reconsideration or cooperative engagement, the IRP is conducted pursuant to a set of independently developed international arbitration rules (as minimally modified) and administered by a provider of international arbitration services, not ICANN itself.”¹⁴

26) As explained in its 20 May 2014 Response to the Panel’s Questions on Procedural Issues (“DCA Trust Second Memorial”), according to DCA Trust, “the IRP is the ***sole forum*** in which an applicant for a new gTLD can seek independent, third-party review of Board actions. Remarkably, ICANN makes no reciprocal waivers and instead retains all of its rights against applicants in law and equity. ICANN cannot be correct that the IRP is a mere ‘corporate accountability mechanism’. Such a result would make ICANN – the caretaker of an immensely important (and valuable) global resource – effectively judgment-proof.”¹⁵

27) Finally DCA Trust submitted that:

“[It] is [...] critical to understand that ICANN created the IRP as an alternative to allowing disputes to be resolved by courts. By submitting its application for a gTLD, DCA agreed to eight pages of terms and conditions, including a nearly page-long string of waivers and releases. Among those conditions was the waiver of all of its rights to challenge ICANN’s decision on DCA’s application in court. For DCA and other gTLD applicants, the IRP is their only recourse; no other legal remedy is available. The very design of this process is evidence that the IRP is fundamentally unlike the forms of

¹³ *Ibid*, paras. 10, 11 and 12.

¹⁴ *Ibid*, paras. 13, 16, 21 and 23.

¹⁵ DCA Trust Second Memorial, *para.* 6. Bold and italics are from the original text.

administrative review that precede it and is meant to provide a final and binding resolution of disputes between ICANN and persons affected by its decisions.”¹⁶

ICANN’s Submissions

28) In response, in its first memorial entitled ICANN’s Memorandum Regarding Procedural Issues filed on 5 May 2014 (“ICANN First Memorial”), ICANN argued, *inter alia*, that:

“[This] proceeding is *not* an arbitration. Rather, an IRP is a truly unique ‘Independent Review’ process established in ICANN’s Bylaws with the specific purpose of providing for ‘independent third-party review of Board actions alleged by an affected party to be inconsistent with the Articles of Incorporation or Bylaws’. Although ICANN is using the International Center [sic] for Dispute Resolution (‘ICDR’) to administer these proceedings, nothing in the Bylaws can be construed as converting these proceedings into an ‘arbitration’, and the Bylaws make clear that these proceedings are not to be deemed as the equivalent of an ‘international arbitration.’ Indeed, the word ‘arbitration’ does not appear in the relevant portion of the Bylaws, and as discussed below, the ICANN Board retains full authority to accept or reject the declaration of all IRP Panels [...] ICANN’s Board had the authority to, and did, adopt Bylaws establishing internal accountability mechanisms and defining the scope and form of those mechanisms. Cal. Corp. Code § 5150(a) (authorizing the board of a non-profit public benefit corporation to adopt and amend the corporation’s bylaws).”¹⁷

29) In its 20 May 2014 Further Memorandum Regarding Procedural Issues (“ICANN Second Memorial”), ICANN submitted that many of the questions that the Panel posed “are outside the scope of this Independent Review Proceeding [...] and the Panel’s mandate.”¹⁸ According to ICANN:

“The Panel’s mandate is set forth in ICANN’s Bylaws, which limit the Panel to ‘comparing contested actions of the Board to the Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws, and [...] declaring whether the Board has acted consistently with the provisions of those Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws.’”¹⁹

The Panel’s Decision on its power to interpret and determine the IRP Procedure

(i) Mission and Core Values of ICANN

30) ICANN is not an ordinary California non-profit organization. Rather, ICANN has a large international purpose and responsibility, to coordinate, at the overall level, the global Internet’s systems of unique identifiers, and in particular, to ensure the stable and secure operation of the Internet’s unique identifier systems.

¹⁶ DCA Trust First Memorial, *para.* 22.

¹⁷ ICANN First Memorial, *paras.* 10 and 11. Bold and italics are from the original text.

¹⁸ ICANN Second Memorial, *para.* 2.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

31) ICANN coordinates the allocation and assignment of the three sets of unique identifiers for the Internet. ICANN's special and important mission is reflected in the following provisions of its Articles of Incorporation:

3. This Corporation is a [non-profit] public benefit corporation and is not organized for the private gain of any person. It is organized under the California [Non-profit] Public Benefit Corporation Law for charitable and public purposes. The Corporation is *organized, and will be operated, exclusively for charitable, educational, and scientific purposes ...* In furtherance of the foregoing purposes, and in *recognition of the fact that the Internet is an international network of networks, owned by no single nation, individual or organization*, the Corporation shall, except as limited by Article 5 hereof, *pursue the charitable and public purposes of lessening the burdens of government and promoting the global public interest in the operational stability of the Internet* by (i) coordinating the assignment of Internet technical parameters as needed to maintain universal connectivity on the Internet; (ii) performing and overseeing functions related to the coordination of the Internet Protocol ("IP") address space; (iii) performing and overseeing functions related to the coordination of the Internet domain name system ("DNS"), including the development of policies for determining the circumstances under which new top-level domains are added to the DNS root system; (iv) overseeing operation of the authoritative Internet DNS root server system; and (v) engaging in any other related lawful activity in furtherance of items (i) through (iv).

4. The Corporation *shall operate for the benefit of the Internet community as a whole, carrying out its activities in conformity with relevant principles of international law and applicable international conventions and local law* and, to the extent appropriate and consistent with these Articles and its Bylaws, through *open and transparent processes* that enable competition and open entry in Internet-related markets. To this effect, the Corporation shall cooperate as appropriate with relevant international organizations. [Emphasis by way of italics is added]

32) In carrying out its mission, ICANN must be accountable to the global internet community for operating in a manner that is consistent with its Bylaws, and with due regard for its core values.

33) In performing its mission, among others, the following core values must guide the decisions and actions of ICANN: preserve and enhance the operational stability, security and global interoperability of the internet, employ open and transparent policy development mechanisms, make decisions by applying documented policies neutrally and objectively, with integrity and fairness and remain accountable to the internet community through mechanisms that enhance ICANN's effectiveness.

34) The core values of ICANN as described in its Bylaws are deliberately expressed in general terms, so as to provide useful and relevant guidance in the broadest possible range of circumstances. Because they are not narrowly prescriptive, the specific way in which they apply, individually and collectively, to each situation will necessarily depend on many factors that cannot be fully anticipated or enumerated.

(ii) Accountability of ICANN

35) Consistent with its large and important international responsibilities, ICANN's Bylaws acknowledge a responsibility to the community and a need for a means of holding ICANN accountable for compliance with its mission and "core values." Thus, Article IV of ICANN's Bylaws, entitled "Accountability and Review," states:

"In carrying out its mission as set out in these Bylaws, ICANN should be accountable to the community for operating in a manner that is consistent with these Bylaws, and with due regard for the core values set forth in Article I of these Bylaws."

36) ICANN's Bylaws establish three accountability mechanisms: the Independent Review Process and two other avenues: Reconsideration Requests and the Ombudsman.

37) ICANN's BGC is the body designated to review and consider Reconsideration Requests. The Committee is empowered to make final decisions on certain matters, and recommendations to the Board of Directors on others. ICANN's Bylaws expressly provide that the Board of Directors "*shall not be bound to follow the recommendations of the BGC.*"

38) ICANN's Bylaws provide that the "charter of the Ombudsman shall be to act as a neutral dispute resolution practitioner for those matters for which the provisions of the Reconsideration Policy [...] or the Independent Review Policy have not been invoked." The Ombudsman's powers appear to be limited to "clarifying issues" and "using conflict resolution tools such as negotiation, facilitation, and 'shuttle diplomacy'." The Ombudsman is specifically barred from "instituting, joining, or supporting in any way any legal actions challenging ICANN's structure, procedures, processes, or any conduct by the ICANN Board, staff, or constituent bodies."

39) The avenues of accountability for applicants that have disputes with ICANN do *not* include resort to the courts. Applications for gTLD delegations are governed by ICANN's Guidebook, which provides that applicants waive all right to resort to the courts:

"Applicant hereby releases ICANN [...] from any and all claims that arise out of, are based upon, or are in any way related to, any action or failure to act by ICANN [...] in connection with ICANN's review of this application, investigation, or verification, any characterization or description of applicant or the information in this application, any withdrawal of this application or the decision by ICANN to recommend or not to recommend, the approval of applicant's gTLD application. APPLICANT AGREES NOT TO CHALLENGE, IN COURT OR ANY OTHER JUDICIAL FORA, ANY FINAL DECISION MADE BY ICANN WITH RESPECT TO THE APPLICATION, AND IRREVOCABLY WAIVES ANY RIGHT TO SUE OR PROCEED IN COURT OR ANY OTHER JUDICIAL FORA ON THE BASIS

OF ANY OTHER LEGAL CLAIM AGAINST ICANN ON THE BASIS OF ANY OTHER LEGAL CLAIM.”²⁰

40) Thus, assuming that the foregoing waiver of any and all judicial remedies is valid and enforceable, the ultimate “accountability” remedy for applicants is the IRP.

(iii) IRP Procedures

41) The Bylaws of ICANN as amended on 11 April 2013, in Article IV (Accountability and Review), Section 3 (Independent Review of Board Actions), paragraph 1, require ICANN to put in place, in addition to the reconsideration process identified in Section 2, a separate process for independent third-party review of Board actions alleged by an affected party to be inconsistent with ICANN’s Articles of Incorporation or Bylaws.

42) Paragraphs 7 and 8 of Section 2 of the Bylaws, require all IRP proceedings to be administered by an international dispute resolution provider appointed by ICANN, and for that IRP Provider (“IRPP”) to, with the approval of the ICANN’s Board, establish operating rules and procedures, which shall implement and be consistent with Section 3.

43) In accordance with the above provisions, ICANN selected the ICDR, the international division of the American Arbitration Association, to be the IRPP.

44) With the input of the ICDR, ICANN prepared a set of Supplementary Procedures for ICANN IRP (“Supplementary Procedures”), to “supplement the [ICDR’s] International Arbitration Rules in accordance with the independent review procedures set forth in Article IV, Section 3 of the ICANN Bylaws.”

45) According to the Definitions part of the Supplementary Procedures, “Independent Review or IRP” refers to “the procedure that takes place upon filing of a request to review ICANN Board actions or inactions alleged to be inconsistent with ICANN’s Bylaws or Articles of Incorporation”, and “International Dispute Resolution Procedures or Rules” refers to the ICDR’s International Arbitration Rules (“ICDR Rules”) that will govern the process in combination with the Supplementary Rules.

46) The Preamble of the Supplementary Rules indicates that these “procedures supplement the [ICDR] Rules in accordance with the independent review procedures set forth in Article IV, Section 3 of the ICANN Bylaws” and Article

²⁰ Applicant Guidebook, Terms and Conditions for Top Level Domain Applications, *para.* 6. Capital letters are from the original text.

2 of the Supplementary Procedures requires the ICDR to apply the Supplementary Procedures, *in addition* to the ICDR Rules, in all cases submitted to it in connection with Article IV, Section 3(4) of ICANN's Bylaws. In the event there is any inconsistency between the Supplementary Procedures and the ICDR Rules, ICANN requires the Supplementary Procedures to govern.

- 47)The online Oxford English Dictionary defines the word “supplement” as “a thing added to something else in order to complete or enhance it”. Supplement, therefore, means to complete, add to, extend or supply a deficiency. In this case, according to ICANN’s desire, the Supplementary Rules were designed to “add to” the ICDR Rules.
- 48)A key provision of the ICDR Rules, Article 16, under the heading “Conduct of Arbitration” confers upon the Panel the power to “conduct [proceedings] in whatever manner [the Panel] considers appropriate, provided that the parties are treated with equality and that each party has the right to be heard and is given a fair opportunity to present its case.”
- 49)Another key provision, Article 36 of the ICDR Rules, directs the Panel to “interpret and apply these Rules insofar as they relate to its powers and duties”. Like in all other ICDR proceedings, the details of exercise of such powers are left to the discretion of the Panel itself.
- 50)Nothing in the Supplementary Procedures either expressly or implicitly conflicts with or overrides the general and broad powers that Articles 16 and 36 of the ICDR Rules confer upon the Panel to interpret and determine the manner in which the IRP proceedings are to be conducted and to assure that each party is given a fair opportunity to present its case.
- 51)To the contrary, the Panel finds support in the “Independent Review Process Recommendations” filed by ICANN, which indicates that the Panel has the *discretion* to run the IRP proceedings in the manner it thinks appropriate. [Emphasis added].
- 52)Therefore, the Panel is of the view that it has the power to interpret and determine the IRP Procedure as it relates to the future conduct of these proceedings, and it does so here, with specificity in relation to the issues raised by the Parties as set out below.

2) What directions does the Panel give the Parties with respect to the Outstanding Procedural Issues?

a) Document request and exchange

Parties' Submissions

- 53) In the DCA Trust First Memorial, DCA Trust seeks document production, since according to it, "information potentially dispositive of the outcome of these proceedings is in ICANN's possession, custody or control."²¹ According to DCA Trust, in this case, "ICANN has submitted witness testimony that, among other things, purports to rely on secret documents that have not been provided." Given that these proceedings may be "DCA's only opportunity to present and have its claims decided by an independent decision-maker", DCA Trust argues "that further briefing on the merits should be allowed following any and all document production in these proceedings."²²
- 54) According to DCA Trust, "by choosing the ICDR Rules, the Parties also chose the associated ICDR guidelines including the Guidelines for Arbitrators Concerning Exchanges of Information ("ICDR Guidelines"). The ICDR Guidelines provide that 'parties shall exchange, in advance of the hearing, all documents upon which each intends to rely' [...]"²³ DCA Trust submits that, "nothing in the Bylaws or Supplementary Procedures excludes such document production, leaving the ICDR Rules to cover the field."²⁴
- 55) DCA Trust therefore, requests that the Panel issue a procedural order providing the Parties with an opportunity to request documents from one another, and to seek an order from the Panel compelling production of documents if necessary.
- 56) ICANN agrees with DCA Trust, that pursuant to the ICDR Guidelines, which it refers to as "Discovery Rules", "a party must request that a panel order the production of documents."²⁵ According to ICANN, "those documents must be 'reasonably believed to exist and to be relevant and material to the outcomes of the case,' and requests must contain 'a description of specific documents or classes of documents, along with an explanation of their materiality to the outcome of the case."²⁶ ICANN argues, however, that despite the requirement by the Supplementary Rules that, '**all necessary evidence** to demonstrate the requestor's claims that ICANN violated its Bylaws or Articles of Incorporation

²¹ DCA Trust First Memorial, *para.* 61.

²² *Ibid*, *paras.* 61 and 66.

²³ *Ibid*, *para.* 67.

²⁴ *Ibid*.

²⁵ ICANN First Memorial, *para.* 28.

²⁶ *Ibid*.

should be part of the [initial written] submission’, DCA Trust has not to date “provided any indication as to what information it believes the documents it may request may contain and has made no showing that those documents could affect the outcome of the case.”²⁷

57) ICANN further submits that, “while ICANN recognizes that the Panel may order the production of documents within the parameters set forth in the Discovery Rules, ICANN will object to any attempts by DCA to propound broad discovery of the sort permitted in American civil litigation.”²⁸ In support of its contention, ICANN refers to the ICDR Guidelines and states that those Guidelines have made it ‘clear that its Discovery Rules do not contemplate such broad discovery. The introduction of these rules states that their purpose is to promote ‘the goal of providing a simpler, less expensive and more expeditious form of dispute resolution than resort to national courts.’ According to ICANN, the ICDR Guidelines note that:

“One of the factors contributing to complexity, expense and delay in recent years has been the migration from court systems into arbitration of procedural devices that allow one party to a court proceeding access to information in the possession of the other, without full consideration of the differences between arbitration and litigation. The purpose of these guidelines is to make it clear to arbitrators that they have the authority, the responsibility and, in certain jurisdictions, the mandatory duty to manage arbitration proceedings so as to achieve the goal of providing a simpler, less expensive, and more expeditious process.”²⁹

The Panel’s directions concerning document request and exchange

58) Seeing that the Parties are both in agreement that some form of documentary exchange is permitted under the IRP Procedure, and considering that Articles 16 and 19 of the ICDR Rules respectively specify, *inter alia*, that, “[s]ubject to these Rules the [Panel] may conduct [these proceedings] in whatever manner it considers appropriate, provided that the parties are treated with equality and that each party has the right to be heard and is given a fair opportunity to present its case” and “at any time during the proceedings, the tribunal may order parties to produce other documents, exhibits or other evidence it deems necessary or appropriate”, the Panel concludes that some document production is necessary to allow DCA Trust to present its case.

59) The Panel is not aware of any international dispute resolution rules, which prevent the parties to benefit from some form of document production. Denying document production would be especially unfair in the circumstances of this case given ICANN’s reliance on internal confidential documents, as advanced by DCA Trust. In any event, ICANN’s espoused goals

²⁷ *Ibid*, para. 29. Bold and italics are from the original text.

²⁸ *Ibid*, para. 30.

²⁹ ICDR Guidelines for Arbitrators on Exchanges of Information, Introduction.

of accountability and transparency would be disserved by a regime that truncates the usual and traditional means of developing and presenting a claim.

60)The Panel, therefore, orders a reasonable documentary exchange in these proceedings with a view to maintaining efficiency and economy, and invites the Parties to agree by or before 29 August 2014, on a form, method and schedule of exchange of documents between them. If the Parties are unable to agree on such a documentary exchange process, the Panel will intervene and, with the input of the Parties, provide further guidance.

61)In this last regard, the Panel directs the Parties attention to paragraph 6 of the ICDR Guidelines, and advises, that it is very “receptive to creative solutions for achieving exchanges of information in ways that avoid costs and delay, consistent with the principles of due process expressed in these Guidelines.”

b) Additional filings, including memoranda and hearing exhibits

Parties’ Submissions

62)In the DCA Trust First Memorial, DCA Trust submits that:

“[The] plain language of the Supplementary Procedures pertaining to written submissions clearly demonstrates that claimants in IRPs are not limited to a single written submission incorporating all evidence, as argued by ICANN. Section 5 of the Supplementary Procedures states that ‘initial written submissions of the parties shall not exceed 25 pages.’ The word ‘initial’ confirms that there may be subsequent submissions, subject to the discretion of the Panel as to how many additional written submissions and what page limits should apply.”³⁰

63)DCA Trust also submits that, “Section 5 of the Supplementary Procedures [...] provides that ‘[a]ll necessary evidence to demonstrate the requestor’s claims that ICANN violated its Bylaws or Articles of Incorporation should be part of the submission.’ Use of the word ‘should’—and not ‘shall’—confirms that it is desirable, but not required that all necessary evidence be included with the Notice of Independent Review. Plainly, the Supplementary Procedures do not preclude a claimant from adducing additional evidence nor would it make any sense if they did given that claimants may, subject to the Panel’s discretion, submit document requests.”³¹

64)According to DCA Trust, in addition, “section 5 of the Supplementary Procedures provides that ‘the Panel may request additional written submissions from the party seeking review, the Board, the Supporting

³⁰ DCA Trust First Memorial, *para.* 57.

³¹ *Ibid*, *para.* 58.

Organizations, or from other parties.’ Thus, the Supplementary Procedures clearly contemplate that additional written submissions may be necessary to give each party a fair opportunity to present its case.”³²

65) In response, ICANN submits that, DCA Trust “has no automatic right to additional briefing under the Supplementary Procedures.”³³ According to ICANN, “paragraph 5 of the Supplementary Procedures, which governs written statements, provides:

The initial written submissions of the parties shall not exceed 25 pages each in argument, double-spaced and in 12-point font. ***All necessary evidence to demonstrate the requestor’s claims that ICANN violated its Bylaws or Articles of Incorporation should be part of the submission.*** Evidence will not be included when calculating the page limit. The parties may submit expert evidence in writing, and there shall be one right of reply to that expert evidence. ***The IRP Panel may request additional written submissions from the party seeking review,*** the Board, the Supporting Organizations, or from other parties.” [Bold and italics are ICANN’s]

ICANN adds:

“This section clearly provides that DCA [Trust’s] opportunity to provide briefing and evidence in this matter has concluded, subject only to a request for additional briefing from the Panel. DCA has emphasized that the rule references the ‘initial’ written submission, but the word ‘initial’ refers to the fact that the Panel ‘may request additional written submissions,’ not that DCA [Trust] has some ‘right’ to a second submission. There is no Supplementary Rule that even suggests the possibility of a second submission as a matter of right. The fact that DCA [Trust] has twice failed to submit evidence in support of its claims is not justification for allowing DCA [Trust] a third attempt.”³⁴

66) ICANN further notes, that in its 20 April 2014 letter to the Panel, ICANN already submitted that, “DCA [Trust’s] argument that it submitted its papers ‘on the understanding that opportunities would be available to make further submissions’ is false. ICANN stated in an email to DCA [Trust’s] counsel on 9 January 2014—prior to the submission of DCA [Trust’s] Amended Notice—that the Supplementary [Procedures] bar the filing of supplemental submissions absent a request from the Panel.”³⁵

67) According to ICANN:

“[The] decision as to whether to allow supplemental briefing is within the Panel’s discretion, and ICANN urges the Panel to decline to permit supplemental briefing for two reasons. First, despite having months to consider how DCA [Trust] might respond to ICANN’s presentation on the merits, DCA [Trust] has never even attempted to explain

³² *Ibid*, para. 59.

³³ ICANN First Memorial, para. 24.

³⁴ *Ibid*.

³⁵ *Ibid*, para. 25.

what it could say in additional briefing that would refute the materials in ICANN's presentation. [...] The fact that DCA is unable to identify supplemental witnesses six months after filing its Notice of IRP is strong indication that further briefing would not be helpful in this case. Second, as ICANN has explained on multiple occasions, DCA [Trust] has delayed these proceedings substantially, and further briefing would compound that delay [...] as ICANN noted in its letter of 20 April 2014, despite DCA [Trust's] attempts to frame this case as implicating issues 'reach[ing] far beyond the respective rights of the parties as concerns the delegation of .AFRICA,' the issues in this case are in fact extremely limited in scope. This Panel is authorized only to address whether ICANN violated its Bylaws or Articles of Incorporation *in its handling of DCA's Application for .AFRICA*. The parties have had the opportunity to submit briefs and evidence regarding that issue. DCA [Trust] has given no indication that it has further dispositive arguments to make or evidence to present. The Panel should resist DCA's attempt to delay these proceedings even further via additional briefing."³⁶

The Panel's directions concerning additional filings

- 68) As with document production, in the face of Article 16 of the ICDR Rules, the Panel is of the view that both Parties ought to benefit from additional filings. In this instance again, while it is possible as ICANN explains, that the drafters of the Supplementary Procedures may have desired to preclude the introduction of additional evidence not submitted with an initial statement of claim, the Panel is of the view that such a result would be inconsistent with ICANN's core values and the Panel's obligation to treat the parties fairly and afford both sides a reasonable opportunity to present their case.
- 69) Again, every set of dispute resolution rules, and every court process that the Panel is aware of, allows a claimant to supplement its presentation as its case proceeds to a hearing. The goal of a fair opportunity to present one's case is in harmony with ICANN's goals of accountability, transparency, and fairness.
- 70) The Panel is aware of and fully embraces the fact that ICANN tried to curtail unnecessary time and costs in the IRP process. However, this may not be done at the cost of a fair process for both parties, particularly in light of the fact that the IRP is the exclusive dispute resolution mechanism provided to applicants.
- 71) Therefore, the Panel will allow the Parties to benefit from additional filings and supplemental briefing going forward. The Panel invites the Parties in this regard to agree on a reasonable exchange timetable. If the Parties are unable to agree on the scope and length of such additional filings and supplemental briefing, the Panel will intervene and, with the input of the Parties, provide further guidance.

³⁶ *Ibid*, paras. 26 and 27.

c) Method of Hearing and Testimony

Parties' Submissions

72) In the DCA Trust First Memorial, DCA Trust submitted that:

“[The] parties agree that a hearing on the merits is appropriate in this IRP. DCA [Trust] respectfully requests that the Panel schedule a hearing on the merits after document discovery has concluded and the parties have had the opportunity to file memorials on the merits. Although the Panel clearly has the authority to conduct a hearing in-person, in the interest of saving time and minimizing costs, DCA [Trust] would agree to a video hearing, as stated during the April 22 hearing on procedural matters.”³⁷

73) In response, ICANN submitted that, “during the 22 April 2014 Call, ICANN agreed that this IRP is one in which a telephonic or video conference would be helpful and offered to facilitate a video conference.”³⁸ In addition, in the ICANN First Memorial, ICANN argued that according to Article IV, Section 3.12 of the Bylaws and paragraph 4 of the Supplementary Procedures, the IRP should conduct its proceedings by email and otherwise via Internet to the maximum extent feasible and in the extraordinary event that an in-person hearing is deemed necessary by the panel, the in-person hearing shall be limited to argument only.

74) ICANN also advanced, that:

“[It] does not believe [...] that this IRP is sufficiently ‘extraordinary’ so as to justify an in-person hearing, which would dramatically increase the costs for the parties. As discussed above, the issues in this IRP are straightforward – limited to whether ICANN’s Board acted consistent with its Bylaws and Articles of Incorporation in relation to DCA’s application for. AFRICA. – and can, easily [...], be resolved following a telephonic oral argument with counsel and the Panel.”³⁹

75) In the DCA Trust First Memorial, DCA Trust also argued that, in “April 2013, ICANN amended its Bylaws to limit telephonic or in-person hearings to ‘argument only.’ At some point after the *ICM* Panel’s 2009 decision in *ICM v. ICANN*, ICANN also revised the Supplementary Procedures to limit hearings to ‘argument only.’ Accordingly, and as ICANN argued at the procedural hearing, ICANN’s revised Bylaws and Supplementary Procedures suggest that there is to be no cross-examination of witnesses at the hearing. However, insofar as neither the Supplementary Procedures nor the Bylaws expressly exclude cross-examination, this provision remains ambiguous.”⁴⁰

³⁷ DCA Trust First Memorial, *para.* 63.

³⁸ ICANN First Memorial, *para.* 36.

³⁹ *Ibid*, *para.* 36.

⁴⁰ DCA Trust First Memorial, *para.* 64.

76)DCA Trust submitted that:

“[Regardless] of whether the parties themselves may examine witnesses at the hearing, it is clear that the Panel may do so. Article 16(1) provides that the Panel ‘may conduct the arbitration in whatever manner it considers appropriate, provided that the parties are treated with equality and that each party has the right to be heard and is given a fair opportunity to present its case.’ It is, moreover, customary in international arbitration for tribunal members to question witnesses themselves – often extensively – in order to test their evidence or clarify facts that are in dispute. In this case, ICANN has submitted witness testimony that, among other things, purports to rely on secret documents that have not been provided. As long as those documents are withheld from DCA [Trust], it is particularly important for that witness testimony to be fully tested by the Panel, if not by the parties. Particularly in light of the important issues at stake in this matter and the general due process concerns raised when parties cannot test the evidence presented against them, DCA [Trust] strongly urges the Panel to take full advantage of its opportunity to question witnesses. Such questioning will in no way slow down the proceedings, which DCA [Trust] agrees are to be expedited – but not at the cost of the parties’ right to be heard, and the Panel’s right to obtain the information it needs to render its decision.”⁴¹

77)In response, ICANN submitted that:

“[Both] the Supplementary Procedures and ICANN’s Bylaws unequivocally and unambiguously prohibit live witness testimony in conjunction with any IRP.” Paragraph 4 of the Supplementary Procedures, which according to ICANN governs the “Conduct of the Independent Review”, demonstrates this point. According to ICANN, “indeed, two separate phrases of Paragraph 4 explicitly prohibit live testimony: (1) the phrase limiting the in-person hearing (and similarly telephonic hearings) to ‘argument only,’ and (2) the phrase stating that ‘all evidence, including witness statements, must be submitted in advance.’ The former explicitly limits hearings to the argument of counsel, excluding the presentation of any evidence, including any witness testimony. The latter reiterates the point that *all evidence, including witness testimony*, is to be presented in writing and prior to the hearing. Each phrase unambiguously excludes live testimony from IRP hearings. Taken together, the phrases constitute irrefutable evidence that the Supplementary Procedures establish a truncated hearing procedure.”⁴²

78)ICANN added:

“[Paragraph] 4 of the Supplementary Procedures is based on the exact same and unambiguous language in Article IV, Section 3.12 of the Bylaws, which provides that ‘[i]n the unlikely event that a telephonic or in-person hearing is convened, **the hearing shall be limited to argument only; all evidence, including witness statements, must be submitted in writing in advance**.’” [...] While DCA [Trust] may prefer a different procedure, the Bylaws and the Supplementary Procedures could not be any clearer in this regard. Despite the Bylaws’ and Supplementary Procedures’ clear and unambiguous prohibition of live witness testimony, DCA [Trust] attempts to argue that the Panel should instead be guided by Article 16 of the ICDR Rules, which states that subject to the ICDR Rules, ‘the tribunal may conduct the arbitration in whatever manner it considers appropriate, provided that the parties are treated with equality and that each

⁴¹ *Ibid*, paras. 65 and 66.

⁴² ICANN First Memorial, paras. 15 and 16.

party has the right to be heard and is given a fair opportunity to present its case.’ However, as discussed above, the Supplementary Procedures provide that ‘[i]n the event there is any inconsistency between these Supplementary Procedures and [ICDR’s International Arbitration Rules], these Supplementary Procedures will govern,’ and the Bylaws require that the ICDR Rules ‘be consistent’ with the Bylaws. As such, the Panel **does not have discretion** to order live witness testimony in the face of the Bylaws’ and Supplementary Procedures’ clear and unambiguous prohibition of such testimony.”⁴³

79) ICANN further submitted:

“[During] the 22 April Call, DCA vaguely alluded to ‘due process’ and ‘constitutional’ concerns with prohibiting cross-examination. As ICANN did after public consultation, and after the *ICM* IRP, ICANN has the right to establish the rules for these procedures, rules that DCA agreed to abide by when it filed its Request for IRP. First, ‘constitutional’ protections do not apply with respect to a *corporate accountability mechanism*. Second, ‘due process’ considerations (though inapplicable to corporate accountability mechanisms) were already considered as part of the design of the revised IRP. And the United States Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed the right of parties to tailor unique rules for dispute resolution processes, including even *binding arbitration proceedings* (which an IRP is not). The Supreme Court has specifically noted that ‘[t]he point of affording parties discretion in designing arbitration processes is to allow for efficient, streamlined procedures tailored to the type of dispute. . . . And the informality of arbitral proceedings is itself desirable, reducing the cost and increasing the speed of dispute resolution’.”⁴⁴

80) According to ICANN:

“[The] U.S. Supreme Court has explicitly held that the right to tailor unique procedural rules includes the right to dispense with certain procedures common in civil trials, including the right to cross-examine witnesses [...] Similarly, international arbitration norms recognize the right of parties to tailor their own, unique arbitral procedures. ***‘Party autonomy is the guiding principle in determining the procedure to be followed in international arbitration.’*** It is a principle that is endorsed not only in national laws, but by international arbitral institutions worldwide, as well as by international instruments such as the New York Convention and the Model Law.”⁴⁵

81) In short, ICANN advanced that:

“[Even] if this were a formal ‘arbitration’, ICANN would be entitled to limit the nature of these proceedings so as to preclude live witness testimony. The fact that this proceeding is not an arbitration further reconfirms ICANN’s right to establish the rules that govern these proceedings [...] DCA [Trust] argues that it will be prejudiced if cross-examination of witnesses is not permitted. However, the procedures give both parties equal opportunity to present their evidence—the inability of either party to examine witnesses at the hearing would affect both the Claimant and ICANN equally. In this instance, DCA [Trust] did not submit witness testimony with its Amended Notice (as clearly it should have). However, were DCA [Trust] to present any written witness statements in support of its position, ICANN would not be entitled to cross examine

⁴³ *Ibid*, paras. 17 and 18. Bold and italics are from the original text.

⁴⁴ *Ibid*, para. 19.

⁴⁵ *Ibid*, paras. 20 and 21. Bold and italics are from the original text.

those witnesses, just as DCA [Trust] is not entitled to cross examine ICANN's witnesses. Of course, the parties are free to argue to the IRP Panel that witness testimony should be viewed in light of the fact that the rules do not permit cross-examination."⁴⁶

The Panel's directions on method of hearing and testimony

- 82) The considerations and discussions under the prior headings addressing document exchange and additional filings apply to the hearing and testimony issues raised in this IRP proceeding as well.
- 83) At this juncture, the Panel is of the preliminary view that at a minimum a video hearing should be held. The Parties appear to be in agreement. However, the Panel does not wish to close the door to the possibility of an in-person hearing and live examination of witnesses, should the Panel consider that such a method is more appropriate under the particular circumstances of this case after the Parties have completed their document exchange and the filing of any additional materials.
- 84) While the Supplementary Procedures appear to limit both telephonic and in-person hearings to "argument only", the Panel is of the view that this approach is fundamentally inconsistent with the requirements in ICANN's Bylaws for accountability and for decision making with objectivity and fairness.
- 85) Analysis of the propriety of ICANN's decisions in this case will depend at least in part on evidence about the intentions and conduct of ICANN's top personnel. ICANN should not be allowed to rely on written statements of these officers and employees attesting to the propriety of their actions without an appropriate opportunity in the IRP process for DCA Trust to challenge and test the veracity of such statements.
- 86) The Panel, therefore, reserves its decision to order an in-person hearing and live testimony pending a further examination of the representations that will be proffered by each side, including the filing of any additional evidence which this Decision permits. The Panel also permits both Parties at the hearing to challenge and test the veracity of statements made by witnesses.
- 87) Having said this, the Panel acknowledges the Parties' desire that the IRP proceedings be as efficient and economical as feasible, consistent with the overall objectives of a fair and independent proceeding. The Panel will certainly bear this desire and goal in mind as these proceedings advance further.

⁴⁶ *Ibid*, paras. 22 and 23.

3) Is the Panel's Decision on the IRP Procedure and its future Declaration on the Merits in this proceeding binding?

DCA Trust's Submissions

88) In addition to the submissions set out in the earlier part of this Decision, DCA Trust argues that, the language used in the Bylaws to describe the IRP process is demonstrative that it is intended to be a binding process. When the language in the Bylaws for reconsideration is compared to that describing the IRP, DCA Trust explains:

“[It] is clear that the declaration of an IRP is intended to be final and binding [...] For example, the Bylaws provide that the [ICANN] [Board Governance Committee] BGC ‘shall act on a Reconsideration Request on the basis of the written public record’ and ‘shall make a final determination or recommendation.’ The Bylaws even expressly state that **‘the Board shall not be bound to follow the recommendations’** of the BGC. By contrast, the IRP Panel makes **‘declarations’** — defined by ICANN in its Supplementary Procedures as ‘decisions/opinions’— that **‘are final and have precedential value.’** The IRP Panel ‘shall specifically designate the prevailing party’ and may allocate the costs of the IRP Provider to one or both parties. Moreover, nowhere in ICANN’s Bylaws or the Supplementary Procedures does ICANN state that the Board shall not be bound by the declaration of the IRP. If that is what ICANN intended, then it certainly could have stated it plainly in the Bylaws, as it did with reconsideration. The fact that it did not do so is telling.”⁴⁷

89) In light of the foregoing, DCA Trust advances:

“[The] IRP process is an arbitration in all but name. It is a dispute resolution procedure administered by an international arbitration service provider, in which the decision-makers are neutral third parties chosen by the parties to the dispute. There are mechanisms in place to assure the neutrality of the decision-makers and the right of each party to be heard. The IRP Panel is vested with adjudicative authority that is equivalent to that of any other arbitral tribunal: it renders decisions on the dispute based on the evidence and arguments submitted by the parties, and its decisions are binding and have *res judicata* and precedential value. The procedures appropriate and customary in international arbitration are thus equally appropriate in this IRP. But in any event, and as discussed below, the applicable rules authorize the Panel to conduct this IRP in the manner it deems appropriate regardless of whether it determines that the IRP qualifies as an arbitration.”⁴⁸

ICANN's Submissions

90) In response, ICANN submits that:

“[The] provisions of Article IV, Section 3 of the ICANN Bylaws, which govern the Independent Review process and these proceedings, make clear that the declaration of the Panel will not be binding on ICANN. Section 3.11 gives the IRP panels the authority

⁴⁷ DCA Trust First Memorial, *paras.* 33, 34 and 35. Bold and italics are from the original text.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.* *para.* 44.

to ‘declare whether an action or inaction of the Board was inconsistent with the Articles of Incorporation or Bylaws’ and ‘recommend that the Board stay any action or decision, or that the Board take any interim action, until such time as the Board reviews and acts upon the opinion of the IRP.’ Section 3.21 provides that ‘[w]here feasible, the Board shall consider the IRP Panel declaration at the Board’s next meeting.’ Section 3 never refers to the IRP panel’s declaration as a ‘decision’ or ‘determination.’ It does refer to the ‘Board’s subsequent action on [the IRP panel’s] declaration [...]’. That language makes clear that the IRP’s declarations are advisory and not binding on the Board. Pursuant to the Bylaws, the Board has the discretion to consider an IRP panel’s declaration and take whatever action it deems appropriate.”⁴⁹

91) According to ICANN:

“[This] issue was addressed extensively in the *ICM* IRP, a decision that has precedential value to this Panel. The *ICM* Panel specifically considered the argument that the IRP proceedings were ‘arbitral and not advisory in character,’ and unanimously concluded that its declaration was ‘not binding, but rather advisory in effect.’ At the time that the *ICM* Panel rendered its declaration, Article IV, Section 3 of ICANN’s Bylaws provided that ‘IRP shall be operated by an international arbitration provider appointed from time to time by ICANN...using arbitrators . . . nominated by that provider.’ *ICM* unsuccessfully attempted to rely on that language in arguing that the IRP constituted an arbitration, and that the IRP panel’s declaration was binding on ICANN. Following that IRP, that language was removed from the Bylaws with the April 2013 Bylaws amendments, further confirming that, under the Bylaws, an IRP panel’s declaration is not binding on the Board.”⁵⁰

92) ICANN also submits that:

“[The] lengthy drafting history of ICANN’s independent review process confirms that IRP panel declarations are not binding. Specifically, the Draft Principles for Independent Review, drafted in 1999, state that ‘the ICANN Board should retain ultimate authority over ICANN’s affairs – after all, it is the Board ... that will be chosen by (and is directly accountable to) the membership and supporting organizations.’ And when, in 2001, the Committee on ICANN Evolution and Reform (‘ERC’) recommended the creation of an independent review process, it called for the creation of ‘a process to require non-binding arbitration by an international arbitration body to review any allegation that the Board has acted in conflict with ICANN’s Bylaws.’ The individuals who actively participated in the process also agreed that the review process would not be binding. As one participant stated: IRP ‘decisions will be nonbinding, because the Board will retain final decision-making authority’.”⁵¹

93) According to ICANN:

“[The] only IRP Panel ever to issue a declaration, the *ICM* IRP Panel, unanimously rejected the assertion that IRP Panel declarations are binding and recognized that an IRP panel’s declaration ‘is not binding, but rather advisory in effect.’ Nothing has occurred since the issuance of the *ICM* IRP Panel’s declaration that changes the fact that IRP Panel declarations are not binding. To the contrary, in April 2013, following the

⁴⁹ ICANN First Memorial, *para.* 33,

⁵⁰ *Ibid*, *para.* 34,

⁵¹ ICANN Second Memorial, *para.* 5,

ICM IRP, in order to clarify even further that IRPs are not binding, all references in the Bylaws to the term ‘arbitration’ were removed as part of the Bylaws revisions. *ICM* had argued in the IRP that the use of the word ‘arbitration’ in the portion of the Bylaws related to Independent Review indicated that IRPs were binding, and while the *ICM* IRP Panel rejected that argument, to avoid any lingering doubt, ICANN removed the word ‘arbitration’ in conjunction with the amendments to the Bylaws.”⁵²

94) ICANN further submits that:

“[The] amendments to the Bylaws, which occurred following a community process on the proposed IRP revisions, added, among other things, a sentence stating that ‘declarations of the IRP Panel, and the Board’s subsequent action on those declarations, are final and have precedential value.’ DCA argues that this new language, which does not actually use the word ‘binding,’ nevertheless provides that IRP Panel declarations are binding, trumping years of drafting history, the sworn testimony of those who participated in the drafting process, the plain text of the Bylaws, and the reasoned declaration of a prior IRP panel. DCA is wrong.”⁵³

95) According to ICANN:

“[The] language DCA references was added to ICANN’s Bylaws to meet recommendations made by ICANN’s Accountability Structures Expert Panel (‘ASEP’). The ASEP was comprised of three world-renowned experts on issues of corporate governance, accountability, and international dispute resolution, and was charged with evaluating ICANN’s accountability mechanisms, including the Independent Review process. The ASEP recommended, *inter alia*, that an IRP should not be permitted to proceed on the same issues as presented in a prior IRP. The ASEP’s recommendations in this regard were raised in light of the second IRP constituted under ICANN’s Bylaws, where the claimant presented claims that would have required the IRP Panel to [re-evaluate] the declaration of the IRP Panel in the *ICM* IRP. To prevent claimants from challenging a prior IRP Panel declaration, the ASEP recommended that ‘[t]he declarations of the IRP, and ICANN’s subsequent actions on those declarations, should have precedential value.’ The ASEP’s recommendations in this regard did not convert IRP Panel declarations into binding decisions.”⁵⁴

96) Moreover, ICANN argues:

“[One] of the important considerations underlying the ASEP’s work was the fact that ICANN, while it operates internationally, is a California non-profit public benefit corporation subject to the statutory law of California as determined by United States courts. That law requires that ICANN’s Board retain the ultimate responsibility for decision-making. As a result, the ASEP’s recommendations were premised on the understanding that the declaration of the IRP Panel is not ‘binding’ on the Board. In any event, a declaration clearly can be both non-binding and precedential.”⁵⁵

97) In short, ICANN argues that the IRP is *not* binding. According to ICANN, “not only is there no language in the Bylaws stating that IRP Panel declarations

⁵² *Ibid*, para. 6.

⁵³ *Ibid*, para. 7.

⁵⁴ *Ibid*, paras. 8 and 9.

⁵⁵ *Ibid*, paras. 9 and 10.

are binding on ICANN, there is no language stating that an IRP Panel even may determine if its advisory Declarations are binding.”⁵⁶ According to ICANN, words such as “arbitration” and “arbitrator” were removed from the Bylaws to ensure that the IRP Panel’s declarations do not have the force of normal commercial arbitration. ICANN also argues that DCA Trust, “fails to point to a *single piece of evidence* in all of the drafting history of the Bylaws or any of the amendments to indicate that ICANN intended, through its 2013 amendments, to convert a non-binding procedure into a binding one.”⁵⁷ Finally, ICANN submits that “it is not within the scope of this Panel’s authority to declare whether IRP Panel declarations are binding on ICANN’s Board...the Panel does not have the authority to re-write ICANN’s Bylaws or the rules applicable to this proceeding. The Panel’s mandate is strictly limited to ‘comparing contested actions of the Board [and whether it] has acted consistently with the provisions of those Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws, and [...] declaring whether the Board has acted consistently with the provisions of those Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws’.”⁵⁸

The Panel’s Decision on Binding or Advisory nature of IRP decisions, opinions and declarations

98) Various provisions of ICANN’s Bylaws and the Supplementary Procedures support the conclusion that the Panel’s decisions, opinions and declarations are binding. There is certainly nothing in the Supplementary Rules that renders the decisions, opinions and declarations of the Panel either advisory or non-binding.⁵⁹

99) In paragraph 1, the Supplementary Procedures define “Declaration” as the “decisions and/or opinions of the IRP Panel”. In paragraph 9, the Supplementary Procedures require any Declaration of a three-member IRP Panel to be signed by the majority and in paragraph 10, under the heading “Form and Effect of an IRP Declaration”, they require Declarations to be in writing, based on documentation, supporting materials and arguments submitted by the parties. The Supplementary Procedures also require the Declaration to “specifically designate the prevailing party”.⁶⁰

⁵⁶ ICANN letter of 2 June 2014 addressed to the Panel.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.* Italics are from the original decision.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

⁵⁹ The Reconsideration process established in the Bylaws expressly provides that ICANN’s “Board *shall not be bound to follow* the recommendations” of the BGC for action on requests for reconsideration. No similar language in the Bylaws or Supplementary Procedures limits the effect of the Panel’s IRP decisions, opinions and declarations to an advisory or non-binding effect. It would have been easy for ICANN to clearly state somewhere that the IRP’s decisions, opinions or declarations are “advisory”—this word appears in the Reconsideration Process.

⁶⁰ Moreover, the word “Declaration” in the common law legal tradition is often synonymous with a binding decision. According to Black’s Law Dictionary (7th Edition 1999) at page 846, a “declaratory

- 100) Section 10 of the Supplementary Procedures, resembles Article 27 of the ICDR Rules. Whereas Article 27 refers to “Awards”, section 10 refers to “Declarations”. Section 10 of the Supplementary Procedures, however, is silent on whether Declarations made by the IRP Panel are “final and binding” on the parties.
- 101) As explained earlier, as per Article IV, Section 3, paragraph 8 of the Bylaws, the Board of Directors of ICANN has given its approval to the ICDR to establish a set of operating rules and procedures for the conduct of the IRP set out in section 3. The operating rules and procedures established by the ICDR are the ICDR Rules as referred to in the preamble of the Supplementary Procedures. These Rules have been supplemented⁶¹ with the Supplementary Procedures.
- 102) This is clear from two different parts of the Supplementary Procedures. First, in the preamble, where the Supplementary Procedures state that: “These procedures supplement the International Centre for Dispute Resolution’s International Arbitration Rules in accordance with the independent review procedures set forth in Article IV, Section 3 of the ICANN Bylaws”.
- 103) And second, under section 2 entitled (Scope), that states that the “ICDR will apply these Supplementary Procedures, in addition to the INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCEDURES, in all cases submitted to the ICDR in connection with the Article IV, Section 3(4) of the ICANN Bylaws”. It is therefore clear that ICANN intended the operating rules and procedures for the independent review to be an international set of arbitration rules supplemented by a particular set of additional rules.
- 104) There is also nothing inconsistent between section 10 of the Supplementary Procedures and Article 27 of the ICDR Rules.
- 105) One of the hallmarks of international arbitration is the binding and final nature of the decisions made by the adjudicators. Binding arbitration is the essence of what the ICDR Rules, the ICDR itself and its parent, the American Arbitration Association, offer. The selection of the ICDR Rules as the baseline

judgment” is, “a binding adjudication that establishes the rights and other legal obligations of the parties without providing for or ordering enforcement”.

⁶¹ As explained by the Panel before, the word “supplement” means to complete, add to, extend or supply a deficiency. The Supplementary Procedures, therefore, *supplement* (not replace or supersede) the ICDR Rules. As also indicated by the Panel before, in the event there is any inconsistency between the Supplementary Procedures and the ICDR Rules, ICANN requires the Supplementary Procedures to govern.

set of procedures for IRP's, therefore, points to a binding adjudicative process.

106) Furthermore, the process adopted in the Supplementary Procedures is an adversarial one where counsel for the parties present competing evidence and arguments, and a panel decides who prevails, when and in what circumstances. The panelists who adjudicate the parties' claims are also selected from among experienced arbitrators, whose usual charter is to make binding decisions.

107) The above is further supported by the language and spirit of section 11 of ICANN's Bylaws. Pursuant to that section, the IRP Panel has the authority to summarily dismiss requests brought without standing, lacking in substance, or that are frivolous or vexatious. Surely, such a decision, opinion or declaration on the part of the Panel would not be considered advisory.

108) Moreover, even if it could be argued that ICANN's Bylaws and Supplementary Procedures are ambiguous on the question of whether or not a decision, opinion or declaration of the IRP Panel is binding, in the Panel's view, this ambiguity would weigh against ICANN's position. The relationship between ICANN and the applicant is clearly an adhesive one. There is no evidence that the terms of the application are negotiable, or that applicants are able to negotiate changes in the IRP.

109) In such a situation, the rule of *contra proferentem* applies. As the drafter and architect of the IRP Procedure, it was open to ICANN and clearly within its power to adopt a procedure that expressly and clearly announced that the decisions, opinions and declarations of IRP Panels were advisory only. ICANN did not adopt such a procedure.

110) ICANN points to the extensive public and expert input that preceded the formulation of the Supplementary Procedures. The Panel would have expected, were a mere advisory decision, opinion or declaration the objective of the IRP, that this intent be clearly articulated somewhere in the Bylaws or the Supplementary Procedures. In the Panel's view, this could have easily been done.

111) The force of the foregoing textual and construction considerations as pointing to the binding effect of the Panel's decisions and declarations are reinforced by two factors: 1) the exclusive nature of the IRP whereby the non-binding argument would be clearly in contradiction with such a factor⁶²;

⁶² If the waiver of judicial remedies ICANN obtains from applicants is enforceable, and the IRP process is non-binding, as ICANN contends, then that process leaves TLD applicants and the Internet community with no compulsory remedy of any kind. This is, to put it mildly, a highly watered down notion of "accountability". Nor is such a process "independent", as the ultimate decision maker,

and, 2) the special, unique, and publicly important function of ICANN. As explained before, ICANN is not an ordinary private non-profit entity deciding for its own sake who it wishes to conduct business with, and who it does not. ICANN rather, is the steward of a highly valuable and important international resource.

112) Even in ordinary private transactions, with no international or public interest at stake, contractual waivers that purport to give up *all* remedies are forbidden. Typically, this discussion is found in the Uniform Commercial Code Official Comment to section 2719, which deals with “Contractual modification or limitation of remedy.” That Comment states:

“Under this section parties are left free to shape their remedies to their particular requirements and reasonable agreements limiting or modifying remedies are to be given effect. However, *it is the very essence of a sales contract that at least minimum adequate remedies be available.* If the parties intend to conclude a contract for sale within this Article *they must accept the legal consequence that there be at least a fair quantum of remedy for breach of the obligations or duties outlined in the contract.*” [Panel’s emphasis by way of italics added]

113) The need for a minimum adequate remedy is indisputably more important where, as in this case, the party arguing that there is no compulsory remedy is the party entrusted with a special, internationally important and valuable operation.

114) The need for a compulsory remedy is concretely shown by ICANN’s longstanding failure to implement the provision of the Bylaws and Supplementary Procedures requiring the creation of a standing panel. ICANN has offered no explanation for this failure, which evidences that a self-policing regime at ICANN is insufficient. The failure to create a standing panel has consequences, as this case shows, delaying the processing of DCA Trust’s claim, and also prejudicing the interest of a competing .AFRICA applicant.

115) Moreover, assuming for the sake of argument that it is acceptable for ICANN to adopt a remedial scheme with no teeth, the Panel is of the opinion that, at a minimum, the IRP should forthrightly explain and acknowledge that the process is merely advisory. This would at least let parties know before embarking on a potentially expensive process that a victory before the IRP panel may be ignored by ICANN. And, a straightforward acknowledgment that the IRP process is intended to be merely advisory might lead to a legislative or executive initiative to create a truly independent compulsory process. The Panel seriously doubts that the Senators questioning former ICANN President Stuart Lynn in 2002 would have been satisfied had they

ICANN, is also a party to the dispute and directly interested in the outcome. Nor is the process “neutral,” as ICANN’s “core values” call for in its Bylaws.

understood that a) ICANN had imposed on all applicants a waiver of all judicial remedies, *and* b) the IRP process touted by ICANN as the “ultimate guarantor” of ICANN accountability was only an advisory process, the benefit of which accrued only to ICANN.⁶³

ICM Case

116)The Parties in their submissions have discussed the impact on this Decision of the conclusions reached by the IRP panel in the matter of *ICM v. ICANN* (“*ICM Case*”). Although this Panel is of the opinion that the decision in the *ICM Case* should have no influence on the present proceedings, it discusses that matter for the sake of completeness.

117)In the *ICM Case*, another IRP panel examined the question centrally addressed in this part of this Decision: whether declarations and/or decisions by an IRP panel are binding, or merely advisory. The *ICM Case* panel concluded that its decision was advisory.⁶⁴

118)In doing so, the *ICM Case* panel noted that the IRP used an “international arbitration provider” and “arbitrators nominated by that provider,” that the ICDR Rules were to “govern the arbitration”, and that “arbitration connotes a binding process.” These aspects of the IRP, the panel observed, were “suggestive of an arbitral process that produces a binding award.”⁶⁵ But, the panel continued, “there are other indicia that cut the other way, and more deeply.” The panel pointed to language in the Interim Measures section of the Supplementary Procedures empowering the panel to “recommend” rather than order interim measures, and to language requiring the ICANN Board to “consider” the IRP declaration at its next meeting, indicating, in the panel’s view, the lack of binding effect of the Declaration.

119)The *ICM Case* panel specifically observed that “the relaxed temporal proviso to do no more than ‘consider’ the IRP declaration, and to do so at the next meeting of the Board ‘where feasible’, emphasized that it is not binding. If the IRP’s declaration were binding, there would be nothing to consider but rather a determination or decision to implement in a timely manner. The Supplementary Procedures adopted for IRP, in the article on ‘Form and Effect of an IRP Declaration’, significantly omit provision of Article 27 of the ICDR Rules specifying that an award ‘shall be final and binding on the parties’. Moreover, the preparatory work of the IRP provisions...confirms that the

⁶³ See in this regard the Memorandum of Jack Goldsmith dated 29 July 2010 at <https://cyber.law.harvard.edu/pubrelease/icann/pdfs/Jack%20Goldsmith%20on%20ICANN-final.pdf>, referred to in footnote 58 of DCA Trust’s Second Memorial.

⁶⁴ *ICM Case*, footnote 30. The panel’s brief discussion on this issue appears in *paras.* 132-134 of the *ICM Decision*.

⁶⁵ *Ibid*, *para.* 132.

intention of the drafters of the IRP process was to put in place a process that produced declarations that would not be binding and that left ultimate decision-making authority in the hands of the Board.”⁶⁶

120)Following the issuance of the *ICM* Case Declaration, ICANN amended its Bylaws, and related Supplementary Procedures governing IRPs, removing most, but not all, references to “arbitration”, and adding that the “declarations of the IRP Panel, and the Board’s subsequent action on those declarations, are final and have precedential value.”

Difference between this IRP and the *ICM* Case

121)According to DCA Trust, the panel in the *ICM* Matter, “based its decision that its declaration would not be binding, ‘but rather advisory in effect,’ on specific language in both a ***different*** set of Bylaws and a ***different*** set of Supplementary Procedures than those that apply in this dispute...one crucial difference in the Bylaws applicable during the *ICM* was the absence of the language describing panel declarations as ‘final and precedential’.”⁶⁷ The Panel agrees.

122)Section 3(21) of the 11 April 2013 ICANN Bylaws now provides: “Where feasible, the Board shall consider the IRP Panel declaration at the Board’s next meeting. The declarations of the IRP Panel, and the Board’s subsequent action on those declarations, are final and have precedential value.” At the time the *ICM* Matter was decided, section 3(15) of Article IV of ICANN’s Bylaws did not contain the second sentence of section 3(21).

123)As explained in the DCA Trust First Memorial:

“[In] finding that the IRP was advisory, the *ICM* Panel also relied on the fact that the Bylaws gave the IRP [panel] the authority to ‘declare,’ rather than ‘decide’ or ‘determine,’ whether an action or inaction of the Board was inconsistent with the Articles of Incorporation or the Bylaws. However, the *ICM* Panel did not address the fact that the Supplementary Procedures, which govern the process in combination with the ICDR Rules, defined ‘declaration’ as ‘decisions/opinions of the IRP’. If a ‘declaration’ is a ‘decision’, then surely a panel with the authority to ‘declare’ has the authority to ‘decide’.”⁶⁸

The Panel agrees with DCA Trust.

124)Moreover, as explained by DCA Trust:

⁶⁶ *Ibid*, para. 133.

⁶⁷ DCA Trust First Memorial, para. 36. Bold and italics are from the original text.

⁶⁸ *Ibid*, para. 39.

“[The] *ICM* Panel [...] found it significant that the Supplementary Procedures adopted for the IRP omitted Article 27 of the ICDR Rules – which specifies that an award ‘shall be final and binding on the parties.’ On that basis, the *ICM* Panel concluded that Article 27 did not apply. ICANN’s Supplementary Rules, however, were – and continue to be – silent on the effect of an award. In the event there is inconsistency between the Supplementary Procedures and the ICDR Rules, then the Supplementary Procedures govern; but there is nothing in the applicable rules suggesting that an **omission** of an ICDR Rule means that it does not apply. Indeed, the very same Supplementary Procedures provide that ‘the ICDR’s International Arbitration Rules [...] will govern the process **in combination** with these Supplementary Procedures. Furthermore, it is only in the event there is ‘any inconsistency’ between the Supplementary Procedures and the ICDR Rules that the Supplementary Procedures govern.”⁶⁹

Again, the Panel agrees with DCA Trust.

125) With respect, therefore, this Panel disagrees with the panel in the *ICM* Case that the decisions and declarations of the IRP panel are not binding. In reaching that conclusion, in addition to failing to make the observations set out above, the *ICM* panel did not address the issue of the applicant’s waiver of all judicial remedies, it did not examine the application of the *contra proferentem* doctrine, and it did not examine ICANN’s commitment to accountability and fair and transparent processes in its Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws.

126) ICANN argues that the panel’s decision in the *ICM* Case that declarations are not binding is dispositive of the question. ICANN relies on the provision in the Bylaws, quoted above, (3(21)) to the effect that declarations “have precedential value.” Like certain other terms in the IRP and Supplementary Procedures, the Panel is of the view that this phrase is ambiguous. Legal precedent may be either binding or persuasive.⁷⁰ The Bylaws do not indicate which kind of precedent is intended.

127) *Stare decisis* is the legal doctrine, which gives binding precedential effect, typically to earlier decisions on a settled point of law, decided by a higher court. The doctrine is not mandatory, as illustrated by the practice in common law jurisdictions of overruling earlier precedents deemed unwise or unworkable. In the present case, there is no “settled” law in the usual sense of a body of cases approved by a court of ultimate resort, but instead, a single decision by one panel on a controversial point, which this Panel, with respect, considers to be unconvincing.

128) Therefore, the Panel is of the view that the ruling in the *ICM* Case is *not* persuasive and binding upon it.

⁶⁹ *Ibid*, para. 40. Bold and italics are from the original text.

⁷⁰ Black’s Law Dictionary, (7th Edition 1999), p. 1195.

VI. DECLARATION OF THE PANEL

129)Based on the foregoing and the language and content of the IRP Procedure, the Panel is of the view that it has the power to interpret and determine the IRP Procedure as it relates to the future conduct of these proceedings.

130)Based on the foregoing and the language and content of the IRP Procedure, the Panel issues the following procedural directions:

(i) The Panel orders a reasonable documentary exchange in these proceedings with a view to maintaining efficacy and economy, and invites the Parties to agree by or before 29 August 2014, on a form, method and schedule of exchange of documents between them;

(ii) The Panel permits the Parties to benefit from additional filings and supplemental briefing going forward and invites the Parties to agree on a reasonable exchange timetable going forward;

(iii) The Panel allows a video hearing as per the agreement of the Parties, but reserves its decision to order an in-person hearing and live testimony pending a further examination of the representations that will be proffered by each side, including the filing of any additional evidence which this Decision permits; and

(iv) The Panel permits both Parties at the hearing to challenge and test the veracity of statements made by witnesses.

If the Parties are unable to agree on a reasonable documentary exchange process or to agree on the scope and length of additional filings and supplemental briefing, the Panel will intervene and, with the input of the Parties, provide further guidance.

131)Based on the foregoing and the language and content of the IRP Procedure, the Panel concludes that this Declaration and its future Declaration on the Merits of this case are binding on the Parties.

132)The Panel reserves its views with respect to any other issues raised by the Parties for determination at the next stage of these proceedings. At that time, the Panel will consider the Parties' respective arguments in those regards.

133)The Panel reserves its decision on the issue of costs relating to this stage of the proceeding until the hearing of the merits.

This Declaration may be executed in any number of counterparts, each of which shall be deemed an original, and all of which together shall constitute the Declaration of this Panel.

This Declaration on the IRP Procedure has thirty-three (33) pages.

Thursday, 14 August 2014


Place of the IRP, Los Angeles, California.



Professor Catherine Kessedjian



Hon. Richard C. Neal



Babak Barin, President of the Panel

APPENDIX H

Cooperative Engagement Process – Requests for Independent Review

11 April 2013

As specified in Article IV, Section 3 of the ICANN Bylaws, prior to initiating an independent review process, the complainant is urged to enter into a period of cooperative engagement with ICANN for the purpose of resolving or narrowing the issues that are contemplated to be brought to the IRP. It is contemplated that this cooperative engagement process will be initiated prior to the requesting party incurring any costs in the preparation of a request for independent review. Cooperative engagement is expected to be among ICANN and the requesting party, without reference to outside counsel.

The Cooperative Engagement Process is as follows:

1. In the event the requesting party elects to proceed to cooperative engagement prior to filing a request for independent review, the requesting party may invoke the cooperative engagement process by providing written notice to ICANN at [independentreview@icann.org], noting the invocation of the process, identifying the Board action(s) at issue, identifying the provisions of the ICANN Bylaws or Articles of Incorporation that are alleged to be violated, and designating a single point of contact for the resolution of the issue.
2. The requesting party must initiate cooperative engagement within fifteen (15) days of the posting of the minutes of the Board (and the accompanying Board Briefing Materials, if available) that the requesting party's contends demonstrates that the ICANN Board violated its Bylaws or Articles of Incorporation.
3. Within three (3) business days, ICANN shall designate a single executive to serve as the point of contact for the resolution of the issue, and provide notice of the designation to the requestor.
4. Within two (2) business days of ICANN providing notice of its designated representatives, the requestor and ICANN's representatives shall confer by telephone or in person to attempt to resolve the issue and determine if any issues remain for the independent review process, or whether the matter should be brought to the ICANN Board's attention.
5. If the representatives are not able to resolve the issue or agree on a narrowing of issues, or a reference to the ICANN Board, during the first conference, they shall further meet in person at a location mutually agreed to within 7 (seven) calendar days after such initial conference, at which the parties shall attempt to reach a definitive agreement on the resolution of the issue or on the narrowing of issues remaining for the independent review process, or whether the matter should be brought to the ICANN Board's attention.
6. The time schedule and process may be modified as agreed to by both ICANN and the requester, in writing.

If ICANN and the requestor have not agreed to a resolution of issues upon the conclusion of the cooperative engagement process, or if issues remain for a request

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for independent review, the requestor's time to file a request for independent review designated in the Bylaws shall be extended for each day of the cooperative engagement process, but in no event, absent mutual written agreement by the parties, shall the extension be for more than fourteen (14) days.

Pursuant to the Bylaws, if the party requesting the independent review does not participate in good faith in the cooperative engagement process and ICANN is the prevailing party in the independent review proceedings, the IRP panel must award to ICANN all reasonable fees and costs incurred by ICANN in the proceeding, including legal fees. ICANN is expected to participate in the cooperative engagement process in good faith.